Weekly Digest
March 21 – March 27, 2026
46 opinions this week
Diamond Hydraulics, Inc. v. GAC Equipment, LLC d/b/a Austin Crane Service
SCOTX
In a commercial breach-of-contract/warranty dispute where causation turned on expert engineering testimony, the defendant timely designated an expert but, after multiple resets, its testifying expert became unavailable shortly before trial due to a job change, relocation out of state, and an express refusal to testify. The defendant promptly notified the other side and moved to substitute another engineer from the same firm who had helped prepare the report, offering to limit the substitute to the same opinions. The trial court excluded the substitute under Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6, denied continuances, and forced the defendant to try the case with no causation expert; the jury returned a plaintiff’s verdict and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that Rule 193.6’s “good cause” exception, while demanding, is not an “impossible” standard, and that the trial court misapplied the rule by rigidly denying substitution when the unavailability was outside the party’s control and the party acted promptly and in good faith to mitigate any prejudice. Because the exclusion was effectively case-dispositive in an expert-driven case, the error was reversible; the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a properly designated expert becomes genuinely unavailable near trial (job change, relocation, refusal to testify), don’t assume you’re stuck: act immediately, document the unavailability, offer a true substitute with the same opinions, and propose cure measures (deposition/limited continuance). Courts cannot weaponize Rule 193.6 deadlines to force trial without essential expert proof when the problem is outside your control and you move diligently.”
C. R. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In a bench-trial termination case, the mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting endangerment grounds and the best-interest finding after she led police on a late-night, 100+ mph chase with her three young children in the car and the Department removed the children. The Third Court of Appeals evaluated the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and viewed the evidence cumulatively, not as a single-incident lapse. It held that the high-speed flight, combined with the children’s unstable living conditions (sleeping and eating in the car, poor hygiene and inadequate clothing), outstanding felony warrants (including custodial interference), and unresolved mental-health/substance-use concerns supported findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering conditions) and (E) (endangering conduct). Applying the Holley best-interest framework, the court emphasized the children’s stability and improvement in a Kentucky placement, concerns that the mother’s hostile communications destabilized the placement and the children, and the mother’s failure to document sobriety/treatment after moving out of state. The court affirmed termination, upheld the finding that the Department made reasonable reunification efforts despite the mother’s relocation, and affirmed appointment of the Department as permanent managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
“High-risk conduct that exposes children to danger—even without physical injury—can support termination and heavily influence custody outcomes, especially when paired with instability, unresolved mental-health/substance issues, and combative communications that harm the children’s emotional stability. If a parent moves out of state during a CPS/SAPCR case, they must proactively secure admissible proof of service completion and sobriety; courts will not treat the move as shifting the agency’s duty to fund or arrange out-of-state services.”
Crystal Flack v. Michael Mendoza, Sr.
COA08
In this transferred appeal from a Travis County bench-tried divorce, the wife challenged a property division she claimed was impermissibly disproportionate—particularly a provision awarding the husband the first $30,000 of proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code § 7.001 (“just and right” division) and emphasized that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, requiring the court to imply all findings necessary to support the decree. On the record presented, the implied findings could support unequal allocations based on equity considerations such as the wife’s unilateral withdrawals and trading losses that depleted community assets, removal of funds from a joint account shortly before filing, the husband’s post-separation payment of home carrying costs, and the decree’s stated rationale tying the $30,000 offset to the wife’s lack of good-faith participation in the litigation. The court also rejected the notion that a no-fault (insupportability) divorce bars a disproportionate division; fault is only one of many permissible factors. Holding that the wife failed to show the division was arbitrary, unsupported by evidence, or manifestly unfair—especially given the lack of concrete valuation proof and the presence of implied findings—the court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“Property-division appeals are won or lost at trial: build a valuation record and request findings of fact. Without numbers and without findings, appellate courts will imply facts supporting a “just and right” division and rarely reverse—even if the decree looks unequal (like awarding one spouse the first $30,000 of sale proceeds). Litigation conduct and dissipation/waste evidence can justify disproportionate offsets in a no-fault divorce if tied to the record.”
Julia Ann Poff v. William Harvey Poff
COA09
In an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a family-violence protective order, the appellant perfected the appeal but never filed an appellate brief. After the Ninth Court of Appeals issued a deficiency notice with a cure deadline (requiring both a brief and a motion to extend) and expressly warned that the appeal could be dismissed, the appellant still filed nothing. The court submitted the case without briefs under Tex. R. App. P. 39.8 and, with no brief assigning error and no explanation for the default, treated the failure as a lack of prosecution. Applying Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), and 43.2(f), the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution, leaving the trial court’s denial of the protective order in place.
Litigation Takeaway
“A protective-order appeal won’t be decided on the merits if the appellant doesn’t prosecute it. Calendar briefing deadlines, respond immediately to clerk deficiency notices, and file a timely brief (or at least a motion to extend with a reasonable explanation) or the court can dismiss—cementing the trial court’s order and eliminating appellate leverage in parallel divorce/SAPCR litigation.”
In re John F. Ross
COA05
In an ongoing Collin County divorce case, the husband sought mandamus relief from the Dallas Court of Appeals on an emergency basis the day before a scheduled hearing. He asked the court to stay the next-day hearing, set aside a January 13, 2026 “final decree of divorce,” return a January 12, 2026 motion to recuse to the trial court’s docket, and compel discovery. The court did not analyze whether those complaints met the mandamus standards (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal) because the mandamus petition and record were procedurally deficient. Citing mandatory original-proceeding requirements under TRAP 52.3(k) (certification), 52.3(l)(1)(B) (appendix requirements), and 52.7(a) (mandamus record), and relying on prior Dallas cases enforcing those rules, the court held that TRAP 52 compliance is a gateway to merits review. Because the relator failed to comply in “numerous respects,” the court denied mandamus without reaching the merits and denied the emergency stay motion as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“In emergency family-law mandamus practice, TRAP 52 compliance is not optional—it is the ticket to get the court to consider your complaint. A missing/defective certification, appendix, or complete authenticated record can trigger a flat denial (even with a hearing the next day), and a stay request will fail with the petition.”
In re J.M.B. II
COA03
In a Travis County juvenile delinquency case, the State filed a Rule 162 nonsuit/motion to dismiss before any adjudication hearing. The trial court initially dismissed the petition but, the next day, signed an order vacating the dismissal and reset the case for adjudication based on policy concerns (including community safety and judicial confessions). The Third Court of Appeals held that, under Family Code § 51.17(a), the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply in juvenile cases absent conflict, and Rule 162 gives a plaintiff an absolute right to nonsuit before resting, leaving the trial court with a ministerial duty to dismiss unless collateral matters (pending claims for affirmative relief) remain. Because no collateral matters were shown, the trial court had no discretion to undo the nonsuit by vacating the dismissal and resetting the case. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order vacating the dismissal, reinstate the nonsuit-based dismissal, and enter the nonsuit in the minutes.
