Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Molina v. State
COA11
Ricardo Molina Jr. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his indecency-with-a-child convictions, arguing that the child’s delayed disclosure, alleged inconsistencies, and lack of corroboration undermined proof of sexual intent. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that the jury could infer intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire from Molina’s intimate touching, sexual statements, isolation of the child, and instruction to keep the incident secret. Because the complainant was under seventeen when the offenses occurred, Article 38.07 did not require corroboration of her testimony. The court treated Molina’s denial and credibility attacks as matters for the jury and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child’s admissible testimony can carry substantial evidentiary weight even without physical evidence, an eyewitness, or an immediate disclosure. In family-law abuse disputes, counsel should focus on competency, admissibility, authentication, consistency of core details, surrounding circumstances, and the connection between the evidence and the specific statutory relief sought. Delayed disclosure and competing accounts generally affect credibility and weight rather than creating a categorical corroboration requirement, although Article 38.07 and the Jackson criminal-review standard do not directly govern civil family-law cases."
In the Interest of E.J., a Child
COA11
The Department sought termination after E.J. and his mother tested positive for drugs and the mother later demonstrated a recurring pattern of methamphetamine use, missed testing and visits, unstable housing and employment, and interrupted communication. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and the nonexclusive Holley best-interest factors, the Eleventh Court of Appeals considered the mother’s recent sobriety, counseling, sober-living participation, and substantial service-plan completion but held that the trial court could weigh those late improvements against her history of relapse and instability, her attendance at only about 40% of visits, and the uncertainty of her proposed placement. Because E.J. was thriving and bonded in a long-term foster home whose family planned to adopt him, the court held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). It also upheld the findings that the Department made reasonable reunification efforts and that continuing danger prevented E.J.’s return, affirming the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination cases turn on sustained, verifiable change—not merely technical service-plan compliance or a short period of sobriety before trial. A parent opposing termination should prove durable sobriety outside a structured setting, consistent visitation, verified child-ready housing and employment, and a practical reunification plan. Counsel seeking termination should present a chronological record connecting relapse, disengagement, and instability to the child’s need for safety and permanence."
Gipson v. Couto Homes, Inc.
COA13
In a dispute over whether Couto Homes breached contractual requirements governing the placement of a water well and septic system, Gipson challenged the jury charge and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a defense verdict. The court held that Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 272 and 274 required Gipson to object before submission and to identify distinctly both the challenged portion of the charge and the specific legal basis for the complaint. Because Gipson failed to make a timely, sufficiently specific objection, the charge complaint was not preserved for appellate review. The court further concluded that the disputed evidence did not establish breach as a matter of law and was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, so it affirmed the judgment for Couto Homes.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat the charge conference as a distinct and critical stage of trial. To preserve a complaint about a defective jury question, instruction, or definition—including in a Texas family-law jury trial—identify the exact language at issue, explain the specific legal defect, and obtain a ruling before the charge is read. Prior briefing, a proposed charge, a generalized objection, or a post-verdict motion is not a substitute. If the complaint concerns an omitted submission, tender a substantially correct written request under Rule 278 and preserve the ruling in the record."
Miller v. State
COA03
After Ryan David Miller’s truck left a rural road and struck a tree, officers observed beer containers, smelled alcohol, and learned that he was the sole occupant and driver. The State obtained hospital blood-alcohol records through a grand-jury subpoena, and Miller sought to suppress them as the product of an unlawful fishing expedition and defective subpoena process. The Third Court of Appeals held that the crash, odor of alcohol, open container, and Miller’s connection to the vehicle supplied specific, articulable facts supporting a DWI investigation. Because the blood was drawn and tested for medical treatment, Miller had no Fourth Amendment interest preventing disclosure of the results through valid grand-jury process; HIPAA permitted disclosure in response to qualifying legal process, and Miller failed to overcome the subpoena’s presumption of regularity. With no constitutional or statutory violation, article 38.23(a) did not require suppression, and the court affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Medical confidentiality is not absolute, but family-law counsel cannot use grand-jury authority to bypass civil discovery protections. When intoxication or similar conduct bears on conservatorship, possession, or child safety, seek narrowly tailored medical evidence through HIPAA-compliant civil process, address privilege and protective-order concerns, and coordinate with criminal counsel. A challenge to records obtained in a related criminal case should identify a specific defect in the legal process; generalized privacy objections are unlikely to suffice."
In re John Constantine
COA03
Natalie Arriaga sought discovery of John Constantine’s net worth to support exemplary damages on gross-negligence and negligent-entrustment claims arising from a motor-vehicle accident involving Constantine’s babysitter. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 41.0115 permits such discovery only when submitted evidence supports a reasonable finding that the claimant is substantially likely to prevail on the exemplary-damages claim. Although Constantine knew the driver previously had suffered a stroke, the record showed that the driver had a valid unrestricted license, had driven without prior accidents or citations, and reportedly had been medically cleared to drive. Because there was no evidence that Constantine actually recognized a serious risk and proceeded with conscious indifference—the subjective element of gross negligence—the Third Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by authorizing and compelling net-worth discovery. It conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate the challenged orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"A request for exemplary damages does not automatically permit discovery of an opposing party’s net worth. The requesting party must submit evidence supporting a substantial likelihood of proving every required element, including the applicable culpable mental state; pleadings, proof of an accident, and evidence of ordinary negligence are insufficient. In family cases involving joined tort or third-party claims, counsel should distinguish ordinary financial discovery for property or support issues from net-worth discovery governed by § 41.0115, insist on a written finding and the least burdensome discovery method, and consider mandamus before sensitive financial information is disclosed."
