Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
Strategy Category
358 opinions found
Pullen v. Pullen
COA02
In Pullen v. Pullen, the parties reached a partial settlement regarding their property division while an appeal of their divorce decree was pending. They filed an unopposed motion under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(B) requesting that the appellate court set aside only the property division and remand it for a new division consistent with their agreement. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed its authority to perform a 'surgical remand,' noting that while trial courts cannot sever a divorce from the property division, appellate courts have the discretion to affirm the divorce and SAPCR (child-related) orders while remanding the marital estate if the divorce itself is not challenged. The court held that the property division was set aside without regard to the merits and remanded to the trial court, while the portions of the decree granting the divorce and establishing custody and support were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Parties who reach a property settlement during an appeal can utilize Rule 42.1(a)(2)(B) to remand only the financial disputes to the trial court. This 'surgical remand' allows you to finalize a settlement agreement without risking the finality of the divorce itself or disturbing favorable custody and support orders."
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile
COA10
In this juvenile law case, a minor (C.C.) challenged a court's jurisdiction to transfer his case to criminal court. He argued that his summons was not served at least two days before the hearing date listed on the document, violating Texas Family Code § 53.07(a). The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory language and determined that the 'two-day' requirement refers to the date the hearing actually occurs, rather than the date originally printed on the summons. Because C.C. was served in June and the hearing did not take place until August, the court held the service was timely. The court also ruled that once jurisdiction is established through initial service, subsequent postponements do not require new summons and that appearing for a hearing without objection waives minor clerical errors.
Litigation Takeaway
"Service of process defects regarding hearing dates are often cured by time. If you are served late for an initial date but the hearing is postponed, the statutory window is measured against the actual hearing date. Critically, if you appear and announce 'ready' at a hearing, you waive the right to challenge these types of clerical or timing defects in the summons."
McKeand v. Lansdown
COA14
In this procedural dispute, attorney David McKeand challenged a $10,000 sanctions order and a 2021 disqualification order stemming from ongoing litigation between Renee Sizemore and Daniel Lansdown. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the sanctions challenge under the mootness doctrine, finding that because the court had already granted mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate those sanctions, there was no longer a live controversy to resolve. Regarding the disqualification order, the court determined it lacked jurisdiction because the order was issued during a prior modification phase that ended in a final judgment in 2022. The court held that McKeand's failure to challenge the disqualification at that time—either through mandamus or a timely appeal of the 2022 judgment—precluded him from raising it years later during an enforcement proceeding. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family law litigation is often divided into distinct phases—such as modification and enforcement—each ending in its own final judgment. To preserve your rights, you must challenge interlocutory orders (like the removal of an attorney) immediately or directly after the final judgment of that specific phase; you cannot wait until a subsequent proceeding years later to raise old grievances. Additionally, obtaining relief via a writ of mandamus will effectively end any parallel direct appeal on the same issue."
In the Matter of D.L.A.
COA01
In this juvenile delinquency case, a sixteen-year-old was found to have committed robbery based on the testimony and in-court identification of two victims. The appellant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence, pointing to inconsistencies in the description of his clothing and the tentative nature of some witness statements. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the case under the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard, concluding that the testimony of a single eyewitness is legally sufficient to support a finding of delinquency. The court held that the trial judge, as the factfinder, has the sole authority to determine witness credibility, and any discrepancies in the evidence go to its weight rather than its legal sufficiency.
Litigation Takeaway
"In 'quasi-criminal' family law proceedings, such as juvenile delinquency or family violence cases, the credible testimony of a single witness can be enough to meet the highest burden of proof. Because appellate courts will not re-weigh witness credibility, legal strategy must focus on impeaching witness reliability and descriptions during the initial trial."
In the Interest of A.C., a Child
COA02
In this case, a mother attempted to appeal an order terminating her parental rights while the claims against the child's presumed father remained pending and unadjudicated. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the order under the finality standard established in Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., determining that because the trial court explicitly recessed the father's portion of the case, the litigation had not concluded as to all parties. Despite the trial court's inclusion of "Mother Hubbard" language and statutory warnings regarding accelerated appeals, the court held that the order remained interlocutory and unappealable without a severance, resulting in a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on boilerplate 'finality' language or Mother Hubbard clauses to create an appealable order in multi-party litigation. If any party's rights—such as an alleged or presumed father—remain unadjudicated, you must affirmatively move for a severance to trigger the appellate clock for a terminated parent, or your appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."