Litigation Takeaway
“A properly timed Rule 162 nonsuit is mandatory, not discretionary: absent collateral claims for affirmative relief (fees, sanctions, counterclaims), the court must dismiss and cannot later “revive” the case for policy or case-management reasons. If a trial court refuses to honor—or tries to vacate—a nonsuit dismissal, mandamus can be the fastest way to enforce the ministerial duty and stop a case from being pushed back to trial.”
In the Interest of A.B., A Child
COA05
In a divorce governed by a premarital agreement (PMA) eliminating community property and treating each spouse’s earnings as separate, the parties disputed ownership of a diamond ring purchased during marriage with Husband’s earnings and allegedly titled in his name. The trial court found the ring was initially Husband’s separate property under the PMA but that Husband later made an interspousal gift of the ring to Wife, confirming it as Wife’s separate property. On appeal, Husband challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting donative intent, delivery, and acceptance under the clear-and-convincing standard. Applying abuse-of-discretion review (with legal/factual sufficiency as factors) and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Husband gifted the ring based on Wife’s testimony and circumstances: Wife selected/designed the ring, the jeweler delivered it to her, she wore it as her wedding ring for years, Husband bought a matching band later, he returned it after cleanings/appraisals, and he never demanded its return at separation. The court affirmed the decree confirming the ring as Wife’s separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even with a “no community property” premarital agreement, high-value personal items can still change character through an interspousal gift. At trial, build (or attack) the gift elements—donative intent, delivery, and acceptance—using the parties’ conduct over time (possession, daily use, repairs/cleanings, related purchases, and separation behavior), because on appeal a supported gift finding is difficult to overturn under abuse-of-discretion review.”
In the Interest of H.S., a Child
COA02
In a Texas child-protection/SAPCR appeal, the appellant failed to pay or make payment arrangements for the clerk’s record. After the district clerk notified the court of appeals of the nonpayment, the Second Court of Appeals issued a written notice giving the appellant ten days to (1) arrange payment and (2) file proof of those arrangements, expressly warning that the appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution if not cured. The appellant did nothing. Applying the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing the appellant’s duty to fund the clerk’s record and the court’s authority to dismiss when the record is not filed due to nonpayment, the court concluded the defect was curable, that adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure were provided, and that the failure to act constituted a failure to prosecute. The court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits and taxed appellate costs against the appellant.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas appeals can be lost on procedure before briefing: immediately confirm record costs, make payment arrangements that satisfy the clerk, and file proof with the court of appeals within any cure deadline. If you ignore a nonpayment notice, dismissal for want of prosecution is likely and your client may still be taxed with appellate costs—leaving the trial court’s orders fully in place and enforceable.”
In the Interest of J.B.S. and R.G.S., Children
COA13
In a Chapter 157 SAPCR enforcement proceeding, Mother sought contempt-style relief against Father for alleged violations of multiple prior orders. The trial court dismissed/denied the enforcement motion on threshold legal grounds (treating many alleged violations as pre-final-order and effectively barred) and signed an order denying enforcement. Mother attempted a direct appeal, arguing the denial was a final, appealable order under Texas Family Code § 109.002. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the substance of the proceeding and reiterated that contempt/enforcement determinations under Chapter 157 are not reviewable by direct appeal; any review lies, if at all, in mandamus (and habeas if confinement is ordered). Because the order was an unappealable enforcement/contempt ruling, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Don’t assume a signed order that ends a Chapter 157 enforcement hearing is appealable. If the relief sought/ruling made is contempt-type enforcement, the correct review vehicle is usually mandamus (or habeas if confinement is involved); filing a direct appeal can waste time and jeopardize your client’s only effective remedy.”
In the Interest of A.Z., a Child
COA02
In a private SAPCR termination case, an incarcerated father failed to appear for the final hearing. The trial court had mailed him notice of the setting with instructions and a phone number to call the bailiff to appear telephonically. Father did not call in, and his mailed request asking the court to coordinate with his prison unit was file-stamped after the hearing. The trial court proceeded, found predicate grounds under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) (failure to support) and (L) (conviction for a listed offense, here sexual assault under Penal Code § 22.011), found termination in the child’s best interest, and terminated Father’s rights. On appeal, Father argued the court lacked personal jurisdiction (based on alleged noncitizenship), that proceeding without him violated his right of access to courts, and that the court should have granted a new trial. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held Father’s personal-jurisdiction complaint was waivable and was forfeited by his participation after answering; the trial court provided a workable means of remote participation and was not required to halt the hearing based on a late-received request; and under the post-answer default/new-trial framework (Craddock/Dolgencorp), Father failed to show his nonappearance was not due to conscious indifference and otherwise did not meet the requirements for a new trial. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When an incarcerated parent receives clear notice and a workable telephonic-appearance procedure, failure to timely follow it (or to secure prison-side coordination well in advance) is unlikely to overturn a termination on “access to courts” grounds. Preserve jurisdiction defenses early (special appearance before answering) and, after a post-answer default, support any motion for new trial with evidence meeting Craddock/Dolgencorp—conclusory complaints and late-filed requests usually won’t suffice.”
In the Interest of I.S., a Child
COA10
In a termination of parental rights case, Mother timely requested a de novo hearing under Texas Family Code § 201.015 after an associate judge’s bench trial and proposed termination ruling. The referring district court began—but did not complete—the de novo hearing, then prematurely signed an order adopting the associate judge’s termination order (incorrectly reciting that no de novo demand had been made). Mother filed an accelerated notice of appeal the same day. The Tenth Court of Appeals held that, although procedurally erroneous, the adoption order was a final, appealable (voidable) judgment that triggered accelerated appellate deadlines and the running of the trial court’s plenary power. Because plenary power expired and appellate jurisdiction attached, the trial court lacked authority to later complete the de novo hearing or sign subsequent adoption/affirmance orders; those later actions were legal nullities and could not cure the § 201.015 violation. The court reversed the termination judgment and remanded for a proper de novo hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a party timely requests a de novo hearing from an associate judge’s ruling, a referring court cannot sign an adoption order before completing the de novo hearing—and if it does, treat that adoption order as a final, deadline-triggering judgment immediately. File the accelerated appeal and/or plenary-power motions right away; do not assume the trial court can “fix it later,” because post-judgment de novo proceedings may be nullities once plenary power expires or an appeal is pending.”
