Weekly Digest
March 14 – March 20, 2026
97 opinions this week
Raggio-2204 Jesse Owens, LLC v. Morgan
COA03
After a trial court's plenary jurisdiction had expired, it entered a sanctions judgment and subsequent turnover orders authorizing a receiver to seize and sell property belonging to Stacey Hammer's LLC. After the Austin Court of Appeals declared these orders void, Hammer and the LLC sued the judgment creditor, his attorney, and the receiver for damages related to the lost property. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b regarding the limits of plenary power and the doctrine of derived judicial immunity. The court held that because the underlying orders were void ab initio, the judgment creditor and the receiver could not claim immunity and were liable for restitution of the value of the property sold under the void authority.
Litigation Takeaway
“A court order signed after plenary power has expired is a legal nullity; practitioners and receivers who move property or distribute funds under a void order are not protected by judicial immunity and are subject to claims for restitution and conversion.”
R.F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence regarding child endangerment and claiming she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her lawyer did not request a trial recess for her to testify. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the "endangerment" ground under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), noting that prenatal drug use followed by continued instability and a failure to complete court-ordered rehabilitation constitutes a voluntary course of endangering conduct. The court also reviewed the ineffective assistance claim under the Strickland standard, finding that without a developed record explaining trial counsel's motives, it must presume the lawyer's decisions were strategic. The court affirmed the trial court's order terminating the mother's parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“Prenatal drug use combined with a failure to maintain sobriety and stability after a child's removal provides strong grounds for termination based on endangerment. Additionally, parties seeking to appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel must develop a record—often through a motion for new trial—to prove that their attorney's actions were not part of a reasonable trial strategy.”
Musk v. Brody
COA03
In this defamation case, Benjamin Brody argued that Elon Musk's Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss was a nullity—and therefore untimely—because it was signed by out-of-state counsel before their pro hac vice admission was finalized. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed Texas's overarching policy of prioritizing the merits of a dispute over technical procedural "traps" and looked to persuasive authority regarding attorney signatures. The court held that if a trial court subsequently grants a pro hac vice motion, that admission cures the signature defect on earlier filings, meaning the TCPA motion was properly before the court and filed within the 60-day statutory window.
Litigation Takeaway
“A pending pro hac vice admission does not render a timely filed motion a "nullity"; provided the admission is eventually granted, the signature defect is cured, protecting parties from losing statutory rights like a TCPA dismissal due to technical filing deadlines.”
In re K.K.E.
COA01
The Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate a mother's parental rights after she suffered a drug overdose while caring for her five-month-old child. The mother had a decade-long history of substance abuse and had previously lost parental rights to two other children. The court analyzed whether her conduct met the statutory grounds for endangerment and whether termination was in the child's best interest using the Holley factors. The court found that her history of drug-induced instability and failure to submit to drug testing during the trial created a presumption of continued endangerment. The First Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, holding that the mother's pattern of conduct and the child's need for stability in a foster placement outweighed the biological bond.
Litigation Takeaway
“A parent's history of substance abuse and prior terminations provides high evidentiary value for "endangerment" even without proof of immediate physical harm. In termination proceedings, a court will likely treat a failure to submit to drug testing as a positive test result, and practitioners must ensure all prescription medications are backed by current, verified medical documentation to avoid them being characterized as illegal substance abuse.”
Landry v. Landry
SCOTX
In Landry v. Landry, the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court could properly characterize investment accounts as separate property when an expert's tracing analysis contained a minor four-month gap in personal review. The court of appeals had reversed the trial court's finding, speculating that the missing months could have changed the character of the funds. However, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the expert’s testimony—which established a consistent 16-year pattern of account activity—provided legally sufficient evidence under the clear and convincing standard. The Court emphasized that when records are in the trial record and expert testimony remains unrebutted, minor gaps in an expert's review do not invalidate the trial court's findings.
Litigation Takeaway
“When defending or asserting a separate property claim, a consistent long-term pattern established by an expert is a powerful tool that can overcome minor gaps in documentation. To successfully challenge such a claim, a party cannot rely solely on cross-examination or pointing out technical omissions; they must typically provide their own rebuttal expert to prove that those gaps are material to the account's characterization.”
Burns Surveying LLC v. Robert H. Burns and Jacob G. Pleasant
COA06
In this professional liability dispute, the plaintiffs sued a registered land surveyor for negligence but failed to attach the mandatory Chapter 150 certificate of merit to their original petition. After the trial court dismissed the claims without prejudice, the plaintiffs attempted to cure the defect by filing an amended petition with the required certificate in the same cause number. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 150.002 and Texas Supreme Court precedent, concluding that the 'first-filed' requirement applies to the very first petition asserting the claim in a specific case. The court held that a dismissal without prejudice requires the claimant to initiate an entirely new lawsuit to satisfy the contemporaneous filing requirement, and an amended petition cannot cure the initial failure to file.
Litigation Takeaway
“When suing a licensed professional like a surveyor, the certificate of merit must be attached to the very first petition filed. If the case is dismissed without prejudice for failing to do so, you cannot fix the error by amending the existing lawsuit; you must file a brand-new suit with a new cause number to satisfy the 'first-filed' rule.”
Crayton v. State
COA03
After being convicted of intoxication manslaughter, John Edgar Crayton, Jr. was assessed court costs without the trial court conducting the mandatory 'ability-to-pay' inquiry required by Article 42.15(a-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Crayton appealed, arguing the omission was reversible error. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory scheme alongside recent precedent, determining that the inquiry is a procedural right rather than a fundamental one. The court held that because Crayton failed to object to the omission during sentencing when given the opportunity, he forfeited the error on appeal. Furthermore, the court held the error was not reversible because the law provides a post-judgment mechanism for defendants to seek relief due to financial hardship at any time.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never rely on a trial court to perform a 'mandatory' statutory inquiry regarding a client's ability to pay fees or costs; counsel must proactively object to any omission on the record or risk waiving the issue for appeal. In the event of a waiver, practitioners should utilize post-judgment hardship statutes to seek relief rather than pursuing a likely-to-fail appeal.”
Crayton v. State
COA03
In Crayton v. State, a defendant challenged the assessment of court costs because the trial court failed to conduct a mandatory inquiry into his 'ability to pay' as required by Article 42.15(a-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether this statutory 'shall' requirement created an absolute right or a forfeitable one. Applying Court of Criminal Appeals precedent, the court determined that the inquiry is not a fundamental systemic requirement. Therefore, because the defendant failed to object at sentencing, he forfeited the error under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court further held that the omission was not reversible error because the defendant retained a statutory right to seek post-judgment relief for financial hardship at any time.
Litigation Takeaway
“In quasi-criminal enforcement matters, 'mandatory' statutory duties are not self-executing for purposes of appeal. If a trial court fails to conduct a required financial inquiry or make a specific finding, you must interpose a timely objection on the record to preserve the error. If you miss the opportunity to object, look to post-judgment statutory remedies for financial hardship rather than relying on an appeal for reversal.”
The City of Arlington v. Airport Properties, Inc.
COA02
After Airport Properties, Inc. sued the City of Arlington, the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea, and the City filed an interlocutory appeal. While the appeal was pending, Airport Properties nonsuited all its claims against the City. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162, which provides an 'absolute right' to nonsuit claims before all evidence is introduced. Because the City had no pending counterclaims for affirmative relief, the court held that the nonsuit extinguished the live controversy, rendering the interlocutory appeal moot and stripping the appellate court of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A plaintiff can use a Rule 162 nonsuit as a 'kill switch' to moot a pending interlocutory appeal and reset the jurisdictional battle, provided the respondent has not anchored the litigation with an independent claim for affirmative relief.”
Castillo-Villamin v. State
COA02
In Castillo-Villamin v. State, the appellant challenged his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and robbery, arguing he should have received a sentencing mitigation because he released the victim in a 'safe place' and that the evidence for a 'deadly weapon' was insufficient since the knife was not immediately recovered. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the 'safe place' defense using the Butcher factors—specifically remoteness, time of day, and the victim's condition—concluding that abandoning a victim at night in a remote area while intentionally depriving them of a cell phone precludes a finding of safety. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the victim’s and accomplice’s testimony was sufficient to establish the use of a deadly weapon regardless of when the physical weapon was found.
Litigation Takeaway
“Legal 'safety' requires more than the absence of immediate physical violence; it requires a 'communication nexus.' In family law contexts, proving that a party deprived a spouse or child of a phone or means to call for help can be used to defeat claims that a location was safe or to establish endangerment. Additionally, credible testimony alone is sufficient to secure family violence findings involving weapons, even if the weapon itself is never recovered by the police.”
Blevins v. Brown
COA07
In Blevins v. Brown, a plaintiff filed suit for slander and tortious interference but failed to include specific factual details regarding the alleged defamatory statements. After the defendant filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff attempted to file an amended petition on the day of the hearing to cure the defects. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict between the general amendment provisions of Rule 65 and the specific requirements of Rule 91a.5(c), determining that the specific three-day deadline for Rule 91a amendments is mandatory and supersedes general rules. The court held that the trial court properly refused to consider the late amendment and affirmed the dismissal, ruling that defamation claims lacking specific factual predicates constitute legally baseless 'threadbare recitals.'
Litigation Takeaway
“Precision is paramount when pleading 'crossover' torts like defamation in family law; you must provide specific facts—the who, what, when, and where—in your petition and remember that the Rule 91a amendment window closes strictly three days before the hearing.”
Chenier v. State
COA01
In Chenier v. State, a defendant appealed his murder conviction, contending that the trial judge made improper comments during voir dire and violated the Confrontation Clause by limiting the cross-examination of a witness regarding third-party bias and threats. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the judge's voir dire remarks as explanatory hypotheticals regarding legal elements rather than biased commentary on the evidence. Regarding the cross-examination, the court emphasized that while defendants have a right to explore witness bias, trial courts maintain discretion to limit testimony that is speculative or marginally relevant. The court held that because the defense failed to provide a concrete offer of proof linking the alleged third-party threats to the witness's specific motive to testify, the trial court's limitations were reasonable and the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“To successfully impeach a witness based on third-party threats or intimidation, you must establish a concrete logical link between the threat and the witness's motive to lie; without a specific offer of proof connecting the two, trial courts have broad discretion to limit your cross-examination.”
