Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
Kelsey v. Rocha
COA13
In Kelsey v. Rocha, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a bill of review seeking to set aside an agreed divorce decree nearly four years after it became final. Kelsey argued the decree was procured through fraud and duress, mischaracterized his separate property as community property, awarded Rocha an unfair share of the estate, and was invalid because no marriage existed. The court applied Texas’s strict bill-of-review standard, requiring proof of a meritorious claim or defense, wrongful prevention from asserting it, and that the failure to assert it was unmixed with the petitioner’s own fault or negligence. The court emphasized that Kelsey had been served, participated in the divorce, and signed a notarized agreed decree containing recitals that he read and understood it and signed voluntarily without coercion or duress. His complaints largely attacked the substantive correctness of the property division—issues for direct appeal, not a late equitable attack—and he failed to show he was prevented from raising them earlier. Because he did not satisfy the elements for bill-of-review relief, the court held the trial court properly denied his petition and left the agreed divorce decree in place.
Litigation Takeaway
"Final agreed divorce decrees are extremely hard to unwind through a bill of review. If a party believes property was mischaracterized, the division was unjust, or the marriage itself is disputed, those issues must be raised and preserved in the original case or by direct post-judgment review. Strong decree recitals about voluntariness, understanding, and fairness can be powerful protection against later attacks."
Tutt v. State
COA02
In Tutt v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a domestic-violence conviction after rejecting a hearsay challenge to the complainant’s on-scene statements and a sufficiency challenge to habitual-offender enhancement proof. Officers forced entry after a distress call and scream, then found the complainant frightened, crying, and bearing fresh cuts. The court held that her statements to the responding officer that Tutt had cut her arm and choked her were admissible as excited utterances because the circumstances showed a startling event, close temporal proximity, ongoing stress, and statements directly related to the assault. The court also held that, under the totality of the evidence, the State sufficiently linked Tutt to two prior Missouri felony convictions for enhancement purposes. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving family violence, on-scene statements to police, 911 narratives, and similar contemporaneous disclosures are far more likely to come in when you can show immediacy, fear, fresh injuries, and little time for reflection. Build or attack the evidentiary mosaic—timing, demeanor, corroborating texts, photos, dispatch records, and officer observations—because those surrounding facts often determine whether violence evidence shapes custody, protective-order, and divorce outcomes."
In the Interest of G.L.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no nonfrivolous issues. The Eleventh Court independently reviewed the record and held the evidence was legally sufficient to support termination under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), based on the mother’s pattern of drug and alcohol abuse and the resulting danger to the child, as well as the best-interest finding. The court also held that the trial court improperly relied on former section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because that predicate ground had been repealed by the 2025 amendments and the case was still pending after the amendment’s effective date. Rather than reverse, the court modified the termination order to delete the void subsection (O) finding, affirmed the order as modified, and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two practical lessons stand out: first, family-law lawyers must update pleadings and proposed orders for statutory changes because a repealed predicate ground can become void in a pending case; second, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) remain critically important on appeal because they can sustain termination and carry collateral consequences in future custody litigation. The case also reminds appointed counsel that an Anders affirmance does not automatically end representation in a termination appeal."
In the Interest of P.S.R.F., D.M.R.F., D.A.R., P.R.R., B.I.R., B.E.R., B.L.R., and Y.R.R., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to eight children after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief and the court independently reviewed the record for any nonfrivolous appellate issue. The court emphasized that the evidence supported endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), relying on proof of the mother’s continuing pattern of drug abuse and the resulting danger and instability for the children, which showed a substantial risk of harm and parental incapacity. Because no arguable challenge existed to the predicate grounds or best-interest finding, the court affirmed, but it denied appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M. because appointed counsel’s duties continue through exhaustion of appeals.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and custody-related litigation, substance-abuse evidence is most powerful when developed as an ongoing pattern tied directly to child danger, instability, and impaired parenting—not as isolated bad acts. Appellate lawyers should also remember that Anders review in parental-rights cases requires meaningful attention to § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) findings, and appointed counsel usually must stay on the case through the petition-for-review stage."
McBride v. Rios-Flores
COA08
In McBride v. Rios-Flores, the Eighth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the underlying family-law dispute because the appeal failed on briefing. After striking the appellant’s original brief for noncompliance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4 and 38.1, the court gave notice, a deadline to cure, and an express warning that continued noncompliance could result in dismissal. The appellant timely filed an amended brief, but it still consisted largely of conclusory bullet points with almost no meaningful record citations and no developed legal analysis connecting authority to the facts. Applying Rules 38.1, 38.9(a), 38.8(a), 42.3, and 44.3, the court explained that while briefing rules are construed liberally to preserve appellate review, that liberality does not require the court to research arguments or search the record on a party’s behalf. Because the amended brief still flagrantly violated the appellate rules after an opportunity to cure, the court struck the brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-law appeal can be lost before the court ever reaches custody, modification, support, or property issues if the brief does not actually brief them. Conclusory complaints, bare statutory citations, and weak record references are not enough; the appellant must identify the ruling challenged, state the standard of review, cite the controlling law and the exact record support, and explain why reversal is required. For appellees, this case is a useful reminder that persistent, serious briefing defects can justify waiver arguments, a motion to strike, and ultimately dismissal after notice and an opportunity to cure."