In re Nicholas David Kiselov
COA05
In a Dallas County post-judgment family case, the relator sought mandamus to compel the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law after a hearing on a motion for jurisdictional production and a motion to disqualify. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied relief at the threshold because the petition omitted the mandatory Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k) certification that every factual statement is supported by competent evidence in the appendix or record—an omission the court treated as an independently sufficient reason to deny mandamus. The court also held, in the alternative, that even with a compliant petition the relator failed to meet the two mandamus prerequisites under In re Prudential—showing neither a clear abuse of discretion nor that appeal was an inadequate remedy—so extraordinary relief compelling findings was not warranted on the record presented.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus in Texas is strict-compliance and strict-proof: include the TRAP 52.3(k) certification (and back every fact with record evidence) or your petition can be denied outright, and even then you must build a record that concretely shows both a clear abuse of discretion and why an appeal cannot fix the problem—especially for post-judgment “findings after a hearing” complaints.”
Robinson v. Kelley
COA01
In an appeal from a Brazoria County SAPCR modification order, the parties entered a later agreed modification order while the appeal was pending. Appellant’s counsel notified the First Court of Appeals by letter that the agreed order eliminated the need to continue the appeal, and appellee did not oppose. The court construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and, because appellant no longer sought appellate relief and there was no live controversy to resolve, dismissed the appeal under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a) and 43.2(f), also dismissing all pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you settle a parenting-plan modification dispute during the appeal and the trial court signs an agreed modification order that replaces the challenged order, the court of appeals will typically end the case quickly—sometimes even treating an informal “no longer necessary” communication as a dismissal request. Be intentional: decide whether you want immediate dismissal, an abatement while performance occurs, or continued appellate leverage, and communicate that clearly in a formal motion whenever possible.”
In the Matter of J.D.
COA14
J.D., a juvenile serving a 25-year determinate sentence for capital murder and aggravated robbery, challenged the juvenile court’s decision under Texas Family Code § 54.11 to transfer him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to the Institutional Division of TDCJ (TDCJ–ID) to complete his unserved sentence rather than release him to parole supervision. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the transfer decision as discretionary and asked only whether the record contained “some evidence” tied to the § 54.11(k) factors supporting transfer. Although J.D. presented evidence of rehabilitation (good institutional behavior, educational progress, and favorable therapeutic notes), the court held the juvenile judge could credit competing evidence and weigh factors differently. The court emphasized the extreme violence and manner of the offenses, TJJD’s recommendation to transfer, J.D.’s incomplete capital/serious violent offender treatment, and testimony about victim-family and community safety concerns. Because these items provided some evidence supporting transfer, the court affirmed and held the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering transfer to TDCJ–ID rather than parole release.
Litigation Takeaway
“In § 54.11 determinate-sentence transfer hearings, “doing well” in TJJD may not overcome a safety-driven record. Expect trial courts to give heavy weight to offense severity, incomplete specialized treatment, and TJJD/prosecutor recommendations—and appellate courts will usually affirm if there is some evidence supporting transfer. For family-law cases that hinge on whether a youth returns to the home, treat the juvenile transfer record as critical evidence for risk, safety planning, and temporary orders.”
In the Interest of C.H., a Child
COA02
In a SAPCR enforcement action, Mother sought reimbursement for prenatal and postnatal medical expenses that the parties’ agreed order required Father to pay 50% of after Mother “furnish[ed]” receipts/bills/EOBs by a set deadline. Father admitted nonpayment but argued enforcement failed because Mother did not prove she provided the required documentation—particularly because the underlying bills and receipts were not admitted at the hearing. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, construed the agreed order under contract principles, and rejected Father’s attempt to treat the “furnish by August 22” language as a condition precedent (noting the absence of clear conditional words like “if” or “provided that”). The court held that service evidence—Mother’s attorney’s reimbursement letter to Father’s attorney with an itemized list of providers, dates, and out-of-pocket amounts, plus electronic proof of email service—constituted some evidence that Mother complied with the order’s notice/documentation requirement, and the trial court was entitled to credit that proof over Father’s denial of receipt. The court affirmed the enforcement judgment awarding Mother $30,181 (plus interest) for unreimbursed prenatal and postnatal medical expenses.
Litigation Takeaway
“In enforcement of unreimbursed medical expenses (treated as additional child support), win or lose often turns on proving the process: documented, provable service of a reimbursement demand can satisfy “furnish/notice” provisions even if every underlying bill is not admitted, and a bare “I never got it” defense is unlikely to overcome credible service records—especially where the order’s notice language is drafted as a covenant, not a true condition precedent.”
In the Interest of M.L. and E.L., Children
COA11
In a CPS termination appeal involving repeated cocaine use and newborn/child drug exposure, the Eleventh Court of Appeals reviewed whether the evidence met the clear-and-convincing standard for multiple pleaded predicate grounds under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)—endangering conditions/surroundings (D), endangering conduct (E), prior termination based on (D)/(E) (M), and “born addicted” (Q)—and for best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The record showed multiple positive drug tests by Mother and at least one child, removals of two children, and later relapse while pregnant; but it also showed substantial rehabilitation (counseling, medication management, completion of outpatient treatment, and sustained negative tests) and a Department-supported monitored return that later failed due to the live-in partner’s marijuana-positive test rather than Mother’s. Applying the heightened legal- and factual-sufficiency standards for termination, the court conducted a ground-by-ground audit, requiring a tight evidentiary fit between the statutory elements and the proof rather than relying on a generalized “drug case” narrative. The court therefore affirmed the termination order in part, but reversed and remanded in part because one or more of the challenged statutory grounds and/or related findings (including best-interest as tied to those grounds) were not supported by clear and convincing evidence on this record.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even in strong drug-exposure cases, appellate courts will scrutinize each termination ground separately—so build an element-by-element record. If a third party’s drug use is the trigger (e.g., during a monitored return), prove the parent’s knowledge and protective capacity (or, for the defense, document prompt removal and safety measures). And if you plead “born addicted” under § 161.001(b)(1)(Q), you must prove addiction/withdrawal with medical precision—not just exposure or suspicion.”
In re Francisco Gibran Morales
COA13
In an original proceeding arising from a child possession dispute, the relator sought mandamus relief to force the trial court to sign a written order that he claimed should have memorialized an alleged oral August 30, 2024 possession-modification ruling. He also challenged later possession-related enforcement/interim orders—including writs of attachment and an interim possession order—arguing the court relied on the wrong “controlling” possession order and issued relief without an evidentiary hearing. Applying Texas’s two-part mandamus standard, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals emphasized that mandamus is extraordinary and requires a record showing (1) a clear abuse of discretion or failure to perform a purely ministerial duty and (2) no adequate remedy by appeal. Because the mandamus record did not conclusively establish a ministerial duty to sign the specific proposed written order (i.e., a definite, rendered oral ruling that the proposed order accurately reflected), nor did it demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion or why ordinary appellate remedies were inadequate as to the interim/enforcement orders, the court denied mandamus and lifted its prior stay.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus won’t fix an unclear or incomplete possession record. If you want extraordinary relief in a possession-modification/enforcement fight, you must (1) prove on a clean mandamus record that a specific, definite ruling was actually rendered and that signing a particular written order is ministerial, and (2) explain concretely why appeal is inadequate—especially when attacking interim possession or attachment/enforcement orders.”
