Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
In the Interest of N.A.G.A., a Child
COA05
Foster parents sought a family-violence protective order on behalf of a child against the child’s permanent managing conservator, relying on evidence of a prior intoxication-based endangerment incident, a criminal plea, a USCIS T-visa approval, and allegations of abuse and trafficking. The Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court, as factfinder, was entitled to conclude that this record did not prove the statutory predicates for a protective order, including trafficking, abuse, and the required family or household relationship under the Family Code. Because the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the denial, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A compelling story is not enough in a protective-order case. Family-law practitioners must prove each statutory element with admissible, case-specific evidence—especially the qualifying relationship or household nexus—and cannot assume CPS history, criminal pleas, immigration findings, or a respondent’s default will carry the application."
Estrada v. State
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed Estrada’s conviction for repeated protective-order violations. The State proved two violations within twelve months: Estrada’s contact with the protected person at the airport despite a no-contact order, and a later incident in which the complainant called 911 reporting that he came to her home and strangled her. Although the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution, the court held the trial court properly admitted the 911 call and EMS records because they were created during an ongoing emergency and for medical-response purposes, making them admissible under hearsay principles and non-testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excusing a juror for cause and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence cases, a later recantation usually does not erase strong contemporaneous evidence. 911 audio, EMS records, photos, neighbor testimony, and other emergency-response evidence can outweigh a complainant’s later change of story and may strongly affect protective-order, custody, and divorce litigation. Also, reconciliation does not suspend a protective order—only a court can modify it."
In re Marriage of Runyon
COA10
In In re Marriage of Runyon, a husband challenged a divorce decree that awarded his wife a $47,990 money judgment, allowed her to relocate their child to Florida, and ordered $1,840 in monthly child support. The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on all counts. The court analyzed the property division under the Murff factors, concluding that the husband's high income as an anesthesiologist compared to the wife's lower earnings justified an unequal division. Regarding the move to Florida, the court applied the Lenz factors and found relocation was in the child's best interest due to the presence of extended family. The court held that the trial court acted within its broad discretion and that the wife's legal pleadings were sufficient to support the remedies awarded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Trial courts have immense discretion in dividing property and determining a child's residence; if there is a significant income gap or a clear best-interest benefit to relocation (like family support), appellate courts are highly unlikely to reverse the decision."
In the Interest of M.L.J.
COA14
In this termination appeal, a Fourteenth Court dissent concluded that a parent’s unsupported claim of “Indian heritage” did not trigger ICWA. The dissent focused on ICWA’s statutory definition of an “Indian child,” emphasizing that the record contained no evidence the child was a tribal member, eligible for membership, or the biological child of a tribal member. Because neither parent nor the child was registered with a tribe, no tribe-specific evidence was offered, and no documentation was produced despite repeated opportunities, the dissent reasoned the trial court had no “reason to know” ICWA applied under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The dissent also criticized reliance on 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 to impose a broader inquiry duty based on mere suspicion, and would have held that ancestry alone is insufficient to trigger ICWA’s heightened protections.
Litigation Takeaway
"If ICWA is in play, vague statements about Native or Indian heritage are not enough. Family-law litigators should build a tribe-specific record on membership, eligibility, and parental tribal status early, because unsupported ancestry claims can create appellate risk, while a well-developed record can support the argument that ICWA was never triggered."
Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger v. Deere Credit, Inc.
COA11
The Eastland Court of Appeals reversed a restricted-appeal default judgment entered against an individual defendant and a limited partnership. The court held that Shelia Unger’s signed pro se letter, which denied liability, asserted that payments had been made and the equipment returned, and asked the court to dismiss the suit, was sufficient to constitute an answer on her own behalf because Texas courts liberally construe informal pro se filings that give fair notice of a defensive position. The same letter could not serve as a valid appearance for the limited partnership because a non-attorney cannot represent an entity. Even so, the court held the trial court erred by treating the record as though no response existed and by signing a default judgment the same day the motion was filed, without notice or an opportunity for the entity to cure the representation defect. The judgment was reversed and remanded as to both defendants.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law-adjacent default practice, any timely pro se filing by an individual that disputes the claims may defeat a no-answer default, even if informal. And if a business entity attempts to respond through a non-lawyer, the safer course is to force counsel to appear and give notice and a chance to cure—not rush to default—because due-process defects can unravel the judgment on restricted appeal."