In re Kirt McGhee
COA09
In a dispute over attorney’s fees, a trial court ordered a party to produce unredacted billing invoices and supplemental expert disclosures, despite a prior appellate ruling that the original disclosures were sufficient. The Ninth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that the 'law of the case' doctrine prevented the trial court from revisiting the adequacy of disclosures already validated on appeal. The court further clarified that seeking attorney's fees does not result in an automatic waiver of attorney-client privilege for billing descriptions and that a party cannot be compelled to produce records that are no longer in their possession or control.
Litigation Takeaway
“Requesting attorney’s fees does not waive your right to redact privileged strategy and communications from your billing records; additionally, once an appellate court confirms your expert disclosures are adequate, the trial court cannot force you to supplement them with more detail on remand.”
Capital City Security, LLC v. Pro-Vision Solutions, LLC
COA02
In this restricted appeal, Capital City Security challenged a no-answer default judgment because the plaintiff, Pro-Vision Solutions, failed to attach the mandatory Rule 185 affidavit to its suit on a sworn account. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed whether this procedural defect required reversal when the plaintiff also pleaded an alternative breach of contract claim. The court determined that because the decretal portion of the judgment did not specify a legal theory and the plaintiff had attached the underlying contracts and invoices to the petition, the claim was liquidated and supported by the alternative breach of contract theory. The court held that the judgment remained valid on the contract claim regardless of the missing affidavit, affirming the trial court's decision.
Litigation Takeaway
“Always use a 'belt and suspenders' pleading strategy by including an alternative breach of contract claim alongside specific statutory or sworn account claims. By attaching the underlying written instrument (such as an MSA or fee agreement) to your petition, you transform the debt into a liquidated claim, which can insulate a default judgment from reversal on technical grounds and eliminate the need for an evidentiary hearing on damages.”
Adam Horwitz v. City of Denton, et al.
COA02
In this case, Appellant Adam Horwitz attempted to appeal interlocutory orders granting a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss. Horwitz filed his notice of appeal nearly three months after the orders were signed, mistakenly believing that his filing of a motion for new trial extended the appellate deadline to 90 days, a belief reinforced by the trial court's docket labeling the orders as 'Final.' The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and 28.1, which stipulate that accelerated appeals from interlocutory orders must be filed within 20 days and are not extended by motions for new trial. The court held that because the orders did not dispose of all parties and claims, they were interlocutory, the 20-day deadline applied, and the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never rely on a Motion for New Trial to extend your appellate deadlines for interlocutory orders. In accelerated appeals—common in family law for jurisdictional disputes or temporary injunctions—you must file your notice of appeal within 20 days of the signature, or you risk losing your right to appeal entirely.”
In the Interest of T.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental termination case, the Department sought to terminate a mother's rights after her child, T.M., tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. The mother contended the exposure was accidental due to her work as a hotel housekeeper, but the Department also cited her failure to keep the child away from a drug-using father. The Court of Appeals analyzed the endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b), determining that the mother's choice to bring the child to a high-risk workplace and allow unsupervised contact with the father supported endangerment. However, the Court also scrutinized the Department's compliance with Section 161.001(f), which requires clear and convincing evidence of reasonable efforts to return the child. Ultimately, the Court issued a partial reversal and remand, holding that the Department failed to satisfy its high evidentiary burden for every mandatory statutory finding required to support the irrevocable termination of parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“Drug exposure is not a "universal solvent" that excuses the Department from its burden of proof; practitioners must ensure that every statutory element, particularly the requirement for reasonable reunification efforts under Section 161.001(f), is supported by clear and convincing evidence to avoid reversal on appeal.”
In the Interest of L.L., a Child
COA02
After a trial court terminated a Father's parental rights to his child, L.L., based on endangerment and best-interest findings, his appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous. The Second Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal existed. Finding no non-frivolous issues, the court affirmed the termination decree. However, the court clarified that under Texas Family Code § 107.016 and the Texas Supreme Court's precedent in In re P.M., appointed counsel’s obligations do not end at the intermediate court; the duty to represent the parent continues through potential proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless counsel is relieved for good cause.
Litigation Takeaway
“In parental termination cases, an appointed attorney's duty of representation is "sticky"—it persists through the exhaustion of all appeals, including a petition for review to the Texas Supreme Court, even if the intermediate court determines the appeal is frivolous.”
Castillo-Villamin v. State
COA02
In Castillo-Villamin v. State, a defendant appealed his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery, arguing that he had voluntarily released the victim in a 'safe place' and that the evidence was insufficient to prove he used a deadly weapon since no knife was recovered at the scene. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the 'safe place' defense using the seven Butcher factors, which include remoteness, time of day, and proximity to help. The court determined that abandoning a victim at night in a remote area while intentionally withholding her cell phone created a state of vulnerability that precluded a 'safe place' finding. Furthermore, the court held that consistent testimony from the victim and a co-defendant was legally sufficient to support a deadly weapon finding. The court affirmed the convictions, establishing that safety is a fact-intensive inquiry involving environmental security and access to communication.
Litigation Takeaway
“Safety is not merely the absence of active physical assault; abandoning a person in a remote location or depriving them of communication tools (like a cell phone) constitutes a continued threat to safety that can justify family violence protective orders and restrictive custody arrangements.”
Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
COA02
Harriet Nicholson, a declared vexatious litigant, filed a pro se restricted appeal without obtaining a mandatory prefiling order from the local administrative judge. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which requires such litigants to obtain written permission before initiating new litigation, including appeals. The court determined that under Section 11.1035, it had an affirmative duty to dismiss the case because it was filed without the required permit. Because Nicholson failed to provide the necessary order—and instead provided an order showing the administrative judge had specifically denied her request—the court held it lacked authority to hear the appeal and dismissed the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“When facing a high-conflict pro se opponent, check the Office of Court Administration’s vexatious litigant list; if they are listed, any appeal they file without a permit from the local administrative judge is procedurally fatal and can be dismissed without the need to argue the merits.”
Raven Robert Rodriguez v. State
COA11
Raven Robert Rodriguez was convicted of capital murder following the stabbing death of his long-term partner. On appeal, Rodriguez argued that the trial court erred by failing to limit the definitions of 'intentionally' and 'knowingly' in the jury charge and by admitting evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence against the victim. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that while the jury charge was technically erroneous, it did not result in egregious harm given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant's admission and surveillance footage. Crucially, the court upheld the admission of prior domestic violence incidents, finding them relevant to establishing the nature of the relationship and the defendant's pattern of conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
“To successfully prove a pattern of domestic violence in family law cases, practitioners should prioritize objective corroboration—such as surveillance video, medical records, and photos—to supplement testimony. When prior acts of violence against the same partner are well-documented, they are highly admissible to establish context and risk, and appellate courts are unlikely to reverse such findings even if technical instructional errors occur at trial.”
Marquez v. State
COA11
In Marquez v. State, the defendant appealed a felony DWI conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient because no law enforcement officer personally observed him driving. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District of Texas analyzed the "operation" element of a DWI charge using a totality-of-the-circumstances test. The court reviewed evidence including a civilian witness's identification of the defendant as the driver, police finding the defendant alone in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle, and the defendant’s immediate flight and attempt to hide from officers. The court held that circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence and that the cumulative force of these factors was legally sufficient to prove the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt.
Litigation Takeaway
“You do not need a 'smoking gun' or direct eyewitness testimony from a police officer to prove substance abuse or endangerment in court. Judges can rely on 'circumstantial markers'—like being found in the driver's seat of a running car or attempting to flee the scene—to establish a pattern of dangerous conduct that justifies restrictive parenting plans, supervised visitation, or protective orders.”
Trevino v. State
COA13
In Trevino v. State, a defendant facing intoxication manslaughter charges attempted to prevent the prosecution from presenting graphic evidence—such as autopsy photos and scene footage—by offering to 'stipulate' (legally admit) to his intoxication and the resulting fatalities. He argued that because he conceded these facts, the evidence was unnecessarily prejudicial under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that while stipulations are required for 'prior conviction' elements, they do not give a party the power to strip the opponent of the right to tell the full narrative of the current incident. The court concluded that the State was entitled to present the 'full evidentiary force' of the case to provide context and support its theories of the crime.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family law disputes involving domestic violence or substance abuse, an opposing party cannot 'stipulate away' your right to show the court the full story. Admitting that an incident happened does not automatically block you from using high-impact evidence like 9-1-1 calls, photos, or police videos to show the court the true severity of the situation.”
Ex Parte Giambi Boyd
COA01
After being detained for 560 days on a $1.2 million bond for felony charges, Giambi Boyd sought a bond reduction because the State failed to announce it was ready for trial within the statutory 90-day window. The trial court denied his pretrial writ of habeas corpus despite the State admitting it was still awaiting forensic lab results. The First Court of Appeals reversed the decision, analyzing Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that a felony defendant must be released on personal bond or have their bail reduced to an affordable amount if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days. The court held that this provision is mandatory and takes precedence over general safety factors, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by maintaining an unattainable bond.
Litigation Takeaway
“In high-conflict family law cases involving parallel criminal charges, practitioners can use Article 17.151 to prevent 'strategic detention.' If the State is not ready for trial within 90 days of a client's felony arrest, counsel can force a bond reduction to an affordable amount, ensuring the client can participate in mediation, attend hearings, and defend their parental rights in the civil suit.”
Ex Parte Giambi Boyd
COA01
In Ex Parte Boyd, a defendant was held for 560 days on a $1.2 million bond for murder and aggravated assault charges. Despite the severity of the crimes, the State admitted it was not ready for trial because forensic firearms testing was still pending. The First Court of Appeals analyzed Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that a felony defendant must be released on a personal bond or have their bail reduced to an affordable amount if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days of detention. The court held that this statute is mandatory and does not permit a "safety exception" for dangerous offenses. Consequently, because the defendant proved he could only afford a $5,000 bond, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and ordered the bail reduction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not rely on the criminal justice system to keep a violent or dangerous party incarcerated during a family law case; if the State isn't ready for trial within 90 days, the party may be released on a nominal bond regardless of the charges. Family law practitioners must proactively secure civil Protective Orders and restrictive temporary orders to ensure the safety of their clients and children.”
