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In the Interest of I.S., a Child

COA10March 26, 2026

Litigation Takeaway

"If a party timely requests a de novo hearing from an associate judge’s ruling, a referring court cannot sign an adoption order before completing the de novo hearing—and if it does, treat that adoption order as a final, deadline-triggering judgment immediately. File the accelerated appeal and/or plenary-power motions right away; do not assume the trial court can “fix it later,” because post-judgment de novo proceedings may be nullities once plenary power expires or an appeal is pending."

In the Interest of I.S., a Child, 10-25-00077-CV, March 26, 2026.

On appeal from 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas

Synopsis

The Tenth Court of Appeals reversed a termination judgment because Mother timely requested a de novo hearing under Family Code § 201.015, yet the referring court signed an order adopting the associate judge’s termination order before completing the de novo hearing. That premature adoption order was a final, voidable judgment that triggered accelerated appellate deadlines and started (and ultimately exhausted) plenary power—so the trial court could not “cure” the error later by finishing the de novo hearing and signing new adoption/affirmance orders after the notice of appeal.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a termination case, the procedural trap is not limited to SAPCRs. Any family-law litigant using an associate judge/referring court structure (temporary orders, enforcement, modifications, discovery sanctions, custody determinations) must treat an associate-judge ruling plus a referring-court “adoption” order as a jurisdictional and deadline-driving event—especially when a de novo request is filed. The opinion is a pointed reminder that (1) premature adoption can create a final, appealable judgment even when it is procedurally wrong, and (2) once appellate jurisdiction attaches (particularly in accelerated contexts), later “cleanup” hearings and orders may be legal nullities rather than cures.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

An associate judge conducted a bench trial and issued a letter ruling (February 3, 2025) finding statutory predicate grounds under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and best interest, and stating Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Mother timely requested a de novo hearing on February 6, 2025. The associate judge then signed a formal termination order on February 14, 2025. The referring district court convened the start of the de novo hearing on February 18, 2025, but did not complete it—explaining that it had requested the reporter’s record from the associate-judge trial and would complete the de novo hearing once the record was received. Before completion, on March 7, 2025, the referring court signed an order adopting the associate judge’s termination order, reciting (incorrectly) that “no demand for hearing” had been made. Mother filed a notice of accelerated appeal the same day, expressly noting that a de novo hearing had been timely requested and was still pending. Despite that, the referring court later completed the de novo hearing on April 10, 2025 and signed additional orders on April 15 and April 21 purporting to adopt/affirm the associate judge’s termination order.

Issues Decided

  • Whether the referring court violated Family Code § 201.015 (and due process principles) by adopting an associate judge’s termination order before completing a timely requested de novo hearing.
  • Whether the error was cured by the referring court later completing the de novo hearing and signing additional adoption/affirmance orders after a notice of accelerated appeal was filed.
  • Whether the premature adoption order was final and appealable, and what effect that had on plenary power and the trial court’s jurisdiction to act thereafter.

Rules Applied

  • TEX. FAM. CODE § 201.015: A party who timely requests a de novo hearing is entitled to a de novo hearing before the referring court.
  • Presumed harm for failure to hold de novo hearing after timely request: Citing In re N.W., No. 07-17-00409-CV, 2018 WL 1440896 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 22, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.), and Phagan v. Aleman, 29 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
  • Finality of adoption order: An order purporting to dispose of all issues and parties is final and appealable even if procedurally flawed. State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); In re E.K.C., 486 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
  • Void vs. voidable: Procedural error generally makes a judgment voidable, not void, unless jurisdiction/capacity is lacking. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485.
  • Plenary power / post-judgment jurisdiction: TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2005).
  • Judicial action after jurisdiction expires is a nullity: Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 486; see also Martin v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 176 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
  • “Cure” doctrine distinguished: Compare In re Lausch, 177 S.W.3d 144 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding) (describing cure where adoption occurs “under the proper circumstances”).

Application

The Tenth Court treated the March 7, 2025 adoption order as the pivotal jurisdictional event. Everyone agreed Mother timely invoked § 201.015 by requesting a de novo hearing, and that the referring court should not have adopted the associate judge’s termination order before completing that hearing. The dispute was whether later proceedings fixed the problem. The Department argued the later completion of the de novo hearing and subsequent adoption/affirmance orders cured the premature adoption. The court rejected that attempt to “repair” the record because the March 7 adoption order—though procedurally wrong—was still a final, appealable, voidable judgment. That final judgment triggered appellate deadlines and started the clock on the referring court’s plenary power. Because no plenary-power-extending motion or timely modification occurred, plenary power expired before the April 10 completion of the de novo hearing and before the later April 15/April 21 orders. Moreover, Mother’s accelerated notice of appeal reinforced that the appellate timetable and jurisdictional transfer were already in play. Once plenary power expired (and with the appeal pending), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to complete the de novo hearing or sign additional merits orders. Those later actions were therefore legal nullities and could not cure the original § 201.015 error.

