Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA01
In In the Matter of A.M., the First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring A.M. to criminal district court under Texas Family Code section 54.02. The State presented surveillance footage, witness testimony, and officer identification tying A.M. to three aggravated assaults and to a shooting in which Faridah Davis was killed. A.M. argued that his low IQ, cognitive limitations, mental-health history, and prior fitness concerns weighed against transfer, but the court held that the juvenile court could reasonably give greater weight to the seriousness and repeated nature of the violent offenses, the recency of the conduct after release from detention, and community-safety concerns. The court also held probable cause existed on the murder allegation even though the State could not yet prove which shooter fired the fatal bullet, because evidence showed A.M. fired multiple rounds into the occupied vehicle and acted in concert with another shooter. The transfer order was therefore supported by sufficient evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a record shows serious, repeated violence supported by objective evidence like video, witnesses, and law-enforcement testimony, Texas courts may prioritize safety over mitigating evidence of mental-health or cognitive impairment. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to connect impairment evidence to actual risk, parenting capacity, and workable safeguards—or expect the court to focus on dangerous conduct and public protection."
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA01
In In the Matter of A.M., the First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer A.M. to criminal court under Texas Family Code section 54.02. The State alleged three aggravated assaults and one murder, and presented surveillance footage, officer testimony, and psychological and probation evidence showing A.M.’s involvement in multiple violent shootings, including a fatal shooting into an occupied vehicle. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support probable cause and the finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings, despite evidence of A.M.’s intellectual and mental-health limitations. It also held probable cause existed for felony murder under the law of parties even though the fatal bullet was not tied to A.M. specifically, and affirmed the denial of a fitness-to-proceed hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts do not treat diagnoses, low IQ, or mental-health history as automatic barriers to transfer or other protective rulings; they focus on functional evidence, prior interventions, public safety, and whether existing services can realistically prevent further harm. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a concrete record linking behavior, supervision history, treatment response, and objective evidence to the governing best-interest or safety standard."
Shaikh v. Rodriguez
COA01
In Shaikh v. Rodriguez, a diabetic patient sued her rheumatologist, alleging negligent prednisone treatment because the doctor failed to ensure glucose monitoring, warn about steroid-related risks, and coordinate diabetic care, which allegedly contributed to serious vision complications. On interlocutory appeal from the denial of dismissal under Chapter 74, the defendant argued the plaintiff’s experts were unqualified because they were not rheumatologists. The First Court of Appeals rejected that specialty-matching argument and held the qualification inquiry is issue-specific: whether the expert has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the precise medical questions at issue. Because the ophthalmologist and the internal-medicine/critical-care physician tied their experience to prednisone use in diabetic patients, glucose monitoring, risk disclosure, and coordinated care, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the reports sufficient and denying dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
"When defending or attacking an expert, focus on the exact issue in dispute—not job titles or subspecialty labels. An expert need not share the opposing party’s specialty if the expert can show real, issue-specific experience with the standard of care, risk, monitoring duty, or methodology actually at issue."
In the Matter of A.M.
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring A.M. to criminal district court under Texas Family Code section 54.02(a). The State alleged three aggravated assaults with a deadly weapon and one murder arising from multiple shootings, including one incident in which A.M. allegedly fired nine rounds into an occupied vehicle and a passenger was killed. On appeal, A.M. argued the evidence was insufficient on probable cause and the welfare-of-the-community finding, and emphasized his extremely low intellectual functioning and mental-health history. The court applied the section 54.02(a) transfer requirements and the nonexclusive section 54.02(f) factors, held the violent, repeated offenses against persons and the failure of prior interventions supported transfer, and concluded the juvenile court was entitled to weigh public-safety concerns more heavily than the evidence favoring treatment in juvenile court. The court also held probable cause existed on the murder allegation even though the investigator could not identify which shooter fired the fatal bullet, and it affirmed the denial of a fitness-to-proceed evidentiary hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case involves youth violence, courts tend to focus on structured statutory factors and will defer heavily to the trial judge’s weighing of conflicting evidence. In family-law litigation, repeated violent conduct, firearm use, surveillance evidence, and failed prior interventions can strongly support emergency relief, possession restrictions, and conservatorship limits; mental-health or cognitive-deficit evidence is most persuasive when tied to a concrete treatment, supervision, and safety plan."
In re U. L.
COA14
In re U. L. involved a party who sought emergency mandamus relief after a regional presiding judge denied her motion to recuse in a pending Harris County case. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(j) controls and makes a denial of recusal reviewable only for abuse of discretion on appeal from a final judgment, which forecloses interlocutory mandamus review of the denial itself. The court also analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and concluded it lacked authority to order the regional presiding judge to vacate the recusal denial or conduct further proceedings absent a specific statutory grant. The court therefore denied the mandamus petitions.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a recusal motion is denied in a family-law case, do not count on emergency mandamus to fix it. Build a complete Rule 18a record, preserve objections and harm, and prepare to challenge the denial only after final judgment."
