Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
In the Interest of N.A.T., a Child
COA05
In *In re N.A.T.*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a father could not use Texas Family Code § 161.005 to undo a prior adjudication of paternity because his mistaken-paternity petition was filed too late. Although he claimed he first learned in December 2023 that he was not the child’s biological father, the record showed he had suspected nonpaternity for years, requested court-ordered genetic testing in the 2009 divorce, and attempted at-home DNA testing in 2012. The court treated the date of awareness as a fact issue for the trial court and deferred to the trial court’s implied finding that Father was aware of facts indicating nonpaternity well more than two years before filing suit in June 2024. Because limitations barred the petition, Father failed to establish the meritorious prima facie case required by § 161.005(f), so the trial court was not required to order genetic testing. The court also held Father did not preserve his due-process complaint and affirmed the support-modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mistaken-paternity claims can be lost on limitations before any DNA test is ever ordered. If a parent suspected nonpaternity years earlier, prior requests for testing, prior statements, or prior conduct can defeat a later § 161.005 petition at the prima facie stage. For family-law litigators, this case highlights the importance of building or attacking the limitations record early and preserving any procedural or due-process complaints clearly on the record."
In the Interest of A.T., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, alleged paternal grandparents intervened seeking standing under former Texas Family Code sections 102.004(a)(2), 102.004(b), and 153.432. The court treated standing as a jurisdictional issue and applied the no-evidence framework for challenged jurisdictional facts. Although the parties disputed whether Brent Taylor was the child’s father, the court resolved the case on a narrower ground: the intervenors produced no evidence that they were Brent Taylor’s parents. Because every standing theory depended on proving that lineage link, pleadings and assumptions were not enough. The court held the Taylors failed to raise a fact issue on grandparent status, so dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"If standing depends on a family relationship, prove every link in the chain with actual evidence. In grandparent-access and conservatorship cases, allegations, shared surnames, or indirect references will not substitute for proof of lineage, and a missing jurisdictional link can end the case before the court ever reaches best interest."
Adrian Ross Bey v. Virginia Pond
COA14
In a bill-of-review proceeding, a father sought to set aside a prior SAPCR judgment. The mother obtained dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, and the Office of the Attorney General separately succeeded in quashing the father’s subpoena. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Rule 91a is categorically unavailable in suits brought under the Texas Family Code, and that this bar extends to a bill of review attacking a SAPCR judgment because the proceeding’s purpose was to undo and retry a Family Code case. The court also rejected the argument that the dismissal could be affirmed under the trial court’s inherent authority, noting the father was not given a proper opportunity to present the prima facie merits of his bill of review. The court reversed the Rule 91a dismissal and remanded, but affirmed the order quashing the subpoena.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use Rule 91a as a dismissal shortcut in Family Code litigation—even in a procedurally separate bill of review. If the case arises under the Family Code, counsel must use authorized tools such as special exceptions, summary judgment where proper, jurisdictional challenges, or a merits hearing, and should preserve error if a court tries to dispose of the case under Rule 91a anyway."
In re Aaron Nicholas Thomas
COA09
After a trial court entered a default protective order, it granted the respondent’s motion for new trial during its plenary-power period based on alleged defective service and lack of notice. The relator sought mandamus, arguing among other things that he did not receive notice of the new-trial hearing. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held mandamus was unavailable because this was a nonjury new-trial order entered while the trial court still had plenary power, so the relator had an adequate appellate remedy: he could seek reconsideration and reinstatement in the trial court and, if necessary, challenge the ruling on appeal from a final order. The court also concluded the complained-of notice problem did not create the extraordinary circumstances needed for mandamus relief, and the order was not void.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-court judge sets aside a default order in a bench proceeding while plenary power is still open, do not assume mandamus is the answer. First build your record in the trial court, move for reconsideration, and preserve any service or notice complaints for a later appeal; absent a void order or truly exceptional harm, appellate courts will expect you to use those ordinary remedies."
Loyo v. Stephen
COA14
In Loyo v. Stephen, a tort creditor sought to execute on real property that had been community property during marriage but was later awarded to the nondebtor spouse in the divorce decree as her separate property. The court analyzed Texas Family Code § 3.202(d) using a plain-language approach and held that "all community property" remains subject to a spouse’s tort liability incurred during marriage. The court concluded that the debtor spouse’s liability was incurred, at the latest, when the arbitrator issued the fiduciary-duty award and the trial court confirmed it during the marriage, even though the confirmation order later merged into a final post-divorce judgment. The court also rejected the argument that the final judgment had to expressly restate the tort finding or attach the arbitration award. Because the liability arose during marriage, the former community property awarded to the nondebtor spouse remained reachable, and the judgment authorizing execution was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A divorce decree does not automatically shield former community property from a spouse’s tort creditors. Family lawyers must investigate pending tort and arbitration exposure before dividing property, because if liability was fixed during marriage, retitling an asset to the nondebtor spouse may not prevent later execution under Family Code § 3.202(d)."
