Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
Patricia Faith Dickinson v. Joshua Thomas Dickinson
COA03
In this SAPCR appeal, the mother argued that the appellate record filed in the court of appeals was incomplete and potentially misleading because important materials had been omitted despite her repeated efforts to obtain them. The Third Court of Appeals did not decide for itself whether the materials existed or belonged in the record. Instead, applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(e)(3), it held that once a post-filing dispute arises over the accuracy or completeness of the record, the proper course is to abate the appeal and remand to the trial court to determine whether the disputed materials exist, are relevant to the appeal, and should be included through supplementation. The court therefore abated and remanded for those factual determinations.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the appellate record in a family-law case is missing key hearings, exhibits, filings, or rulings, do not just complain around the problem. Build a paper trail, file a verified motion, and ask for a TRAP 34.6(e)(3) abatement so the trial court can decide whether the missing items exist, matter, and must be added to the record."
In re José Garza
COA03
In In re José Garza, the Austin Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 264.408(d-1) required the trial court to deny a criminal defendant’s request to have CAC forensic interview videos transcribed once the State had already made the recordings reasonably available for review under Code of Criminal Procedure article 39.15(d). Relying on its prior decision in Tharp, the court concluded that a verbatim transcript is a prohibited copy or reproduction of the recording, regardless of protective-order limits or neutral court-reporter procedures. Because the statute left the trial court with no discretion, the order authorizing transcription exceeded the court’s authority, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a statute tightly limits access to CAC forensic interviews, lawyers cannot get around that limit by asking for a transcript or other derivative version of the recording. In family cases involving abuse allegations, build your strategy around lawful review access, note-taking, and expert inspection protocols—not reproduction requests that invite statutory objections and possible mandamus."
McCulloch v. McCulloch
COA03
In McCulloch, the obligor sought to reduce child support and terminate or reduce spousal maintenance based on alleged disability, unemployment, and worsening finances after the divorce decree. The Austin Court of Appeals held that modification under Texas Family Code sections 156.401(a)(1) and 8.057(c) requires proof of a material and substantial change in circumstances since the prior order, and that the movant failed to meet that burden because much of his evidence predated the decree, had already been litigated in earlier proceedings, or did not conclusively prove a post-decree loss of earning capacity. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings and intentional-unemployment finding, the court affirmed the denial of modification, rejected the guideline-support complaint, upheld the denial of continuance, and affirmed the judgment in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"A modification case is not a retrial of the divorce. To change child support or spousal maintenance, the movant must present a clean before-and-after record proving a post-order material and substantial change, backed by objective evidence such as medical records and reliable financial proof. SSA disability findings, client testimony, and general financial strain will not carry the day if the same issues existed before the decree or the trial court doubts credibility."
Jaka Janaka v. Rina Sefrin Hutagaol
COA01
In Janaka v. Hutagaol, the father sought to modify the mother’s possession terms only months after a divorce decree based on a mediated settlement agreement, alleging a false CPS report, possession-schedule violations, and interference with the children’s activities. The First Court of Appeals held that Family Code section 156.101(a)(1) requires proof of a threshold material and substantial change in circumstances since the earlier of the prior order or the underlying MSA, and that disputed evidence of post-decree conflict did not require the trial court to find such a change. Because the trial court was entitled to credit the mother’s explanation for contacting CPS and to treat the parties’ disputes as ordinary continuing conflict rather than a new substantial development, the appellate court affirmed the denial of modification and the attorney’s-fees award based on a finding that the suit was frivolous or designed to harass.
Litigation Takeaway
"A possession modification is not a do-over for co-parenting conflict. If you file soon after an agreed decree, you need concrete, corroborated proof of a genuinely new and material change tied to the statutory baseline date—not just allegations of interference, CPS involvement, or bad motives—or you risk losing and paying the other side’s fees."