Lonis v. Kinzie
COA02
In a Denton County family-law enforcement case, the trial court signed an order revoking a previously suspended commitment and enforcing support obligations, including contempt/commitment provisions and an arrearage money judgment. The pro se appellant attempted to appeal the December 8, 2025 enforcement order but filed the notice of appeal on February 2, 2026—after the 30-day jurisdictional deadline—and did not file any postjudgment motion extending the timetable or any timely motion for extension under the appellate rules. Applying Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 26.1, and 26.3 and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Verburgt, the Fort Worth court held it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the notice was untimely and no extension was sought; the appellant’s pro se status did not excuse noncompliance. The court also reiterated that contempt rulings are not reviewable by direct appeal, so the contempt/commitment portions were independently nonappealable, and any attack on the arrearage judgment likewise failed due to the untimely notice. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law enforcement, deadlines and remedies are everything: calendar the notice-of-appeal deadline immediately for any arrearage money judgment, and don’t try to “appeal the contempt” (contempt is typically reviewable only by habeas if confined or, in limited cases, mandamus). A late notice of appeal without a timely extension request is jurisdictional and will get the entire appeal dismissed—even for pro se litigants.”
In the Interest of J.E.H., a Child
COA07
In a Department of Family and Protective Services termination suit involving a fifteen-year-old, Mother appealed only the trial court’s best-interest finding. The Amarillo Court of Appeals applied the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest framework, noting that unchallenged predicate findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1) (endangering conditions/endangerment/constructive abandonment) were binding on appeal and could be considered as best-interest evidence. The record showed Mother provided unsafe and unstable housing with inconsistent utilities and unsanitary conditions, failed to ensure the child’s medical and educational needs were met, had minimal visitation and support during the year-long case, and did not complete key service-plan requirements (including parenting classes and counseling). By contrast, the child was thriving in a stable placement, expressed discomfort with visits, and wanted to remain with the caregiver. Rejecting Mother’s argument that termination punished poverty/disability, the court focused on concrete safety and caregiving deficiencies and affirmed that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest under § 161.001(b)(2).
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases are won with specific, child-centered proof of safety, stability, and follow-through over time—not generalized hardship arguments. Service-plan noncompliance, minimal contact/support, and unsafe or unstable housing can carry the best-interest finding, especially when contrasted with a child’s documented progress and stated preference for a stable placement; and on appeal, unchallenged predicate grounds will be treated as established and can powerfully support best interest.”
In the Matter of X.M., a Juvenile
COA12
In a Texas juvenile determinate-sentence case, X.M. attempted to appeal a December 2, 2019 adjudication and disposition order committing the juvenile to TJJD by filing a pro se notice of appeal on February 24, 2026—more than six years late. The Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed the mandatory appellate timetables under TRAP 26.1 (deadline to file notice of appeal) and TRAP 26.3 (15-day grace period requiring both a notice of appeal and a timely motion for extension). Because neither a timely notice nor a timely extension request was filed within the rule-based windows, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction. The court also rejected any request to “fix” the problem by suspending the rules, holding TRAP 2 cannot be used to alter the time to perfect an appeal in a civil case. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction under TRAP 42.3(a) and overruled pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate deadlines are jurisdictional: if you miss the TRAP 26.1 notice-of-appeal deadline (and the narrow TRAP 26.3 grace period), the court of appeals cannot reach the merits—no matter how compelling the circumstances. In family-law cases with accelerated timetables, calendar the signing date immediately, file the notice early when in doubt, and do a “jurisdiction audit” before evaluating appellate issues.”
In re Miranda Fredenberg
COA12
In a SAPCR modification case, the mother sought mandamus/prohibition arguing a retired visiting judge lost authority to act once the trial court’s plenary power expired because the assignment order carried forward only “until plenary power has expired.” After the modification order was signed, the visiting judge signed an income withholding order (IWO) after plenary power expired and scheduled/reset hearings on other post‑judgment motions. The Tyler Court of Appeals applied the mandamus standard (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate appellate remedy) and analyzed (1) the distinction between plenary power over the merits and the court’s continuing enforcement jurisdiction, and (2) the scope of the visiting judge’s assignment. The court held the post‑plenary IWO was not void because it functioned as an enforcement tool contemplated by the modification order and authorized by Texas Family Code § 158.102, which allows withholding to issue until support/arrearages are paid. As to other post‑judgment matters, the record did not show the visiting judge ruled on them outside his authority before the presiding administrative judge issued an amended assignment expressly granting authority to handle post‑judgment proceedings going forward. Mandamus and prohibition were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“Plenary power expiring does not necessarily end a court’s ability to issue support-enforcement instruments like an income withholding order—especially when the final SAPCR order anticipates withholding and the Family Code authorizes it. If you plan to attack a visiting judge’s post‑judgment authority, you must build a precise record of what was signed and when, and move quickly because an amended assignment can prospectively cure assignment-scope problems.”
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a divorce case, the trial court’s final decree required the wife to sell a New Mexico residence for “fair market value.” The husband later sought enforcement and a receiver; the trial court found the decree too indefinite for contempt but issued a post-judgment “clarification order” defining “fair market value” and awarding the husband attorney’s fees and costs. While that clarification-order appeal was pending, the Dallas Court of Appeals in a separate appeal partially reversed and remanded the community-property division of the same divorce decree due to a valuation error involving performance units. Because the clarification order was tethered to the now-reversed/remanded property-division framework, any decision about the decree’s ambiguity or the propriety of the clarification would not affect the parties’ rights going forward, making the appeal moot. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the clarification order in full, including the fee and cost award.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you pursue (or defend) clarification/enforcement orders while the property division is on appeal, a later partial reversal/remand of the decree can render those post-judgment orders moot and wipe out associated attorney’s-fee awards. Manage parallel proceedings carefully, consider sequencing/abatement, and preserve independent bases for fees and relief that can survive changes to the underlying decree.”
In re E.R.F.
COA04
In a parentage action, the alleged father nonsuited his petition and the trial court signed an order granting the nonsuit. Because the mother had not filed any counterclaim or other pleading seeking affirmative relief at the time of the nonsuit, the nonsuit extinguished the case. Under Rule 329b, the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction expired 30 days after the signed nonsuit order. The mother later filed a motion for temporary orders and the trial court held a hearing and orally announced temporary possession-and-access rulings, later reducing them to a written temporary order. The Fourth Court of Appeals held the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue any substantive temporary possession/access orders after plenary power expired; both the oral pronouncements and the later written temporary orders were void. The court granted mandamus relief and ordered the void temporary orders set aside.
