Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
In Re Jessica Acosta
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding arising from a divorce case, the trial court held Jessica Acosta in contempt for failing to make payments required by agreed temporary orders, including monthly business-account distributions and vehicle payments. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the contempt order was void to the extent it punished alleged violations that occurred before October 23, 2025, the date the temporary orders were actually signed. The court explained that contempt can enforce only a written, signed, and operative court order; retroactive due dates in a later-signed order do not create retroactive contempt exposure. Because the trial court imposed a single punishment for multiple alleged violations, most of which were based on pre-signing conduct, even the one post-signing allegation could not stand. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the contempt order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not plead contempt for conduct that occurred before the operative temporary order was signed, even if the order later recites earlier due dates. Separate pre-signing claims into non-contempt remedies, and avoid bundling valid and invalid contempt allegations into one undifferentiated punishment because one defective allegation can void the entire contempt order."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Meilyn Rutz Danski De Oliveira and Edrey Clarence Oliveira and in the Interest of S.L.D.O., a Child
COA13
In De Oliveira, the father challenged Texas’s authority to make the initial custody determination in a divorce/SAPCR, arguing the child had not lived in Texas during the six months before suit and that West Virginia, not Texas, was the proper forum. The court applied the UCCJEA’s home-state framework in Texas Family Code §§ 152.201(a)(1) and 152.102(7), focusing on the child’s long residence in Texas from birth until late 2022 and whether later stays in West Virginia, Florida, and Brazil were temporary absences. Because the evidence showed those moves were provisional, tied to family travel and attempted reconciliation, and did not establish a settled new home state, the court treated them as temporary absences included in the home-state calculation. The court held Texas had home-state jurisdiction within six months before filing, a parent continued to reside in Texas, unjustifiable-conduct arguments did not require Texas to decline jurisdiction, and the decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In UCCJEA fights, the winning issue is often not where the child was right before filing, but whether time away from Texas was only temporary. Build a precise timeline, prove whether any move was provisional or permanent, and make sure your pleadings on domicile and residence do not undermine your jurisdiction position."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Samantha RaeJon Downs and Ethan Sahen Downs and in the Interest of P.A.D. and Q.P.D., Children
COA06
In Downs, the Texarkana court of appeals held that when a December 11, 2025 final merits hearing functioned as the first trial setting in a contested divorce and child-custody case, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 required at least forty-five days’ notice. The record did not establish that an earlier June setting was actually received or remained operative, and Mother had objected in writing to the shortened setting. Relying on In re K.M.L. and Highsmith, the court treated Rule 245’s first-setting notice requirement as a constitutional due-process protection, not merely a procedural scheduling rule, and concluded that Mother did not waive the complaint by failing to file or properly present a continuance motion or by not appearing at trial. The court affirmed the divorce itself, but reversed the remaining challenged portions of the final decree and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a final hearing is the first real trial setting in a contested family-law case, forty-five days’ notice under Rule 245 is a due-process requirement. Actual notice, nonappearance, or defects in a continuance motion will not necessarily save the judgment; lawyers should make a clear Rule 245 record or risk reversal."
Hernandez v. State
COA04
In Hernandez v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support aggravated sexual assault of a child despite some inconsistencies in the child’s statements and a largely nonspecific SANE exam. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Texas authority on penetration, the court concluded the jury could credit the child’s reports that Hernandez touched “inside” her vagina, that it hurt, and that the contact occurred inside her underwear, which was enough to support the penetration element. The court also held any Confrontation Clause complaint about limits on cross-examination of the mother was not preserved because counsel did not make a clear constitutional objection or offer of proof. Finally, the court reversed and remanded Count II for a new punishment hearing because the 35-year sentence for indecency with a child by contact exceeded the lawful second-degree felony range of 2 to 20 years.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-abuse-driven custody or protective-order litigation, imperfect child outcry testimony and a normal or equivocal SANE exam do not automatically defeat the allegation; those issues usually go to weight and credibility. But if you want to challenge alternative-causation limits or other evidentiary restrictions on appeal, preserve error precisely with specific objections and an offer of proof."
American Zurich Insurance Company v. Mark Carrera
COA04
In American Zurich Insurance Company v. Carrera, the claimant tried to expand an accepted workplace injury from a wrist and lumbar fracture to include a hip fracture, closed head injury, traumatic brain injury, hallucinations, and lifetime benefits based on alleged incurable insanity. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that these were medically complex conditions requiring competent expert medical testimony on diagnosis, causation, and disability. The claimant’s proof—family-member observations, temporal proximity, and two unsupported doctor letters—was legally insufficient, and the letters were also treated as hearsay. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and rendered judgment affirming the agency decision denying the expanded injury findings and lifetime income benefits.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party wants a Texas court to make findings about complex medical or psychiatric conditions, lay testimony and generic doctor letters are not enough. In family cases involving TBI, PTSD, psychosis, abuse-related diagnoses, incapacity, or inability to work, Carrera is a strong gatekeeping case for requiring qualified expert testimony that actually connects diagnosis, causation, and functional impact."