Layton v. State
COA13
William Dewayne Layton was convicted of violating a protective order after approaching his former wife’s residence after the order’s original expiration date but during a later extension entered while he was incarcerated. The court held that Texas Penal Code § 25.07 required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Layton knew the protective order remained effective through the extension. His knowledge of the original order was insufficient, and the extension order’s direction that the clerk serve him did not prove that service occurred or create a presumption of notice. Because the State offered no return of service, delivery record, acknowledgment, testimony, admission, or other evidence that Layton knew of the extension, the court reversed the conviction and rendered a judgment of acquittal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A protective order’s existence and a respondent’s knowledge of it are separate issues. When extending or modifying an order—especially while the respondent is incarcerated—counsel should obtain and preserve affirmative proof of notice, service, or receipt. Without evidence that the respondent knew of the operative extension or modification, a knowing-violation allegation may fail and should not be treated as conclusively established in related custody or divorce litigation."
Carrion v. State
COA11
In this aggravated-assault prosecution, John Anthony Carrion claimed self-defense after stabbing his longtime partner, while she testified that he initiated the attack following a dispute about their volatile relationship. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that the jury could reject self-defense based on the parties’ accounts, the number and location of the complainant’s wounds, Carrion’s control of the knife, and other physical evidence. It also held that Texas Rule of Evidence 403 did not require exclusion of prior violent altercations because the relationship history was highly probative of the charged assault and the competing narratives, and that value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prior incidents of partner violence may be admitted when they provide necessary context for a disputed confrontation, credibility determination, claim of self-defense, or family-violence issue. The proponent should identify a specific non-propensity purpose and explain the evidence’s probative value; the opponent must identify a concrete Rule 403 danger that substantially outweighs that value, while preserving separate objections involving character evidence, hearsay, authentication, remoteness, or cumulative proof."
McFarlane v. State
COA02
After Shawn McFarlane violently assaulted his mother and took her property, a jury convicted him of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated assault of a family member, and family-violence assault. The Second Court of Appeals held that testimony explaining how the parties came to live together was relevant relationship evidence under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.371; remoteness alone did not make it irrelevant, and any error was harmless. But because the aggravated-robbery and aggravated-assault counts, as charged and proved, punished the same assaultive conduct and bodily injury, the dual convictions violated double jeopardy. The violation was apparent on the record and reviewable despite the lack of a trial objection. The court reversed the aggravated-robbery conviction and affirmed the aggravated-assault conviction carrying the greater punishment, along with the remaining convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
"Relationship-history evidence can provide admissible context for intrafamily violence, but counsel should still prepare for relevance, Rule 403, character-evidence, and hearsay objections. In family cases, independently prove the underlying violent conduct and tie it to conservatorship, possession, protective relief, or property issues; do not treat a conviction vacated on double-jeopardy grounds as an existing conviction. Criminal counsel should also compare overlapping counts as charged and proved because concurrent sentences do not cure multiple punishments for the same conduct."
In the Interest of M.J., a Child
COA07
The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Father’s parental rights to M.J. under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The evidence showed recurring domestic violence against Mother, methamphetamine and marijuana use, missed drug testing, failure to participate in recovery services, limited contact with the child, hostile communications, and broader service-plan noncompliance. The court concluded that this evidence established both an endangering home environment and a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct. The Department was not required to prove that Father’s conduct was directed at M.J. or caused an actual injury. Given Father’s unresolved risks and M.J.’s safety, stability, and bond with the foster family, the evidence also supported the best-interest finding. After independently reviewing the record under Anders and examining the subsection (D) and (E) findings as required by In re N.G., the court found no arguable basis for reversal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domestic violence against a coparent and ongoing substance abuse can establish child endangerment even when the child was not directly assaulted or visibly injured. Courts may consider the cumulative pattern—including missed drug tests, incomplete services, limited visitation, and hostile communications—rather than viewing each incident in isolation. A parent facing endangerment allegations should promptly document sustained behavioral change through consistent testing, treatment, services, and visitation. On appeal, subsection (D) and (E) findings should be challenged separately because they can have serious consequences in later termination proceedings involving another child."
In the Interest of J.J.L., a Child
COA04
The Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights after her infant became unresponsive and was found to have ingested marijuana. The trial court terminated under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) and found termination was in the child’s best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). Applying clear-and-convincing-evidence review and deferring to the bench trial’s credibility determinations, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the best-interest finding. Although Mother challenged the endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E), she did not challenge the independent grounds under (N) and (O); because only one predicate ground is required, those unchallenged findings supported termination. The court nevertheless reviewed the challenged (D) and (E) findings because of their potential collateral consequences and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a termination appeal, challenge every predicate ground that can independently support the judgment; leaving one ground unchallenged may make best interest the only remaining path to reversal. At trial, separately develop the best-interest record and connect drug use or unsafe conditions to concrete risks to the child, while remembering that challenged endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) still require appellate review because of their future collateral consequences."