Opinion Library

In the Interest of E.B.J., J.B.J., B.B., and C.B.J., Children

COA14

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s rights to all four children and Father’s rights to the three girls, holding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence of a deliberate pattern of severe physical abuse of Brian, including multiple hand fractures in different stages of healing, corroborated by medical testimony, school observations, child disclosures, and Charlotte’s testimony describing ongoing abuse and concealment. As to Father, the court held that subsection (E) was also satisfied because evidence showed he knew of Mother’s abuse and failed to protect the children. The court further held that abuse directed at one child can support endangerment findings as to siblings, and that the Department did not need to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances as an element of its termination claim in this post-2023 proceeding. Because subsection (E) and best interest were supported, the court did not reach the remaining predicate grounds.

Litigation Takeaway

"Endangerment cases are built on patterns, not isolated incidents: severe abuse of one child, combined with the other parent’s failure to intervene, can justify termination and strongly influence conservatorship disputes involving all siblings. For litigators, the case shows the value of tying together medical proof, child statements, witness observations, therapy evidence, and parental denial to prove a continuing safety threat."

Property Division

Loyo v. Stephen

COA14

In Loyo v. Stephen, a tort creditor sought to execute on real property that had been community property during marriage but was later awarded to the nondebtor spouse in the divorce decree as her separate property. The court analyzed Texas Family Code § 3.202(d) using a plain-language approach and held that "all community property" remains subject to a spouse’s tort liability incurred during marriage. The court concluded that the debtor spouse’s liability was incurred, at the latest, when the arbitrator issued the fiduciary-duty award and the trial court confirmed it during the marriage, even though the confirmation order later merged into a final post-divorce judgment. The court also rejected the argument that the final judgment had to expressly restate the tort finding or attach the arbitration award. Because the liability arose during marriage, the former community property awarded to the nondebtor spouse remained reachable, and the judgment authorizing execution was affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"A divorce decree does not automatically shield former community property from a spouse’s tort creditors. Family lawyers must investigate pending tort and arbitration exposure before dividing property, because if liability was fixed during marriage, retitling an asset to the nondebtor spouse may not prevent later execution under Family Code § 3.202(d)."

Evidence

Stockton v. State

COA13

In Stockton v. State, the court considered whether statements a domestic-violence complainant made to a responding officer and later to a paramedic, both captured on body-camera video, were barred by the Confrontation Clause after the complainant became unavailable at trial. Applying Crawford, Davis, Bryant, and Texas authority, the court focused on the objective primary purpose of the exchanges. It concluded the officer’s initial questions were asked during an unfolding domestic-disturbance response when the scene was not yet secure and the officer did not know who was involved, whether the suspect remained nearby, or whether weapons or additional danger existed. It likewise concluded the paramedic’s questions were aimed at assessing possible strangulation injuries and addressing immediate medical and safety concerns. Because both exchanges were primarily emergency-response and medical-assessment interactions rather than formal evidence-gathering for prosecution, the statements were non-testimonial, and the trial court properly admitted the videos.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, early body-cam, 911, and EMS statements can carry major evidentiary weight even if the complainant later recants, disappears, or refuses to testify. The key fight is often whether the statements were made during an ongoing emergency and for safety or medical purposes, which strengthens admissibility and persuasive value in custody, protective-order, and divorce litigation."

Child Custody

Adrian Ross Bey v. Virginia Pond

COA14

In a bill-of-review proceeding, a father sought to set aside a prior SAPCR judgment. The mother obtained dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, and the Office of the Attorney General separately succeeded in quashing the father’s subpoena. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Rule 91a is categorically unavailable in suits brought under the Texas Family Code, and that this bar extends to a bill of review attacking a SAPCR judgment because the proceeding’s purpose was to undo and retry a Family Code case. The court also rejected the argument that the dismissal could be affirmed under the trial court’s inherent authority, noting the father was not given a proper opportunity to present the prima facie merits of his bill of review. The court reversed the Rule 91a dismissal and remanded, but affirmed the order quashing the subpoena.

Litigation Takeaway

"Do not use Rule 91a as a dismissal shortcut in Family Code litigation—even in a procedurally separate bill of review. If the case arises under the Family Code, counsel must use authorized tools such as special exceptions, summary judgment where proper, jurisdictional challenges, or a merits hearing, and should preserve error if a court tries to dispose of the case under Rule 91a anyway."

In the Interest of S.K. and A.K., Children

COA02

In this parental-rights termination appeal, the mother did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but instead argued that the jury charge improperly defined “endanger” and that her appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge drug-test evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the jury-charge complaint was waived because no objection was made in the trial court, and longstanding Texas Supreme Court precedent forecloses any due-process exception to ordinary preservation rules in termination cases. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because the criminal forensic licensing and accreditation statutes the mother relied on apply only in criminal cases, so counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection. The court affirmed the termination order.