Willie Silliman v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Silliman v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could exclude late-produced April 2024 police and recording materials as a discovery sanction under article 39.14 yet still admit testimony about that same prior family-violence incident under article 38.371. The complainant recanted at trial, and the court treated the discovery-sanction issue and the admissibility of relationship evidence as separate questions, concluding that independently admissible testimony was not automatically tainted by exclusion of related exhibits. The court also held that using the excluded materials outside the jury’s presence to refresh recollection did not make the testimony inadmissible because the excluded items themselves were never shown to the jury, and that a timely disclosed May body-camera video referencing the April incident was admissible because its probative value in evaluating recantation and relationship context was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403.
Litigation Takeaway
"Excluding a late-produced exhibit does not automatically exclude live testimony about the underlying conduct. In family-law cases involving violence, recantation, or coercive control, lawyers should separate excluded documents from admissible personal-knowledge testimony and focus objections or responses on relevance, Rule 403, and whether the other side is using testimony as a backdoor way to publish excluded material."
Christopher Matthew Vickers v. Lena Cherie Chaisson-Munoz
COA13
In Vickers v. Chaisson-Munoz, the father tried to immediately appeal protective orders entered after the trial court heard two protective-order applications together with a pending SAPCR modification involving the parties’ child. The court of appeals focused on Texas Family Code § 81.009(c), which delays appeal of a protective order rendered against a party in a SAPCR until there is a final, appealable order addressing child support, possession, or access. Even though the protective-order applications had separate cause numbers, the court held they were procedurally intertwined with the SAPCR because they were transferred to the SAPCR court, heard together, and reflected in an order referencing all related cases. Because no final SAPCR order had yet been signed, the protective orders were interlocutory, and the appeals were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Separate cause numbers do not guarantee an immediate appeal of a protective order when the case is functionally merged with a SAPCR. Family-law litigators should think carefully before agreeing to combined hearings, transfers, or consolidation, because once protective-order issues are heard as part of a child-possession or access dispute, appellate review may be deferred until the final SAPCR order."
In the Interest of S.P. and K.D.C.L., Children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). Father argued the case was based only on his incarceration, but the court analyzed the full Holley-factor record and emphasized that incarceration alone is not enough; here, the surrounding facts included domestic violence against pregnant Mother while Father was holding a child, instability, lack of contact with the children, failure to complete services, no viable interim or post-release care plan, and the children’s significant need for safety, medical care, and permanence. Because the children were thriving in a stable foster placement and the record showed ongoing danger and no realistic reunification plan, the court upheld termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat incarceration as the key fact in a best-interest case. What persuades courts is the conduct behind the incarceration, its effect on the child, the parent’s history of violence or instability, the absence of a workable caregiving plan, and the child’s concrete need for safety and permanence."
Tozee Construction, Inc. v. BNG Management Group, LLC
COA05
In a construction dispute, the plaintiff perfected the jury right by filing a timely jury demand and paying the jury fee, then later tried to withdraw that demand and obtain a bench trial. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 216 and 220, a perfected jury demand benefits the entire case, so the opposing party could rely on it without filing a separate demand. Because the defendant objected before trial and the trial court nevertheless conducted a bench trial, the court held the trial court abused its discretion, reversed the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once any party properly demands a jury and pays the fee, that jury setting becomes a shared procedural right. In family law cases, if the other side later tries to withdraw the jury demand, preserve the issue immediately with a clear written and oral objection; the court cannot force a bench trial over that objection."
Christopher Matthew Vickers v. Lena Cherie Chaisson-Munoz
COA13
In Vickers v. Chaisson-Munoz, the father tried to immediately appeal protective orders entered after the mother filed two protective-order applications while a SAPCR modification between the same parents was pending. Although the protective-order cases began under separate cause numbers, they were transferred to the SAPCR court and heard together with the modification case. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals focused on the functional reality of that consolidation, not the separate filings, and applied Texas Family Code § 81.009(c), which delays appeal of a protective order rendered against a party in a SAPCR until there is a final, appealable order on support, possession, or access. Because the modification case remained pending and no final SAPCR order existed, the court held the protective orders were interlocutory and dismissed the appeals for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A separate protective-order cause number does not guarantee an immediate appeal. If a protective-order case is transferred into, coordinated with, or jointly tried alongside a SAPCR, the order may become interlocutory under Family Code § 81.009(c). Family lawyers should be deliberate about consolidation language, joint hearings, transfer strategy, and preservation of alternative remedies like mandamus when immediate review matters."