Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Berman v. Rogan
COA04
Michael Berman sued Brooke Rogan for assault by offensive contact and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from alleged nonconsensual contact at a bar. The trial court granted Rogan’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion and awarded her $17,167.50 in attorney’s fees as Rule 13 sanctions because Berman purportedly lacked evidence. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that Berman’s fact-specific affidavit supplied more than a scintilla of evidence on offensive-contact assault, although his intentional-infliction claim failed. It further held that losing on no-evidence summary judgment does not itself establish that a pleading was groundless when filed or brought in bad faith or for harassment. The court therefore reversed the assault judgment and fee sanction, affirmed the disposition of the intentional-infliction claim and related preserved rulings, and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"An unsuccessful claim is not automatically a sanctionable one. A party seeking Rule 13 sanctions must separately prove that the challenged filing was groundless based on the facts and law available when filed and that it was brought in bad faith or to harass. Family-law litigants responding to no-evidence motions should also preserve discovery complaints through a verified continuance motion or Rule 166a affidavit and obtain express rulings on evidentiary objections."
In the Interest of E.J.G.-S., E.G.A., and E.J.A., Children
COA04
The Department sought to terminate Father’s parental rights based on domestic violence, alcohol-related instability, incarceration, and delayed completion of services. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that the Department failed to prove Father’s responsibility for statutory endangerment by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence was legally insufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) because Mother was identified as the domestic-violence perpetrator and the record did not show that Father knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in endangering surroundings. It was factually insufficient under § 161.001(b)(1)(E) because Father’s caregiving history, regular and appropriate visitation, disputed reasons for service delays, and progress by trial outweighed an inference that he pursued a deliberate course of endangering conduct. The court reversed and remanded the termination of Father’s rights while affirming the judgment as to Mother.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination evidence must be parent-specific and tied to the exact statutory predicate ground. Household instability, incarceration, delayed services, or another parent’s misconduct may justify intervention, but they do not establish endangerment without clear and convincing proof of the respondent parent’s knowledge, acts, omissions, or deliberate course of conduct. Counsel should separately develop and preserve sufficiency arguments under subsections (D) and (E), emphasizing evidence of caregiving, appropriate visitation, rehabilitation, service progress, and domestic-violence victimization where applicable."
In the Interest of J.J.L., a Child
COA04
The Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights after her infant became unresponsive and was found to have ingested marijuana. The trial court terminated under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) and found termination was in the child’s best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). Applying clear-and-convincing-evidence review and deferring to the bench trial’s credibility determinations, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the best-interest finding. Although Mother challenged the endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E), she did not challenge the independent grounds under (N) and (O); because only one predicate ground is required, those unchallenged findings supported termination. The court nevertheless reviewed the challenged (D) and (E) findings because of their potential collateral consequences and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a termination appeal, challenge every predicate ground that can independently support the judgment; leaving one ground unchallenged may make best interest the only remaining path to reversal. At trial, separately develop the best-interest record and connect drug use or unsafe conditions to concrete risks to the child, while remembering that challenged endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) still require appellate review because of their future collateral consequences."
1 Coventry Court, LLC v. The Downs of Hillcrest Residential Association, Inc.
COA05
Coventry Court and the Downs of Hillcrest Residential Association disputed whether an April 2022 Rule 11 settlement authorized entry of judgment after Coventry objected that the agreement was tentative and withdrew consent to rendition. The Dallas Court of Appeals distinguished an agreed judgment, which requires the parties’ consent when judgment is rendered, from contractual enforcement of a settlement, which requires proper pleadings, notice, proof, and adjudication. It also concluded that a later release signed after monetary sanctions and threatened civil and criminal contempt did not bar appellate review because the surrounding coercion called into question whether Coventry voluntarily waived its appellate rights. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"A court generally cannot render an agreed judgment on an ordinary Rule 11 settlement after a party withdraws consent, even if the settlement may remain enforceable as a contract. The proponent must pursue a properly pleaded enforcement claim and prove entitlement to relief. Family-law counsel should identify whether an agreement is governed only by Rule 11 or by a Family Code mediated-settlement statute, confirm present consent before rendition, and preserve evidence of coercion when contempt pressure leads to a release or purported appellate waiver."
In the Interest of M.S., a Child
COA07
The Department sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights to M.S. for constructive abandonment under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N), relying on her limited contact, missed visitation, lack of participation in services, and mental-health instability. The Seventh Court of Appeals held that constructive abandonment requires clear and convincing proof of the Department’s own reasonable efforts to reunify the family under sections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and 161.001(f). Although the Department created a service plan, it did not prove that Mother received it or that anyone explained its requirements, and the plan was excluded from evidence. The Department also failed to act on continuing-care recommendations it received after Mother completed a behavioral-health program. Because a parent’s shortcomings cannot substitute for evidence of meaningful reunification efforts, the court found the evidence legally insufficient, reversed the termination judgment, and rendered judgment denying termination on the constructive-abandonment ground.
Litigation Takeaway
"A service plan does not establish reasonable reunification efforts merely because it was drafted or incorporated into an order. The Department must prove that the completed plan was delivered and explained, that appropriate services and visitation were meaningfully facilitated, and that individualized treatment recommendations were acted upon. Parent’s counsel should challenge reasonable efforts as a separate element and seek rendition when the Department presents legally insufficient proof at trial."
In re L.S. Jr.