Litigation Takeaway

"Termination cases do not get a free pass on error preservation. If you want to complain about the jury charge on appeal, you must object clearly and on the record in the trial court. And ineffective-assistance arguments will fail if the omitted objection had no valid legal basis—especially when counsel tries to import criminal evidentiary rules into a civil family-law case."

In the Interest of E.B.J., J.B.J., B.B., and C.B.J., Children

COA14

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). The record showed Mother engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children through severe and escalating abuse of Brian, corroborated by medical testimony, school observations, and the children’s statements. As to Father, the court held that knowing exposure to Mother’s abuse and failure to protect the children likewise supported an endangerment finding. The court also relied on trauma evidence, the parents’ shifting explanations and denials, and the children’s safety and permanency needs to uphold best interest. Because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough, the court did not need to reach the other predicate grounds or the parents’ argument that the Department had to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances.

Litigation Takeaway

"Endangerment cases are won or lost on pattern, corroboration, and parental insight. A documented course of abuse, failure to protect, inconsistent explanations, and refusal to acknowledge responsibility can support termination—and in non-termination SAPCR cases, the same proof can justify major restrictions on conservatorship and possession."

Appeal and Mandamus

In Re Maj. Christina I. Leake

COA07

In this mandamus proceeding arising from a long-running SAPCR, the relator argued that filing written objections under Texas Family Code section 201.015 automatically stripped the associate judge of authority to receive filings, send hearing communications, and continue handling the case. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected that reading, holding that section 201.015 creates a mechanism for de novo review by the referring court after an associate judge’s order, but does not revoke the authority granted to associate judges under section 201.007. Because the relator did not show that the associate judge acted outside the powers authorized by statute, and also failed to establish other mandamus prerequisites such as presentment, unreasonable delay, and a precise record, the court denied mandamus relief.

Litigation Takeaway

"A section 201.015 objection is not a pause button on an associate judge’s authority. If you want mandamus relief, you must identify a specific act outside section 201.007, build a clean record showing presentment and delay where relevant, and act quickly—especially when challenging temporary orders or case-administration issues."

In the Interest of M.S., M.J.S., and N.E.S., Children

COA04

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights because clear and convincing evidence supported Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O) and best interest. The record showed the father used methamphetamine daily, including in the home and around the children, and that his drug use was tied to domestic violence, threats with firearms, neglect, financial instability, and unsafe living conditions. The court relied on current subsection (O), as informed by In re R.R.A., to analyze drug use in context rather than in isolation, concluding the father’s controlled-substance use endangered the children’s health or safety and that he failed to complete court-ordered substance-abuse treatment. Because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough to affirm, the court did not need to reach the father’s challenge to an additional predicate ground under subsection (N).

Litigation Takeaway

"Drug-use evidence is strongest when it is connected to real-world parenting danger. To prove endangerment, build a record showing not just substance use, but how it impaired parenting, fueled violence, destabilized the home, exposed children to risk, and remained unresolved through failure to complete treatment. For parents defending these cases, appearing at trial, documenting treatment compliance and sobriety, and breaking the link between use and child endangerment are critical."

In the Interest of E.J.S., a Child

COA04

In this parental-rights termination case, the mother tried to use a restricted appeal after the trial court terminated her rights in her absence. The Fourth Court of Appeals held restricted appeal was unavailable because Rule 30 requires non-participation in the decision-making event that produced the judgment, and the mother had already participated by filing a verified pleading expressly consenting to termination, acknowledging its consequences, and asking the court to terminate her rights at the scheduled hearing without her appearance. The court focused on the substance of that filing—not whether it was labeled a pleading instead of a statutory relinquishment affidavit—and concluded it made the termination judgment possible. Because the non-participation requirement is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the restricted appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Litigation Takeaway

"Nonappearance alone does not preserve a restricted appeal. If a party files a signed document that affirmatively asks the court to grant relief—even if the party plans not to attend the hearing—that filing may count as participation in the decision-making event and destroy Rule 30 restricted-appeal jurisdiction. Family lawyers should draft consents, waivers, stipulations, and prove-up papers with extreme care."

Modifying the Parenting Plan

In re Jarrod Heath Aaron

COA12

In this original proceeding arising from a SAPCR modification case, the petitioner sought mandamus after the trial court denied his motion to transfer venue from Van Zandt County to Smith County, where the children had allegedly lived for more than six months. The court focused on Texas Family Code §§ 155.201(b) and 155.204(b), emphasizing that while transfer may be mandatory when residency requirements are met, timeliness depends on the movant’s procedural posture. Because the relator filed the modification petition himself, he was a petitioner and was required to file any motion to transfer at the same time as his initial pleading. His later-filed transfer motion was therefore untimely, and the residency facts could not cure that defect. The court held that the trial court correctly denied transfer, retained authority to proceed with case-management orders such as mediation, and did not abuse its discretion; mandamus relief was denied.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you file the modification, file the transfer motion with the petition or lose the right to mandatory transfer. In Chapter 155 cases, strong residence facts do not matter if the petitioner misses the filing deadline."