Litigation Takeaway
“A nonsuit is a hard jurisdictional stop: if the opposing party has not already filed a live claim for affirmative relief, the case is over and the court cannot issue post-dismissal temporary custody/possession orders once plenary power runs. To preserve (or obtain) temporary relief, get an affirmative counterclaim on file before the nonsuit—or file a new SAPCR/parentage case. Void post-plenary orders are immediately mandamusable without proving an inadequate appellate remedy.”
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a Dallas County divorce after a 23-year marriage, the community estate included the husband’s executive deferred-compensation “performance units,” which would pay only upon future contingent events (e.g., IPO, dividend, sale) and could be forfeited. The only valuation evidence was uncontroverted expert CPA testimony that the units had no presently ascertainable fair market value as of trial, but were not worthless and could be divided in kind. The trial court nevertheless treated the units as 100% community property, awarded 100% of them to the husband, and assigned a $0 value in the just-and-right division. Applying the abuse-of-discretion framework with embedded legal-sufficiency review under Texas Family Code § 7.001, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that evidence showing “no current calculable FMV” does not support a finding of “no value,” and the record contained no affirmative evidence that the units were worthless. Because the performance units were a material portion of the community estate, the erroneous $0 valuation tainted the overall division. The court reversed the property division and remanded for a new, proper division of the community estate (affirming the divorce otherwise).
Litigation Takeaway
“Contingent does not mean worthless. If an asset can’t be reliably valued today (executive compensation, earnouts, carried interests, options), a court cannot simply assign $0 without evidence of actual worthlessness—especially if it awards the entire asset to one spouse. Build a record that either (1) proves worthlessness, or (2) supports a division-in-kind or other non-speculative mechanism, and tie any valuation error to overall “just and right” harm when the asset is material.”
Chase Allen Curtis v. Gabrielle Analisa Laplante
COA04
In a bifurcated divorce proceeding, the trial court found an informal marriage existed between Curtis and Laplante beginning in January 2014 under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2), then entered a divorce decree and divided property as community. On appeal, Curtis challenged the sufficiency of the informal-marriage finding. The Fourth Court of Appeals applied § 2.401(a)(2), which requires proof that the parties (1) agreed to be married, and after that agreement (2) lived together in Texas as spouses and (3) represented to others in Texas that they were married—concurrently. The court emphasized that the “agreement” element requires a present, mutual decision to be married, not merely engagement or plans for a future ceremony, and that occasional “husband/wife” references do not, by themselves, establish a present agreement. Reviewing the evidence against the specific date found (January 2014), the court held the proof was factually insufficient to establish the required concurrence of the statutory elements as of that time. Because the divorce decree and property division depended on the existence of a marriage, the court reversed and remanded. The court also held the absence of additional findings of fact and conclusions of law was not reversible because it did not prevent Curtis from presenting his sufficiency challenge; any inconsistency between the decree and findings was resolved under Rule 299a by giving controlling effect to the findings for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
“Informal marriage is a make-or-break issue: the proponent must prove a present, mutual agreement to be married plus Texas cohabitation and Texas holding out, all occurring together on a defensible inception date—not just a long relationship, engagement, or sporadic “husband/wife” talk. Build (or attack) the case with date-specific, corroborated evidence (documents and third-party testimony), because factual-sufficiency review can overturn an informal-marriage finding and collapse the divorce/property-division framework.”
In the Interest of I.R.R., a Child
COA05
In a restricted appeal from a default SAPCR, Father argued the judgment was void for defective service and, alternatively, unsupported by evidence. The Dallas Court of Appeals first examined the face of the record for strict compliance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 106 and 107 and held the return of service adequately identified Father and what was served; Rule 107 did not require the served petition/exhibits to be attached to the return in the clerk’s file, so the trial court had personal jurisdiction. The court then reviewed the default prove-up evidence and concluded it was legally insufficient to establish Father’s net resources, making both the guideline-based current support order and the retroactive support judgment unsustainable. Finally, the court held the record was factually insufficient to overcome the Family Code presumption that joint managing conservatorship is in the child’s best interest; the prove-up lacked substantive best-interest evidence justifying Mother as sole managing conservator with Father as possessory conservator. The court reversed the SAPCR order and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even in a default SAPCR with airtight service, you still must build a real evidentiary record: prove net resources (and show the guideline math) for current and retroactive support, and present concrete best-interest facts to rebut the joint-managing presumption if seeking a sole-managing conservatorship. For respondents, restricted appeals often succeed on sufficiency problems in thin prove-ups rather than on service defects.”
In the Interest of B.D.R., a Child
COA05
In a child-related appeal from the 301st District Court (Dallas County), the appellant’s brief became overdue. The Fifth Court of Appeals sent a delinquency notice directing the appellant to file a brief within ten days and expressly warning that failure to comply would result in dismissal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1). The appellant neither filed a brief nor sought an extension or otherwise communicated with the court. Applying TRAP 38.8(a)(1) and its independent dismissal authority under TRAP 42.3(b) (want of prosecution) and 42.3(c) (failure to comply with a rule/court notice), the court treated the appeal as abandoned and dismissed it, leaving the trial court’s child-related orders in place.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law appeals, missed briefing deadlines can end the case. If your brief is late, act immediately—file the brief and/or a motion for extension with a reasonable explanation before the court’s cure deadline. Silence after a Rule 38.8 delinquency notice is a fast path to dismissal for want of prosecution, even in child-interest cases.”
In the Interest of C.R., a Child
COA04
In a Guadalupe County divorce, the mother alleged a history or pattern of family violence/abuse/neglect and sought to be appointed sole managing conservator with the father denied possession and access (or, alternatively, supervised access). A jury trial on conservatorship resulted in findings (under a preponderance standard in the charge) that the mother should be sole managing conservator and that the father should not be appointed a possessory conservator. At the charge conference, the father affirmatively stated he had “no objections.” The trial court then rendered a decree appointing the mother sole managing conservator and denying the father any possession or access, with findings that access would endanger the child and was not in the child’s best interest. On appeal, the father argued the preponderance instruction was unconstitutional because a no-access decree is “tantamount to termination” and should require clear-and-convincing evidence, and also contended the submission improperly asked the jury to decide an impermissible “term or condition” of possession/access under Tex. Fam. Code § 105.002(c)(2)(B). The Fourth Court treated both arguments as unpreserved jury-charge complaints: by stating “no objections,” the father waived charge error, and the court declined to apply fundamental-error review, noting that even in actual termination cases the Supreme Court requires preservation and that conservatorship orders—unlike termination—remain modifiable (distinguishing cases like *Stary* tied to protective orders). The court further concluded the jury was asked to decide conservatorship status (permissible), and because the jury refused to place the father in any conservatorship role, the trial court properly denied possession and access as a consequence of that status determination. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a conservatorship submission sets up a potential “no access” outcome, you must preserve error at the charge conference—object to the burden of proof and the form of the questions and obtain rulings. Saying “no objections” will almost certainly waive appellate review, and courts will not rescue the issue by rebranding it as fundamental error or “de facto termination.””
