Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
In Re Maj. Christina I. Leake
COA07
In this mandamus proceeding arising from a long-running SAPCR, the relator argued that filing written objections under Texas Family Code section 201.015 automatically stripped the associate judge of authority to receive filings, send hearing communications, and continue handling the case. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected that reading, holding that section 201.015 creates a mechanism for de novo review by the referring court after an associate judge’s order, but does not revoke the authority granted to associate judges under section 201.007. Because the relator did not show that the associate judge acted outside the powers authorized by statute, and also failed to establish other mandamus prerequisites such as presentment, unreasonable delay, and a precise record, the court denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"A section 201.015 objection is not a pause button on an associate judge’s authority. If you want mandamus relief, you must identify a specific act outside section 201.007, build a clean record showing presentment and delay where relevant, and act quickly—especially when challenging temporary orders or case-administration issues."
In the Interest of M.S., M.J.S., and N.E.S., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights because clear and convincing evidence supported Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O) and best interest. The record showed the father used methamphetamine daily, including in the home and around the children, and that his drug use was tied to domestic violence, threats with firearms, neglect, financial instability, and unsafe living conditions. The court relied on current subsection (O), as informed by In re R.R.A., to analyze drug use in context rather than in isolation, concluding the father’s controlled-substance use endangered the children’s health or safety and that he failed to complete court-ordered substance-abuse treatment. Because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough to affirm, the court did not need to reach the father’s challenge to an additional predicate ground under subsection (N).
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug-use evidence is strongest when it is connected to real-world parenting danger. To prove endangerment, build a record showing not just substance use, but how it impaired parenting, fueled violence, destabilized the home, exposed children to risk, and remained unresolved through failure to complete treatment. For parents defending these cases, appearing at trial, documenting treatment compliance and sobriety, and breaking the link between use and child endangerment are critical."
Ware v. State
COA06
In Ware v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals considered whether admitting a community supervision officer’s testimony about a police officer’s allegations concerning GPS-monitor tampering violated the Confrontation Clause or due process. Rather than decide the broader constitutional question, the court assumed error and conducted a harm analysis. It held any error was harmless because Ware himself admitted two independent violations of his deferred-adjudication conditions: removing the GPS monitor and failing to report when directed. Because Texas law permits revocation or adjudication based on proof of just one violation, those admissions independently supported the trial court’s judgment. The court also held Ware failed to preserve any complaint about the denial of his continuance motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any enforcement-style hearing, evidentiary objections may not matter on appeal if your client’s own testimony proves an independent violation. Preserve error, but also build or defend the record with harmless-error analysis in mind: one admitted breach can be enough to sustain the ruling."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Jerry Bracken and Cristina Bracken and in the Interest of H.L.B., a Child
COA07
In this Texas divorce and SAPCR appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed a post-answer default divorce decree because the mother, who had filed an answer, did not appear at final trial and the record did not show she received notice of the final trial setting. The court rejected arguments that notice could be inferred from docket entries, withdrawal papers, or counsel’s representations, especially where former counsel had withdrawn and the withdrawal order required specific methods of future service that the record did not show were followed. Applying Mathis v. Lockwood and Highsmith v. Highsmith, the court held that a party who has appeared is entitled to due-process notice of trial, and when notice is lacking, the first Craddock element is established as a matter of law without needing to prove the remaining prongs. The trial court therefore abused its discretion by letting the post-answer default stand, and the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side has answered, you cannot safely take a final family-law default unless the record affirmatively proves notice of the trial setting to the party herself—especially after counsel withdraws. Docket references, vague service records, and lawyer argument are not enough. For challengers, lack of trial-setting notice is often the cleanest path to reversal because it satisfies Craddock’s first prong automatically and can require a new trial without litigating the merits."
In the Interest of P.A., Jr., L.L.-A., and S.A., Children
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and on best interest. The court relied on evidence of repeated methamphetamine use, multiple refused or missed drug tests, failure to complete treatment and court-ordered services, instability, and unsafe parental decision-making, including Mother’s association with a dangerous individual. The court held that this pattern supported findings that the children were exposed to endangering conditions and that the parents engaged in a continuing course of endangering conduct. The children’s success in a safe kinship placement supported the best-interest finding. As to Mother, the court also noted that unchallenged predicate findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(I) and (P) independently supported affirmance.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas child-related cases, courts can infer endangerment from a pattern of drug use, test avoidance, service-plan noncompliance, and unsafe associates even without one dramatic harmful event. For trial lawyers, small facts build a powerful endangerment record; for appellate lawyers, failing to challenge every predicate ground can forfeit the appeal."