Ex Parte Giambi Boyd
COA01
Giambi Boyd was held in pretrial detention for over 500 days on $1.2 million bail for felony charges including murder. He filed for habeas corpus, arguing that under Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, he was entitled to release or a bail reduction because the State was not ready for trial within the mandatory 90-day window. The trial court denied the request, prioritizing the severity of the offenses and community safety. On appeal, the court analyzed Article 17.151 as a mandatory statutory directive that leaves no room for judicial discretion regarding safety or the nature of the crime once the 90-day readiness period expires. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, holding that because the State admitted it was not ready for trial due to pending lab results, the trial court was required by law to either release Boyd on a personal bond or reduce his bail to an amount he could actually afford.
Litigation Takeaway
“In "crossover" cases where a family law client is detained on high bail for felony allegations, Article 17.151 is a mandatory tool to secure their release if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days. This rule allows practitioners to bypass judicial concerns about "community safety" and the "nature of the offense" to ensure the client can participate in civil proceedings like custody evaluations and final trials.”
In the Interest of E.D., a Child
COA02
In In the Interest of E.D., a Child, the Second Court of Appeals addressed whether it possessed jurisdiction over a restricted appeal filed nearly eleven months after the trial court signed a dismissal order. The appellant, a pro se father, sought to challenge an order of dismissal for want of prosecution (DWOP). The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(c), which strictly mandates that a notice for a restricted appeal must be filed within six months of the signed judgment. Because the father failed to meet this jurisdictional requirement, the court held that it lacked the authority to reach the merits of the case and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Jurisdictional deadlines are absolute; in a restricted appeal, the six-month window to file a notice of appeal begins the moment the judge signs the order, not when a party receives notice of it. Failing to meet this deadline—even for pro se litigants—creates a jurisdictional bar that cannot be excused, leaving an equitable bill of review as the only remaining, and much more difficult, legal remedy.”
DePriest v. DePriest
COA14
In this post-decree dispute, a husband sought amended Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs) after plan administrators rejected the originals. The wife filed counterclaims for fraud and breach of contract, attempting to relitigate the property division established in the final 2019 decree, which had already been affirmed on appeal. The trial court dismissed the wife's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, ruling that a trial court lacks the authority to substantively alter or "undo" a final property division once plenary power has expired and appellate remedies are exhausted. The court also held that the wife waived her right to 45-day trial notice under Rule 245 by participating in the hearing without objection.
Litigation Takeaway
“A final divorce decree affirmed on appeal is truly final; parties cannot use post-decree enforcement or QDRO proceedings as a vehicle to revive old disputes or launch collateral attacks on the original property division. Furthermore, procedural rights like trial notice are waived if you participate in a hearing without making a timely objection.”
Hyde v. Aero Valley Property Owners Association, Inc.
COA02
The Hyde Parties appealed a summary judgment regarding airport management authority but only targeted the primary appellee (POA), intentionally excluding twenty-five intervening property owners who had been awarded identical declaratory relief in the same judgment. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the 'doctrine of entangled interests' and the finality of unchallenged judgments, concluding that when a party fails to challenge a portion of a judgment granting the same relief to an intervenor as it does to the primary appellee, that portion remains binding. The court held that because the judgment in favor of the intervenors became final and could not be disturbed, the appeal against the POA was rendered moot, necessitating an affirmance of the entire judgment without reaching the underlying merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“In cases involving intervenors—such as grandparents in custody battles or business entities in property divisions—failing to specifically name and challenge the relief granted to those third parties in your appeal can result in a total waiver of your right to challenge the judgment as a whole.”
Luis Noguera v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Luis Noguera v. The State of Texas, the defendant attempted to exercise his statutory 'absolute' right to sever consolidated criminal charges on the morning of trial. Despite having six months' notice of the State's intent to try the cases together, the defense failed to file a pretrial motion and instead raised the issue orally just before jury selection. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the request under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which treats severance as a pretrial pleading. The court held that because the request was not raised pretrial, it was untimely, and the trial court did not err in denying it despite the mandatory nature of the underlying right.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never wait until the morning of trial to invoke 'mandatory' procedural rights like severance, bifurcation, or separate trials. Even absolute entitlements are subject to timeliness requirements; if you fail to raise these issues in writing during the pretrial phase, you likely waive the right and fall into a preservation trap that appellate courts will not rescue.”
Fanous v. Allstate Insurance
COA02
In Fanous v. Allstate Insurance, the appellant filed a notice of appeal 21 days after the mandatory 90-day deadline triggered by a motion for new trial. The appellant argued the delay was a strategic decision to avoid 'alienating' the trial judge during a pending hearing. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 26.3, concluding that appellate deadlines are strictly jurisdictional. The court held that subjective tactical concerns or the desire to maintain a judge's favor do not constitute a reasonable explanation for missing filing windows, and subsequently dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never miss a jurisdictional appellate deadline for the sake of 'trial court optics'; the appellate clock does not pause for pending motions or a lawyer's fear of alienating the trial judge.”
Absolute Oil + Gas, LLC v. Chord Energy Corp.
COA01
In Absolute Oil + Gas, LLC v. Chord Energy Corp., the trial court severed dismissed tort and unjust enrichment claims from an ongoing contract dispute to create a final, appealable judgment. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the severance under the three-prong Guaranty Federal test, focusing on whether the claims were 'factually interwoven.' The court found that because all claims stemmed from the same alleged collusive scheme to inflate costs and shared identical parties and evidence, severance risked inconsistent rulings—particularly regarding whether an express contract barred quasi-contractual recovery. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion, reversing the severance order because the claims were inextricably linked by shared operative facts.
Litigation Takeaway
“Prevent 'divide and conquer' tactics in complex property litigation by using the Interwoven Claims Doctrine to block the severance of tort claims (like fraud on the community) from the main property division, ensuring a single, cohesive 'just and right' adjudication.”
Gonzalez v. Montalvo
COA14
In a dispute over the partition of several hundred acres of estate property, the appellant challenged the trial court's order to sell the land and its denial of a jury trial. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals first clarified that a "phase-one" partition order—which determines if property should be sold or divided in kind—is a final, appealable judgment. On the jury issue, the court held that a party cannot rely on a jury demand and fee payment made by another party who has since nonsuited their claims, as a nonsuit restores the parties to their pre-filing positions. Regarding the partition itself, the court found the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by focusing on whether individual tracts could be split equally rather than whether the aggregate estate could be fairly divided. The court affirmed the denial of the jury trial but reversed the order of sale.
Litigation Takeaway
“Always file your own jury demand and pay the fee; relying on an opponent’s request is a 'trap' because a nonsuit will immediately strip you of that jury right. Furthermore, in partition litigation, the 'phase one' order is not interlocutory—you must appeal the decision to sell versus divide immediately or lose the right to challenge it.”
Childress v. Tradd
COA03
Following the death of Robert Caldwell, the executor of his estate sued Dione Childress for conversion after she removed estate property, claiming she was Caldwell's common-law wife. During litigation, Childress, acting pro se, failed to respond to discovery requests, including requests for admissions. The executor moved for summary judgment based on these 'deemed admissions.' Childress filed a response only four days before the hearing without seeking leave of court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment, holding that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), a response filed less than seven days before a hearing is a nullity. Furthermore, under Rule 198.3, the failure to respond to admissions conclusively established the facts necessary for the estate to prevail. The court emphasized that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as licensed attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
“Procedural deadlines are absolute, and 'deemed admissions' are a litigation guillotine. In marriage and property disputes, failing to answer discovery requests can conclusively surrender your case, as courts will not grant leniency to pro se litigants who ignore the mandatory seven-day window for summary judgment responses or discovery deadlines.”
Patterson v. State
COA07
In Patterson v. State, the Seventh Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court must provide statutory admonishments or specific due process warnings before accepting a 'plea of true' in a revocation or adjudication proceeding. The defendant challenged his fifteen-year sentence, arguing his plea was involuntary because the trial court failed to inform him of his right to plead 'not true' and failed to state the punishment range on the record. The court analyzed Article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and constitutional due process standards, concluding that statutory admonishments required for initial pleas do not apply to the revocation context. The court held that a 'plea of true' is voluntary and binding if the totality of the record—including original plea paperwork and the defendant's own testimony—demonstrates the defendant was aware of the potential consequences, even if the trial judge remained silent regarding specific rights during the hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family law enforcement and contempt proceedings, a respondent's admission or 'plea of true' is sufficient to support a revocation of suspended commitment without the trial court needing to provide formal, ritualistic warnings. If the respondent was notified of the potential consequences in the underlying motion or the original suspension order, their judicial admission will likely be upheld on appeal, making pre-hearing counseling on the finality of such admissions critical for practitioners.”
In the Interest of A.R. and C.R., Children
COA10
In this parental termination case, a mother’s court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, asserting that the appeal was frivolous, and simultaneously moved to withdraw from the case. The Tenth Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record and agreed that there were no arguable grounds for reversal, affirming the termination decree. However, the court denied the attorney’s motion to withdraw. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in In re P.M., the court concluded that a parent’s statutory right to counsel persists through the exhaustion of all appellate remedies, including the filing of a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. Therefore, an attorney cannot withdraw simply because the appeal is deemed meritless at the intermediate stage.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas parental termination cases, the right to court-appointed counsel is a "long-tail" obligation; even if an attorney believes an appeal is meritless, they must generally remain on the case until the client has had the opportunity to seek review from the Texas Supreme Court.”
In re K.M.R., a Child
COA14
In this parental termination case, a mother appealed the loss of her parental rights after her child tested positive for cocaine at birth. She argued that the trial court violated her due process by denying a request to delay the trial while she was in a behavioral hospital, and that her prenatal drug use did not constitute an endangering 'environment' because the child was removed immediately after birth. The 14th Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, holding that the mother failed to follow mandatory procedures by not including a sworn affidavit with her request for a delay. The court also clarified that under Texas law, the 'environment' of a child includes the womb, meaning drug use during pregnancy is sufficient evidence of endangerment to support termination.
