Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
Waleski v. State
COA11
In Waleski v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that a revocation judgment may be reformed when the written judgment incorrectly states the pleas made in open court. Waleski pleaded true to only one alleged supervision violation and not true to the other two, but the written revocation judgments recited that he pleaded true to all three. The court concluded revocation was still proper because one proven violation is enough to support revocation, and Waleski’s plea of true plus supporting evidence established at least one violation. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) and Bigley v. State, the court modified the judgments to accurately reflect the actual pleas and affirmed them as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not ignore inaccurate recitals in a signed order just because the judgment itself is likely to stand. If the written order does not match what happened in court, ask the trial or appellate court to correct it so the record “speaks the truth,” especially where those inaccuracies could affect future enforcement, modification, protective-order, or credibility disputes."
In the Interest of D.K.L., D.C.L., and R.R.M., Children
COA13
In this SAPCR-related appeal, the appellant tried to challenge a final order signed on October 14, 2025, by filing notices of appeal in July 2026. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and held that the notice of appeal was untimely under either the 30-day deadline or the 90-day deadline that would have applied even if a qualifying post-judgment motion had been filed. Relying on Mitschke v. Borromeo, the court explained that a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite. It also rejected the appellant’s argument that the final order was void and therefore could be attacked at any time, holding that an allegedly void order still cannot be reviewed through an untimely direct appeal. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if the notice of appeal is late, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction, and calling the order “void” will not save a direct appeal. Lawyers must calendar the Rule 26.1 deadline from the date the order is signed and quickly evaluate other remedies if that deadline is missed."
Krueger v. Krueger
COA02
In Krueger v. Krueger, the wife tried to amend her divorce counterpetition ten days before trial to add new fault-based theories—including cruelty, family violence, adultery, and waste—and to seek a disproportionate share of the community estate. The trial court struck the late amendments and excluded related business records, affidavits, and supplemental discovery because those theories had not been timely pleaded or disclosed and would unfairly surprise the husband after discovery had already proceeded on different claims. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Rule 63 allowed the trial court to deny the late amendments as prejudicial and that Rule 193.6 supported exclusion of the late-produced supporting evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to pursue fault-based property arguments in a Texas divorce, plead them early and disclose the supporting evidence on time. Waiting until the eve of trial to add disproportionate-division theories can get both the claims and the evidence thrown out as unfair surprise."
Khaled Mohammad Ikhlas v. Farzana Rasooli
COA14
In Ikhlas v. Rasooli, the appellant tried to appeal an order denying his Texas Family Code section 85.025(b) motion to review, modify, or dissolve an existing protective order. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed section 81.009(a), which allows appeals from a protective order rendered under Subtitle B, and held that a denial of post-judgment review under section 85.025(b) is not a new protective order and does not independently create appellate jurisdiction. The court also refused to treat the attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding because the appellant’s complaints were fact-bound and challenged evidentiary sufficiency rather than presenting a pure legal issue. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat a section 85.025(b) review hearing as a second chance to appeal a protective order. If you may need appellate review, build the record and calendar deadlines from the original protective order; later denials of review or dissolution are likely not appealable, and mandamus will usually require a clear legal error rather than a fact-based attack on the evidence."
Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina
COA09
In Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina, the Beaumont Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the parties had an informal marriage under Texas Family Code section 2.401. Medina sought to prove a common-law marriage as part of her divorce and property-division case, while Lara argued the evidence was insufficient because the parties filed separate taxes, lacked joint financial accounts, and did not consistently use traditional marital markers. The court analyzed the totality of the evidence under the three statutory elements—agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others as married—and emphasized that, in a bench trial without findings of fact, implied findings favor the judgment if supported by the record. Crediting testimony that the parties lived together as husband and wife, introduced each other as spouses, celebrated their marriage, and were described in at least one property-related document as husband and wife, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the informal-marriage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informal-marriage cases are usually decided on credibility and record-building, not on whether the couple checked every traditional marriage box. If there is some evidence of agreement, cohabitation as spouses, and holding out, appellate courts will heavily defer to the trial judge—especially when no findings of fact are requested. For lawyers, that means the real battle is at trial: build corroboration if you are proving the marriage, and do more than point to separate finances or tax filings if you are trying to defeat it."
