Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
In the Interest of D.G. and D.G., children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights to her premature twins after she challenged only the finding that termination was in their best interest. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2), the Holley factors, and the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, the court weighed Mother’s appropriate visits, completion of some services, and loving relationship with the children against prenatal drug exposure, her post-treatment cocaine relapse, five months of missed drug tests, interrupted substance-abuse treatment, unresolved domestic-violence concerns, and failure to demonstrate lasting stability. Because the twins were progressing, bonded with their foster mother, and had an established path to adoption, the court held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support a firm belief or conviction that termination was in their best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Service-plan completion and affectionate, appropriate visitation may not overcome recent evidence of relapse, missed testing, incomplete treatment, domestic violence, and instability. Counsel defending parental rights should present objective proof of sustained sobriety, current treatment compliance, protective measures, and a concrete parenting plan; counsel seeking termination should connect the parent’s course of conduct to future risk and prove the child’s progress and permanency through specific placement evidence."
Cain v. Lemoine-Cain
COA09
In this Texas relocation dispute, the father challenged a divorce decree allowing the mother, upon acceptance into a nurse practitioner program, to establish the children’s primary residence in Smith County or a contiguous county. Applying the best-interest standard in Texas Family Code § 153.002 and considering the nonexclusive Lenz relocation and Holley best-interest factors, the Ninth Court of Appeals held that factually sufficient evidence supported the restriction. The mother showed concrete educational and clinical-placement opportunities, substantially greater earning potential, access to extended-family support, and a workable possession and transportation plan. Although the move would reduce the father’s ability to attend routine school and extracurricular activities, it would not prevent meaningful possession and access. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations and weighing of conflicting evidence, the appellate court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"A parent seeking relocation should tie the move to a verifiable event and prove specific benefits to the children and household—such as improved income, educational opportunities, family support, and a workable possession and transportation plan. A parent opposing relocation should quantify the parenting opportunities that distance will eliminate and offer a credible local alternative. Because relocation rulings turn on the child’s best interest and credibility findings receive substantial appellate deference, both sides must build a detailed record addressing the Lenz and Holley considerations."
Gary W. Shaw and Pamela Shaw v. 1910 Longmire LLC
COA09
After a bench trial, the trial court awarded 1910 Longmire LLC damages and attorney’s fees arising from alleged misrepresentations concerning the construction of two metal buildings. The Shaws argued on appeal that Longmire lacked standing and challenged the trial court’s findings, its treatment of exhibits, and the timing of exhibit disclosure, but they supplied only the trial exhibits—not the testimony, objections, or evidentiary rulings. The Ninth Court of Appeals held that Longmire alleged a concrete financial injury sufficient for standing and that the Shaws’ contract-party argument concerned capacity or the merits rather than constitutional standing. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and the presumption governing an incomplete record, the court concluded that it could not review the remaining challenges or conduct a harm analysis without the omitted testimony and proceedings. It therefore presumed the missing portions supported the trial court’s implied findings and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"An appellant must provide every portion of the reporter’s record needed to show reversible error. Exhibits alone generally cannot support challenges involving evidentiary sufficiency, credibility, objections, or harm; absent proper use of Rule 34.6(c)’s partial-record procedure, omitted testimony is presumed to support the judgment. In family-law appeals, counsel should audit and complete the record before briefing any challenge to a property division, parenting order, modification, enforcement ruling, or other fact-dependent decision."
City of Houston v. Rajendra
COA14
After Sathya Rajendra amended her negligence petition to add allegations supporting a waiver of the City of Houston’s governmental immunity, the City filed a document labeled a “reply” that addressed the new allegations and developed a new basis for dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals looked to the filing’s substance rather than its title and held that it functioned as an amended Rule 91a motion. Under Rule 91a.5(d), that amendment restarted the deadlines for the hearing, response, and further pleading amendments, making Rajendra’s response and Second Amended Petition timely. Accepting the live pleading’s allegations as true, the court also concluded that Rajendra sufficiently pleaded the Texas Tort Claims Act’s motor-driven-vehicle waiver at the Rule 91a stage and affirmed the denial of dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts classify filings by what they do, not what counsel calls them. When a purported Rule 91a “reply” addresses an amended petition or adds a new dismissal ground, it may be treated as an amended motion that restarts all Rule 91a deadlines. Family-law counsel should remember that Rule 91a generally does not apply to Family Code cases, but this timing rule can be critical in related civil disputes involving property, businesses, contracts, fraud, or fiduciary duties."
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M., Children
COA10
The Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights after evidence showed that she physically abused two other children in the household, failed to obtain medical care for their visible injuries, and failed to act on warning signs that another household member may have sexually abused them. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), the court considered whether clear and convincing evidence established a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered Mother’s children. It explained that endangering conduct need not be directed at the children at issue or cause them actual injury, and that abuse of other children in the home may demonstrate danger to a parent’s own children. Although knowledge is unnecessary when the parent personally commits the endangering acts, the Department generally must prove the parent knew of a third party’s dangerous conduct. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings, the appellate court held that Mother’s violence, omissions, inconsistent explanations, lack of accountability, and failure to demonstrate improved protective capacity supported termination under subsection (E).
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment should be proved or challenged as a complete course of conduct, not as a series of isolated incidents. Abuse of another child in the household, failure to seek medical care, ignored warning signs, inconsistent accounts, and lack of meaningful behavioral change may collectively support termination even without proof that the child at issue was directly injured. When the danger comes from a third party, however, counsel must develop evidence that the parent knew of the risk. Completing services alone is not enough; the parent should show accountability, changed behavior, protective judgment, and a workable safety plan."