Litigation Takeaway
“Always adhere to the technical requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251 when seeking a trial delay; failing to include a sworn verification or affidavit can prevent you from challenging the denial on appeal. Furthermore, be aware that Texas courts consider prenatal drug use as creating an endangering environment, effectively neutralizing the defense that a parent never had post-birth custody of the child.”
Trevino v. Trevino
COA01
After Mark Anthony Trevino appealed a family law judgment, the trial court exercised its plenary power to grant a motion for new trial. The parties requested that the appellate court abate (pause) the appeal pending the outcome of the new trial. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the jurisdictional requirements for an appeal, noting that appellate jurisdiction generally requires a final judgment. The court held that because the grant of a new trial effectively vacates the original judgment, there was no longer a final order for the court to review. Consequently, the court held it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal entirely rather than granting an abatement.
Litigation Takeaway
“A trial court’s order granting a new trial acts as a total 'reset' button that vacates the original judgment; this automatically divests the appellate court of jurisdiction, resulting in a dismissal of the appeal rather than a temporary pause.”
In the Interest of K.H., K.H., K.H., and E.H., Children
COA14
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her four children, arguing that the evidence against her was legally and factually insufficient. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the mother's history under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), which focuses on a parent's endangering course of conduct. The court reviewed documentary evidence—including CPS reports and criminal affidavits—detailing a 16-hour abandonment of a toddler, physical abuse, and chronic medical neglect. The court held that this persistent pattern of instability and failure to complete a court-ordered service plan constituted clear and convincing evidence to support termination. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decree, finding that termination was in the children's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“In termination proceedings, documentary evidence like CPS reports and criminal affidavits can be just as powerful as live testimony; if admitted without objection, these records can establish a "course of conduct" sufficient to permanently terminate parental rights even if the parent fails to appear at trial.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Ronald Franklin Warren and Karen Ashley Courtney
COA08
Karen Ashley Courtney appealed a judgment regarding the marriage of Ronald Franklin Warren but failed to pay the required appellate filing fees or file a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. The Eighth Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 5 and 42.3(c), noting that the appellant failed to respond to a formal notice of deficiency from the Clerk of the Court. Because the appellant neither cured the financial deficiency nor established indigency by the court-ordered deadline, the court held that dismissal was mandatory for failure to comply with procedural requirements and clerk notices.
Litigation Takeaway
“Administrative diligence is just as critical as substantive legal arguments; failure to manage "clerk's side" requirements like filing fees or indigency statements can result in the summary dismissal of an appeal before its merits are ever considered.”
In the Interest of R.D.E., a Child
COA05
In this case, a mother voluntarily placed her child in an Iowa guardianship, which was later domesticated in Texas. When the non-parent guardian filed a Texas SAPCR and the mother sought to terminate the guardianship, the trial court consolidated the two proceedings. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed this consolidation, holding that trial courts have broad discretion to combine related cases to prevent conflicting orders. The court further determined that the mother's challenges to the 'parental presumption' were either waived due to her failure to provide proper record citations in her brief or were unsupported because the existing voluntary guardianship had already altered the legal landscape regarding the child's best interests.
Litigation Takeaway
“Voluntarily entering into a guardianship—even in another state—can significantly weaken the legal 'parental presumption' in future Texas custody battles. Additionally, appellate courts strictly enforce procedural rules; failing to include specific record citations in a brief can lead to the automatic waiver of your most critical arguments.”
In the Interest of M.B., a Child
COA02
In a private termination suit brought by grandparents, the trial court failed to appoint an amicus attorney or attorney ad litem for the child. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code Section 107.021(a-1), which states that a court 'shall' appoint a representative unless it specifically finds the child’s interests are adequately represented by a non-conflicted party. Because the trial court made no such finding and acknowledged the child's interests were unrepresented, the appellate court held that the failure to appoint a representative was a mandatory statutory error. The court concluded this constitutes reversible error that is not subject to a harmless error analysis, necessitating a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“In private termination and adoption proceedings, the appointment of a representative for the child is a non-discretionary statutory duty; trial counsel must ensure an amicus or ad litem is appointed or obtain an express 'no-conflict' finding on the record to prevent the judgment from being automatically reversed on appeal.”
Hutcherson v. Hutcherson
COA03
In a divorce involving a high-net-worth couple with a valid premarital agreement (PMA), the trial court awarded the wife a $900,000 money judgment and $5,000 per month in spousal maintenance. This award occurred despite the PMA limiting the community estate to approximately $83,000, with most assets characterized as the husband's separate property. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict between the trial court's equitable "just and right" division powers and the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA). The court held that because the PMA was valid, the trial court was strictly bound by its property characterizations. By awarding a judgment nearly eleven times the value of the community estate, the trial court effectively divested the husband of his separate property, which is prohibited under Texas law. The court reversed the money judgment and maintenance award, holding that a luxurious lifestyle during marriage does not allow a court to circumvent the contractual limitations of a PMA.
Litigation Takeaway
“A premarital agreement is a binding ceiling on property division. Trial courts cannot use large money judgments or "lifestyle-based" spousal maintenance to bypass a valid agreement that limits community assets. If the community estate is small due to a premarital contract, the court's award must stay within the value of those limited assets; otherwise, it is an unconstitutional divestiture of separate property.”
Watkins v. Watkins
COA09
Bryce Mathew Watkins appealed a final decree of divorce but failed to pay the required filing fee or submit a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. The Ninth Court of Appeals provided multiple extensions and formal warnings, yet the appellant failed to comply with the financial mandates of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court analyzed the procedural requirements under TRAP 5 and 42.3(c), concluding that without the necessary fees or evidence of indigency, the appeal could not proceed. Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.
Litigation Takeaway
“Filing a notice of appeal is only the first step; an appeal is not functionally perfected until filing fees are paid or a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs is filed. Failure to clear these financial hurdles after court warnings provides a streamlined path for the opposing party to secure a dismissal for want of prosecution.”
In the Interest of K.A.E.E. and K.M.-A.E., Children
COA10
The Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate parental rights following incidents of domestic violence and substance abuse. Despite being offered relocation assistance and shelter services, the mother chose to return to an abusive environment with the father and violated a court-ordered safety plan. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), emphasizing that endangerment occurs when a parent prioritizes an abusive relationship over a stable environment, even without evidence of actual injury to the child. The court held that the parents' continued association and rejection of safety resources constituted clear and convincing evidence to support termination and the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“In termination proceedings, a parent's affirmative decision to reject domestic violence resources and return to an abuser in violation of a safety plan is potent evidence of endangering conduct, as 'endangerment' does not require a child to suffer actual physical injury.”
Mahasneh v. Mahasneh
COA02
A former wife sought a protective order against her ex-husband after he engaged in a persistent pattern of stalking, including placing a GPS tracker on her vehicle and surveilling her workplace. The trial court issued a 30-year protective order under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and awarded her attorney's fees. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals examined whether the evidence supported such a long duration and whether the attorney's fees were sufficiently proven. The court affirmed the 30-year protective order, ruling that Chapter 7B allows for long-term orders based on stalking without the "future family violence" findings required by the Family Code. However, the court reversed the attorney's fees award, holding that counsel's testimony was too conclusory and failed to meet the strict "lodestar" requirements—specifically failing to detail the hours worked, the hourly rate, and the specific tasks performed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Winning a protective order does not exempt you from strict evidentiary rules for attorney's fees; always provide a detailed "lodestar" breakdown—including specific tasks, hours, and rates—or risk losing the fee award on appeal. Additionally, consider utilizing Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure for stalking cases, as it can provide longer-term protection than the Family Code with different evidentiary requirements.”
KSW Rail Group, LLC v. SLI, Inc.
COA05
SLI, Inc. sued KSW Rail Group, LLC using its registered assumed name and obtained a default judgment via substituted service. KSW challenged the judgment, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the legal entity was not properly named in the citation and the return of service was technically deficient. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied the 'misnomer' doctrine, ruling that serving an entity under its registered d/b/a effectively invokes jurisdiction over the legal entity. Furthermore, the court held that Rule 118 allows for the post-judgment amendment of a return of service to reflect the truth of service and demonstrate strict compliance with a substituted service order. The court affirmed the default judgment, holding that technical clerical errors in a return do not void service if they can be cured by amendment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Technical errors in a process server's return of service aren't necessarily fatal to a default judgment; Rule 118 allows you to retroactively fix the record to reflect that proper service actually occurred. Additionally, if a party is using a registered assumed name (d/b/a), serving them under that name is legally sufficient to bind the actual legal entity.”
In Re Estate of Wright
COA11
In a contested probate case transferred from a Throckmorton County court to a district court, a contestant challenged the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction, alleging the transfer order was procedurally defective. The court of appeals analyzed Texas Estates Code § 32.003, which mandates transfers of contested probate matters in counties without statutory probate courts. The court held that because the transfer was mandatory and the case had actually moved, any clerical or internal inconsistencies in the transfer order were non-jurisdictional procedural defects that the contestant waived by failing to object in the trial court. Additionally, the court found that testimony stating a will was never revoked 'to the best of [the witness's] knowledge' constituted probative evidence to support admitting the will to probate.
Litigation Takeaway
“Procedural defects in a transfer order between courts are not 'jurisdictional silver bullets' and must be preserved by a timely objection in the trial court; otherwise, the complaint is waived. Furthermore, personal knowledge testimony framed as 'to the best of my knowledge' regarding the non-revocation of a document is sufficient probative evidence to support a trial court finding.”
Boardman v. State
COA13
In a criminal burglary case with significant implications for family law evidence, the defendant challenged the admission of bodycam footage from a subsequent, unrelated traffic stop used to identify him. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals focused on whether the defendant's trial objection under Rule 403 (unfair prejudice) was sufficient to preserve a complaint under Rule 404(b) (extraneous acts). The court held that a Rule 403 objection does not preserve a Rule 404(b) challenge and that the footage was admissible because its high probative value regarding the defendant's identity—linking his clothing and vehicle to the crime scene—was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
“To protect your record for appeal, a Rule 403 objection is not a "catch-all"; you must specifically invoke Rule 404(b) if you are challenging the admission of extraneous acts or character evidence, even when the evidence is a "mundane" video like a traffic stop.”
