Opinion Library

Property Division Enforcement

Rodriguez v. Torres

COA13

After a divorce decree awarded Alma Rodriguez a $115,000 money judgment against Levi Medina, Rodriguez alleged Medina fraudulently transferred two Brownsville parcels to his daughter after Rodriguez recorded an abstract of judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Medina and the daughter, but the court of appeals reversed. Applying Texas Business and Commerce Code § 24.005(a)(1), the court held Rodriguez produced more than a scintilla of evidence of actual intent through multiple badges of fraud: transfer to an insider, transfer after the debt and judgment lien arose, transfer of substantially all reachable Texas assets, and a later no-compensation transfer to a church in Mexico. The court also held res judicata did not bar the suit because the fraudulent-transfer claims were based on post-decree conduct, not the divorce court’s original property adjudication.

Litigation Takeaway

"In post-divorce collection cases, direct proof of fraudulent intent is not required to defeat summary judgment. If a debtor spouse moves property to a relative after judgment or after an abstract is recorded, build the case around UFTA badges of fraud—timing, insider status, lack of consideration, and depletion of reachable assets—because those facts alone can create a triable issue."

Bruce Horn v. Karla Horn

COA14

In Horn v. Horn, a brother challenged an intra-family transfer of a Houston home to his sister, alleging their elderly parents lacked capacity, that signatures were forged, and that the deed-related documents were defectively executed. After a bench trial with no findings of fact or conclusions of law requested, the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals presumed all findings necessary to support the judgment and held the appellant failed to show reversible error because his briefing did not adequately develop the legal arguments with supporting authority and record citations as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). The court therefore treated key deed-invalidity and evidentiary complaints as waived and affirmed the judgment.

Litigation Takeaway

"Serious allegations like incapacity, forgery, and defective acknowledgment will not win on appeal without a trial record tied to the execution date, preserved objections, requested findings in a bench trial, and fully developed appellate briefing with authority, record cites, and harm analysis."

Evidence

Robert v. State

COA10

In Robert v. State, the Tenth Court of Appeals held that a defendant accused of continuous sexual abuse of a child could not cross-examine the child complainant about an earlier accusation against her grandfather without first proving that earlier accusation was false. The defendant argued the prior allegation supported his theory that the child fabricated abuse claims when she got in trouble over cell-phone use, but the court applied Lopez v. State and concluded that suspicion, timing arguments, delayed reporting, omissions, and a good-faith belief in falsity do not satisfy the threshold requirement of proof of falsity. Because the prior accusation was not shown to be false, it was not probative impeachment evidence, and the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding it. The court also held that the defendant failed to preserve a separate Rule 613(b) complaint because that theory was not presented to the trial court.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you want to use a prior abuse allegation to show bias, fabrication, or motive in a family-law case, you need actual proof that the earlier allegation was false—not just inconsistencies, delay, or suspicion. Preserve every admissibility theory separately and be prepared to build the foundation outside the factfinder’s presence."

Child Custody

Hoisington v. State

COA11

In Hoisington v. State, the Eastland Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by exposure. The defendant argued the proof failed because there was no DNA evidence, no recovered pornography, and no conclusive forensic findings. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferred to the jury’s credibility determinations. The child complainant gave age-appropriate, internally consistent testimony describing exposure, sexual contact, oral contact, and digital penetration that tracked the statutory elements. Her account was reinforced by consistent disclosures to a SANE nurse and forensic interviewer, medical findings consistent with her description, and corroboration of a specific detail about a pink sex toy. The court held that a child complainant’s testimony alone can sustain the findings if believed, and the absence of DNA or other definitive forensic proof did not render the evidence insufficient.

Litigation Takeaway

"In abuse-driven family cases, do not let the case rise or fall on DNA or conclusive physical proof. A child’s specific, developmentally appropriate, and consistent disclosures—especially when supported by outcry, forensic interview, medical evidence, or corroborating details—can be enough to justify protective relief, while credibility attacks must focus on real inconsistencies or contamination concerns rather than generic claims of “no forensic evidence.”"

In the Matter of B.F.P.

COA11

In In the Matter of B.F.P., the Eastland Court of Appeals dismissed a juvenile appeal for want of jurisdiction because Texas Family Code section 56.01 allows an appeal from a disposition-modification order only if it is filed by or on behalf of the child. After the juvenile court modified B.F.P.’s disposition and placed her with her paternal grandfather, two adults filed a pro se notice of appeal alleging notice and due-process defects. But B.F.P.’s attorney informed the court that B.F.P. did not want to appeal and that the adults’ objectives conflicted with hers. Relying on the text of section 56.01 and prior juvenile cases, the court held that a parent or other adult cannot create appellate jurisdiction when the child, through counsel, does not desire an appeal. The adults’ later amended notice purporting to proceed on the child’s behalf was also ineffective, so the appeal was dismissed.

Litigation Takeaway

"Identify who actually owns the right to appeal before filing. When a statute makes appellate rights personal to the child, parents or other relatives cannot invoke appellate jurisdiction in their own names or override the child’s contrary position through counsel, even by framing the complaint as a due-process or voidness challenge."

