Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
Krueger v. Krueger
COA02
In Krueger v. Krueger, the wife tried to amend her divorce counterpetition ten days before trial to add new fault-based theories—including cruelty, family violence, adultery, and waste—and to seek a disproportionate share of the community estate. The trial court struck the late amendments and excluded related business records, affidavits, and supplemental discovery because those theories had not been timely pleaded or disclosed and would unfairly surprise the husband after discovery had already proceeded on different claims. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Rule 63 allowed the trial court to deny the late amendments as prejudicial and that Rule 193.6 supported exclusion of the late-produced supporting evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to pursue fault-based property arguments in a Texas divorce, plead them early and disclose the supporting evidence on time. Waiting until the eve of trial to add disproportionate-division theories can get both the claims and the evidence thrown out as unfair surprise."
In the Interest of V.R., A.R., and M.R., Children
COA02
In In re V.R., the father appealed an order dismissing his child-support enforcement-related motions, arguing the Office of the Attorney General lacked authority to continue withholding and garnishing income and that various procedural defects required reversal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the dispositive associate-judge hearing was not included in the appellate reporter’s record. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and Christiansen v. Prezelski, the court presumed the missing hearing record supported the trial court’s ruling and held that, without that record, the father could not show reversible error. The court also rejected attempts to rely on materials not admitted below and noted that new complaints raised for the first time in a reply brief were not properly before the court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your appeal depends on what happened at the hearing, you must bring the reporter’s record. In Texas family-law cases, an incomplete appellate record usually means the court will presume the missing evidence supports the judgment, which can doom challenges to enforcement, modification, custody, and other post-judgment rulings before the merits are ever reached."
McFarland v. Bouyer
COA11
In McFarland v. Bouyer, the husband appealed a divorce decree awarding the wife the marital residence and argued he was not given a meaningful chance to present evidence. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code section 7.001 and emphasized that a property division is reversible only if it is manifestly unjust and unfair. Because the husband failed to provide the reporter’s record from the final hearing, the appellate court presumed the missing evidence supported the trial court’s decree. The court also rejected his due-process complaint, concluding the record showed he had opportunities to cross-examine, object, testify, and offer evidence, and that his failure to understand how to present electronic evidence was a preparation problem, not trial-court error. The court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge a divorce property division on appeal, you need a full record and proof that the overall division—not just one asset award—was manifestly unfair. This case also shows that courts will not reverse simply because a pro se party failed to prepare or did not understand how to admit evidence when the record shows the party was given a fair opportunity to participate."
In the Interest of D.K.L., D.C.L., and R.R.M., Children
COA13
In this SAPCR-related appeal, the appellant tried to challenge a final order signed on October 14, 2025, by filing notices of appeal in July 2026. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and held that the notice of appeal was untimely under either the 30-day deadline or the 90-day deadline that would have applied even if a qualifying post-judgment motion had been filed. Relying on Mitschke v. Borromeo, the court explained that a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite. It also rejected the appellant’s argument that the final order was void and therefore could be attacked at any time, holding that an allegedly void order still cannot be reviewed through an untimely direct appeal. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if the notice of appeal is late, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction, and calling the order “void” will not save a direct appeal. Lawyers must calendar the Rule 26.1 deadline from the date the order is signed and quickly evaluate other remedies if that deadline is missed."
In Re Jessica Coronado
COA11
In this mandamus proceeding arising from temporary orders in a divorce and SAPCR, the mother challenged the trial court’s appointment of both parents as temporary joint managing conservators and a travel-exchange provision after evidence showed the father physically abused her son from a prior relationship. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 153.004(b) is a mandatory bar to joint managing conservatorship when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse against a child, spouse, or the other parent. The court relied on the mother’s testimony about two bruising incidents, photographs, text messages, and permissible adverse inferences from the father’s repeated Fifth Amendment invocations to conclude the abuse evidence was credible. It also held the travel requirement was an abuse of discretion because the trial court expressly imposed it to burden the mother for moving, not to protect the child’s safety and welfare. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If credible abuse evidence is in the record, § 153.004(b) does more than weigh against joint conservatorship—it forbids it, even in temporary orders and even when the abuse was directed at a stepchild rather than the subject child. For litigators, the case underscores the importance of building a corroborated abuse record and preserving any punitive, child-untethered temporary-order rulings for mandamus."
