Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Clements v. Cagniart-Singh
COA03
While Bradford A. Clements’s appeal and the Singhs’ cross-appeal were pending, the parties disputed whether they had formed an enforceable post-judgment settlement. Clements sought abatement and remand so he could pursue settlement-enforcement claims, although the record did not show that he had filed an enforcement action. Applying Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals and its resource-conservation rationale, the Third Court of Appeals concluded that a potential enforcement proceeding could moot the appellate controversy and therefore warranted pausing the appeal. The court granted abatement but denied remand, retained the case on its docket, and required Clements to file a status report or motion to reinstate by a firm deadline, warning that noncompliance could result in dismissal. The court did not decide whether the alleged settlement was enforceable.
Litigation Takeaway
"A disputed post-judgment settlement may justify abating a Texas family-law appeal when enforcement could moot the appellate issues, but abatement neither proves the agreement is enforceable nor automatically requires remand. Counsel should promptly file the proper enforcement action, continue protecting all appellate deadlines until relief is granted, explain exactly how enforcement could affect the appeal or cross-appeal, and strictly calendar every status-report or reinstatement deadline to avoid dismissal."
City of Houston v. Rajendra
COA14
After Sathya Rajendra amended her negligence petition to add allegations supporting a waiver of the City of Houston’s governmental immunity, the City filed a document labeled a “reply” that addressed the new allegations and developed a new basis for dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals looked to the filing’s substance rather than its title and held that it functioned as an amended Rule 91a motion. Under Rule 91a.5(d), that amendment restarted the deadlines for the hearing, response, and further pleading amendments, making Rajendra’s response and Second Amended Petition timely. Accepting the live pleading’s allegations as true, the court also concluded that Rajendra sufficiently pleaded the Texas Tort Claims Act’s motor-driven-vehicle waiver at the Rule 91a stage and affirmed the denial of dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts classify filings by what they do, not what counsel calls them. When a purported Rule 91a “reply” addresses an amended petition or adds a new dismissal ground, it may be treated as an amended motion that restarts all Rule 91a deadlines. Family-law counsel should remember that Rule 91a generally does not apply to Family Code cases, but this timing rule can be critical in related civil disputes involving property, businesses, contracts, fraud, or fiduciary duties."
Martinez v. Noria Cadena
COA05
After the trial court dismissed the suit for want of prosecution, the appellant filed an untimely motion to reinstate. Although the trial court later purported to reinstate the case and entered additional orders, the Fifth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 165a and 329b limited the trial court’s plenary power to thirty days after dismissal because no timely motion extended it. Rule 306a did not provide a later deadline because its delayed-notice procedures were not invoked and proved. Accordingly, the reinstatement order and all subsequent substantive orders were void, and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal from those void orders for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat a dismissal for want of prosecution as an immediate jurisdictional deadline. A verified Rule 165a motion to reinstate must be timely filed, and delayed notice must be formally established under Rule 306a. A judge’s later reinstatement order, the parties’ agreement, or continued litigation cannot revive expired plenary power, and an appeal from later void orders will not preserve review of the original dismissal."
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
The Second Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to B.C. Evidence showed a sustained course of endangering conduct, including addiction to methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin; fentanyl use after Mother learned she was pregnant; prior termination of her rights to seven children because of drug use; repeated criminal activity; and conduct resulting in a twelve-year prison sentence. The court treated incarceration not as independently dispositive but as part of the broader voluntary course of conduct that endangered B.C. and prevented Mother from providing stability and permanence. It also held that Mother’s generalized motion for new trial did not preserve each separate legal- and factual-sufficiency challenge because it failed to identify the challenged jury findings with specificity. Because the endangerment and best-interest findings were supported, and B.C. was thriving in a relative placement prepared to adopt her, the court affirmed the termination judgment and rejected the placement and dismissal-deadline challenges advanced by Father and Grandfather.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) case turns on the parent’s entire course of conduct: recurring drug use, prenatal exposure, criminal activity, prior terminations, and resulting incarceration may collectively prove endangerment even without evidence of actual injury or the child’s presence during each act. After a jury trial, counsel must also challenge each predicate ground, best-interest finding, and other material finding separately and specifically in the proper post-verdict motion; a global sufficiency objection may waive appellate review."
Khatib v. Qaddurah
COA14
After Maha Qaddurah received a residence in her divorce, Mohammad Yousef Khatib claimed she later conveyed it to him by deed and sought to evict her through a forcible-detainer action. Qaddurah alleged that her signature had been taken from another document and attached to the deed without her knowledge or authorization. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals concluded that Khatib’s right to possession depended entirely on the disputed deed because there was no independent lease, tenancy-at-sufferance provision, or other landlord-tenant relationship. Thus, deciding possession required first deciding whether title had validly transferred—an issue a justice court cannot adjudicate under Texas Government Code § 27.031(b). The court also held that the county court at law obtained no broader authority through the de novo appeal because its appellate jurisdiction was derivative of the justice court’s jurisdiction. It affirmed dismissal without prejudice so the parties could resolve title and possession in a court with jurisdiction over real-property title.
Litigation Takeaway
"An eviction action is not the proper vehicle to recover a divorce-awarded home when possession turns on the validity of an allegedly fraudulent or forged deed. Counsel should first identify whether an independent possessory relationship exists. If possession rises or falls with ownership, pursue enforcement of the divorce decree or title-related remedies—such as declaratory relief, deed cancellation, or trespass to try title—in a court authorized to adjudicate title. A de novo appeal to the county court cannot cure the justice court’s lack of jurisdiction."
