Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1400 opinions found
In the Interest of C.A.B. and P.B., Children
COA05
In an appeal from a post-divorce order terminating spousal support, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the support obligation in the parties’ agreed 2010 divorce decree was contractual alimony, not statutory spousal maintenance under Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code. Although the decree used the label “Court-Ordered Maintenance” and included Chapter 8 eligibility findings, the court looked to the decree’s operative language and structure: it expressly incorporated the parties’ agreement as enforceable as a contract, tied duration to remarriage or cohabitation rather than a statutory end date, required life-insurance security, and made the obligation survive the payor’s death as a charge against his estate. Because those terms exceeded or departed from Chapter 8’s statutory framework, the court concluded the obligation was contractual in nature. The court further held that Wife’s earlier enforcement efforts invoking Chapter 8 did not change the decree’s legal character. It reversed the termination order and remanded because Chapter 8’s modification and termination provisions did not govern this agreed contractual support obligation.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas divorce cases, labels do not control spousal-support characterization—the decree’s actual terms do. If an agreed decree includes support provisions that go beyond Chapter 8, such as indefinite duration, estate liability, or insurance security, courts may treat the obligation as contractual alimony, which changes the available enforcement, modification, and termination strategies. Before filing or defending a support review action, litigators should analyze the whole decree and plead the case consistent with the obligation’s true legal character."
M.D., Jr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to prove constructive abandonment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(N). The court focused on the statutory elements: the child had been in the Department’s conservatorship well over six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child through services and case management, Father failed to maintain regular visitation or significant contact, and Father showed an inability to provide a safe environment, especially given the child’s significant medical and developmental needs. The court also rejected Father’s evidentiary complaints on harm grounds, concluding that any hearsay error tied to assault allegations was cumulative of other admitted evidence. Because one predicate ground plus the best-interest finding was enough to support termination, the court affirmed without needing to resolve every challenged ground.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and custody-related cases alike, courts care more about documented follow-through than stated intentions. A parent facing constructive-abandonment allegations must build a concrete record of visits, requests for contact, services completed, and safety planning; sporadic effort and unmanaged instability will not suffice. For the prevailing party, this case shows the value of proving one predicate ground cleanly and supporting key facts through multiple admissible sources to blunt appellate evidentiary complaints."
In the Matter of the Marriage of William Christopher Cannon and Stacie Lynette Cannon
COA06
In Cannon v. Cannon, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a divorce settlement recited in open court, agreed to by both spouses, and accepted by the trial court became binding once the court rendered judgment on it. After the August 8, 2025 hearing, the husband later objected to the written decree, refused to approve it, and argued the decree was unreliable, incomplete, and unsupported, especially as to provisions for their adult-disabled son. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Family Code section 7.006, and Texas rendition law, emphasizing that the key moment is rendition, not later signature or approval of the written decree. Because the material terms were stated on the record, both parties assented, and the judge used present-tense language showing immediate adjudication, the later decree was merely a memorialization of the earlier rendered judgment. The court held that the husband could not revoke consent after rendition to block entry of a conforming decree, and it affirmed the decree in full, including the continuance ruling and support provisions.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you settle a family case in open court, make the record count: state all material terms clearly, get both parties’ personal assent, and obtain present-tense rendition from the judge. After rendition, a party usually cannot undo the deal by refusing to sign the decree or claiming second thoughts; the real fight becomes whether the written decree actually matches what was rendered."
In the Interest of J.L. and J.L., Children
COA02
In this CPS termination appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 263.403(c) requires the temporary order ending a monitored return to expressly set a new dismissal deadline. Here, after Mother’s monitored return was terminated, the temporary order did not include a reset dismissal date, so the prior dismissal date remained in effect. Because trial began after that existing deadline expired, the case had already been automatically dismissed by operation of law, the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction, and the later termination order was void.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Chapter 263 cases, dismissal dates are jurisdictional and order drafting is outcome-determinative. If a monitored return fails, the temporary order terminating it must itself include the new section 263.403(c) dismissal date; a later order cannot fix the omission. Lawyers should independently calculate every deadline and confirm the signed order matches the statute, or risk a void judgment after months of litigation."
In re Frank Morales
COA08
In this original mandamus proceeding, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly continued ex parte TRO relief that barred a father’s possession of his children. The mother obtained an ex parte TRO based on an unsigned, unnotarized document labeled as an affidavit, and the court later signed another extended TRO months later. The court analyzed Rule 680, Rule 687, and Family Code § 105.001(c)(3), concluding that ex parte TROs must be supported by a verified pleading or valid affidavit, must expire within 14 days, and may be extended only once for a like period absent consent. Because the supporting document was not a valid affidavit and the second extension exceeded Rule 680’s strict time limits, the TRO relief was void. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the noncompliant TRO.