Sheehan v. Sheehan
COA11
In Sheehan v. Sheehan, the divorce decree awarded the wife $64,661.44 from a BB&T account in the husband’s name, but he later depleted the account and failed to deliver the funds. On enforcement, the husband argued that a money judgment would improperly modify the decree because the specific account no longer contained the money. The Eleventh Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Texas Family Code §§ 9.002, 9.006, and especially 9.010 allow a trial court to enforce an existing property award through a money judgment when direct delivery of the awarded property is no longer an adequate remedy. Because the decree had already awarded the wife that sum, reducing the undelivered award to a money judgment did not change the substantive property division; it simply implemented it. The court also affirmed attorney’s fees under § 9.014.
Litigation Takeaway
"A spouse cannot defeat a divorce decree’s property award by draining the account or liquidating the asset from which payment was supposed to come. If the decree already awarded a sum certain, the court can enforce that award with a money judgment—and attorney’s fees—without impermissibly modifying the decree."
In re Zermeno
COA07
In In re Zermeno, the Amarillo Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus after a trial court’s temporary orders named Father a joint managing conservator despite uncontroverted evidence that he had committed family violence against Mother within two years before the divorce was filed. The court focused on Texas Family Code section 153.004(b), explaining that the statute is not just a factor in the best-interest analysis; it prohibits appointment of joint managing conservators when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse by one parent against the other. Because Father admitted multiple assaults, including one shortly before separation, and Mother and the parties’ adult children corroborated the violence, the trial court misapplied the law to essentially undisputed facts. The appellate court held that mandamus was the proper remedy for the unlawful temporary order and directed the trial court to vacate it.
Litigation Takeaway
"When credible evidence establishes a recent history or pattern of family violence, a Texas trial court cannot treat joint managing conservatorship as a compromise option. Family Code section 153.004(b) creates a hard statutory limit on the court’s discretion, and mandamus is available to correct temporary orders that ignore that limit."
In the Interest of S.M.T. and S.J.T., Children
COA14
In a pending SAPCR, the appellant tried to immediately appeal trial-court orders denying motions to correct the reporter’s record and clerk’s record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the final-judgment rule, noted that interlocutory orders are appealable only when a statute expressly authorizes it, and found no statute permitting an interlocutory appeal from record-correction rulings. Because the challenged orders were purely interlocutory and did not dispose of all parties and claims, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot create appellate jurisdiction by appealing a procedural ruling about the contents of the record. In family-law cases, record-correction disputes usually must be handled through the proper correction procedures, preserved for review after a final judgment, or—if truly extraordinary—addressed by mandamus rather than a stand-alone interlocutory appeal."
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals largely upheld a post-answer default SAPCR order against a pro se father. The court concluded the record showed he had actual notice of the trial setting, his eve-of-trial email continuance request was not verified or supported by affidavit as Rule 251 requires, and his post-judgment effort to set aside the default did not establish reversible error under the standards governing post-answer defaults. The court also rejected his other complaints as unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or contradicted by the record. But it modified the final order to strike the child’s surname change because the mother never pleaded for that relief, and a court may not grant affirmative relief not supported by the live pleadings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two family-law lessons stand out: post-answer defaults are hard to undo without a properly supported Craddock record, and even in SAPCR cases a final order cannot include affirmative relief that was never pleaded. Plead every item of requested relief, and if you seek to set aside a default, use a properly signed, sworn, and fully developed motion."
In the Interest of A.S., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) and § 161.001(b)(2). Mother sought termination after Father failed to pay support, had no in-person contact following a Rule 11 agreement suspending access pending a mental-health evaluation, and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both the predicate ground and best interest. The court emphasized that a failure-to-support termination requires proof of the parent’s actual ability to support the child during each month of the relevant twelve-month period; a prior support order or arrearage evidence alone is not enough. Applying deferential legal- and factual-sufficiency review, the court held the trial judge could disbelieve Father’s testimony minimizing his income and infer from the broader financial record that he had some ability to pay but failed to support the child in accordance with that ability. The same evidence, together with Father’s prolonged absence and instability in the parent-child relationship, supported the best-interest finding. The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a § 161.001(b)(1)(F) case, the winning record is a month-by-month ability-to-pay record, not just proof of arrearages. Petitioners should build concrete evidence of income, resources, and spending during the statutory twelve-month window, while respondents need disciplined documentary proof of genuine inability to pay because unsupported excuses and credibility problems can be fatal."