In the Interest of S.K. and A.K., Children
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the mother did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but instead argued that the jury charge improperly defined “endanger” and that her appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge drug-test evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the jury-charge complaint was waived because no objection was made in the trial court, and longstanding Texas Supreme Court precedent forecloses any due-process exception to ordinary preservation rules in termination cases. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because the criminal forensic licensing and accreditation statutes the mother relied on apply only in criminal cases, so counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection. The court affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination cases do not get a free pass on error preservation. If you want to complain about the jury charge on appeal, you must object clearly and on the record in the trial court. And ineffective-assistance arguments will fail if the omitted objection had no valid legal basis—especially when counsel tries to import criminal evidentiary rules into a civil family-law case."
In the Interest of R.R.D. and L.R.W., Children
COA05
In In re R.R.D., the parents tried to directly appeal temporary orders requiring them to participate in protective services under Texas Family Code § 264.203. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and held that because the challenged orders were temporary family-law orders, Family Code § 105.001(e) barred an interlocutory appeal. The court further concluded that § 264.203 did not create an independent right to immediate appellate review, and because the parents identified no other statute authorizing interlocutory jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a burdensome temporary family-law order can be appealed just because it has immediate consequences. Before filing a notice of appeal, confirm there is an express statutory basis for interlocutory review; otherwise, counsel should consider alternatives like mandamus, trial-court modification, and preserving error for appeal after a final order."
In the Interest of A.A., a Child
COA01
In *In re A.A.*, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a termination order based on endangerment grounds after the Department removed an infant following a domestic-violence incident and concerns about the mother’s mental-health stability. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and also legally sufficient on best interest. But applying the clear-and-convincing factual-sufficiency standard, the court concluded the Department relied too heavily on the mother’s past conduct and not enough on the full record showing current improvement: completed services, resumed medication, negative drug tests, recent housing and employment stability, substantial visitation, and a bond with the child. Because that disputed evidence was too significant to permit a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Past endangerment and a strong foster placement do not automatically prove termination is in a child’s best interest. In close child-related cases, lawyers must build a record that addresses present circumstances—service completion, stability, compliance, bonding, and why those facts do or do not reduce risk—because factual-sufficiency review can undo a ruling that rests mainly on historical misconduct."
In re Rachel Michelle Atherton
COA09
In this original proceeding arising from a divorce, the parties’ marital residence was sold under temporary orders and the net proceeds were deposited into the court’s registry. Rachel Atherton argued the residence was the parties’ homestead and asked the trial court to either release enough proceeds for her to buy a replacement home before the six-month exemption period in Texas Property Code section 41.001(c) expired, or toll the exemption while the funds remained unavailable in the registry. The Beaumont Court of Appeals relied chiefly on London v. London and the protective purpose of section 41.001(c) to hold that when homestead-sale proceeds are unavailable because they are held in the court registry, the six-month exemption may be equitably tolled. Because no party showed a valid lien against the homestead proceeds and the trial court’s failure to rule threatened forfeiture of the exemption solely through delay, the court held the trial court abused its discretion. Mandamus was conditionally granted, directing the trial court to timely rule on the motion or preserve the exempt status of the proceeds while in the registry and for six months after delivery.
Litigation Takeaway
"If divorce-related homestead sale proceeds are sitting in the court registry, do not let the six-month exemption deadline pass without action. Ask early for either release of funds or an order tolling the exemption, and if the trial court’s inaction threatens loss of homestead protection, mandamus may be the right remedy."
In the Interest of E.B.J., J.B.J., B.B., and C.B.J., Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). The record showed Mother engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children through severe and escalating abuse of Brian, corroborated by medical testimony, school observations, and the children’s statements. As to Father, the court held that knowing exposure to Mother’s abuse and failure to protect the children likewise supported an endangerment finding. The court also relied on trauma evidence, the parents’ shifting explanations and denials, and the children’s safety and permanency needs to uphold best interest. Because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough, the court did not need to reach the other predicate grounds or the parents’ argument that the Department had to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on pattern, corroboration, and parental insight. A documented course of abuse, failure to protect, inconsistent explanations, and refusal to acknowledge responsibility can support termination—and in non-termination SAPCR cases, the same proof can justify major restrictions on conservatorship and possession."