Pyrtle v. Fowler
COA14
In Pyrtle v. Fowler, a dispute arose between former cohabitants regarding the ownership and use of a home and a 2012 Lexus. The trial court granted a temporary injunction allowing the plaintiff to remain in the home and retain control of the vehicle pending trial. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether these assets met the requirements for equitable relief. The court held that while real property is considered unique and justifies an injunction to preserve the status quo, personal property like vehicles does not qualify because any harm can be adequately compensated through money damages (such as rental costs or loss-of-use value). Consequently, the court affirmed the injunction as to the residence but struck down the provisions regarding the motor vehicles.
Litigation Takeaway
“While courts will readily issue injunctions to protect your right to occupy a unique residence during a lawsuit, they generally will not do the same for vehicles or personal property because those losses can be fixed with a check for damages.”
City of Houston v. Pellott
COA14
In City of Houston v. Pellott, a plaintiff sued the city under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) but failed to specifically plead that timely statutory notice was provided to the governmental unit. The City moved for dismissal under Rule 91a, arguing the petition lacked a basis in law because it failed to allege this jurisdictional prerequisite. Although the plaintiff provided evidence in a response suggesting that notice had actually been sent and received, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused strictly on the pleadings. The court analyzed the case under the Harris County v. Sykes doctrine, which requires dismissal with prejudice when a party fails to cure a jurisdictional pleading defect after being given multiple opportunities to replead. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion and rendered a judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
“When suing a governmental entity—whether for incidents involving CPS, school districts, or police during possession exchanges—pleading statutory notice in your petition is a jurisdictional requirement, not a suggestion. You cannot rely on external evidence or 'actual notice' to save a case if your formal pleadings are defective; if you fail to fix the petition after a challenge, the court can dismiss your claim permanently with prejudice.”
Shamsa v. Reagan
COA05
In Shamsa v. Reagan, a homeowner who acquired her property via a divorce decree sued her neighbor for adverse possession over a disputed boundary strip. The neighbor argued the homeowner lacked standing because the divorce decree contained a scrivener's error in the legal description of her own lot. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed constitutional standing, concluding that the right to assert title via adverse possession depends on the claimant's actual appropriation of the disputed land, not the perfection of the record title to their adjacent property. The court held that Reagan had standing and title to the strip, but reversed the award of attorney’s fees because Texas law does not provide a statutory basis for fees in adverse possession suits.
Litigation Takeaway
“Clerical errors in a divorce decree's property description do not automatically strip a party of the right to sue third parties for land ownership; however, clients should be prepared to bear their own legal costs in adverse possession cases as attorney's fees are generally not recoverable.”
Joseph Christopher Cole v. The State of Texas
COA12
In Joseph Christopher Cole v. The State of Texas, the Twelfth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court can assess court-appointed attorney’s fees against a defendant who had previously been found indigent. The court analyzed Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 26.04(p), which establishes a legal presumption that a party found indigent remains so for the remainder of the proceedings unless a "material change" in financial circumstances occurs. Because the record lacked any affirmative evidence that the defendant’s financial status had improved, the court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order reimbursement. Consequently, the appellate court modified the trial court's judgment to delete the assessment of attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
“The "once indigent, always indigent" presumption is a powerful shield; if you seek to recover court-appointed fees or ad litem costs from a party previously declared indigent, you must proactively build an evidentiary record demonstrating a "material change" in their financial resources before the final judgment is entered.”
Simon Rico, Jr. v. State
COA06
In Simon Rico, Jr. v. State, an appellant who was initially declared indigent and provided with court-appointed counsel substituted his representation for a private, retained attorney. When the retained attorney determined the appeal was frivolous, he attempted to follow the Anders v. California protocol by filing an Anders brief. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed whether these constitutional safeguards apply to non-indigent parties, concluding that the purpose of Anders is to provide indigent appellants with advocacy equal to those who can afford counsel. The court held that the substitution of retained counsel rebuts the presumption of continued indigency, meaning the attorney is not required to file an Anders brief and must instead follow the standard withdrawal procedures under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.5.
Litigation Takeaway
“In parental termination appeals, the rigorous Anders briefing requirement disappears the moment a party retains private counsel; hiring an attorney rebuts the presumption of indigency and shifts the procedural burden for withdrawing from a meritless appeal to the standard requirements of TRAP 6.5.”
In re Brandon Charles Cole
COA05
In this original proceeding, Relator Brandon Charles Cole challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to recuse via a petition for writ of mandamus. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition, focusing on two primary issues: procedural non-compliance and the availability of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court found that Cole failed to provide a sworn or certified record as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7. Substantively, the court held that under Texas Supreme Court precedent, the erroneous denial of a recusal motion does not satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief because the issue can be fully addressed through a direct appeal following a final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas civil and family law litigation, mandamus is generally unavailable to challenge a trial court's refusal to recuse. Practitioners must focus on meticulously perfecting the appellate record and preserving the bias issue for a post-judgment appeal rather than seeking mid-stream intervention.”
Pesca Holding LLC v. Skoldeberg
COA04
In Pesca Holding LLC v. Skoldeberg, a jury trial was held regarding alleged fraud in a business sale. Although the defendants prevailed on the liability claims, they failed to include a question about attorney’s fees in the jury charge. The trial court, believing an informal agreement to bifurcate the issues existed, later convened a second jury trial specifically for fees. On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed whether a party waives attorney's fees by failing to submit them to the initial factfinder. The court held that because attorney’s fees are questions of fact for the jury, they are waived unless the record contains a clear and unambiguous bifurcation agreement, such as a written Rule 11 agreement. Finding no such agreement in the record, the court reversed the $800,000 fee award and rendered a take-nothing judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never rely on an informal or "handshake" agreement to handle attorney’s fees after a jury trial; if the fee question isn't in the jury charge and you don't have a signed Rule 11 agreement to bifurcate, you waive your right to fees the moment the jury is discharged.”
In Re Jaimee Michelle Collins
COA04
In a Bexar County Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR), Relator Jaimee Michelle Collins filed a petition for writ of mandamus and an emergency motion seeking to challenge a trial court's order. The Fourth Court of Appeals summarily denied the request, ruling that the Relator failed to meet the heavy burden of proof required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a). The court concluded that the Relator did not establish a clear right to relief by demonstrating both a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court and the lack of an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is an "extraordinary" remedy, not a routine one; to succeed, a party must strictly adhere to procedural rules and provide a comprehensive record that proves the trial court's ruling was a clear abuse of discretion that cannot be fixed through a standard appeal.”
In re Mark Warner
COA05
Relator Mark Warner filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a trial court's order for sanctions and turnover. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition on two procedural grounds without reaching the merits. First, the court found the relator failed to provide a properly 'sworn or certified' record because his unsworn declaration lacked the specific 'penalty of perjury' language required by Texas law. Second, the court held that because the relator was represented by counsel in the trial court, he was not permitted to file a pro se petition, as Texas law prohibits 'hybrid representation.'
Litigation Takeaway
“Procedural precision is non-negotiable in mandamus proceedings. To avoid summary denial, ensure every document in the record is authenticated with a declaration specifically invoking the 'penalty of perjury' and remember that a represented party cannot 'go rogue' by filing pro se motions or petitions while still appearing through counsel.”
Calvin Dorsey Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA12
After a trial commenced, it became apparent that a juror lacked sufficient English proficiency to understand the proceedings. The defendant moved for a mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion because the issue was not raised during jury selection. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed, analyzing the distinction between absolute disqualifications and waivable challenges for cause. The court held that a juror's inability to comprehend English is a waivable challenge that must be exercised during voir dire; failure to do so precludes a mistrial or a later challenge to the jury's composition.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never rely solely on a juror's self-certification of English proficiency on their questionnaire; you must actively vet their comprehension through open-ended questions during voir dire or risk waiving any future objection to their fitness to serve.”
Ralston v. Ralston
COA07
Two family members, James and Anthony Ralston, were involved in a dispute over the ownership and possession of a residence. After a district court issued a partial summary judgment quieting title in Anthony’s favor and voiding James’s claims, Anthony initiated a forcible detainer (eviction) action in the county court at law. James argued that the county court lacked jurisdiction because the title dispute was still 'active' since the district court's judgment was only partial and not yet final. The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the eviction, holding that once a district court adjudicates title—even through an interlocutory or partial summary judgment—the jurisdictional bar for forcible detainer actions is removed. The court also held that a notice to vacate is not required to be signed to be valid under Texas Property Code § 24.005.
Litigation Takeaway
“In intra-family property disputes, you do not need a final, appealable judgment to begin eviction proceedings; an interlocutory or partial summary judgment from a district court quieting title is sufficient to establish jurisdiction for a forcible detainer action in a lower court.”
Nemarugommula v. VHS San Antonio Partners, LLC
COA04
Dr. Vishal Nemarugommula sought a temporary injunction to prevent Baptist Medical Center from reporting his disciplinary suspension to the Texas Medical Board and the National Practitioner Data Bank, claiming the peer-review process was a 'sham' and reporting would cause irreparable reputational and financial harm. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the requirements for injunctive relief, specifically whether the physician demonstrated a probable right to recovery and irreparable injury. The court held that because an independent fair-hearing panel substantiated the underlying misconduct (unauthorized medical record access), the physician failed to show a probable right to relief, and the hospital's mandatory reporting duties outweighed the physician's claim of reputational damage.
Litigation Takeaway
“In litigation involving high-asset professionals, 'reputational harm' is rarely sufficient to enjoin mandatory reporting of disciplinary actions to licensing boards; courts will prioritize statutory transparency over a litigant's attempt to 'sanitize' their record during a divorce or custody battle.”
Arturo Diaz, et al. v. Herc Rentals Inc.
COA08
In this case, a creditor (Herc Rentals) sought to reach assets transferred by a debtor (Arturo Diaz) to a newly formed LLC intended to shield those assets from a judgment. The debtor argued that the claims under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA) were barred by the four-year statute of repose. The Eighth Court of Appeals analyzed the 'discovery rule' within TUFTA, which allows a claim to be brought within one year of when a transfer 'could reasonably have been discovered.' The court held that the public filing of articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State constitutes constructive notice as a matter of law, meaning the clock started when the entity was formed, not when the debtor's fraudulent intent was later revealed in a deposition. Consequently, the claims were extinguished.
