Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Wood v. State
COA02
In Wood v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a complainant could testify under Texas Rules of Evidence 701 and 602 about what the defendant meant in sexualized text messages when her interpretation was based on her firsthand experience with him, their relationship history, and the surrounding context of the messages. The court treated the issue as one of adequate foundation rather than improper speculation and concluded the testimony helped the factfinder understand ambiguous or coded communications. The court also held that the defendant waived his complaint that a detective gave improper outcry testimony under Article 38.072 because he failed to make a timely, specific objection at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Context matters, and preservation matters just as much. In family cases involving texts, emails, threats, grooming, or coercive control, a witness with personal knowledge of the relationship can often explain what ambiguous messages meant if you lay a proper Rule 701/602 foundation. But if you want to challenge outcry-like or hearsay testimony, you must object specifically and on time or lose the issue on appeal."
Perricone v. Perricone
COA11
In Perricone v. Perricone, the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed a contested Rule 145 statement of inability to afford court costs in litigation arising from divorce and custody-related disputes. After a defendant challenged the indigency filing, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found the declarant’s financial statement contained material misrepresentations and omissions, including unsupported claims of means-tested benefits, undisclosed assets, and inaccurate income and valuation information. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f), the court held that once a contest is filed, the burden shifts to the declarant to prove inability to pay by a preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings and concluded the record supported denial of indigency status. The court also held that the challenger’s unsworn declaration was sufficient because it substantially complied with Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 132.001 despite minor technical defects.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 145 form is only the starting point. If the other side contests indigency, the party claiming inability to pay must back it up with credible, documented proof, and courts will closely examine omissions, inconsistencies, household support, and prior financial representations. For family-law litigators, Perricone is a roadmap both for attacking weak indigency claims and for preparing defensible ones."
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed a notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still insufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within the grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion until after the grace period had expired, the late explanation could not be construed to revive jurisdiction. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an appeal may be accelerated, treat Rule 26.3 as a two-step jurisdictional checklist: if the notice is late but still within the 15-day grace period, file both the notice of appeal and a motion for extension within that same window. A later explanation will not save the appeal."
In the Interest of B.A. and B.A., Children
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and on best interest. The record showed repeated domestic violence by the father, the mother’s knowledge of that violence, her repeated minimization and recantation of serious assaults, her continued facilitation of the father’s return after arrests, and her denial of drug-use concerns. The court analyzed subsection (D) as an endangering environment case and subsection (E) as an endangering course-of-conduct case, concluding that the mother’s failure to protect the children from recurring violence and instability supported both predicates. The same evidence also supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, minimization of domestic violence can be as damaging as the violence itself. A parent’s recantation, selective memory, denial of risk, and continued association with a violent partner can support findings on endangerment, credibility, protective capacity, and best interest across termination, custody, modification, and protective-order litigation."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Melissa A. Paredes v. Trini J. Paredes, Jr. and In the Interest of V.N.P. and T.J.P. III, Children
COA05
In Paredes v. Paredes, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed an enforcement judgment based on a divorce decree provision requiring the wife to pay the husband “twelve months’ worth of the proceeds” if she sold certain real property. After the wife sold the property, the husband asked the trial court to enforce the decree and relied on an email and his own calculation to argue the phrase meant one year’s worth of annualized net proceeds. The appellate court held that the decree’s operative language was not merely ambiguous but facially unintelligible, because proceeds cannot coherently be measured in units of time. Applying Texas law requiring judgments to be definite enough to be executed from their four corners, the court concluded the provision was a nullity and could not be enforced through extra-textual evidence or the parties’ claimed shared understanding. The court therefore reversed the damages award and the derivative attorney’s-fees awards and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree’s property language does not state a clear, mathematically coherent obligation on its face, it may be unenforceable altogether. Family-law litigators should draft future-sale and deferred-payment provisions with precise formulas, defined terms, and objective triggers, because emails, testimony, or course of dealing will not rescue a decree that is unintelligible as written."
