Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
In re H.R.J., J.G.J., T.J.P., and L.P.
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and a best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on Mother’s ongoing illegal drug abuse, three prior removals tied to her addiction, and her decision to leave one child with that child’s father despite a protective order protecting the child from him. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations after a bench trial, the court held that this pattern showed both an endangering environment and a continuing course of endangering conduct, and that the same evidence supported termination as being in the children’s best interests. The court also emphasized that due process required review of both (D) and (E) findings because of their future collateral consequences under § 161.001(b)(1)(M).
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are built through pattern evidence, not just proof of a single injury. Repeated drug abuse, prior removals, instability, and exposing a child to a dangerous or court-restrained adult can together support both predicate termination grounds and best-interest findings. On appeal, lawyers must separately challenge or defend subsection (D) and (E) findings because those findings can affect future cases involving other children."
Arellano v. Arrellano
COA04
After a decedent’s children sued to void a lien on family property, the surviving spouse intervened claiming homestead rights. The trial court struck her intervention for lack of a justiciable interest, then later entered a final judgment declaring she had no homestead interest and assessed attorney’s fees against her. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the order striking the intervention was interlocutory, so it did not start plenary-power deadlines and instead merged into the final judgment, leaving the struck intervenor bound by and able to appeal the final judgment. But because the strike was based on a jurisdictional lack of justiciable interest, the trial court could not then adjudicate the merits of the intervenor’s homestead claim. The appellate court therefore vacated the homestead merits declaration, affirmed the interlocutory-jurisdiction/plenary-power ruling, and remanded for further proceedings on attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you successfully strike an intervention, do not overreach in the final judgment. A struck intervenor is still bound until final judgment and can appeal, but once the court rules the intervenor lacks a justiciable interest, it cannot also decide that person’s substantive property, homestead, custody, or possession claims without an independent jurisdictional basis."
A.C. v. S.G.A.
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted appeal from an order denying a protective order and modifying visitation because related family-law proceedings—a pending SAPCR and registration of a foreign custody/support order—remained unresolved in the trial court. Applying Texas finality principles, Family Code section 81.009(c), and precedent treating temporary SAPCR-related possession and access rulings as interlocutory, the court concluded the December 4, 2025 order was not a final judgment and no statute authorized an immediate interlocutory appeal. The court therefore held it lacked appellate jurisdiction over both the protective-order denial and the visitation modification.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing an appeal in a family case, confirm the order is actually final or expressly appealable by statute. In pending SAPCRs or related child-custody proceedings, even urgent rulings denying protection or changing visitation may be only temporary, interlocutory orders, making mandamus, emergency trial-court relief, or pushing the case to a final order the better strategy."
Leonard v. Wooten and Ellison
COA05
In Leonard v. Wooten and Ellison, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defamation suit based on statements in an affidavit filed to obtain a TRO in a child-custody proceeding arose from protected petitioning activity under the TCPA. The court focused on the plaintiffs’ own allegations, which showed the challenged statements were made in a sworn filing submitted to a court for judicial relief. It then held that the judicial-proceedings privilege independently barred the defamation claim because statements in affidavits and other court-filed papers that bear some relation to the proceeding are absolutely privileged, even if alleged to be false or malicious. Because Leonard established that defense as a matter of law, the court reversed the TCPA denial by operation of law and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, allegations made in affidavits or other filings submitted to obtain court relief—especially emergency custody relief—may be both TCPA-protected petitioning activity and absolutely privileged against later defamation claims. The practical lesson is to challenge allegedly false statements inside the family case when possible, and to draft emergency affidavits carefully so they stay tied to the relief requested and the issues before the court."
In the Interest of Z.A.A., a Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights to Z.A.A. after DFPS proved constructive abandonment and best interest by clear and convincing evidence. The court held DFPS made reasonable efforts to reunify by creating and discussing a family service plan and repeatedly trying to locate and contact father through phone numbers, relatives, social media, prior addresses, and his parole officer. It also found father failed to maintain significant contact, failed to support the child, and showed an inability to provide a safe environment, especially because he had substantial periods out of jail but still did not visit or engage. On best interest, the court emphasized the child’s stability and improvement in the maternal great-grandfather’s home, the adoption plan and backup caregiver plan, and contrasted that with father’s drug- and domestic-violence-related criminal history, repeated incarceration, nonparticipation in services, and ongoing absence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In constructive-abandonment cases, DFPS wins on appeal when it builds a detailed record of specific reunification efforts and the parent’s missed opportunities during periods of freedom. For family-law litigators generally, the case reinforces that stability, consistent contact, support, and a concrete permanency plan can outweigh a parent’s bare biological connection when best interest is at issue."