Litigation Takeaway
“Public records are notice to the world; in divorce litigation involving business owners, counsel must perform regular Secretary of State entity searches to identify newly formed shell companies. Waiting for formal discovery or depositions to uncover a spouse's fraudulent intent may result in your claims being barred by the statute of repose if the entity's formation was publicly recorded more than a year prior.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Njipwo
COA07
In a Williamson County divorce case, the husband insisted that Cameroon law govern the property division. When the trial court rejected this, the husband explicitly requested on the record to discharge his attorney and signed a handwritten withdrawal order to proceed pro se. The trial court subsequently divided the marital estate based on unsworn property spreadsheets and attorney statements. On appeal, the husband challenged both the withdrawal of his counsel and the evidentiary basis of the property division. The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the decree, holding that the "invited error" doctrine precluded the husband from complaining about a withdrawal he specifically requested. Additionally, the court found that the husband waived any objection to unsworn evidence by failing to object at trial and proceeding on an agreed factual basis.
Litigation Takeaway
“Be cautious when making mid-trial demands; once you explicitly request a procedural change—such as discharging your lawyer—or fail to object to the use of unsworn property summaries, the "invited error" and waiver doctrines may permanently bar you from challenging those issues on appeal.”
Robert Garrison Cheshire v. The State of Texas
COA12
In a consolidated appeal from child–sexual-assault convictions, Cheshire argued the evidence was legally insufficient because both complainants had made inconsistent statements and there was recantation-related evidence in treatment notes and to third parties, and he also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and reversible error from denial of a continuance. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and deferring to the jury on credibility conflicts, the Twelfth Court of Appeals held a rational jury could find the elements of aggravated sexual assault of a child beyond a reasonable doubt based on the complainants’ detailed disclosures in protocol-based forensic interviews, their in-court testimony, corroborative context including a journal discovered during treatment, and testimony explaining delayed disclosure/recantation dynamics. The court further held Cheshire failed to meet Strickland because the record did not demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice, and it found no reversible error in the continuance ruling because he did not make a concrete, record-supported showing of specific harm from the denial. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Recantation and inconsistent statements rarely end the inquiry—when a case includes a structured forensic interview, detail-rich outcry evidence, corroborating context (e.g., journals/treatment disclosures), and testimony explaining delayed disclosure or recantation, courts typically treat contradictions as jury credibility issues. In family-law SAPCR/protective-order strategy, build (or attack) the “credibility mosaic”: protective parties should preserve forensic-interview and corroboration evidence and explain recantation dynamics; accused parties must go beyond impeachment and develop affirmative proof of contamination, motive, or methodological flaws, and make a detailed record for any continuance request.”
In re Georgina Yackelin Ramirez Uzcátegui
COA03
After being deported to Venezuela, a mother sought the return of her child from the father in Texas based on a Venezuelan custody order granting her exclusive possession. When the Texas trial court denied her writ of habeas corpus, the Third Court of Appeals intervened, ruling that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) requires Texas courts to treat foreign custody orders with the same weight as orders from other U.S. states. The court held that once a parent establishes a 'bare legal right' to possession through a valid order, the trial court must enforce it as a mandatory duty, unless the opposing party proves a dire emergency or an immediate threat to the child's safety.
Litigation Takeaway
“Valid foreign custody orders provide a powerful 'fast-track' for child recovery in Texas; unless a parent can prove a dire emergency, Texas courts are legally required to enforce foreign decrees via habeas corpus without reconsidering the merits of the custody case.”
Benavidez v. State
COA04
In Benavidez v. State, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed his sentence on the grounds that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify by stating he 'couldn’t even take that stand' to take responsibility. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the issue under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and the precedent set in Cockrell v. State, which requires a timely objection to preserve error for appellate review. The court held that because the defense failed to object during the closing argument, the complaint was forfeited. Furthermore, the court reaffirmed that Texas no longer recognizes an 'incurable argument' exception, meaning even egregious constitutional violations in jury arguments are waived without a contemporaneous objection.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never rely on the 'incurable' nature of an opponent’s error to save you on appeal; if you do not object to an improper comment during closing arguments—such as a parent’s 'failure to take responsibility' or choice to remain silent—you waive that error entirely. To fully protect the record, you must object timely, request an instruction to disregard, and move for a mistrial.”
In re Brandon Charles Cole
COA05
Relator Brandon Charles Cole filed a petition for writ of mandamus after the trial court denied his motions to recuse in two related cases. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the petition on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, the court found the Relator failed to provide a sworn or certified record of the trial court proceedings as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7. Substantively, the court applied Texas Supreme Court precedent holding that a denial of a motion to recuse does not satisfy the 'no adequate remedy by appeal' requirement for mandamus relief. The court held that because the recusal issue can be raised on appeal following a final judgment, mandamus intervention is unavailable, and the petition was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“You cannot use a mandamus petition to immediately overturn a judge's refusal to recuse themselves; instead, you must proceed to trial and reserve the issue for a standard appeal after the final decree. Furthermore, any attempt at mandamus requires a strictly certified or sworn record—procedural errors alone are sufficient for the appellate court to dismiss your petition.”
Gary D. Pickens v. City of Greenville, Texas
COA05
In Pickens v. City of Greenville, a plaintiff filed a mandamus action under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA) after a city failed to respond to multiple record requests. After the suit was filed, the parties entered into a Rule 11 settlement agreement where the City 'voluntarily' produced the records. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiff's request for mandatory attorney's fees and dismissed the case as moot. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that to 'substantially prevail' under Texas Government Code § 552.323(a), a plaintiff must obtain judicially sanctioned relief—such as a court order or judgment—that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties. Because the production was secured via a contract (Rule 11) rather than a judicial mandate, the plaintiff did not meet the prevailing party standard.
Litigation Takeaway
“To recover attorney's fees in a Public Information Act mandamus action, do not accept a 'voluntary' production via a Rule 11 agreement. You must secure a signed court order or an agreed final judgment that explicitly compels the production of documents to ensure your client qualifies as a 'prevailing party.'”
Justin Eugene Howard v. The State of Texas
COA06
In Howard v. State, the Sixth Court of Appeals addressed the requirement for jury unanimity when the State proves multiple distinct criminal acts to support a single charged count. The defendant was convicted of three counts of child sex offenses, but argued on appeal that the jury charge failed to require the jurors to agree on which specific incident formed the basis of the conviction for two of those counts. The court affirmed Count I because the evidence described only one discrete act for that timeframe, making a general unanimity instruction sufficient. However, it reversed Counts II and III, holding that the State's reliance on a 'course of conduct' narrative without a specific-unanimity instruction created a risk of a non-unanimous 'patchwork' verdict, which constituted egregious harm under the Almanza standard.
Litigation Takeaway
“In cases involving 'multiple acts over time'—common in protective orders and SAPCR proceedings—litigators must force the opposing party to identify specific, discrete incidents rather than relying on a generalized course of conduct. Failure to demand this specificity allows a factfinder to reach a 'composite' finding based on different incidents, whereas requiring incident-level clarity creates a stronger record for appeal and prevents relief based on vague, aggregated allegations.”
In re Lerardrick Phillips
COA04
In a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR), Relator Lerardrick Phillips filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to overturn a trial court order from the 438th Judicial District Court. The San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a), emphasizing that a relator must demonstrate both a clear abuse of discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court held that because the Relator failed to provide a sufficient record or argument to prove the trial court's actions were arbitrary or unreasonable, he failed to establish entitlement to extraordinary relief, and the petition was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“Success in mandamus practice requires a meticulous record and a compelling argument that the trial court's error cannot be corrected through a standard appeal; appellate courts will not fill in the gaps for a Relator who fails to meet these strict procedural and substantive burdens.”
Jay Morgan v. The State of Texas
COA03
Jay Morgan appealed his conviction for indecency with a child, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing. Morgan’s motion was based on a post-trial affidavit from his ex-fiancée, who claimed she had recanted her incriminating statements to investigators before the trial but was told she did not need to testify. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the affidavit established "reasonable grounds" for relief, concluding it was too conclusory and failed to demonstrate why the evidence could not have been presented at trial with reasonable diligence. The court also held that the complainant’s testimony was legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict, affirming the conviction with a minor clerical modification.
Litigation Takeaway
“A post-trial "recantation" affidavit is not an automatic ticket to a new hearing; to reopen a case or set aside an order, the moving party must show the new evidence is specific, material, and could not have been discovered earlier through reasonable diligence.”
Paredes v. State
COA08
In a prosecution for indecency with a child, the defendant challenged the admission of an unindicted extraneous sexual offense involving the same complainant. The defendant argued the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed the evidence under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.37, which permits propensity evidence in specific child-sex cases, and the Gigliobianco factors for Rule 403 balancing. The court found the evidence was highly probative of intent and propensity and that the State had a significant "need" for the evidence because the defense's strategy centered on attacking the victim's credibility. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, as its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion.
Litigation Takeaway
“In cases involving family violence or sexual misconduct where credibility is the central issue, "pattern" evidence of other bad acts is often admissible to rebut claims of fabrication. To win the Rule 403 balancing test, practitioners should emphasize the factual similarities, temporal proximity, and the heightened "need" for such evidence when the opposing party's theme is that the victim is lying or coached.”
In re Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.
COA05
In a commercial vehicle accident case, the employer (Old Dominion) challenged a discovery order requiring the production of personnel records for two of the driver's supervisors. Old Dominion argued that because it had stipulated to respondeat superior liability (vicarious liability) and sought bifurcation, the records were irrelevant to the remaining issues. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the request under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3, finding that because the plaintiff also pleaded direct corporate negligence and gross negligence, the documents—specifically training records, evaluations, and job descriptions—were relevant to proving the company's 'conscious indifference.' The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the order was narrowly tailored, included privacy protections, and sought information relevant to institutional culpability that a vicarious liability stipulation does not resolve.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party's stipulation to one form of liability does not serve as a 'discovery kill switch' for evidence related to other pleaded theories. Narrowly tailored discovery into supervisor training, performance, and knowledge remains discoverable to prove 'conscious indifference' or direct corporate misconduct, even when vicarious liability is conceded.”