Jones v. State
COA13
Michael Jones appealed three criminal convictions, arguing in part that several bench conferences went unrecorded despite a pretrial order requiring the court reporter to transcribe them. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 13.1 and 33.1 and Valle v. State, the court held that the pretrial request and order did not preserve the complaint because counsel failed to object when the omissions occurred, thereby denying the trial court an opportunity to correct or reconstruct the record. The court also rejected Jones’s jury-qualification and jury-unanimity challenges and affirmed all three judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"A granted motion or standing order requiring a complete reporter’s record is not enough by itself to preserve error. Family-law counsel must confirm that bench conferences and other material proceedings are being recorded, object contemporaneously if they are not, and promptly place or reconstruct the request, arguments, objections, and ruling on the record."
Phillips v. Phillips
COA03
In a guardianship proceeding, a probate court voided two deeds involving Marsha and Scott Phillips, determined their ownership interests in two properties, and recorded its summary-judgment orders in the county real-property records. Marsha then invoked Texas Government Code section 51.903, arguing that the recorded orders were fraudulent. The Third Court of Appeals held that section 51.903 provides only an expedited procedure for determining whether a recorded instrument is fraudulent under section 51.901; it does not permit a collateral attack on the evidence, legal reasoning, or property adjudication underlying an authentic court order. Because the challenged instruments were orders imposed by a court with jurisdiction—and Marsha alleged no fabrication, forgery, or defect in the documents themselves—they were not presumed fraudulent under section 51.901(c)(2)(C). The court affirmed the denial and dismissal of her motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"Section 51.903 cannot be used as a back-door appeal of a recorded divorce decree or other judicial order affecting real property. Counsel must distinguish fraud or forgery in the recorded instrument from alleged error in the underlying property ruling. Challenges to characterization, ownership, fiduciary findings, valuation, or the merits of a property division must be pursued through a direct appeal, bill of review, or another authorized remedy."
In the Interest of C.M., a Child
COA02
The Department sought termination of both parents’ rights after the child was born drug-exposed with significant medical needs, while the parents failed to demonstrate sustained sobriety, complete required drug testing and services, or show an ability to meet the child’s needs. Father argued that the case was automatically dismissed under Texas Family Code § 263.401, and both parents challenged the sufficiency of the termination evidence; Mother also asserted jury-charge error. The Second Court of Appeals held that the trial court retained jurisdiction because, before the original dismissal deadline, it expressly found that extraordinary circumstances required the child to remain in the Department’s temporary managing conservatorship and that continued conservatorship was in the child’s best interest. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, the court also found legally and factually sufficient evidence supporting the predicate termination grounds. Because Mother did not properly preserve her jury-charge objections, those complaints presented no basis for reversal. The court affirmed the order terminating both parents’ rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Section 263.401 deadline must be treated as jurisdictional: any extension order and the required extraordinary-circumstances and best-interest findings must be made before the dismissal date. Parties should support or oppose those findings with concrete evidence concerning the child’s needs, parental progress, sobriety, testing, visitation, and ability to provide safe care. Completing some services will not overcome unresolved endangering conduct, and jury-charge complaints must be timely and specifically preserved in the trial court."
Gary W. Shaw and Pamela Shaw v. 1910 Longmire LLC
COA09
After a bench trial, the trial court awarded 1910 Longmire LLC damages and attorney’s fees arising from alleged misrepresentations concerning the construction of two metal buildings. The Shaws argued on appeal that Longmire lacked standing and challenged the trial court’s findings, its treatment of exhibits, and the timing of exhibit disclosure, but they supplied only the trial exhibits—not the testimony, objections, or evidentiary rulings. The Ninth Court of Appeals held that Longmire alleged a concrete financial injury sufficient for standing and that the Shaws’ contract-party argument concerned capacity or the merits rather than constitutional standing. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and the presumption governing an incomplete record, the court concluded that it could not review the remaining challenges or conduct a harm analysis without the omitted testimony and proceedings. It therefore presumed the missing portions supported the trial court’s implied findings and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"An appellant must provide every portion of the reporter’s record needed to show reversible error. Exhibits alone generally cannot support challenges involving evidentiary sufficiency, credibility, objections, or harm; absent proper use of Rule 34.6(c)’s partial-record procedure, omitted testimony is presumed to support the judgment. In family-law appeals, counsel should audit and complete the record before briefing any challenge to a property division, parenting order, modification, enforcement ruling, or other fact-dependent decision."
In the Interest of J.R., a Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights to J.R., a medically vulnerable child who repeatedly suffered failure to thrive and starvation after Mother failed to follow feeding instructions, maintain feeding logs, attend medical appointments, and obtain necessary care. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2), the court evaluated the entire record under the clear-and-convincing factual-sufficiency standard and the nonexclusive Holley best-interest factors. It emphasized J.R.’s recurring harm despite repeated warnings and services, Mother’s instability and limited participation, and J.R.’s weight gain and developmental progress in a stable foster placement. Because Mother also left the predicate findings under § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (N) unchallenged, those findings remained established and could inform the best-interest analysis. The court held that factually sufficient evidence supported the best-interest finding and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Build best-interest cases with a documented chronology connecting notice, offered assistance, repeated noncompliance, resulting harm, and the child’s improvement in a safer placement. On appeal, separately challenge every independently sufficient predicate ground as well as the best-interest finding; leaving predicate findings unchallenged substantially narrows the path to reversal."