COA02
After the child’s mother died, the child’s stepfather sought to modify conservatorship based on his actual care, control, and possession of the child. While the case was pending, Texas Family Code Section 102.0031 took effect and imposed new requirements for the affidavit supporting nonparent standing. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the statute applied because the suit remained pending on its effective date and that the stepfather’s earlier affidavit did not satisfy the new requirements. Evidence concerning the child’s preference, the stepfather’s parental role, and the risk of emotional harm addressed the conservatorship merits but could not cure the jurisdictional affidavit defect. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the father’s jurisdictional challenge, but it left the trial court to decide the stepfather’s unresolved request for leave to amend.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a pending or newly filed nonparent custody case governed by Section 102.0031, counsel must treat the supporting affidavit as a threshold jurisdictional requirement and ensure that it independently alleges concrete facts satisfying every statutory element. Strong best-interest evidence, temporary orders, and proof overcoming the fit-parent presumption cannot substitute for a compliant affidavit. Nonparents should expressly request leave to amend in the alternative, while parents should raise affidavit defects promptly through a plea to the jurisdiction and consider mandamus if the trial court permits the case to proceed without statutory standing."
Nixon v. State
COA14
In this criminal appeal with family-law crossover significance, Nixon challenged his aggravated-sexual-assault-of-a-child conviction based on the complainant’s delayed disclosure and credibility disputes, and argued that double jeopardy barred retrial after he requested a mistrial prompted by the State’s late disclosure of a witness interview. The Fourteenth Court held that the child complainant’s direct testimony was legally sufficient under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.07 and that delayed reporting, prior denials, and conflicting accounts concerned credibility and evidentiary weight for the jury, not legal sufficiency. Retrial was not barred because the record did not show that prosecutors intended to provoke the mistrial or intentionally withheld exculpatory evidence to avoid a probable acquittal. The court also rejected the confrontation and evidentiary challenges and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A delayed child-abuse disclosure does not automatically defeat the allegation; it ordinarily creates a credibility issue that counsel must develop through a complete chronology, admissible evidence, careful cross-examination, and appropriate expert testimony. When evidence is disclosed late, seek the remedy available under the governing procedure and build a complete record showing materiality, prejudice, and—when legally required—intent; an excerpt or unsupported allegation of misconduct may be insufficient on appeal."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Christina Marie Quillen and Paul Arthur Daniel
COA05
In this divorce, the parties disputed whether the husband’s jewelry-business receipts supported the maximum guideline child-support award despite his claim that business expenses left little profit. Applying Texas Family Code §§ 154.062 and 154.065, the Fifth Court of Appeals held that self-employment income is a child-support resource and that an obligor must substantiate claimed ordinary and necessary business expenses. Because bank records showed substantial deposits, the husband controlled the business, and his expense evidence was inadequate, the trial court could impliedly find monthly net resources at or above the $9,200 guideline cap. The court therefore affirmed the $2,760 monthly guideline award for three children. It also held that decree language allowing a future request to reconsider conservatorship, possession, or access after a positive drug or alcohol test was not an impermissible advisory opinion.
Litigation Takeaway
"A self-employed parent cannot rebut evidence of substantial business receipts merely by citing aggregate account withdrawals, tax deductions, or low reported personal income. The parent should prove each material expense is ordinary, necessary, and business-related with reliable records and testimony. Counsel seeking support should pursue bank, merchant-processing, cash-flow, and business-paid personal-expense records; counsel anticipating an appeal should also request detailed findings on revenue, allowable expenses, statutory deductions, and net resources."
Bhavin Shah v. HMC RFG Investors LLC
COA05
HMC RFG Investors LLC sued Florida resident Bhavin Shah and opposed his special appearance with a notarized affidavit and attachments. Shah argued that the evidence was hearsay, unauthenticated, and unsupported by personal knowledge. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a expressly permits courts to consider party-filed affidavits when deciding special appearances, so the affidavit was not barred by the general hearsay rule. The notarized affidavit was also self-authenticating under Texas Rule of Evidence 902(8), Shah inadequately briefed his personal-knowledge challenge, and any error in admitting the attachments was harmless because the affidavit independently supported the ruling. Concluding that the record established specific personal jurisdiction, the court affirmed the order denying Shah’s special appearance.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a family-law special appearance, a global hearsay objection ordinarily will not exclude an affidavit authorized by Rule 120a. Attorneys should use fact-specific, notarized affidavits to establish or negate Texas contacts, while separately addressing personal knowledge, competency, authentication, conclusory statements, and each attachment’s admissibility. To obtain reversal, an appellant must also explain why the challenged evidence probably affected the jurisdictional ruling."
Austin v. Falls of Kirkwood, LP
COA01
After the trial court signed a final judgment, the appellant filed an untimely motion for new trial and notice of appeal, arguing that delayed receipt of the judgment reset the appellate timetable under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a. The First Court of Appeals held that merely stating a late-notice date in a motion for new trial was insufficient. Rule 306a(5) required a sworn motion, notice, a hearing, proof of the first date of notice or actual knowledge, and an express trial-court finding under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.2. Because the appellant did not satisfy those requirements, the deadlines ran from the judgment’s signing date, making the notice of appeal untimely. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Late notice of a divorce decree or other appealable family-law order does not automatically extend appellate deadlines. Counsel should immediately file a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion, present evidence at a hearing, obtain an express written finding establishing the first date the party or counsel received notice or actual knowledge, and ensure that finding is included in the appellate record. When possible, file a protective notice of appeal under the earliest plausible deadline."