In re Levi Hardy
COA08
After a bench-trial divorce decree was signed, the wife moved for new trial and, after the original judge recused, a successor judge granted the motion without stating reasons. The husband sought mandamus, arguing the order was arbitrary because it set aside a nonjury decree without explanation and was entered by a judge who had not heard the evidence. The Eighth Court of Appeals denied relief, holding that the Texas Supreme Court’s merits-based mandamus review of new-trial orders under Columbia Medical, United Scaffolding, and Toyota is tied to protection of the constitutional right to a jury trial and has not been extended to bench-trial family-law cases. Because this was a nonjury divorce case and the relator did not show the order was void or otherwise exceptionally subject to mandamus review, any complaint about the new-trial ruling must await appeal after a new final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law bench trials, do not count on mandamus to undo an order granting new trial—even if the order gives no reasons and even if a successor judge entered it. Treat motions for new trial as a serious merits threat, make a full record in opposition, preserve findings and post-judgment issues carefully, and prepare for retrial unless you have a true voidness or other extraordinary mandamus ground."
In the Interest of E.A.A., a Child
COA12
In *In the Interest of E.A.A., a Child*, the Twelfth Court of Appeals dismissed a child-related appeal after the pro se appellant failed to file the docketing statement required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. The court sent two notices and gave the appellant an opportunity to cure, but no docketing statement was filed by the final deadline. Applying Rule 42.3(c), the court held dismissal was proper because the appellant failed to comply with the appellate rules after notice. The court also emphasized that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as attorneys, so self-representation did not excuse the default.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family-law appeals can be lost before briefing begins if basic appellate filing requirements are ignored. Treat the docketing statement and other initial appellate filings as mandatory, monitor deficiency notices immediately, and do not assume a pro se party will receive procedural leniency."
In re Steven Joseph Slivinski
COA14
In this original habeas proceeding, Steven Joseph Slivinski challenged a Galveston County family-law contempt restraint and sought interim relief. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the narrow civil habeas standard under Texas Government Code section 22.221(d), explaining that habeas review does not revisit the merits of the contempt ruling but asks only whether the relator is unlawfully restrained because he was denied due process or because the underlying order is void. The court held Slivinski failed to show either a due-process violation or a void order, so his restraint was not shown to be unlawful. The court therefore denied both habeas relief and interim relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Habeas relief from a family-law contempt order is a narrow remedy. To win, the relator must present a tight record showing unlawful restraint based on a true due-process defect or a void underlying order—not just alleged trial-court error. In enforcement cases, precise drafting, clear notice, and a complete appellate record are critical."
Gallegos v. State
COA04
In Gallegos v. State, the Fourth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support an indecency-with-a-child count alleging contact with a child’s breast even though the child said the defendant touched her “chest.” The court analyzed the issue under a context-based sufficiency framework, relying on the child’s young age, her undeveloped anatomy, and her testimony distinguishing her “chest” from other body areas like her stomach and tummy. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Arroyo, the court concluded a rational factfinder could infer she meant her breast area. The court also rejected unpreserved jury-charge complaints for lack of egregious harm and upheld the assessed court costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child’s imperfect or age-limited body-part vocabulary does not automatically destroy the evidentiary value of the child’s statement. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, courts may rely on context—age, developmental stage, narrative detail, and differentiation among body areas—to draw reasonable inferences about what the child meant. The case also underscores that charge complaints must be preserved to have real appellate traction."
In the Interest of D.A.V. and N.B.V., Children
COA04
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification order naming the father sole managing conservator and the mother possessory conservator because the mother’s pro se appeal was fatally defective. After striking her original brief and allowing rebriefing, the court held the amended brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 because it lacked record citations, legal authority, and developed analysis. The court also emphasized that the appellate record did not include the reporter’s record from the November 20, 2025 modification hearing that produced the order under review, making meaningful review impossible. Applying the rule that even pro se litigants must comply with appellate procedure, the court held the mother waived her complaints and affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law appeals, the merits do not matter if the appellant cannot present a compliant brief and the reporter’s record from the actual hearing that produced the challenged order. Preservation, Rule 38.1 compliance, and record control are often outcome-determinative—especially in custody modification cases reviewed for abuse of discretion."