Holding

The court held that the referring court reversibly erred by signing a final adoption order on March 7, 2025—adopting the associate judge’s termination order—before completing Mother’s timely requested de novo hearing under Family Code § 201.015. The failure to provide the completed de novo hearing in the proper procedural posture required reversal. The court further held that the attempted cure failed because the March 7 adoption order was a final, appealable (but merely voidable) judgment that triggered deadlines and limited the trial court’s plenary power. By the time the referring court later completed the de novo hearing and entered additional adoption/affirmance orders, it had lost jurisdiction; those later proceedings and orders were a nullity. The case was reversed and remanded for a de novo hearing.

Practical Application

Texas family-law litigators should read this case as a warning that “everyone knows” a de novo is pending does not prevent a premature adoption order from becoming final and deadline-triggering. The trial bench may view a premature adoption as correctable housekeeping; the court of appeals viewed it as a final judgment with real jurisdictional consequences. Key implications for day-to-day practice:

  • Treat an adoption order as potentially final—immediately. If the referring court signs an order adopting an associate judge’s ruling that disposes of all issues/parties (or is intended as final), assume appellate deadlines are running even if it recites incorrect facts (e.g., “no demand for hearing”).
  • Do not assume the trial court can later “finish” the de novo to fix the problem. Once a final judgment is signed, plenary power begins to run, and once an accelerated appeal is filed, the trial court’s ability to make substantive corrections is sharply constrained.
  • In non-termination settings, the same structure can bite you. Consider custody modifications, enforcement judgments, disproportionate property division rulings, or final orders entered after associate-judge trials: if a de novo request is filed and the court nonetheless signs an adoption order, you may have (a) an appellate deadline problem and (b) a jurisdictional problem if the court later tries to redo the merits.
  • For the party benefiting from the associate-judge win, beware “curing” by later hearing. If you represent the prevailing party and the referring court prematurely signs adoption, pushing forward with a later de novo completion may not salvage the judgment—and may waste time while the case becomes vulnerable on appeal.

Checklists

When You Request a De Novo Hearing (Preserve and Control the Timeline)

  • File the de novo request within the statutory deadline under TEX. FAM. CODE § 201.015.
  • Set the de novo request for hearing and obtain a signed setting order (not just coordinator emails).
  • Create a record that the de novo is pending:
  • File a written “Notice of Pending De Novo Hearing” if necessary.
  • Ensure the docket sheet reflects the de novo request and any settings/continuances.
  • If the case is accelerated (e.g., termination), calendar:
  • Potential final-judgment signing dates
  • Accelerated appellate deadlines
  • Plenary-power expiration (Rule 329b)
  • If a premature adoption order is signed, be prepared to:
  • File the accelerated notice of appeal (to protect jurisdictional rights).
  • Consider an immediate motion to vacate/modify within plenary power (crafted to extend plenary power where available), consistent with the accelerated framework.

If the Referring Court Signs an Adoption Order While De Novo Is Pending (Immediate Triage)

  • Obtain the signed order and determine whether it purports to dispose of all issues and parties (finality).
  • Check for incorrect recitals (e.g., “no demand for hearing”) and create a paper trail showing the de novo request was timely filed.
  • Evaluate immediate remedies within plenary power:
  • Motion to modify/correct/reform
  • Motion to vacate
  • Request for nunc pro tunc only if truly clerical (rare in this context)
  • Decide promptly whether to file an appeal to avoid waiver or deadline forfeiture, particularly in accelerated matters.
  • If an appeal is filed, treat later merits hearings with caution:
  • Object on jurisdictional grounds if the court’s plenary power has expired.
  • Ensure the record reflects your position that later actions are not curative.

For the Prevailing Party: Avoid Building a “Nullity” Record

  • Verify whether the opposing party filed a timely de novo request before submitting an adoption order to the referring court.
  • Do not rely on later completion of a de novo hearing as a cure if:
  • A final adoption order has already been signed; and/or
  • An accelerated notice of appeal has been filed; and/or
  • Plenary power has expired under Rule 329b
  • If a premature adoption order was signed:
  • Consider agreeing to timely corrective action within plenary power (before the window closes).
  • Avoid pushing for post-plenary “affirmance” orders that may be void and complicate appellate posture.

Citation

In the Interest of I.S., a Child, No. 10-25-00077-CV (Tex. App.—Waco (10th Dist.) Mar. 26, 2026) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here ~~c4c8a360-2e9d-46af-b3bd-59e8f3716479~~

Thomas J. Daley

Analysis by Thomas J. Daley

Lead Litigation Attorney

Thomas J. Daley is a board-certified family law attorney. He has guided more than 225 clients to successful resolution of their cases over his 18 years of experience.

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