In re I.M.
COA03
In an original proceeding arising from Travis County, the relator sought mandamus relief from the Third Court of Appeals but provided a petition and/or record that did not affirmatively establish the prerequisites for extraordinary relief. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a) and the traditional mandamus standard (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal), the court issued a one-sentence memorandum opinion denying relief because the relator failed to show entitlement to mandamus. The court’s summary disposition reflects strict enforcement of Rule 52’s briefing and record burdens and a refusal to reach the merits when the required elements are not demonstrated on the face of the petition and supporting record.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is not a second appeal: win or lose depends on the front-end work. If you cannot prove (with a complete, authenticated Rule 52 record and element-by-element briefing) both a clear abuse of discretion and why ordinary appeal is inadequate, the court may deny mandamus summarily—without addressing the underlying dispute.”
In re Modesto E. Garza
COA04
In a pending Bexar County SAPCR, the relator sought mandamus relief and emergency temporary relief from the Fourth Court of Appeals. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a), the court held the relator failed to carry the Rule 52 burden to affirmatively establish entitlement to the extraordinary remedy—i.e., the petition and mandamus record did not sufficiently demonstrate a right to relief. Because mandamus was denied, the requested emergency temporary relief was denied as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus in SAPCR cases is record-driven: the court of appeals will not reach the equities or treat custody disputes as self-proving emergencies. Build a Rule 52-compliant petition and mandamus record (signed order/ruling, key pleadings, transcripts, and authenticated exhibits) and clearly show both an abuse of discretion and why there is no adequate appellate remedy—or expect a swift denial and any emergency relief request to become moot.”
In the Interest of A.I.M.H., S.R.V. Jr., and F.K.V., Children
COA04
In a Department-initiated termination suit, both parents challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination. The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and termination sufficiency frameworks (legal sufficiency: view evidence favorably to the finding and defer to credibility determinations; factual sufficiency: consider the whole record and whether disputed evidence is so significant that a firm belief could not be formed). The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support predicate grounds—especially endangerment and continued controlled-substance use coupled with refusal/failure to complete treatment—based on Mother’s admissions of frequent methamphetamine and marijuana use, physical evidence of methamphetamine, and an extensive drug-test history (33 positives out of 36 requests, including shortly before trial), along with service-plan noncompliance and untreated mental-health concerns. As to Father, the court affirmed termination and rejected his best-interest challenge, emphasizing his refusal to drug test and meaningfully engage in services, unmanaged mental-health issues (including self-medicating with street-obtained pills), unstable housing/employment, and the children’s trauma responses tied to domestic-violence risk factors. Weighing the chronic, unresolved risk factors against the children’s stability and progress in the maternal grandmother’s home and her intent to adopt, the court upheld the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed termination of both parents’ rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“Termination (and high-stakes custody) cases are won on patterns, not episodes: repeated positive/missed drug tests, refusal or discharge from treatment, unmanaged mental health, and ongoing domestic-violence risk factors can establish endangerment and drive the best-interest analysis. Document the services offered and the parent’s noncompliance, and contrast ongoing instability with the child’s progress and permanency in a stable placement—late, last-minute re-engagement is often too little, too late.”
In the Interest of Q.G., C.G., Z.G. and A.I.G., Children
COA05
In an appeal involving the interests of multiple children, the appellant failed to participate in key post-notice appellate steps: the appellant did not respond to the court’s inquiry about the reporter’s record and did not file an appellate brief. The Fifth Court of Appeals ordered the case submitted without a reporter’s record and set a firm briefing deadline. After the deadline passed, the court issued a delinquency notice giving a ten-day cure period and expressly warning that the appeal would be dismissed without further notice if no brief was filed. When the appellant still filed nothing and made no contact with the court, the court applied the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing want of prosecution and noncompliance and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Child-related appeals can be lost on procedure: if you don’t secure the record, respond to court inquiries, and file your brief by the ordered deadline (or timely seek an extension), the court can—and will—dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution even after a single delinquency warning.”
In the Interest of E.D.A., Child
COA04
In a Department of Family and Protective Services termination case, Mother challenged only the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and the legal/factual sufficiency framework, applying the Holley factors and the statutory permanency and safety considerations in § 263.307. The court emphasized Mother’s admitted heroin relapse, her refusal to submit to any of eighteen requested drug tests (supporting an inference of continued use), her failure to complete key service-plan requirements (assessment/treatment, counseling, parenting class), and her pattern of missed visits as evidence of present and future danger and diminished parental ability. Against that risk evidence, the court credited proof of the child’s stability, bonding, and needs being met in an adoptive foster placement, including testimony about the child’s dysregulation after visits and the foster parents’ structured support. The court held the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases are won on a cohesive narrative: relapse plus refusal to test and failure to engage services can be powerful, forward-looking danger evidence—especially when contrasted with a child’s stability and bonding in the proposed placement. If you represent the accusing party, document test requests and noncompliance and pair it with concrete stability evidence; if you defend the parent, avoid a “refusal/disengagement” record by testing, completing treatment-focused services early, and documenting consistent visitation and objective sobriety.”
In the Interest of T.C.C. and B.D.C., Children
COA05
After a bench trial, the judge orally rendered that Father would pay guideline child support based on minimum-wage net resources and reimburse Mother for the children’s portion of health-insurance premiums. The written final divorce decree signed shortly after trial contained lower child-support numbers and omitted any reimbursement obligation. Months later—after the trial court’s plenary power expired—Mother moved for a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct the decree to match the oral rendition. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the dispute as a clerical “rendition-versus-entry” problem: because the reporter’s record showed the court had already rendered guideline child support on minimum-wage earnings and ordered premium reimbursement, the later written decree’s inconsistent numbers and omission were clerical mistakes in memorializing the judgment, not a new judicial decision. The court held the trial court could correct those clerical errors by nunc pro tunc at any time, and it affirmed the corrected child-support amounts and added medical-support reimbursement term. The court also dismissed Father’s challenges to unrelated provisions (protective order, conservatorship, homestead sale) for lack of jurisdiction because an appeal from a nunc pro tunc judgment reaches only the nunc pro tunc corrections, not issues that could have been appealed from the original decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the signed decree doesn’t match what the judge said on the record, a nunc pro tunc can fix true clerical discrepancies—even after plenary power expires—but it cannot be used to make new judicial changes. Also, appealing a nunc pro tunc order does not reopen the whole divorce; appellate review is limited to the corrections actually made, so missing the original appeal deadline can be fatal to other complaints.”
