Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M., Children
COA10
The Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights after evidence showed that she physically abused two other children in the household, failed to obtain medical care for their visible injuries, and failed to act on warning signs that another household member may have sexually abused them. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), the court considered whether clear and convincing evidence established a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered Mother’s children. It explained that endangering conduct need not be directed at the children at issue or cause them actual injury, and that abuse of other children in the home may demonstrate danger to a parent’s own children. Although knowledge is unnecessary when the parent personally commits the endangering acts, the Department generally must prove the parent knew of a third party’s dangerous conduct. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings, the appellate court held that Mother’s violence, omissions, inconsistent explanations, lack of accountability, and failure to demonstrate improved protective capacity supported termination under subsection (E).
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment should be proved or challenged as a complete course of conduct, not as a series of isolated incidents. Abuse of another child in the household, failure to seek medical care, ignored warning signs, inconsistent accounts, and lack of meaningful behavioral change may collectively support termination even without proof that the child at issue was directly injured. When the danger comes from a third party, however, counsel must develop evidence that the parent knew of the risk. Completing services alone is not enough; the parent should show accountability, changed behavior, protective judgment, and a workable safety plan."
In re William Michael Talley
COA06
William Michael Talley, an incarcerated pro se litigant, sought mandamus relief compelling a trial judge to rule on pending motions, recuse, and transfer his case. The Sixth Court of Appeals determined that Talley failed to serve the respondent judge and real parties in interest, provide the certification required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k), or authenticate the material documents in his mandamus record under Rules 52.3(l) and 52.7. His general unsworn declaration did not establish personal knowledge or state that the exhibits were true and correct copies of the originals, and neither his pro se status nor incarceration excused compliance. The court also explained that mandamus may compel a trial court to rule when the required elements are proved, but ordinarily cannot dictate the substance of a discretionary ruling such as recusal. It denied the petition for writ of mandamus.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat Rule 52 compliance as essential to mandamus relief. Serve the respondent judge and every real party in interest, include the rule-specific petition certification, and support all material facts with certified or properly sworn record documents. To compel a ruling, authenticate evidence showing that the motion was filed, presented to the judge, and left undecided for an unreasonable time—and ask the appellate court to require a ruling, not to dictate the result."
Hernandez v. Frithiof
COA03
In a modification and enforcement proceeding involving two children, the trial court converted future child and medical support into lump-sum awards but applied the two-child rates through the younger child’s emancipation, even though the older child would reach majority thirteen months earlier. The Third Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 154.127 requires support orders to state reduced amounts for each period in which fewer children remain eligible. Because the proper figures were established in the record, the court modified the child-support award from $38,500 to $33,950 and the medical-support award from $26,400 to $18,600. The court also held that the father waived his fee-segregation complaint by failing to object at trial, but preserved his legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges after the bench trial; it therefore reversed the attorney’s-fee award and remanded the fee issue for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Orders covering multiple children must expressly step down child support—and any corresponding medical support—as each child’s eligibility ends. When future support is reduced to a lump sum, counsel should separately calculate every eligibility period and ensure the operative judgment contains the correct totals. In combined enforcement and modification cases, object at trial to unsegregated fees, and support every fee request with competent lodestar evidence; admission of billing records alone does not establish that fees are reasonable and necessary."
Denton v. Hagle
COA03
In a divorce involving property division, child support, and issues concerning the parties’ children, the parties placed a property-division and child-support settlement on the record in open court. After consulting with counsel, Denton personally confirmed that the recited terms reflected his agreement, and the trial court rendered judgment before he later objected. The Third Court of Appeals held that the oral settlement satisfied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 because it was made in open court and entered of record. Denton’s consent at rendition waived appellate challenges to the agreed provisions absent fraud, collusion, misrepresentation, or fundamental error, and his post-rendition objection could not withdraw that consent. The court also concluded that the settlement eliminated any reversible harm from the earlier bifurcation dispute, that Denton inadequately briefed his new-trial complaints, and that he failed to preserve his discovery complaint. The divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"An oral divorce settlement can become binding when its material terms are recited on the record, the parties personally assent, and the court renders judgment. A party wishing to withdraw consent must do so before rendition; regret or objection afterward generally will not preserve an appeal. Counsel should clearly state every material term, expressly reserve any unresolved issues, obtain an unmistakable rendition, secure rulings on disputed motions, and cite specific record pages on appeal."
Jones v. State
COA09
Jones appealed his robbery conviction and life sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted injury evidence from an extraneous robbery and that the jury failed to make separate findings on two habitual-offender enhancements. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that Jones forfeited his evidentiary complaint under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 because he objected only once, did not obtain a running objection, and allowed substantially the same evidence to be admitted before and afterward without objection. The court also concluded that Jones’s pleas of “true” relieved the State of its burden to prove the enhancement allegations; because the enhancements were no longer disputed and the charge directed the jury to treat them as true, separate findings were unnecessary. The court therefore upheld the enhanced punishment and life sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
"One objection generally does not preserve error when the same or substantially similar evidence is presented repeatedly. Family-law counsel should object each time challenged evidence is offered—or obtain an express, clearly defined running objection covering the relevant testimony, witnesses, exhibits, recordings, and expert opinions—and must secure a ruling. Counsel should also review and timely object to charge and verdict-form defects before submission."
