Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
Jason Murray Davis and Davis & Santos, P.C. v. Graham Weston; Carowest Land Ltd.; Graham Weston as Trustee of Countyline Land Trust; and Kuehler Road, LLC f/k/a Kuehler Road, Ltd.
COA03
In this divorce-related crossover dispute, the Austin Court of Appeals held that former clients’ claims against their longtime lawyer and his firm for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by nondisclosure could proceed despite a TCPA motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs alleged the lawyer had represented Graham Weston, related family entities, and other family interests over many years, then switched sides and represented Graham’s wife in the divorce while using trust and confidential information gained from those prior relationships. The court analyzed the case as a substantive conflict-and-loyalty dispute rather than merely an attack on protected petitioning or litigation conduct. Relying on the record, including prior disqualification findings that described the lawyer as effectively a family attorney with fiduciary duties to Graham, the court concluded the suit was not subject to TCPA dismissal on the record presented and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In entity-heavy divorces, a lawyer’s prior work for one spouse, family businesses, trusts, or the broader family enterprise can create fiduciary-duty exposure that survives early dismissal. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a strong record on the practical scope of prior representation and frame conflict claims as loyalty, confidentiality, and nondisclosure violations—not just complaints about litigation activity."
Harolyn Graves-Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this aggravated-assault family-violence appeal, the defendant argued the trial court wrongly excluded handwritten letters and prison messages allegedly sent by the complainant that she wanted to use to impeach him and to show the nature of their relationship under article 38.371. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion because the defense did not properly authenticate the communications and did not satisfy Texas Rule of Evidence 613 by confronting the complainant with the specific statements before offering the writings as extrinsic impeachment evidence. The court also explained that article 38.371 does not override ordinary evidentiary requirements, so unauthenticated and unsupported relationship evidence may still be excluded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texts, jail messages, emails, and letters can be powerful family-violence evidence, but only if counsel lays the foundation. Authenticate the communication, connect it to the witness, give context, and if using it for impeachment, confront the witness with the exact statement first. Article 38.371 and broad “relationship evidence” arguments will not rescue sloppy predicate work."
Vera v. State
COA03
In Vera v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed exclusion of a defense psychologist’s proposed testimony that stress-induced “fight-or-flight” physiology and alcohol effects reduced the defendant’s culpable mental state during a fatal bar fight. The court held the expert was qualified, but her opinions were too general and did not meaningfully connect the science to whether Vera intentionally or knowingly stabbed the victims; the testimony also risked confusing the jury by effectively smuggling voluntary-intoxication evidence in as a defense. The court further held that Vera was not entitled to a sudden-passion instruction because the escalating confrontation and intervening events did not amount to adequate cause that would render an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving family violence, child abuse, or coercive conduct, expert testimony about trauma, dysregulation, or “fight-or-flight” must be tightly tied to a specific legal issue and the party-specific facts. Generalized psychology that merely reframes intentional conduct as reactive can be excluded as unhelpful, confusing, or an improper excuse narrative."
Lartigue v. Farias
COA01
In Lartigue v. Farias, the First Court of Appeals held that a civil stalking claim under Chapter 85 was not subject to dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The dispute arose after Lartigue, in the context of separate unauthorized-practice litigation, sent repeated emails and placed repeated calls to attorney Farias that included abusive language, threats, and statements implying an in-person confrontation. Lartigue argued the communications were protected because they related to pending litigation and thus involved free speech and petitioning. The court rejected that framing and focused on the gravamen of the live claim: threatening, harassing, repeated conduct that allegedly caused fear and disrupted Farias’s work. Because the stalking claim was based on alleged intimidation rather than protected speech or petitioning activity, the TCPA did not apply at step one, so the court affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss without reaching prima facie proof or defenses.
Litigation Takeaway
"Not every communication connected to a lawsuit is TCPA-protected. When the real target of the claim is repeated threats, harassment, stalking, or intimidation, courts may stop the TCPA analysis at step one. In family-law cases, that makes pleading and framing critical: emphasize the coercive conduct, unwanted contacts, escalation, and safety impact—not just the fact that the parties were already in litigation."
Curtis Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Curtis Johnson v. State, the Amarillo court held that a defendant complaining the State’s article 38.37 notice of extraneous sexual-offense evidence was too vague did not preserve error by objecting alone. The defense argued the notice lacked specifics about the number of incidents, precise conduct, and locations, but never requested a continuance, postponement, or other curative relief to address the claimed surprise. The court treated the complaint as a surprise-based notice issue, applied preservation rules requiring a request for time to prepare, and concluded the issue was waived. The court also found no harm because the defense had long-range notice of the general allegations, heard and cross-examined the witness at the pretrial hearing, and failed to show how more detail would have changed trial preparation or strategy.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your real complaint is trial surprise from vague or late notice of prejudicial conduct evidence, an objection is not enough—you must ask for a continuance, postponement, or other specific curative relief. In family-law cases, this preservation rule matters whenever abuse, bad acts, or misconduct evidence surfaces without enough detail to prepare."