Mora v. Morales
COA13
In Mora v. Morales, the appellant tried to use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a to extend post-judgment and appellate deadlines after claiming late notice of a final judgment. The court held the Rule 306a(5) motion was defective because its sworn allegations referred only to one lawyer as “counsel” and failed to negate timely notice or actual knowledge as to the client and another attorney of record. Without a proper Rule 306a showing, plenary power expired 30 days after the original judgment, making the later amended judgment void. The court also held that even if Rule 306a had applied, the notice of appeal was still untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the alleged date of first actual knowledge. The amended judgment was vacated and the appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are relying on Rule 306a to revive deadlines in a family-law case, your sworn motion must specifically address the client and every attorney of record—not just one lawyer or “counsel” generally. And even with a valid Rule 306a motion, you must immediately recalculate and protect the new appellate deadlines."
Khaled Mohammad Ikhlas v. Farzana Rasooli
COA14
In Ikhlas v. Rasooli, the appellant tried to appeal an order denying his Texas Family Code section 85.025(b) motion to review, modify, or dissolve an existing protective order. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed section 81.009(a), which allows appeals from a protective order rendered under Subtitle B, and held that a denial of post-judgment review under section 85.025(b) is not a new protective order and does not independently create appellate jurisdiction. The court also refused to treat the attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding because the appellant’s complaints were fact-bound and challenged evidentiary sufficiency rather than presenting a pure legal issue. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat a section 85.025(b) review hearing as a second chance to appeal a protective order. If you may need appellate review, build the record and calendar deadlines from the original protective order; later denials of review or dissolution are likely not appealable, and mandamus will usually require a clear legal error rather than a fact-based attack on the evidence."
WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio
COA11
In WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio, a limited partner sought access to partnership books and records after seeing apparent disparities in distributions and unexplained accounting related to partnership assets. The partnership refused, arguing Fenoglio may have transferred his interest in an earlier divorce, that the records could be used in collateral litigation, and that he had to sign a unilateral confidentiality agreement before inspection. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Fenoglio’s stated purpose—determining whether partnership assets were properly managed and whether revenues and expenses were properly accounted for and allocated—was a proper purpose under Texas Business Organizations Code section 153.552. The court further held that speculation about other litigation, an unresolved allegation that his interest had been transferred in the divorce, and reliance on a general prudence clause in the partnership agreement did not defeat his contractual and statutory inspection rights. It affirmed summary judgment enforcing inspection and the award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law dispute involves an entity interest, frame any records demand around valuation, accounting, distributions, tracing, and management review. This case shows that a proper-purpose inspection right cannot be defeated by speculation about divorce-related litigation, unsupported claims that the ownership interest changed hands in the divorce, or extra-contractual confidentiality conditions."
Ryan Keith Markowski v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Markowski v. State, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for violating a family-violence bond condition under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A). The court rejected his attempt to treat the case like a protective-order prosecution, explaining that the charging instrument alleged violation of a bond condition, not a protective order, so the State did not need to prove the statutory pedigree of a protective order. Applying the legal-sufficiency standard, the court held the evidence was enough because the bond-condition order was admitted, it prohibited the defendant from coming within 200 yards of the protected person’s residence, officers testified the underlying criminal case was still pending, and officers observed him within the prohibited zone. The court further held that the lack of an express expiration date did not make the bond condition unenforceable while the underlying criminal case remained unresolved.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a family-violence bond condition expires just because the order omits an end date. In parallel family and criminal cases, lawyers should obtain the actual bond paperwork, confirm whether the criminal case is still pending, and make sure temporary orders, residence access, and exchange plans do not require conduct that would violate a still-active criminal stay-away condition."
Waleski v. State
COA11
In Waleski v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that a revocation judgment may be reformed when the written judgment incorrectly states the pleas made in open court. Waleski pleaded true to only one alleged supervision violation and not true to the other two, but the written revocation judgments recited that he pleaded true to all three. The court concluded revocation was still proper because one proven violation is enough to support revocation, and Waleski’s plea of true plus supporting evidence established at least one violation. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) and Bigley v. State, the court modified the judgments to accurately reflect the actual pleas and affirmed them as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not ignore inaccurate recitals in a signed order just because the judgment itself is likely to stand. If the written order does not match what happened in court, ask the trial or appellate court to correct it so the record “speaks the truth,” especially where those inaccuracies could affect future enforcement, modification, protective-order, or credibility disputes."