Gurrola v. State
COA03
In Gurrola v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the defendant waived any appellate complaint that a trauma therapist’s guilt-innocence testimony was improper victim-impact evidence. Although defense counsel objected at the outset to the witness generally on relevance, prejudice, bolstering, and victimization grounds, counsel did not obtain a running objection and did not renew those objections when the specific testimony about therapy, PTSD, trauma symptoms, and emotional effects was actually elicited. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and preservation cases such as Martinez and Fuller, the court concluded that an initial global objection and a granted motion in limine were not enough to preserve error. Because the complaint was not preserved, the court did not reach the admissibility merits and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law trials, one opening objection to a therapist, counselor, or expert is not enough. If damaging testimony keeps coming in, you must keep objecting or secure a clear running objection; and a motion in limine never substitutes for a trial objection. Appellate issues are often lost on preservation, not merit."
In re Lillian Gonzalez
COA14
In In re Lillian Gonzalez, the relator asked the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to order the Texas Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division, to release child-support funds. The court did not reach the merits of whether she was entitled to the money. Instead, it analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and held that courts of appeals may issue mandamus against certain judges and associate judges, but not against the OAG Child Support Division. The court also held that Gonzalez did not show the writ was necessary to protect or enforce the court’s appellate jurisdiction under section 22.221(a). Because neither basis for mandamus jurisdiction applied, the court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing mandamus in a child-support payment dispute, identify the correct respondent and the source of the complained-of conduct. Even a strong complaint about withheld support funds will be dismissed if the petition is directed at a non-judicial actor like the OAG and does not show why extraordinary relief is necessary to protect the court of appeals’ jurisdiction."
Nicholas Allen White v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Nicholas Allen White v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to prove lack of consent for indecent assault even though the complainant never verbally said “no” during the touching. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that indecent assault requires the force-based “without consent” definition from the sexual-assault statute, and instead applied the Penal Code’s general definition of consent as “assent in fact, whether express or implied.” Using that framework, the court concluded a rational jury could infer nonconsent from circumstantial evidence: the complainant had declined related advances, testified that White forced his hand down her pants, froze in fear, resisted being pulled into the men’s restroom, and immediately returned to friends crying and reported what happened. The conviction for indecent assault was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, the absence of a spoken “no” does not equal consent. White is useful authority for arguing that courts may infer nonconsent from context, trauma responses like freezing, physical resistance, immediate outcry, and surrounding circumstances, even when the parties were previously friendly or flirtatious. That makes the case especially helpful in custody, protective-order, and fault-based divorce litigation involving allegations of sexual coercion or boundary violations."
Ortego v. State
COA01
In Ortego v. State, a husband sought to suppress incriminating text messages discovered on his cell phone by his wife, arguing the search was unconstitutional and violated Texas computer security laws. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the search under the Fourth Amendment and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23, which excludes evidence obtained in violation of the law. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to private individuals acting without government involvement. Furthermore, because the husband had provided his wife with a written "Commitment to You" note granting her permission to look at his phone "for any reasons" if she had concerns, she had "effective consent." This consent defeated claims of illegal access, making the evidence admissible.
Litigation Takeaway
"Documented consent is the ultimate "kill switch" for digital privacy objections. In family law disputes, evidence found via "digital self-help" is likely admissible if there is a written agreement, a reconciliation memo, or a proven course of conduct involving password sharing and mutual device access. To protect or attack such evidence, practitioners must focus on the specific scope, duration, and potential revocation of that consent rather than general privacy rights."
In the Interest of K.D.M. and S.I.L.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights to two children after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and 161.003, as well as on best interest and conservatorship. The court focused on evidence of endangering surroundings and conditions, including domestic violence, unstable care arrangements, and the prior death of an infant sibling in Mother’s care that the Department linked to medical neglect. It also relied on Mother’s significant cognitive limitations and her inability to present a coherent, realistic plan for housing, childcare, schooling, therapies, supervision, and emergency response. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard, the court held that Mother’s limitations were not merely abstract diagnoses but functionally prevented her from meeting the children’s present and future needs, and that termination and appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator were in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, courts look beyond a parent’s good intentions and focus on functional parenting capacity: who will care for the child, where the child will live, how needs will be met, and how safety risks will be managed. Where cognitive limitations, domestic violence, instability, or poor safety planning affect day-to-day care, lawyers must build a concrete record with specific facts, corroboration, and workable caregiving plans."