Youlan Varasteh-Tafti v. Manouchehr Varasteh-Tafti
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the wife challenged the trial court’s characterization of several assets as the husband’s separate property and argued the record lacked enough valuation evidence for a just-and-right division. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the husband rebutted the community-property presumption with clear and convincing evidence through specific, uncontroverted testimony that one property bought during marriage was purchased entirely with premarital investment funds and that two other properties were owned before marriage. The court explained that while documentary tracing is often helpful, it is not always required when credible testimony clearly identifies the source and character of the property and the opposing spouse offers no contrary evidence. The court also rejected the wife’s argument that paying expenses or providing unpaid labor created an ownership interest, noting those facts may relate to reimbursement but do not change title. Finally, because the wife failed to present valuation evidence at trial, she could not complain on appeal that the trial court lacked sufficient information to divide the estate or show the division was an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas property-characterization fights, uncontroverted live testimony can be enough to prove separate property even without perfect paper tracing—but only if it is specific, credible, and unrebutted. On the flip side, a spouse who does not challenge tracing testimony or put on valuation evidence will have a very hard time overturning the property division on appeal."
In Re Richard Earl Purkey Jr. and Ashlyn Purkey Jordan
COA09
In re Purkey holds that a district court cannot use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 to authorize pre-suit depositions aimed at developing claims that belong in a statutory probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction. The petitioners sought depositions to investigate alleged lack of capacity, undue influence, and trust-related issues surrounding a decedent’s 2024 will and amended trust. Looking past the Rule 202 label to the substance of the requested discovery, the Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded the anticipated claims were classic probate matters—a will contest, an effort to set aside probate, and trust disputes incident to an estate. Because Rule 202 does not expand subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court exceeded its authority by ordering the depositions. The court conditionally granted mandamus, holding that the improper pre-suit discovery could not be adequately cured on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing a Rule 202 petition, identify the real dispute and the court that actually has power to hear it. If the discovery is really designed to build a will contest, probate challenge, or trust dispute tied to an estate, you must proceed in probate court—not through a separate district-court discovery action. For family lawyers, the lesson is to screen early for probate overlap and avoid using Rule 202 as an end-run around jurisdictional limits."
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed the notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still not enough to invoke jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within that grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension in the appellate court that reasonably explains the delay. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion or equivalent filing until after the grace period expired, the late explanation could not cure the defect, and the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law-related appeals, a late notice of appeal is not self-curing just because it lands within Rule 26.3’s grace period. If the notice is late, counsel must also file a Rule 26.3 extension motion in the appellate court within that same window, with a reasonable explanation. Do not wait for a clerk’s defect notice or assume a later response will save jurisdiction."
Bruno Gonzalez v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Gonzalez v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for assault causing bodily injury—family violence. The defendant argued the State failed to prove the complainant’s identity because of a name discrepancy, failed to prove bodily injury because the complainant later minimized the assault and the bruises were not tied precisely to the charged date, and failed to prove the required mental state. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Texas variance law, the court held the complainant’s exact name was not a substantive element and the evidence showed the person named in the information and the person proved at trial were the same individual. The court further held the jury could credit the 911 outcry, officer testimony, photographs of bruising, and surrounding circumstances over later recantation-style statements, and could infer intent, knowledge, or recklessness from the assaultive conduct and knife-related intimidation. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Contemporaneous family-violence evidence—especially 911 calls, officer observations, photographs, and other corroborating records—can outweigh later recantation or minimization. In family-law cases, do not assume a changed story, name discrepancy, or imprecise injury timing defeats a violence finding; build or attack the case around corroboration, causation, and credibility."
Brennan Short v. Jamie Short
COA04
In Short v. Short, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that although a deed from one spouse to the other during marriage creates a presumption of gift, that presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence when the deed does not contain an express separate-property recital. Wife owned the Boerne home before marriage, later deeded Husband a one-half interest during a refinance intended to pay off other debt and lower monthly payments, and testified she did not intend a gift. Relying on In re J.Y.O., the court held parol evidence of her intent was admissible, found sufficient evidence that the transfer was a financing accommodation rather than a donative transfer, and affirmed the trial court’s characterization of the entire property as Wife’s separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
"An interspousal deed is powerful, but not always dispositive. In Texas property-characterization disputes, a spouse can defeat the gift presumption with clear and convincing evidence showing the transfer was made for refinancing or debt-service purposes rather than out of donative intent—especially when the deed lacks an express separate-property recital. Plead lack of donative intent and any fraud, duress, or mistake theories, and preserve objections if the other side tries unpleaded issues."