In the Interest of A.L.L.N.R. and A.R.A.R., Children
COA04
The Department sought termination of the father’s parental rights after recurring positive tests for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana, eleven missed drug tests, and repeated failures to complete recommended substance-abuse treatment. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), the Fourth Court of Appeals examined the father’s conduct as a continuing pattern rather than as isolated incidents and held that the positive and missed tests, unsuccessful treatment efforts, and failed in-home safety arrangement permitted a firm conviction that he endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. The court found the evidence legally and factually sufficient, upheld the best-interest finding based in part on the children’s stable foster placement and bond with their prospective adoptive parents, rejected the derivative challenge to the Department’s appointment as permanent managing conservator, and affirmed the termination order as to both parents.
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug-use endangerment depends on the documented course of conduct, not merely one positive test. Counsel should build or rebut a complete chronology of confirmed and missed tests, specimen types, treatment recommendations, attendance, discharge history, safety-plan failures, and evidence of sustained sobriety. In termination and custody litigation, repeated missed testing and incomplete treatment can reinforce proof that substance abuse remains unresolved and that protective restrictions are necessary."
Denton v. Hagle
COA03
In a divorce involving property division, child support, and issues concerning the parties’ children, the parties placed a property-division and child-support settlement on the record in open court. After consulting with counsel, Denton personally confirmed that the recited terms reflected his agreement, and the trial court rendered judgment before he later objected. The Third Court of Appeals held that the oral settlement satisfied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 because it was made in open court and entered of record. Denton’s consent at rendition waived appellate challenges to the agreed provisions absent fraud, collusion, misrepresentation, or fundamental error, and his post-rendition objection could not withdraw that consent. The court also concluded that the settlement eliminated any reversible harm from the earlier bifurcation dispute, that Denton inadequately briefed his new-trial complaints, and that he failed to preserve his discovery complaint. The divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"An oral divorce settlement can become binding when its material terms are recited on the record, the parties personally assent, and the court renders judgment. A party wishing to withdraw consent must do so before rendition; regret or objection afterward generally will not preserve an appeal. Counsel should clearly state every material term, expressly reserve any unresolved issues, obtain an unmistakable rendition, secure rulings on disputed motions, and cite specific record pages on appeal."
Morris v. Morris
COA04
After a modification order changed the children’s primary-residence designation, imposed child support, and awarded more than $24,000 against Rachael Morris, she filed a Rule 145 statement asserting that she could not afford the appellate record. Although her uncontroverted evidence showed that her necessary monthly expenses exceeded her net income, the trial court relied primarily on her gross income, employability, potential summer work, and lack of legal-aid representation to require payment. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that Rule 145 asks whether court costs can be paid without sacrificing basic essentials such as housing and food; employment and income above federal poverty guidelines are relevant but not dispositive. Because the trial court failed to account for Morris’s net income, expenses, and debts, the appellate court found an abuse of discretion, reversed the ability-to-afford-costs order, and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 145 determination must address the litigant’s actual ability to pay, not merely gross salary or earning capacity. Parties seeking protection should document net income, essential expenses, debts, dependents, assets, access to credit, and the financial effect of the appealed order; challengers need contrary evidence, and any order requiring payment should contain detailed findings addressing the complete financial picture."
Travis v. State
COA10
In this criminal-law crossover case, the defendant sought to exclude a complainant’s testimony and obtain a mistrial after trial information was communicated among witnesses and others in violation of Texas Rule of Evidence 614. Applying the prejudice analysis from Bell and Webb, the Waco Court of Appeals examined whether the witness actually received another witness’s testimony and whether the communication caused her to alter her account, improperly corroborate another witness, or contradict the opposing side. Although prohibited communications occurred, the defendant identified no material change in the witness’s testimony and conceded there was no direct proof that any testimony had been affected. Because cross-examination, recall of witnesses, and comparison with prior statements provided adequate safeguards, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony or denying a mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
"A witness-sequestration violation does not automatically justify exclusion or a mistrial. Counsel must promptly establish what information was communicated, connect it to a specific change or improper corroboration in the witness’s testimony, and explain why cross-examination or another lesser remedy cannot cure the prejudice. Preserve the issue with an evidentiary hearing, prior statements, communication records, specific objections, and rulings on alternative remedies."
In Re Champion LLP
COA05
Champion LLP sought mandamus relief after the trial court left its motion to compel discovery unresolved for more than fifteen months after filing and more than a year after a hearing, despite repeated written requests, proposed orders, status conferences, and communications with court staff. Applying the rule that a trial judge has a ministerial duty to rule on a properly filed and presented motion within a reasonable time, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered the length of the delay, the judge’s knowledge of the motion, the parties’ repeated efforts to obtain a ruling, the absence of unusual complexity or demonstrated docket constraints, the prejudice to trial preparation, and the three-month benchmark in Texas Rule of Judicial Administration 7.2(c). The court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial judge to issue a written ruling, while emphasizing that it could not dictate whether the motion should be granted or denied. It dismissed the request concerning the continuance motion as moot because the relevant trial date had passed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an unresolved discovery motion stalls a family-law case, counsel should create a clear record showing that the motion was filed, presented, taken under advisement, and repeatedly brought to the judge’s attention, while documenting how the delay harms trial preparation. A delay substantially beyond Rule 7.2(c)’s three-month benchmark may support mandamus, but the appellate court can compel only a ruling—not a particular result. Any requested continuance relief must also remain tied to a live trial setting."