General trial issues

Mulford v. 1st Service Solutions

COA06

In Mulford v. 1st Service Solutions, a former executive sued for more than $800,000 in unpaid commissions, but he never served mandatory initial disclosures, filed witness and exhibit lists less than 30 days before trial, and produced nearly 180 pages of documents only days before trial. The defendants moved to strike under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The Texarkana Court of Appeals treated the issue as a mandatory-exclusion question rather than a discretionary sanctions dispute, holding that once the record showed the evidence and witnesses were not timely disclosed, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. Because he did not establish either exception, the trial court properly excluded the exhibits and witness testimony, and that exclusion left him unable to prove his claim. The court affirmed the take-nothing judgment and held any continuance complaint was waived.

Litigation Takeaway

"Rule 193.6 can win or lose a case before the merits are ever tried: if your documents, witnesses, or trial exhibits were not timely disclosed, the court must exclude them unless you prove good cause or no unfair surprise/prejudice. In family law, that can wipe out tracing claims, custody witnesses, valuation evidence, or fee proof, so build trial evidence through timely Rule 194 disclosures and prompt supplementation from the start."

Estate of Lavon Matrick Frisby

COA12

In Estate of Frisby, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a petitioner could not use a bill of review to attack an adverse summary judgment when she had an ordinary appellate remedy and failed to pursue it. The petitioner tried to revive fraud, notice, heirship, and probate-defect allegations through a bill of review after losing a 2025 state-court suit and not appealing that judgment. Relying on longstanding Texas bill-of-review doctrine, including Wembley and Caldwell, the court treated exhaustion of legal remedies as a threshold requirement and concluded that the missed direct appeal barred equitable relief as a matter of law. The court also concluded that complaints about the lack of an evidentiary hearing and dismissal before service were waived for inadequate briefing, while noting that a separate hearing is not always required at the prima facie stage.

Litigation Takeaway

"A bill of review is a last-resort remedy, not a backup plan for a missed appeal. In family-law cases involving divorce decrees, custody orders, property divisions, or enforcement judgments, the first question is whether the complaining party exhausted available post-judgment and appellate remedies; if not, the case may be defeated on that threshold ground before the court ever reaches allegations of fraud, lack of notice, or concealment."

In Re Edward Scott Rubin

COA05

In In re Rubin, the relator sought habeas relief from contempt and incarceration orders entered in a Dallas County family-law case. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the contempt challenge because the relator failed to provide competent proof of present confinement, which is a threshold requirement for habeas relief from a contempt commitment. Relying on prior cases distinguishing inadequate indirect proof from reliable evidence such as a sheriff’s affidavit, the court held the filing did not establish current restraint on liberty. The court also struck the petition and appendix because they contained unredacted sensitive information about minor children in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9, and it denied habeas relief, rendering the emergency request for release moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"In a family-law contempt habeas, the merits do not matter unless you first prove the client is actually in custody with competent evidence such as jail records or a sheriff’s affidavit. And even in emergency filings, scrub every appendix for minors’ identifying information or risk having the filing struck."

Russo v. State

COA04

In Russo v. State, the defendant argued that only the district court that originally placed him on deferred adjudication could later revoke supervision and adjudicate guilt unless the case was formally transferred under Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42A.151 and 42A.754. The Fourth Court of Appeals rejected that argument, explaining that no statutory transfer occurred at all; instead, another district judge in the same county, sitting in a court with concurrent jurisdiction, heard the revocation proceeding. Relying on Texas Government Code section 24.003, article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution, and Mata v. State, the court held that same-county district judges may hear and determine matters pending in another district court without a written transfer or bench-exchange order unless a contrary statute or rule requires one. The court therefore affirmed the revocation, adjudication, and sentence.

Litigation Takeaway

"Before attacking an order because a different same-county district judge heard the case, distinguish a true jurisdictional or mandatory-transfer defect from mere internal court assignment. If the courts share concurrent jurisdiction and no statute or local rule requires transfer, the absence of a written transfer or bench-exchange order likely will not make the order void."

Child Support Enforcement

July 14, 2026

In Re Johnny Joseph Chavez III

COA07

In In re Chavez, the Amarillo Court of Appeals denied habeas relief from a child-support contempt order because the relator’s petition was inadequately briefed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3, especially Rule 52.3(i). Chavez raised multiple complaints, including lack of notice, denial of counsel, inability-to-pay findings, and other due-process defects, but the court did not reach the merits because he offered only conclusory assertions without developed legal analysis, controlling authority, or record citations. The court held that an original habeas petition may be denied outright when the relator fails to clearly explain why the alleged defects render the contempt order void or otherwise entitle him to relief.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law contempt habeas practice, even potentially strong due-process complaints can be lost if the petition is not built like a true appellate brief. Lead with the voidness theory, support each issue with controlling authority and precise record citations, and explain exactly why the defect justifies habeas relief—courts will not develop the argument for you."