Stowe v. State
COA09
In Stowe v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that article 38.371 allowed the State to introduce evidence of the abusive nature of the relationship between Stowe and the complainant, including prior assaultive conduct and a prior no-contact order, in a family-violence prosecution. The defense argued the evidence was improper Rule 404(b) propensity evidence, but the court concluded it served a noncharacter purpose because it explained the complainant’s fear, recantation, affidavit of nonprosecution, and inconsistent statements after the defense attacked her credibility. The court affirmed, holding that admission of the relationship-history evidence was not reversible error on this record.
Litigation Takeaway
"When recantation, resumed contact, or inconsistent statements are at issue, prior abuse and no-contact-order evidence can be admissible as contextual proof of fear, coercion, and relationship dynamics—not just as bad-acts evidence. Family-law litigators should tie the evidence to a specific noncharacter purpose and, if opposing it, press for Rule 403 balancing, narrowing, and limiting instructions rather than relying on a generic 404(b) objection."
Chang Qing Tan v. Michelle Moore
COA05
In Tan v. Moore, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a defendant’s special appearance because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a requires strict compliance: the special appearance must be sworn or properly verified. The defendant argued he lived in China and lacked sufficient Texas contacts, and he later attached his daughter’s affidavit describing his move and lack of Texas ties. But neither the original nor supplemental special appearance was sworn, and the affidavit did not verify that the allegations in the special appearance were true and correct. Relying on Dawson-Austin and Dallas precedent, the court held the defect was fatal and affirmed without reaching the underlying personal-jurisdiction analysis.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge personal jurisdiction in Texas, get the Rule 120a mechanics exactly right. An unsworn special appearance is ineffective, and even strong no-contacts evidence will not matter unless the motion itself is sworn or expressly verified by an affidavit or declaration adopting its allegations as true and correct. For family lawyers, this is a procedural knockout tool in interstate and international divorce, custody, modification, and enforcement cases."
In the Interest of W.J.G.G., a Child
COA04
In In re W.J.G.G., the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a termination order could not stand where the evidence was factually insufficient on best interest, even though unchallenged predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N) and (P) remained valid. The court analyzed Father’s single positive methamphetamine test, which occurred before the child was conceived, along with his incarceration, service participation, and efforts to maintain contact, and concluded the evidence was legally insufficient to prove endangerment under subsection (E). More importantly, after reviewing the full record under the clear-and-convincing standard, the court held the best-interest evidence was too thin to support a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest. The court affirmed the surviving predicate grounds, reversed the best-interest finding, and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Predicate grounds do not win a termination case by themselves. If you want termination upheld, you must build a separate, child-focused best-interest record showing why termination—not a less restrictive alternative—serves the child’s present and future needs. For parents appealing termination, best interest can remain a strong point even when some predicate grounds survive."
In the Matter of B.F.
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring a 15-year-old charged with capital murder to criminal district court. The court rejected the argument that Family Code § 54.02(a)(3) required findings on both the seriousness of the offense and the child’s background because the statute is disjunctive: transfer may be based on either ground. It also held that the State’s conjunctive pleading did not increase its burden, and that the evidence on the § 54.02(f) factors—including the double homicide, evidence of planning and concealment, B.F.’s sophistication and maturity, and expert testimony that rehabilitation within the juvenile system was unlikely before age nineteen—supported the transfer decision.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a Family Code statute is written in the disjunctive, proving one statutory ground may be enough even if the pleading alleges multiple grounds. For family lawyers, this case is a reminder to track statutory text closely, frame appeals around required statutory elements rather than pleading form, and build a record supporting at least one independently sufficient basis for a discretionary ruling—especially in expert-driven cases where appellate courts defer heavily to the trial court’s credibility calls."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Danielle Lauren Henry & Johnathon Hall
COA12
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued that her due-process rights were violated because she was not admitted into a January 3, 2025 Zoom hearing where the court granted a continuance and the parties agreed that the husband would not pay February spousal support. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of that constitutional complaint because the wife waited until the May 7, 2025 judgment hearing—after the final trial had already occurred—to raise it. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, the court held that even constitutional due-process complaints must be raised through a timely, specific objection, motion, or request at a point when the trial court can still cure the problem. Because the complaint was raised months too late, the issue was not preserved for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume calling something a due-process violation preserves it automatically. In family-law cases—especially Zoom hearings, temporary-orders settings, and continuance hearings—counsel must object immediately, request a concrete cure, and make a record while the trial court can still fix the problem, or the complaint will likely be waived on appeal."