Litigation Takeaway
"Emergency family-law TROs are strictly rule-bound: if you want ex parte relief affecting possession, you need a properly verified record, a valid affidavit, a prompt injunction hearing, and a TRO that expires on time. Courts cannot keep possession restrictions alive through rollover extensions or 'until further order' language, and a parent restrained by a void TRO has a strong basis for mandamus relief."
Hayes v. State
COA14
In Hayes v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a constitutional complaint that the trial judge was biased or partial may be raised for the first time on appeal, even without a contemporaneous objection in the trial court. Using the Marin framework and relying on Proenza, Grado, and Tates, the court reasoned that the right to an impartial judge is at least a category-two right because requiring a party to accuse the presiding judge of bias during trial is often unrealistic and can undermine confidence in the proceeding. On the merits, however, the court found the record did not show the extreme favoritism or antagonism required by due process under Liteky, Brumit, and related cases. Because adverse rulings and ordinary courtroom management did not establish disqualifying bias, the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the complaint is that the judge’s own conduct showed unconstitutional bias, Texas appellate courts may still review that issue even without a trial objection—but winning on the merits requires a record showing far more than adverse rulings, impatience, or stern courtroom management. In family cases, preserve all ordinary trial errors as usual, but recognize that a true impartial-judge complaint may remain available on appeal as a separate due-process issue."
Paige Lindsey Marlow v. Christopher Clayton Cooley
COA14
In a bifurcated family-law case, the trial court tried only the threshold issue of whether Paige Marlow and Christopher Cooley had an informal marriage and signed an order finding no marriage existed. Marlow appealed, but the court of appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because the order resolved only that single issue while SAPCR, child-support, and property matters remained pending. Applying Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. and the one-final-judgment rule, the court concluded the order was not final because it did not dispose of all claims and parties and did not clearly state that it did so. The court also found no statute authorizing interlocutory appeal of this type of order, so it dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bifurcated ruling on informal marriage is usually not immediately appealable if any SAPCR, support, fee, or property issues remain. Before filing a notice of appeal, family-law counsel should perform a finality audit and consider severance—not just bifurcation—if the goal is to create an appealable judgment."
In the Interest of P.G., A Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(f). The case began after the child was born testing positive for methamphetamine, and the Department removed the child and implemented a court-ordered service plan requiring drug testing, counseling, parenting classes, visitation, employment, and stable housing. On appeal, the mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child and that a continuing danger prevented reunification. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because the Department created and monitored a meaningful reunification path through services, testing, and visitation opportunities, while the mother remained unstable, attended only a small fraction of visits, tested positive for methamphetamine during the case, and lacked a concrete plan for the child’s care. The court also upheld the best-interest finding and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas child-related cases, partial compliance with a service plan does not overcome ongoing evidence of current danger. Courts focus on present sobriety, stability, consistent contact, and a realistic caregiving plan—not just whether a parent checked off classes or assessments. For practitioners, the lesson is to build a record showing either a real reunification pathway and unresolved safety risks, or, for the parent, verified proof that those risks are truly resolved by final hearing."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Daniel Maurice Murillo and Lindsey Marie Murillo
COA08
In a post-divorce procedural dispute, the husband tried to separately appeal an order denying his motion to seal records by relying on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a, which generally treats sealing orders as severed and immediately appealable. The El Paso Court of Appeals first examined whether Rule 76a applied at all and held that it did not, because Rule 76a expressly excludes documents filed in actions originally arising under the Family Code from its definition of "court records." Since the underlying case was a divorce, the sealing order remained part of the same family-law case rather than becoming a separate final judgment. The court therefore held that any challenge to the sealing ruling had to proceed within the existing divorce appeal, and it administratively dismissed the second appeal and directed that the filings be placed in the original appellate cause.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, do not assume Rule 76a gives you a separate, immediate appeal from an order about sealing records. If the case arises under the Family Code, Rule 76a likely does not apply, so confidentiality issues must be preserved and pursued within the existing family-law case or appeal using the correct procedural vehicle."
In re Attune Insurance Services, LLC, TWFG Insurance Services, LLC, and Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly consolidated, less than thirty days before trial, a debt-collection suit with a separate insurance coverage and bad-faith suit. Although both disputes stemmed from the same fire, the court emphasized that Rule 174 requires more than a shared background event: the cases involved different contracts, different primary parties, different causes of action, and materially different proof. Because the late consolidation threatened prejudice in trial preparation, presentation, and jury comprehension that could not be adequately cured on appeal, the court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the consolidation order.
Litigation Takeaway
"A shared factual backdrop does not justify consolidation when the suits turn on different legal duties, documents, parties, and evidence. And if a trial court orders consolidation on the eve of trial in a way that disrupts preparation and creates unfair prejudice, mandamus may be the right remedy rather than waiting for appeal."