In re Jesus Ybarra
COA07
In an adult parentage suit, the trial court ordered the alleged father (relator) to submit to genetic testing. Although he sought a stay and obtained a written order plus findings and conclusions, he did not file for mandamus until almost a year later—after the court issued a renewed testing deadline and warned noncompliance could lead to contempt. The Seventh Court of Appeals treated mandamus as an equity-governed remedy and held the unexplained delay was unreasonable and barred relief; a later contempt warning did not “restart the clock” or create new mandamus issues because the relator’s statutory/constitutional complaints (retroactivity, privacy, due process) were the same when the original testing order was issued. The court also rejected the relator’s request to prospectively prohibit a future contempt proceeding on double-jeopardy grounds as unripe and an impermissible advisory opinion. Mandamus was denied without reaching the merits of the challenges to the testing order.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you plan to challenge a genetic-testing (or other intrusive, effectively unreviewable) family-law order by mandamus, act fast—equity favors the diligent, and waiting until enforcement ramps up or contempt is threatened is often too late. Contempt warnings usually don’t reset mandamus deadlines, and appellate courts won’t pre-approve defenses to hypothetical future contempt proceedings.”
In the Interest of K.D.R., a Child
COA05
In a Dallas SAPCR appeal, the appellant failed to respond to the court of appeals’ inquiry about the reporter’s record, leading the court to order submission without a reporter’s record and to set a firm briefing deadline. The appellant then failed to file any appellate brief by the ordered due date and ignored a subsequent delinquency notice that gave an additional ten days and expressly warned the appeal would be dismissed. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1) (failure to file brief after notice) and 42.3(b) and (c) (want of prosecution and failure to comply with court orders/rules), the Fifth Court of Appeals treated the appeal as abandoned and dismissed it without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law appeals, the merits don’t matter if the appeal is procedurally abandoned: promptly address reporter’s record issues, calendar briefing deadlines, and respond immediately to delinquency notices or risk outright dismissal under TRAP 38.8 and 42.3—locking in the trial court’s SAPCR orders.”
In the Interest of T.S., a Child
COA05
In a SAPCR appeal from the 301st District Court (Dallas County), the appellant filed an opening brief that violated Texas appellate privacy/redaction requirements (Tex. R. App. P. 9.9) and the required contents/organization of an appellant’s brief (Tex. R. App. P. 38.1). The Dallas Court of Appeals struck the noncompliant brief, ordered the appellant to file an amended, rule-compliant brief by a firm deadline, and expressly warned the appeal would be dismissed without further notice if the appellant did not comply. The appellant neither rebriefed nor contacted the court. Treating the silence as failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a court order, the court dismissed the appeal under Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1) and 42.3(b), (c).
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law appeals, the merits won’t be reached if you don’t follow the rules. A brief that violates privacy/redaction (TRAP 9.9) or briefing requirements (TRAP 38.1) can be struck; if you then miss a rebriefing deadline and stay silent, the court can—and likely will—dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. Calendar rebriefing deadlines immediately, cure every defect, and if you need more time, file an extension motion before the deadline.”
In re Nicholas David Kiselov
COA05
In an original proceeding arising from a Dallas County family case, the relator sought mandamus relief to force the trial court to vacate its refusal to hold a hearing on a renewed plea to the jurisdiction. The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed the request under the two-part mandamus standard from In re Prudential—requiring a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal—and concluded the relator’s mandamus record and briefing did not meet that burden. Without reaching the merits of the underlying jurisdictional challenge, the court denied mandamus under TRAP 52.8(a) and, because mandamus was denied, also denied as moot the relator’s request to compel preparation and filing of an omitted reporter’s record from a March 5, 2026 hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is not automatic just because the dispute is framed as “jurisdictional.” If you want emergency appellate relief to force a trial court to hear (or re-hear) a jurisdictional plea, you must build a mandamus-ready record proving the court clearly abused its discretion and explaining—case specifically—why a normal appeal is inadequate under Prudential; otherwise, the appellate court may deny relief without ever addressing whether jurisdiction is actually lacking.”
Butler v. Taylor
COA01
In a bench-tried divorce, the husband appealed complaining the trial court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law and challenging the decree’s property division (including a townhome), conservatorship/possession provisions, and child-support ruling. The First Court of Appeals held the husband waived any complaint about missing findings because, although he timely requested findings under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296, he did not timely file a Rule 297 notice of past-due findings. Without findings, the appellate court implied all facts necessary to support the judgment and reviewed the decree under the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Applying inception of title, the court concluded the record supported treating the Yorktown Meadow Lane townhome as the wife’s separate property because she acquired it before marriage; the husband’s testimony that he paid down the mortgage did not change characterization and did not establish a separate-property reimbursement/tracing claim (and the trial court could credit testimony that the payoff was intended as a gift). The court also rejected the husband’s conservatorship/possession and child-support complaints, noting broad trial-court discretion and that portions of the husband’s briefing were inadequately developed and thus waived. The divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a Texas bench-tried divorce, calendar Rule 296/297 deadlines with zero slack: a late Rule 297 past-due notice waives the right to findings and forces the appeal into implied-findings territory, where the court will presume facts supporting the decree. Also, property-characterization and reimbursement claims live or die on proof—deeds for inception of title, tracing documents for the source of funds, and clear evidence on gift vs. reimbursement intent—because abuse-of-discretion review plus implied findings makes reversal unlikely.”
In re Praveen Venkateswara Pinnamaneni
COA01
In an original habeas corpus proceeding arising from a Harris County divorce case, the relator sought release from a civil contempt commitment order jailing him for six violations of agreed temporary orders requiring spousal support payments. The First Court of Appeals emphasized that habeas relief from a contempt confinement is available only when the relator affirmatively shows the commitment is void or the confinement otherwise unlawful, and the relator bears the burden to supply a record demonstrating that defect. Even though no respondent filed a response and the court had temporarily released the relator on a $500 bond while it reviewed the petition, the court concluded the relator did not carry his burden to show any jurisdictional, due-process, specificity, or other facial defect rendering the contempt/commitment order void. The court therefore denied habeas relief, lifted the temporary bond-release order, and dismissed pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Contempt habeas is narrow and record-driven: to get a client out of jail, you must bring a complete record showing a facial/jurisdictional or due-process defect that makes the commitment order void; a temporary bond release or the other side’s nonresponse will not win the case for you.”
In the Interest of A.C. and N.C., Children
COA07
In a Texas parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appellate counsel moved to withdraw after briefing was complete, citing a new employment-based, “irreconcilable” conflict. Because termination appeals are accelerated and parents have a protected right to counsel, the Seventh Court of Appeals declined to proceed on an unclear record regarding counsel’s conflict and the parent’s continued representation. The court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to (1) rule on the withdrawal motion, (2) determine whether replacement appellate counsel must be appointed, and (3) create an appellate-ready supplemental record—including findings of fact and conclusions of law and any reporter’s record of the hearing—by a firm, expedited deadline (March 31, 2026).