S. T. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
After a child was injured by a mother's partner, the Department of Family and Protective Services initially sought to terminate the mother's parental rights. However, following the mother’s successful completion of most of her service plan, the Department recommended a monitored return of the child. When the mother later tested positive for marijuana and allowed an unauthorized visitor, the trial court terminated her rights. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals reversed the termination, analyzing the 'best interest' of the child through the Holley factors. The court held that because the Department had previously deemed the home safe for a return and the subsequent violations did not involve physical harm, the evidence was factually insufficient to support the permanent 'death penalty' of civil litigation: the termination of the parent-child bond.
Litigation Takeaway
"Progress in a service plan and Department concessions—like a recommended monitored return—create a powerful defense; if the State later pivots back to termination, they must prove that new, technical violations outweigh your demonstrated ability to provide a safe and stable home."
In the Interest of A.L.V., A.D.V., and A.C.V., Children
COA05
After a trial court issued temporary orders in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR), the appellant attempted to challenge those orders through an interlocutory appeal. The Fifth Court of Appeals identified a jurisdictional defect, noting that temporary orders are generally not final judgments and are not eligible for interlocutory appeal under Texas law. After the appellant failed to respond to a court order requiring a brief on the jurisdictional issue, the court applied Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b) and (c). The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Temporary orders in family law cases are generally not appealable; if a trial court abuses its discretion in a temporary order, the correct legal remedy is a petition for writ of mandamus, not a standard appeal. Additionally, failing to respond to an appellate court's jurisdictional inquiry is a fatal procedural error that will result in the immediate dismissal of your case."
In the Interest of C.R., a Child
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's order terminating a mother's parental rights to her two-year-old child, who suffered from end-stage liver failure. The conflict centered on the mother's persistent failure to maintain a sterile environment and adhere to clinical protocols necessary for the child's survival before and after a life-saving transplant. The court analyzed the evidence under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), determining that the mother’s refusal to remediate horrific living conditions—including mold, maggots, and animal waste—despite receiving specialized education and free medical housing, constituted a conscious course of conduct that endangered the child. The court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under both environmental and conduct-based grounds and that termination was in the child's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In cases involving medically fragile children, 'endangerment' is a relative standard; a parent's failure to maintain sterile conditions or follow clinical hygiene protocols can elevate ordinary housekeeping issues to a termination-level 'conscious course of conduct.'"
Pentcheva v. Mundt
COA03
In this case, a biological mother sought to challenge a court order terminating her parental rights through a "bill of review." The trial court denied her request, treating the original termination order as a final, unchangeable judgment. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order was truly final given that it arose from a combined "Petition for Termination and Adoption" but failed to address the adoption claim or the co-petitioner (the stepmother). Applying established legal standards for finality, the court determined that because the adoption remained pending and the order did not dispose of all parties and claims, the termination order was merely "interlocutory" (non-final). The court held that the trial court's denial of the mother's challenge was premature and reversed the ruling, remanding the case for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a legal action combines both termination of parental rights and adoption, the case is not legally final until both claims are officially resolved or dismissed by the court. If the adoption piece is left "hanging," the termination order remains open to legal challenges indefinitely, as the standard appellate deadlines never begin to run."
In the Interest of B.H.
COA04
In this interstate custody dispute, a Father filed a motion to modify the parent-child relationship in a Texas court that had previously issued orders regarding the child. Despite the Father's filing, the trial court initiated a conference with a Louisiana court and determined—on its own motion—that Texas was an 'inconvenient forum' because the child had lived in Louisiana for two years. The Father appealed, arguing the court lacked the authority to move the case without a formal request from a party or a full evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Texas law explicitly allows judges to relinquish jurisdiction 'sua sponte' (on their own) and that the law only requires parties be given an opportunity to submit information rather than requiring a formal hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never assume that jurisdiction is safe just because the other parent hasn't challenged it. In interstate cases, Texas judges act as 'gatekeepers' and can move your case to another state on their own initiative if the child has a stronger connection elsewhere. If your child lives out of state, you must be prepared to immediately provide evidence regarding their school, healthcare, and support network to defend your choice of forum."