In the Interest of J.G.S., a Child
COA01
In In re J.G.S., the First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights and held that her complaint that the Department failed to provide ADA accommodations in her service plan was waived because she never raised it in the trial court. Mother argued the court should overlook preservation because termination implicates fundamental rights and because Family Code section 161.001(f) and (g) require the Department to prove reasonable efforts to return the child. The court rejected both arguments, reaffirmed In re C.M., and concluded that an ADA-based challenge to reunification services remains an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved below. The court also held that Mother’s request for more time, based only on scheduling and technical problems, did not preserve a disability-accommodation complaint, and it affirmed the termination order on the challenged predicate grounds and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"If disability affects a parent’s ability to complete services or participate in a family-law case, do not assume the court or opposing party’s awareness preserves the issue. Make a specific ADA or accommodation request on the record, tie it to the client’s actual limitations, seek a ruling, and connect any continuance or extension request to that accommodation need. In Texas family cases, even in termination appeals, unpreserved accommodation complaints are likely waived."
In Re Jessica Coronado
COA11
In this mandamus proceeding arising from temporary orders in a divorce and SAPCR, the mother challenged the trial court’s appointment of both parents as temporary joint managing conservators and a travel-exchange provision after evidence showed the father physically abused her son from a prior relationship. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 153.004(b) is a mandatory bar to joint managing conservatorship when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse against a child, spouse, or the other parent. The court relied on the mother’s testimony about two bruising incidents, photographs, text messages, and permissible adverse inferences from the father’s repeated Fifth Amendment invocations to conclude the abuse evidence was credible. It also held the travel requirement was an abuse of discretion because the trial court expressly imposed it to burden the mother for moving, not to protect the child’s safety and welfare. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If credible abuse evidence is in the record, § 153.004(b) does more than weigh against joint conservatorship—it forbids it, even in temporary orders and even when the abuse was directed at a stepchild rather than the subject child. For litigators, the case underscores the importance of building a corroborated abuse record and preserving any punitive, child-untethered temporary-order rulings for mandamus."
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, the appellant tried to challenge a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring him for criminal prosecution as an adult only after he was later convicted in criminal court. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code sections 54.02 and 56.01 together with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and held that a juvenile transfer order is directly appealable as an accelerated appeal. That means the notice of appeal had to be filed in the juvenile court within 20 days after the transfer order was signed. Because the transfer order was signed on November 1, 2024, and the only notice of appeal was filed in the criminal case on April 6, 2026, the notice was both untimely and filed in the wrong court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and did not reach the merits of the transfer challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the Family Code creates a direct, accelerated appeal, lawyers must act immediately, file in the correct court, and not assume the issue can be preserved for review after a later final judgment in a related case. A trial-court certification or later criminal judgment cannot cure a missed statutory appellate deadline."
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed whether a juvenile-transfer order under Texas Family Code section 54.02 could be challenged through a later criminal appeal after conviction. The juvenile court had signed a November 1, 2024 order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring Gonzales for adult criminal prosecution, but Gonzales did not file a notice of appeal in the juvenile court within 20 days. Instead, he filed a notice of appeal in the criminal case after his April 2, 2026 conviction. The court analyzed sections 54.02 and 56.01 of the Family Code together with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and held that a transfer order is directly appealable, the appeal is accelerated, and the notice of appeal must be filed in the juvenile court within 20 days after the transfer order is signed. Because Gonzales filed only an untimely post-conviction notice in the criminal case, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a Family Code order is immediately appealable, lawyers must identify the correct order, file in the correct court, and meet the statute-driven deadline. A later judgment, trial-court certification, or notice filed in a related case will not revive a missed appeal deadline or create appellate jurisdiction."
In the Interest of J.W.H. and T.L.H., Children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the paternal grandparents lacked standing to bring an original SAPCR under Texas Family Code § 102.004(a)(1) because they did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence as of the filing date, that Mother’s specific conduct would probably cause significant impairment to the children’s physical health or emotional development. The court analyzed the grandparents’ allegations about marijuana use, leaving a child unattended, educational problems, and cohabitation through the required filing-date lens and concluded the evidence showed only generalized concerns, stale events, or post-filing developments—not present circumstances meeting the statute’s high threshold. Because standing is jurisdictional, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, so the court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the suit.
Litigation Takeaway
"In third-party custody cases, standing is a jurisdictional hurdle that must be proven with date-specific evidence at the time of filing. Nonparents cannot rely on sympathy, family conflict, lifestyle criticism, old incidents, or proof they could provide a better home; they must tie a parent’s identifiable conduct to probable significant impairment. For parents’ counsel, this case is a strong blueprint for an early plea to the jurisdiction."