Litigation Takeaway
“In accelerated family-law appeals (especially termination), a withdrawal or conflict motion is not “paperwork”—it can stop the appeal. Get a prompt trial-court ruling, make a record (hearing + reporter), and secure written findings and a supplemental clerk’s record quickly, or the court of appeals will abate and impose strict deadlines that can compress briefing and jeopardize client rights.”
In the Interest of Z.P., a Child
COA05
In a child-support enforcement action, the mother sought confirmation of arrears and a cumulative money judgment “plus interest,” along with attorney’s fees. Before the enforcement hearing, the father paid the arrearage principal ($25,420) through the OAG, and the trial court confirmed the arrears as paid and awarded $8,766.65 in attorney’s fees/costs but omitted any interest from the cumulative money judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 157.263 makes interest on confirmed child-support arrearages mandatory when a money judgment is requested; the trial court’s role is essentially mechanical once arrears are confirmed, and a pretrial payment of principal does not eliminate accrued statutory interest. The court reversed and remanded for the limited purpose of adding interest on the previously accrued $25,420 arrearage amount, while affirming the reduced attorney’s-fee award because reasonableness remains a fact issue within the trial court’s discretion even when the fee evidence is uncontroverted.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas child-support enforcement, don’t let a last-minute payment of arrears principal lull you into thinking the case is over—if you plead for a money judgment, interest under Family Code § 157.263 is mandatory and an order that omits it is reversible. Also, even strong, uncontroverted fee proof doesn’t guarantee the full amount requested; position “reasonableness” and tie the work to enforcement necessity if you want the court to award all fees.”
Hirut Assefa Desta v. Abraham Ayalew Wassihun
COA14
In a Fort Bend County divorce, the husband took a default final decree after the pro se wife never filed a formal answer but had sent an email to court staff (addressed to the district clerk, identifying the case and her status as respondent, requesting more time before any default, and providing contact information). About a year later the husband proceeded to a prove-up/final trial without giving her notice; the court signed a default decree with significant property consequences. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court held the wife’s email was an “appearance”/informal answer under Texas law, even though it was not file-stamped or included in the clerk’s record, because it was tendered into the court’s administrative channels and objectively showed intent to participate. Once a respondent has appeared, due process and Texas default-judgment law require notice of the dispositive setting; because the husband obtained the default decree without notice to an appearing party, the decree violated due process and the trial court abused its discretion by letting it stand. The court also held appellate deadlines were preserved via Rule 306a based on the wife’s late notice of the judgment. The default divorce decree was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
““Default-ready” means more than “no answer on file.” Any informal written communication by a pro se spouse that identifies the case and shows intent to participate (emails to coordinators/clerks, letters, faxes) can constitute an appearance and trigger mandatory notice of the final/prove-up setting. If you take a default without provable notice after such an appearance, the decree is vulnerable to reversal for a due-process violation—often without having to satisfy the full Craddock new-trial showing.”
In re Samuel Oyewole
COA01
In a Harris County divorce case, the husband sought mandamus relief after (1) the trial court’s docket sheet showed the March 2, 2026 trial setting was reset to May 18, 2026 following his eve-of-trial recusal motion, and (2) the regional presiding judge denied his third motion to recuse the trial judge. Applying the mandamus standard (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate appellate remedy), the First Court of Appeals refused to use mandamus to second-guess routine docket control reflected only in a docket-sheet entry and further held the mandamus record did not demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion in the regional presiding judge’s recusal denial. The court therefore denied mandamus and left both the May 18 trial setting and the recusal denial intact.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is an exceptional remedy—not a scheduling weapon. Trial resets (especially those shown only by docket entries) are usually treated as ordinary docket management, and recusal denials—particularly after referral to the regional presiding judge and in the context of serial recusal motions—are hard to overturn without a complete, evidence-supported record showing legally cognizable bias and irreparable harm.”
In re A.R.M.
COA08
In an original proceeding arising from a divorce and SAPCR, the relator sought mandamus to vacate various trial-court orders and requested an emergency stay. The Eighth Court of Appeals denied relief because the petition and record did not strictly comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52: the petition omitted required sections and the Rule 52.3(j) certification, provided no meaningful citations to legal authority, and was supported by an appendix/record that was neither sworn nor certified. The court further held mandamus was improper because the relator asserted a final divorce decree had been signed and a direct appeal was pending, making appeal an adequate remedy for the decree and for interlocutory rulings that merged into the final judgment. Separately, the court struck the appendix and mandamus record for containing unredacted sensitive data about a minor in violation of TRAP 9.9 (authorized by TRAP 9.4(k)) and dismissed the stay motion as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus in Texas family cases is unforgiving: (1) strict TRAP 52 compliance is a threshold requirement—missing sections, lack of authority, or an unsworn/uncertified record can sink the case before the court reaches the merits; (2) if a final divorce/SAPCR judgment exists (or you allege finality), appeal is usually the adequate remedy and interlocutory complaints typically must be raised in that appeal; and (3) TRAP 9.9 redaction is mandatory—filing unredacted child identifiers can get your record struck and destroy your ability to obtain emergency relief.”
Vijayalakshmi Nadar v. Thinakar Nadar
COA05
In a post-divorce property-division enforcement fight, the ex-wife sought to compel delivery/transfer of property awarded to her in the 2017 decree (safe-deposit contents, stock, and compensation tied to a Mumbai flat), while the ex-husband countered that she had wrongfully remained in possession of the Plano residence awarded to him and sought reimbursement for payments he made on debt tied to a vehicle awarded to her. The trial court managed the matters together (hearing the enforcement the same day as a bill of review) under a previously agreed scheduling order and limited each side to one hour total; it denied all relief requested by the wife, held her delivery-type claims for the safe-deposit contents and stock time-barred, and awarded the husband money judgments for damages related to her continued occupancy of the residence and for vehicle-debt payments. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the wife failed to preserve any due-process/case-management complaint about consolidation or time limits, (2) the trial court did not err in applying limitations to the wife’s delayed enforcement requests for delivery/transfer relief, and (3) sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s discretionary enforcement remedies awarding the husband $195,000 for extended post-decree occupancy of the residence and $9,600 for vehicle-debt reimbursement.
Litigation Takeaway
“Post-divorce “enforcement” is time-sensitive and proof-driven: delay can bar your affirmative requests by limitations and simultaneously expose your client to large offsetting money judgments for ongoing noncompliance (like staying in a house the decree awarded to the other spouse). Preserve procedural objections (time limits/consolidation) with a timely objection, offer of proof, and ruling, and come to a short bench trial with clean, documented damages and payment histories.”