Morris v. Morris
COA04
After a modification order changed the children’s primary-residence designation, imposed child support, and awarded more than $24,000 against Rachael Morris, she filed a Rule 145 statement asserting that she could not afford the appellate record. Although her uncontroverted evidence showed that her necessary monthly expenses exceeded her net income, the trial court relied primarily on her gross income, employability, potential summer work, and lack of legal-aid representation to require payment. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that Rule 145 asks whether court costs can be paid without sacrificing basic essentials such as housing and food; employment and income above federal poverty guidelines are relevant but not dispositive. Because the trial court failed to account for Morris’s net income, expenses, and debts, the appellate court found an abuse of discretion, reversed the ability-to-afford-costs order, and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 145 determination must address the litigant’s actual ability to pay, not merely gross salary or earning capacity. Parties seeking protection should document net income, essential expenses, debts, dependents, assets, access to credit, and the financial effect of the appealed order; challengers need contrary evidence, and any order requiring payment should contain detailed findings addressing the complete financial picture."
In the Interest of A.L.L.N.R. and A.R.A.R., Children
COA04
The Department sought termination of the father’s parental rights after recurring positive tests for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana, eleven missed drug tests, and repeated failures to complete recommended substance-abuse treatment. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), the Fourth Court of Appeals examined the father’s conduct as a continuing pattern rather than as isolated incidents and held that the positive and missed tests, unsuccessful treatment efforts, and failed in-home safety arrangement permitted a firm conviction that he endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. The court found the evidence legally and factually sufficient, upheld the best-interest finding based in part on the children’s stable foster placement and bond with their prospective adoptive parents, rejected the derivative challenge to the Department’s appointment as permanent managing conservator, and affirmed the termination order as to both parents.
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug-use endangerment depends on the documented course of conduct, not merely one positive test. Counsel should build or rebut a complete chronology of confirmed and missed tests, specimen types, treatment recommendations, attendance, discharge history, safety-plan failures, and evidence of sustained sobriety. In termination and custody litigation, repeated missed testing and incomplete treatment can reinforce proof that substance abuse remains unresolved and that protective restrictions are necessary."
A.G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services obtained termination of Father’s parental rights on constructive abandonment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(N), even though its live petition did not expressly plead that ground. Father argued on appeal that the resulting lack of notice was fundamental error reviewable despite his failure to object at trial. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and Civil Procedure 67 and 301, the Third Court of Appeals held that parental-rights cases remain subject to ordinary error-preservation requirements and that the narrow fundamental-error doctrine did not apply. Because the petition gave notice of possible constructive abandonment, the issue was developed and submitted without a timely pleading or notice objection, and the Department expressly sought termination on that ground in closing, subsection (N) was tried by consent. The court affirmed the termination based on subsection (N) and the unchallenged best-interest finding without reaching Father’s challenge to the separate subsection (P) finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Object promptly when an opposing party introduces evidence or requests relief on an unpleaded theory. Even in a parental-rights termination case, characterizing the defect as a constitutional notice violation will not excuse failure to preserve the complaint, and silence may allow the issue to be tried by consent. Counsel should identify the pleading variance, explain prejudice, request exclusion, a continuance, or an opportunity to respond, and obtain a ruling. On appeal, challenge every predicate finding necessary to reverse the judgment."
Roel Guerra v. Maria Fabiola Guerra and Elma Guerra Chavez
COA07
A dispute among siblings over a family limited partnership and trust led the district court to enter a temporary injunction and related winding-up relief against Roel Guerra. On interlocutory appeal, Guerra challenged the injunction, the district court’s plenary power, the finality of earlier accounting and attorney’s-fee orders, and the court’s jurisdiction in light of a related probate proceeding. Because Guerra did not provide the reporter’s record from the multi-day evidentiary hearing, the court of appeals presumed the omitted testimony and exhibits supported the injunction and its findings. The court also concluded that the prior orders were interlocutory because they neither disposed of all claims and parties nor contained unequivocal finality language, so the district court retained plenary power. Finally, the pending probate matter did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the county court because the trust was a nonprobate asset, while the district court had statutory jurisdiction over the trust, receivership, and partnership-winding-up claims. The appellate court affirmed the challenged orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"An appellant cannot overturn an evidence-based temporary injunction without supplying the complete reporter’s record, including all hearing dates and exhibits; absent that record, the appellate court will presume the evidence supports the trial court. Counsel should also avoid assuming that an accounting, fee award, or winding-up order is final merely because it resolves an important issue. Before seeking review in a family-law or family-wealth dispute, determine whether the order is appealable or reviewable only by mandamus, secure a complete record, and carefully analyze finality and probate-versus-district-court jurisdiction."
Masimula v. Masimula
COA08
After a prior appeal removed only the future spousal-maintenance award and affirmed the divorce decree as modified, the trial court entered a modified decree implementing the appellate mandate. The former husband appealed again, renewing challenges under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, seeking to set aside the post-answer default decree, and attacking the evidentiary sufficiency of the property division. The Eighth Court of Appeals held that the law-of-the-case doctrine and mandate rule barred relitigation of matters resolved or left intact in the first appeal. It further concluded that the husband had not satisfied 50 U.S.C. § 3932’s requirements for an initial stay, so he was not entitled to an additional stay or mandatory appointed counsel, and the trial court was not required to grant a stay sua sponte based solely on his military status. Because the modified decree faithfully implemented the mandate without reopening the affirmed property division or default judgment, the court affirmed it.
Litigation Takeaway
"The first appeal is generally the only opportunity to challenge all appealable portions of a divorce decree. After a limited appellate disposition, the trial court may implement only the mandate, and a modified decree does not create a second chance to attack affirmed rulings. Servicemembers seeking an SCRA stay should also submit the statute’s required written statements and command documentation; military status alone does not compel a stay or appointment of counsel."