In the Interest of C.S. Jr. and Z.S., Children
SCOTX
The Texas Supreme Court held that Family Code § 263.401(a) is strictly jurisdictional: if trial does not begin by the dismissal date and no extension is actually granted before that date, the case is automatically dismissed by operation of law. In this termination case, the trial judge said she was 'going to have to grant' an extension and asked counsel to submit an extension order before the deadline, but no order was signed and no other operative ruling granting an extension was made before the dismissal date. The Court analyzed the judge’s statements as expressing future intent rather than a present judicial act, concluded jurisdiction expired on the statutory deadline, and vacated the trial court’s termination judgment and the court of appeals’ judgment as void for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not rely on a judge’s anticipated ruling when a jurisdictional deadline is approaching. If continued jurisdiction depends on an extension or other time-sensitive ruling, make sure the record shows the court actually granted it before the deadline through a clear oral ruling, docket entry, and preferably a signed written order."
In the Interest of L.E.-N.N., C.J.W. and C.R.W., Children
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, Mother argued the trial court erred by trying the case to the bench after she had requested a jury. The court held that filing a jury demand perfects the right to a jury but does not, by itself, preserve appellate error. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and prior Dallas precedent, the court focused on the trial record: when the case was called, Mother did not appear, her counsel appeared and participated, and neither Mother nor counsel objected to proceeding without a jury. Because no timely, specific objection was made when the court conducted the non-jury trial, any complaint about denial of a jury trial was waived. The court therefore affirmed the final SAPCR order appointing conservators and restricting Mother’s access.
Litigation Takeaway
"A jury demand is not self-executing error preservation. In Texas family cases, if the court proceeds without a jury, counsel must object on the record then and there—even if the client is absent, difficult, or claiming to proceed pro se—or the jury-trial complaint is likely waived on appeal."
In the Interest of K.N., K.L., K.L., and K.L., Children
SCOTX
The Texas Supreme Court held that termination for endangerment under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) must be proven separately as to each parent by clear-and-convincing, legally and factually sufficient evidence. The Court rejected an approach that treated the family’s overall dysfunction as enough to terminate both parents’ rights. It upheld termination as to one parent because the record showed direct abuse allegations, visible injuries, threats against a reporter, obstruction of the investigation, refusal of services, and failure to address known safety risks. But it reversed as to the other parent because the evidence was too generalized and relied too heavily on association with the abusive household rather than parent-specific proof of knowing placement, knowing allowance, or endangering conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Serious parental restrictions and termination findings require parent-specific proof. If you want relief against a particular parent, build a record showing exactly what that parent did, knew, allowed, or refused to do—not just that the household was chaotic or another parent was abusive."
Headrick v. State
COA05
In Headrick v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld revocation of deferred adjudication after the State alleged the defendant violated a no-contact condition by emailing his daughter. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard and held the State only had to prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. It concluded circumstantial evidence was enough to identify Headrick as the sender, including the parties’ prior Wordle-related communication pattern, his access to the daughter’s email account through an iPad at his home, and the daughter’s testimony recognizing the message as coming from him. The court also held that Headrick waived any complaint that the motion to adjudicate was too vague because he did not file a motion to quash in the trial court. The adjudication and sentence were therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When disputed electronic contact is at issue, courts may find authorship based on a mosaic of circumstantial evidence rather than direct forensic proof. For family-law litigators, the case is a strong reminder to build pattern-and-access evidence for no-contact, enforcement, and protective-order disputes—and to preserve any pleading-specificity or notice complaint in the trial court, or lose it on appeal."
Headrick v. State
COA05
In Headrick v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant waived any complaint that the State’s motion to adjudicate was too vague because he never filed a motion to quash in the trial court. The State alleged only that Headrick had made contact with his daughter in violation of a no-contact condition of deferred adjudication, and on appeal he argued that the pleading lacked enough detail to give adequate notice. The court did not reach the merits of that notice argument, instead applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and longstanding revocation precedent requiring a timely motion to quash to preserve pleading-specificity complaints. The court also upheld the adjudication on the merits, concluding the daughter’s testimony and surrounding circumstances were sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Headrick made the prohibited contact, and it rejected the disproportionality challenge to the within-range sentences.
Litigation Takeaway
"If an enforcement, contempt, modification, or other family-law pleading is too vague to let your client prepare a defense, do not save that complaint for appeal. File a specific motion to quash, special exception, or other targeted objection in the trial court and get a ruling, because notice defects that could have been cured will usually be treated as waived."