Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
In re Ganga Thapa
COA03
In In re Ganga Thapa, the Third Court of Appeals held that a grandmother had standing under Texas Family Code section 102.004(a)(2) to seek managing conservatorship because the Department, which had been appointed managing conservator after termination of the parents’ rights, expressly consented to her suit. The trial court had sua sponte found she lacked standing and struck her intervention in the pending SAPCR. The appellate court treated the issue as a pure standing question, applied the rule that an intervenor in a SAPCR generally needs only the same standing required to file the claim as an original suit, and concluded that Thapa’s original-suit standing carried over to intervention. Because the trial court’s contrary legal conclusion was an abuse of discretion and denial of intervention in a SAPCR lacks an adequate appellate remedy, the court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its standing ruling and order striking the intervention.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a grandparent’s standing depends on Family Code section 102.004(a)(2), get the managing conservator’s consent clearly into the record—preferably in a filed written consent tied expressly to the statute. Once that statutory gateway is satisfied, a trial court cannot deny intervention based on generalized discretion; the fight shifts from standing to the merits."
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez
COA04
In Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, the trial court ordered the father to pay $1,417.23 in monthly child support even though the decree referenced lower guideline amounts and stated only that he was underemployed and that above-guideline support was in the children’s best interest. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that because the award varied from the guideline calculation, Texas Family Code § 154.130 required written findings stating the parties’ net resources, the percentage applied, whether guideline support would be unjust or inappropriate, and the specific reasons for the variance. The appellate court concluded the decree’s conclusory recitals were insufficient because they left the father and the court to guess whether the trial court had imputed income, varied upward from a guideline figure, or both. The omission was harmful and reversible, so the court abated the appeal and remanded for entry of the required findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a Texas court orders child support above or below the guideline amount, the decree must do more than say 'underemployed' and 'best interest.' Lawyers should make sure the order spells out the guideline calculation, net resources, percentage used, and the specific reasons guideline support would be unjust or inappropriate, or an otherwise defensible support award may be sent back on appeal."
In the Interest of P.H.S. and E.K.S., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally insufficient to support endangerment findings against Father under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The Department proved serious concerns in Mother’s home, including unsanitary conditions, domestic violence concerns, a violated safety plan involving Mother’s paramour, and an unexplained injury to one child, but the court emphasized that subsections (D) and (E) require parent-specific proof. Applying the clear-and-convincing and legal-sufficiency standards, the court concluded the record did not show Father knowingly placed the children in endangering conditions, knowingly allowed them to remain there, personally engaged in a course of endangering conduct, or knowingly placed them with someone who did. The court therefore reversed and rendered the (D) and (E) findings as to Father, while affirming the termination order on other grounds.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings cannot rest on guilt by association. If you want a Family Code 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) finding against a particular parent, you need evidence tying that parent to knowledge, control, placement, permission, or a conscious course of dangerous conduct—not just proof that the child was in a bad situation with someone else."
In the Interest of K.D.S., a Child
COA05
In In re K.D.S., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a father’s SAPCR modification suit, a $5,000 attorney’s-fee award, and an order requiring him to post a $5,000 bond before filing future modification pleadings in the case. The father tried to use the modification proceeding to collaterally attack the underlying 2021 SAPCR order based on alleged service defects and other jurisdictional theories, but the court held those complaints were waived by his prior appearance and answer and could not support a collateral attack on a non-void final order. The court also held that any complaint about the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law was waived because none were requested. Most significantly, the court approved the prefiling bond as a sanctions measure for repeated frivolous filings, discovery abuse, failure to appear, and refusal to litigate within the rules, explaining that such relief may be imposed without a formal vexatious-litigant finding when supported by the record and tailored to secure costs and attorney’s fees. The father’s due-process, equal-protection, and access-to-courts objections were not preserved, so the sanctions and dismissal were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas family courts can use their sanctions power—not just the vexatious-litigant statute—to require a bond before future SAPCR modification filings when a party shows a pattern of frivolous pleadings, discovery abuse, and rule-defying conduct. For practitioners, the key is to build a detailed record, tie the bond to anticipated costs and fees, and preserve any constitutional objections with specificity in the trial court."
In the Interest of V.R.Z., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas appeal, the parties both sought divorce but disputed whether they had ever entered an informal marriage under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2). The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of marriage because the record showed a specific marriage date and anniversary, testimony that the parties referred to each other as husband and wife, cohabitation in Texas beginning in 2012, Facebook posts calling one party “my husband,” joint tax filings, and deed records identifying them as married. Applying the usual sufficiency standards and relying on the rule that an agreement to be married may be proved by circumstantial evidence, the court deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations and affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informal marriage cases are won or lost through a pattern of evidence, not a single statement. To prove marriage, build a cumulative record with anniversary evidence, cohabitation proof, tax returns, deeds, social media, and third-party testimony; to defeat it, you must explain away that documentary and public-facing pattern with a coherent alternative narrative, not just deny the marriage."