In the Interest of K.B., a Child
COA12
In the Interest of K.B., the Twelfth Court of Appeals reviewed the termination of parental rights where the parents challenged the sufficiency of evidence for endangerment and the admission of hearsay statements from the child’s siblings. The court analyzed the 'excited utterance' exception, determining that the siblings' visible distress—including crying and fearful demeanor—was a sufficient foundation for admitting their statements regarding the parents' intoxication. Furthermore, the court found that driving while intoxicated with a child in the vehicle, combined with neglectful physical conditions, provided legally and factually sufficient evidence of endangerment under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1). The court held that the termination was in the child's best interest and affirmed the trial court's decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“Simply 'checking the boxes' of a service plan is insufficient for parents to avoid termination if they fail to acknowledge the underlying issues, such as substance abuse; additionally, visible physical manifestations of a child's stress can provide the necessary predicate to admit hearsay under the excited utterance exception.”
Fusilier v. State of Texas ex rel. Galloway
COA04
Joshua Fusilier appealed a civil protective order issued in favor of Valencia Galloway, arguing that his subsequent acquittal in a related criminal case necessitated the order's dissolution and that the evidence against him was insufficient. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the order, explaining that civil protective orders and criminal trials operate under different legal standards—"preponderance of the evidence" versus "beyond a reasonable doubt." The court held that a complainant's credible testimony regarding a physical struggle is legally sufficient to support a finding of family violence, and a "not guilty" verdict in criminal court does not invalidate a civil court's finding that violence was likely to occur.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas, a criminal acquittal does not automatically overturn a civil protective order. Because the 'burden of proof' is lower in civil proceedings, a family court can still maintain a protective order even if the state fails to secure a criminal conviction for the same conduct.”
In re Stephen Girard
COA03
After a father was sentenced to 180 days in jail for allegedly violating child possession provisions, the Third Court of Appeals ordered his immediate discharge because the trial court's commitment order was too vague. The Court analyzed Texas Family Code § 157.166(b), which mandates that enforcement orders must include specific findings identifying the provisions violated and the exact dates of non-compliance. Because the trial court relied on a generic 'Writ to Sheriff' that lacked these details, the appellate court held the order was void for violating constitutional due process requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
“When seeking to jail a party for contempt, a 'win' at the hearing is meaningless if the final commitment order is not drafted with extreme technical precision. An enforcement order must explicitly list every date of violation and the specific decree language breached; otherwise, the incarcerated party can secure their release through a habeas corpus challenge based on due process deficiencies.”
Piper v. Tax Rescue II, LLC
COA14
In Piper v. Tax Rescue II, LLC, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed a dispute over whether a party received proper notice of a summary judgment motion and whether tax liens take priority over adverse possession claims. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a(e), which establishes that a certificate of service creates a rebuttable presumption of receipt. Because the appellant provided only unsworn allegations of non-receipt rather than affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or technical proof of delivery failure), the court held the presumption was not rebutted. Furthermore, the court held that under the Texas Tax Code, transferred tax liens maintain a "special priority status" superior to unperfected adverse possession claims. The court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“To protect your filings against a pro se litigant's claim of non-receipt, ensure the party's email address is memorialized in the withdrawal order of their former counsel. If you are the party claiming non-receipt, you must provide affirmative evidence—such as affidavits or IT logs—to overcome the Rule 21a presumption; mere allegations are legally insufficient.”
Kapasi v. Villarreal
COA14
In this case, Ashrafi Kapasi sued Stalina Villarreal over a motor vehicle accident. Villarreal eventually filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment under Rule 166a(i), asserting Kapasi lacked evidence for essential elements of the claims. Kapasi did not file a response but argued that her prior request for a jury trial and payment of the jury fee preserved her right to a trial. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Rule 166a(i) and the Texas Constitution, determining that the right to a jury trial is not absolute but contingent upon the existence of a material fact issue. The court held that a trial court must grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment if the non-movant fails to produce evidence raising a genuine issue of fact, regardless of a pending jury demand.
Litigation Takeaway
“A jury demand is not a shield against summary judgment; failing to file a timely, evidence-backed response to a no-evidence motion will result in the mandatory dismissal of your claims, even if you have paid for a jury.”
Castillo v. State
COA07
In a case involving aggravated assault of a child, the defendant challenged the reliability of a burn expert's testimony regarding the timing of the injury. The trial court admitted the testimony over an objection that the State 'failed to lay a proper predicate.' The Seventh Court of Appeals held that a 'predicate' objection is too general to preserve a Rule 702 reliability complaint for appeal, as it fails to specify whether the challenge concerns the expert's qualifications, the methodology, or the application of facts. Analyzing the merits in the alternative, the court found no abuse of discretion, ruling that the expert's extensive clinical experience provided a sufficient basis for his opinions and that gaps in scientific literature were matters for cross-examination rather than exclusion.
Litigation Takeaway
“A general 'lack of predicate' or 'foundation' objection will not preserve a Daubert/Robinson challenge to an expert's reliability; you must explicitly object under Rule 702 and identify the specific methodological gap or analytical defect to avoid waiving the issue for appeal.”
Pope v. Perrault
COA01
In Pope v. Perrault, the appellant initiated an appeal from a Brazoria County district court judgment but failed to file an appellate brief within the mandatory timeframe. Despite the First Court of Appeals issuing a formal warning that the appeal would be dismissed unless a reasonable explanation was provided, the appellant remained silent. The court analyzed the procedural default under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a) and 42.3(b), which grant appellate courts the authority to involuntarily dismiss cases for want of prosecution or failure to comply with court notices. The court held that dismissal was the appropriate remedy, effectively terminating the appeal and leaving the trial court's judgment in place.
Litigation Takeaway
“An appeal can be lost before the merits are ever considered if procedural deadlines are ignored. In family law cases, administrative silence after a court warning is a terminal error that results in the permanent loss of your right to challenge a trial court's decree.”
Bess v. State
COA01
Kendrick Bess appealed his conviction for aggravated assault of a family member, asserting that the trial judge's active participation—including questioning witnesses and summarizing testimony—deprived him of a fair trial and demonstrated judicial bias. The First Court of Appeals first addressed whether the appeal was 'multifarious' for combining multiple legal theories into one point of error, concluding that appellate courts have the discretion to review such issues in the interest of justice if the complaint is discernable. On the merits, the court analyzed the judge's conduct under the 'Liteky' standard, finding that the interventions were intended for clarification and courtroom administration rather than advocacy. The court held that a judge's active role does not violate due process unless it reveals such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.
Litigation Takeaway
“Trial judges are permitted wide latitude to question witnesses and manage their courtrooms; to successfully challenge a judge's impartiality on appeal, a party must show that the judge’s actions revealed deep-seated favoritism or extrajudicial bias rather than mere impatience or a desire for clarification.”
In Re Glen Edward Williams
COA14
In this Houston family law matter, Glen Edward Williams sought a writ of mandamus to force a trial court to rule on his 'Special Appearance'—a motion challenging whether the court had personal jurisdiction over him. After waiting approximately two months without a decision, Williams argued the court was failing its duty to rule. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals denied the request, holding that a trial court is allowed a 'reasonable time' to rule based on the circumstances of the case. The court emphasized that Williams failed to provide a record showing he had properly brought the motion to the trial judge's attention or that the judge had expressly refused to act. Consequently, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion that would justify the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.
Litigation Takeaway
“Filing a motion is only the first step; you must actively bring it to the judge's attention and document those efforts. Appellate courts will rarely intervene in a trial court's schedule unless you can prove a clear refusal to act after a significant and unreasonable delay—and in busy jurisdictions like Harris County, a two-month wait is generally not enough to trigger appellate relief.”
In the Interest of C.G.
COA14
In this case, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's decree terminating a father's parental rights while he was incarcerated. The Father challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the 'best interest' finding, arguing that his participation in prison-based parenting classes and future plans for employment as a barber should weigh in his favor. The court analyzed the conflict using the Holley factors, focusing on the Father's extensive history of violent criminal conduct—including offenses committed after he knew of the child's existence—and his lack of financial support. The court contrasted this with the child's strong bond with a stable caregiver (a Great Aunt). Ultimately, the court held that the Father’s history of instability and danger outweighed his limited rehabilitative efforts, affirming the termination decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“While incarceration alone is not a sufficient ground for termination, a persistent pattern of violent criminal activity—particularly conduct occurring after a parent is aware of their child—is highly probative of future danger and serves as strong evidence that termination is in the child's best interest.”
In the Matter of the Expunction of K.J.
COA08
After K.J. was indicted for causing injury to a child, the State dismissed the charges due to 'insufficient evidence' and K.J.'s completion of a parenting class. K.J. subsequently sought an expunction of the records. The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of the expunction, clarifying that 'insufficient evidence' is not legally equivalent to the statutory requirements of 'mistake, false information, or lack of probable cause' needed for an expunction. The court held that because expunction is a statutory privilege and not an equitable right, the petitioner failed to meet the strict evidentiary burden required to scrub the criminal record.
Litigation Takeaway
“A criminal dismissal for 'insufficient evidence' does not automatically entitle a party to an expunction. For family law practitioners, this means that unless an opponent can prove factual innocence or mistake in an expunction hearing, their history of arrests or indictments for child abuse remains accessible and admissible for 'best interest' analyses in custody disputes.”
Bess v. State
COA01
Kendrick Bess appealed his conviction for aggravated assault of a family member, arguing that the trial judge’s active questioning and summarization of witness testimony violated his due process right to a neutral and detached judge. The State contended the appeal was procedurally defective because it was 'multifarious'—bundling multiple legal theories into a single point of error. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the 'interest of justice' exception, determining that it could review multifarious issues if the underlying complaint is discernable with reasonable certainty. On the merits, the court held that trial judges are presumed neutral and that actions taken to manage the courtroom or clarify facts do not constitute bias unless they reveal high-degree favoritism or antagonism. The court ultimately found the judge’s interventions were administrative in nature and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“To challenge a trial judge's perceived bias on appeal, you must build a record of conduct that transcends mere 'courtroom management'; however, even if your appellate brief is technically multifarious, the 'interest of justice' standard may save the issue if the alleged error is clearly identifiable.”