In re Genevience Alexandrie Anthony
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus after a Bexar County trial court denied the mother’s jurisdictional challenge to the father’s SAPCR. The child was born in Mississippi and had lived there continuously with the mother since birth, while Texas had previously entered only a UIFSA support order establishing paternity and support. Applying the UCCJEA, the court held that Mississippi was the child’s home state under Family Code section 152.201(a)(1), so Texas lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination. The court rejected the father’s reliance on significant-connection jurisdiction because that basis applies only when no home state exists or the home state declines jurisdiction, and it also rejected use of the inconvenient-forum statute as an independent source of jurisdiction. The court further made clear that a prior Texas UIFSA support case does not create or support UCCJEA custody jurisdiction. Because improper assertion of custody jurisdiction is reviewable by mandamus, the court conditionally granted relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"In interstate custody cases, start with the child’s home state and keep UIFSA and UCCJEA analyses separate. A Texas support or paternity order does not give Texas power to decide conservatorship or possession if another state is the child’s home state. Before filing a Texas SAPCR, confirm that no other state has home-state jurisdiction or that the home state has expressly declined; otherwise the case is vulnerable to dismissal and mandamus."
Lorkovic v. Lorkovic
COA04
In Lorkovic v. Lorkovic, the Fourth Court of Appeals considered whether a final divorce decree improperly included permanent injunctions and a child-support amount that were not fully resolved at trial. The court held that most of the injunctions were valid because the wife had pleaded for harmful-contact relief and the trial evidence about abuse, safety concerns, communication problems, and interference with possession supported protective restrictions tied to the parent-child relationship. The court also concluded that the decree did not become reversible merely because its injunction language was more detailed than the trial court’s oral rendition. But the court reversed the child-support provision because the trial court never actually adjudicated the amount at trial; it only stated that the husband would owe support and later indicated the parties were expected to calculate the figure or return for a further hearing. Because the decree inserted $650 per month without a prior adjudication of that amount, the support award had to be reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Protective injunctions in a divorce decree can survive appeal if they are grounded in the pleadings, the evidence, and conservatorship-related concerns, even when the written decree is more detailed than the oral rendition. Child support is different: the exact amount must be actually decided by evidence, stipulation, or later hearing before it can appear in the final decree. Do not treat support numbers as decree-drafting details."
In the Interest of E.M.M. Jr., N.M.M., N.J.M., I.A.M., M.S.R., A.L.M., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b). Mother challenged only best interest, so the court accepted the unchallenged predicate grounds as true and evaluated the record under the Holley factors and Family Code section 263.307. The court relied on evidence that Mother and a newborn tested positive for marijuana, the children reported domestic violence, the family lived in unsafe housing without electricity, Mother refused or failed to engage in services, and she went about 175 days without contacting the Department or visiting the children. Considering that pattern of conduct, the court held a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief that termination was in the children’s best interest and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, courts can infer future risk from a parent’s pattern of past conduct—especially when drug use, domestic violence, unsafe housing, and noncompliance all appear together. On appeal, leaving predicate findings unchallenged can be outcome-determinative because those findings will reinforce the best-interest analysis."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brendan Potyondy and Meredith Potyondy and in the Interest of D.P., C.P., and B.P., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision voiding the parties’ premarital agreement in their divorce. The trial court had found the agreement unconscionable based on the circumstances of signing—two days before the wedding, no separate counsel for the wife, and a perceived “double recovery” because the husband’s premarital assets were no longer traceable. The appellate court held that those reasons did not satisfy Texas Family Code section 4.006, emphasized that unconscionability in this context must be analyzed under the statute rather than general equitable concerns, and noted the absence of any finding that the wife signed involuntarily. Because the agreement’s equalization payment was part of the bargain the parties made, not an improper double recovery, the court reversed the property division and remanded for entry of a division consistent with the premarital agreement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts cannot set aside a premarital agreement just because it seems unfair in hindsight or because the signing circumstances look imperfect. To defeat enforcement, the resisting spouse must prove a statutory ground under Family Code section 4.006 and obtain findings that match that theory. For trial lawyers, this case is a strong reminder to build the record around voluntariness and statutory disclosure issues—not generalized fairness, tracing complaints, or lack-of-counsel themes standing alone."
In re Costco Wholesale Corporation
COA14
In In re Costco Wholesale Corporation, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by granting Rule 202 pre-suit discovery based only on a verified petition and attorney declarations. The petitioner sought broad deposition and document discovery before filing a personal-injury suit, arguing she needed the information to identify additional parties and avoid delay from a possible federal removal. The court emphasized that Rule 202 requires proof, not pleading, and that verified pleadings are not competent evidence. Because no admissible evidence was offered at the hearing, and because the petitioner failed to prove either that the discovery would prevent a failure or delay of justice or that its likely benefit outweighed its burden, the Rule 202 order could not stand. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 202 is not a shortcut to merits discovery. If you want pre-suit discovery, you must present competent evidence from a witness with personal knowledge and prove a real Rule 202 necessity; if you are opposing it, attack the lack of evidence, the availability of ordinary post-filing discovery, and any speculative claim of urgency."