In Re Fort Bend Christian Academy
COA14
In *In re Fort Bend Christian Academy*, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that ecclesiastical abstention barred parents’ contract, promissory-estoppel, and DTPA claims against a private Christian school to the extent those claims required a court to interpret and evaluate the school’s internal policies on academic accommodations, bullying, harassment, and discipline. The court analyzed the dispute claim by claim, explaining that Texas courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction when resolving a claim would entangle the judiciary in a religious institution’s doctrine, mission, or internal governance. But the court distinguished concussion-related claims tied to TAPPS rules and concussion-management protocols, concluding those allegations could potentially be resolved through neutral principles of law because they involved external, secular safety standards rather than faith-based decision-making. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus in part, holding the protected internal-policy claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction while the neutral-principles concussion-related claims could proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law dispute touches a religious school, the key question is not the label on the claim but whether the court would have to second-guess the school’s faith-infused internal decisions. Claims based on internal discipline, accommodations, or student-governance policies may be jurisdictionally barred, while claims tied to objective outside standards or secular safety rules may still be litigated."
In re Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin, & Hubbard and Todd Crawford
COA01
In this mandamus proceeding, the First Court of Appeals reviewed sanctions imposed after out-of-state defense counsel accepted and used an opposing party’s sensitive personal records supplied by his former fiancé outside formal discovery. The trial court responded with sweeping relief, including disqualification, a large monetary sanction, revocation of pro hac vice status, disciplinary referrals, and a requirement that the attorneys disclose the sanctions order in any future Texas pro hac vice application for ten years. Applying TransAmerican’s just-sanctions framework, the court held that while trial courts have broad authority to punish serious litigation misconduct, non-monetary sanctions must be directly related to the misconduct and no more severe than necessary. The ten-year disclosure requirement failed that test because it operated as a reputational penalty affecting unrelated future cases rather than a case-specific remedy tied to the handling of the records. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus to vacate that disclosure requirement and denied relief on the remaining challenged rulings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Sensitive records obtained through spouses, ex-partners, or other third parties can expose counsel to disqualification and serious sanctions, but trial courts still cannot impose creative non-monetary sanctions that reach beyond the case and function as long-term professional punishment. In family-law litigation, use this case both to attack improper handling of private records and to challenge sanctions that are not tightly tethered to the actual misconduct."
In the Interest of E.K.S., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, the mother challenged only the visitation language in a final order appointing DFPS permanent managing conservator and giving her supervised possession "at a date, time and location as arranged and agreed" with the Department. The court reviewed the order for abuse of discretion and focused on the child’s best interest, rejecting the argument that the Family Code always requires a fallback schedule with fixed dates and times. Because the record showed unresolved substance abuse, incomplete services, an eleven-month lapse in drug testing, inconsistent visitation, transportation problems, and an out-of-state placement requiring DFPS oversight, the court held the open-ended supervised-access provision was not arbitrary or unreasonable and affirmed the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"An "as arranged and agreed" visitation provision can survive appeal if the record shows why flexibility is necessary and tied to the child’s best interest. If you want to defend a non-specific supervised-access clause, build evidence of safety concerns, instability, logistics, and a reliable supervising conservator; if you want to attack one, preserve complaints that it is indefinite, unenforceable, or effectively delegates control over access without a workable minimum schedule."
In the Interest of M.M.S., a Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in M.M.S.’s best interest under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards from In re J.F.C. and In re J.O.A. and the Holley factors, the court focused on Mother’s continued drug use, inconsistent mental-health treatment, unstable housing, poor visitation history, and prior neglect-related concerns involving siblings. The court also relied on evidence that M.M.S. had lived her entire life in a stable foster placement with her brother, was bonded there, and was thriving. Considering the full record and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the appellate court held a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are built through patterns, not isolated facts. A layered record showing substance abuse, untreated mental-health issues, unstable housing, missed visitation, and a child’s success in a stable placement will usually carry the day on appeal; on the defense side, rehabilitation must be documented with concrete proof of sobriety, treatment compliance, stability, and consistent parenting over time."
In the Interest of T.W.B., a Child
COA05
In *In re T.W.B.*, a pro se father appealed a divorce and SAPCR decree challenging rulings on possession, child support, and property division. The Dallas Court of Appeals focused not on the underlying family-law complaints, but on whether the father’s brief complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. After finding that the first twenty record citations it checked were inaccurate, the court held it was not required to search fifteen volumes of appellate record to locate support for his factual assertions or claimed error. Applying settled law that pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules as represented parties, and noting that most issues were reviewed for abuse of discretion, the court concluded the father failed to demonstrate reversible error from the record and affirmed the trial court’s decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"On appeal, even potentially valid family-law complaints will fail if the brief does not accurately cite the record. Courts will not act as counsel, reconstruct arguments from a massive record, or relax briefing standards for pro se parties; if you cannot show the exact place where error was preserved and proved, affirmance is likely."