In re Ha Duong
COA01
In the divorce case of In re Ha Duong, the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to rule on several pending motions that had been delayed. The First Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court had breached its ministerial duty to rule within a reasonable time. The court determined that because the trial judge remained engaged in the litigation and was 'actively managing' the case through other proceedings, the delay did not amount to a refusal to act. Consequently, the appellate court denied the petition, holding that the relator failed to prove a clear abuse of discretion or a total breakdown in the judicial process.
Litigation Takeaway
“The mere passage of time is rarely enough to force a judge to rule; you must demonstrate that the trial court has completely stopped managing the case or specifically refused to perform its duty despite proper requests.”
In the Interest of A.G. and G.G.
COA14
After a Harris County trial court dismissed a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) for want of prosecution, the appellant initially filed an appeal but later moved to voluntarily dismiss it. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the request under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a), which allows for the voluntary dismissal of an appeal upon the appellant\'s motion. Finding no opposition or cross-appeals that would prevent dismissal, the Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a) is a vital strategic tool that allows an appellant to voluntarily abandon an appeal. In family law cases involving procedural dismissals, counsel should weigh the costs of a lengthy appeal against the benefits of refiling the underlying action or reaching a settlement, utilizing voluntary dismissal to exit the appellate process when it is no longer in the client\'s best interest.”
Kappler v. State
COA14
Kappler appealed a felony DWI conviction, claiming the evidence was insufficient because of a three-hour delay between the crash and her blood draw, alongside potential lab contamination from a gas leak. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the state's "stacked proof," which included civilian observations of her unsteady gait, officer notes on slurred speech and field sobriety test failures, and a 0.102 BAC result. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that a rational jury could find intoxication under both impairment and per se theories, and that technical challenges to testing reliability generally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its legal sufficiency.
Litigation Takeaway
“When alleging alcohol impairment in custody or divorce proceedings, build a "mosaic of evidence" by combining behavioral observations, inconsistent statements, and physical clues with chemical testing; this layered approach helps defeat "delay" or "technicality" defenses that attempt to isolate and discredit a single piece of evidence.”
Rehab Squad General Contractors, LLC v. Phamily Capital Partners, LLC and Derek Pham
COA05
In this contract and "alter ego" dispute, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed whether a plaintiff preserved its right to appeal the omission of a jury question regarding piercing the corporate veil. Despite filing a trial brief arguing the sufficiency of the evidence, the plaintiff failed to tender a written, "substantially correct" question as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 278. The court analyzed the procedural requirements for preservation of error, concluding that oral objections and trial briefs regarding the evidence cannot substitute for the formal written tender of a requested jury question. The court held that the issue was waived on appeal, emphasizing that even compressed trial timelines do not excuse the proponent's burden to provide specific charge language to the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
“A trial brief is not a substitute for a formal jury charge request; to preserve a theory of recovery for appeal, you must physically tender the specific, "substantially correct" written question to the trial judge.”
Williams-James v. James
COA03
In Williams-James v. James, the appellant challenged the accuracy of the reporter’s record, claiming it was incomplete and that certain exhibits were improperly included or omitted. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the dispute under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6, which requires a trial court to resolve record inaccuracies that the parties cannot agree upon. The court held that it could not adjudicate these factual disputes in the first instance and ordered the appeal abated and remanded to the trial court for a formal hearing to settle the record.
Litigation Takeaway
“The integrity of the trial record is the foundation of any appeal; if you discover the reporter's record is inaccurate or incomplete after it has been filed, you must file a formal motion to abate the appeal so the trial court can settle the dispute through a hearing.”
Allen v. State
COA14
In a human trafficking appeal with significant procedural implications for family law litigators, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed issues regarding evidence suppression, impeachment by prior convictions, and jury unanimity. The defendant argued the trial court failed to rule on a second motion to suppress and erred in its evidentiary and jury charge rulings. The appellate court analyzed the record under the principle that a signed written order controls over oral announcements and evaluated the jury charge under the 'Almanza' egregious harm standard. The court held that the written order constituted a valid ruling, the admission of prior convictions for impeachment was within the trial court's discretion, and the lack of a unanimity instruction did not cause egregious harm, ultimately affirming the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“To preserve error for appeal, always ensure a signed written order is entered, as it overrides ambiguous oral statements from the bench; furthermore, in credibility-heavy trials like SAPCRs or protective order hearings, litigators must proactively request specific jury instructions or findings of fact to avoid the near-insurmountable 'egregious harm' standard for unpreserved charge errors.”
In the Estate of Thomas Doniver Fugler, Jr., Deceased
COA06
In a probate proceeding, non-party stepdaughter Christy Lynne Powell filed a "Notice of Possible Fraud and Concealment." A party to the case moved to strike the filing and requested sanctions, which the trial court granted, finding the filing groundless and brought in bad faith. Powell attempted to appeal the $750 sanction. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed whether a non-party possesses appellate standing and whether such a sanctions order constitutes a final, appealable judgment under the probate exception. The court held that because Powell never formally intervened, she remained a non-party without standing to appeal, and she failed to demonstrate that the order qualified as a final judgment on a discrete issue. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Non-parties such as stepchildren or meddling relatives who interfere in litigation with unauthorized filings risk immediate, unappealable sanctions. Because non-parties generally lack appellate standing, a trial court's order for sanctions under Rule 13 or Chapter 10 provides a powerful and final deterrent against "shadow litigants" in high-conflict family law or probate disputes.”
Magdaleno-Garcia v. State
COA07
The Appellant challenged twenty-five convictions for sexual assault and prohibited sexual conduct, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient because the victims provided generalized testimony about a high volume of abuse—hundreds of instances over two years—rather than identifying specific dates for each individual count. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict by distinguishing between evidentiary sufficiency and jury unanimity requirements. The court applied a 'mathematical' approach, determining that if the described frequency (e.g., 'once or twice a week') within a specific timeframe establishes that the conduct occurred at least as many times as there are counts, the evidence is legally sufficient. The court held that the inability to distinguish which specific act supports which specific count is a jury charge issue, not a sufficiency issue, and affirmed the convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
“To establish a history of family violence or abuse, you do not need to prove the exact date of every incident; establishing a 'mathematical' pattern through a clear start date, end date, and consistent frequency is legally sufficient to support multiple findings of fact.”
In re Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield
COA06
Relators moved a child to Smith County in violation of a geographic restriction issued in a Panola County SAPCR order. After six months, they moved for a mandatory venue transfer to Smith County under Texas Family Code Section 155.201. The court analyzed whether a county where residency is established via a violation of a court order constitutes a 'proper county' for transfer. The court held that the mandatory transfer provision is not triggered by unauthorized residency, and the trial court of continuing exclusive jurisdiction retains authority to deny the transfer and enforce its orders through contempt.
Litigation Takeaway
“Violating a geographic restriction to establish residency in a new county will not trigger a mandatory venue transfer; a court will not reward 'venue shopping' or 'self-help' that occurs in direct defiance of a standing court order.”
In re the Commitment of Rufino Coronado
COA05
The State sought the civil commitment of Rufino Coronado as a sexually violent predator. At trial, the State's expert psychologist testified that Coronado had a behavioral abnormality, basing her opinion in part on a prior evaluation conducted by a non-testifying psychologist. Coronado objected, arguing the prior evaluator's findings were inadmissible hearsay. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, which permit experts to rely on and disclose inadmissible facts or data if they are of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the specific field. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony because the expert performed her own independent evaluation and used the prior report as a standard clinical "building block" rather than offering the report itself as substantive evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“To introduce influential third-party data or prior evaluations without calling the original source, have your testifying expert integrate those materials into their own independent assessment. By establishing that such records are 'reasonably relied upon' in the expert's field under TRE 703, you can disclose the basis of the opinion to the factfinder, though you should be prepared for a Rule 705(d) limiting instruction to prevent the hearsay from being treated as substantive truth.”
In re John Henry Garber
COA06
In this original proceeding, the Relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to rule on motions pending in three separate cases. The Sixth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of whether the trial court's inaction constituted an abuse of discretion because the Relator failed to include the specific, sworn certification required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k). Analyzing the case under strict procedural standards and Texas Supreme Court precedent, the court determined that technical compliance with Rule 52 is a mandatory prerequisite for seeking extraordinary relief. The court held that the petition must be summarily denied due to the fatal absence of the required verification that the factual statements were supported by competent evidence in the record.
Litigation Takeaway
“Technical precision is not optional in mandamus practice. Failing to include the exact verbatim certification required by TRAP 52.3(k) will result in a summary denial of your petition, regardless of the merits. In high-stakes family law disputes, always perform a technical audit of your filings to ensure strict compliance and avoid unnecessary delays or potential malpractice claims.”
In Re Gregory Lynn Allison
COA06
In In re Gregory Lynn Allison, a relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to rule on motions filed less than three weeks earlier. The relator failed to provide a certified or sworn record, submitting only handwritten copies of his motions. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed whether a nineteen-day delay constituted an "unreasonable" period of time for a court to rule and whether the relator's pro se status excused procedural deficiencies under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that a delay of less than three weeks is insufficient to establish a failure to perform a ministerial duty and denied the petition, noting that strict compliance with record requirements (TRAP 52.3 and 52.7) is mandatory regardless of a party's indigency.
Litigation Takeaway
“Patience and procedural precision are mandatory for mandamus relief; a three-week delay in a trial court's ruling is legally insufficient to justify appellate intervention, and failure to provide a certified or sworn record will result in summary denial.”
Riley v. State
COA13
In Riley v. State, an ex-husband was convicted of "interception" under the Texas wiretap statute for accessing his ex-wife's stored voicemails using a known passcode without her consent. On appeal, the defendant argued that an "interception" can only occur if the communication is captured contemporaneously during transmission, rather than after it has been stored. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals rejected this narrow construction, analyzing Texas Penal Code § 16.02 and concluding that the statute does not require contemporaneous acquisition. The court held that unauthorized access to stored electronic or wire communications, including voicemails, constitutes a criminal interception.
Litigation Takeaway
“"Snooping" into an ex-spouse's digital life is more than a credibility issue—it is a potential felony. Accessing stored voicemails or accounts without permission constitutes criminal "interception" in Texas, providing family law litigants with powerful leverage to secure protective orders, exclusive use of devices, and evidence of coercive control.”