Journey v. State
COA06
In Journey v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed revocation of deferred adjudication after the State alleged Journey violated supervision by committing a new family-violence assault and by failing to complete community service. Although the complainant recanted at the revocation hearing and claimed she had lied about the assault, the court held the trial court could still credit the contemporaneous 9-1-1 call, the responding officer’s testimony, and photographs showing facial injuries. Applying the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the appellate court concluded the State proved at least one violation. Because one proven violation is enough to support revocation, the court did not need to address the separate community-service ground.
Litigation Takeaway
"A recantation does not automatically defeat a family-violence allegation when contemporaneous evidence supports it. In family-law cases, judges may rely on 9-1-1 recordings, officer observations, photos, medical records, and other corroboration over a later walk-back, so lawyers should build or attack the case around that objective evidence—not just the witness’s live testimony."
Mary G. Mauldin and Carl Adams v. James C. Nix, III, as Co-Trustee and on Behalf of the Nix Family Trust
COA05
In Mauldin v. Nix, a trust beneficiary sued his sister over alleged mismanagement of a family trust after years of discovery disputes that began in a Rule 202 presuit proceeding and continued after merits claims were filed. The trial court repeatedly ordered discovery, found ongoing noncompliance and delayed disclosure that financial records had been shredded, and ultimately struck the sister’s pleadings as a sanction. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s procedural handling of the Rule 202-to-merits transition and sustained the severe discovery sanctions, concluding the record showed persistent discovery abuse rather than a mere scope dispute. But the court reversed the $125,000 breach-of-fiduciary-duty damages award because legally sufficient evidence did not connect the alleged fiduciary breach to a compensable loss. The court rendered a take-nothing judgment on that damages claim, remanded attorney’s fees tied to that recovery, and otherwise left the conversion and sanctions-related rulings intact.
Litigation Takeaway
"Bad conduct and bad optics are not enough to win money damages. In family-law crossover cases involving hidden assets, waste, reimbursement, or fiduciary-duty theories, you still need proof that the alleged misconduct caused a measurable loss. At the same time, parties who keep resisting discovery after repeated court orders risk pleadings-striking sanctions, and Rule 202 is not a shield once full merits litigation is underway."
Gonzalez v. State
COA01
In Gonzalez v. State, the First Court of Appeals affirmed admission of a friend’s testimony recounting the complainants’ earlier disclosures of abuse. The defense argued hearsay, but the State invoked Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(1)(B), contending that the defense had implied through voir dire, cross-examination, and closing that the complainants had recently embellished or fabricated their allegations for trial. The court held the complaint was not preserved because the defense did not specifically challenge the rule’s elements after the State identified the basis for admission. On the merits, the court concluded that, under Hammons, the trial court could consider the totality of the defense presentation and reasonably find an implied charge of recent fabrication. Because the prior statements to the friend were made years before the alleged motive to falsify arose, the premotive requirement was satisfied, and the testimony was properly admitted as prior consistent statements.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases involving abuse allegations or litigation-driven credibility fights, be careful when implying that a witness recently tailored testimony for custody, possession, or divorce advantage. That strategy can open the door to earlier consistent statements that would otherwise stay out. If you want to admit such statements, identify the exact motive alleged by the opponent and prove the statement predates it; if you want to exclude them, preserve element-specific objections and avoid turning a reliability attack into an accusation of calculated fabrication."
Payne v. Cocoroiu
COA14
In Payne v. Cocoroiu, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification order after the father challenged personal jurisdiction, service, venue, and the evidentiary basis for the judgment. The court held that by filing a pro se answer before filing a Rule 120a special appearance, the father made a general appearance and waived any objection to personal jurisdiction; that same appearance also cured any service defects under Rules 120 and 124. The court further held that Harris County had continuing exclusive jurisdiction because of the earlier final parentage order, defeating the venue challenge. Finally, because the father failed to provide the reporter’s record, the appellate court presumed the missing evidence supported the modification findings and rejected unpreserved complaints.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, a respondent who files an answer before a special appearance likely waives personal-jurisdiction and service complaints. Family litigators should assess jurisdiction immediately, carefully sequence pleadings, and make sure the appellate record is complete—especially in modification cases where most complaints depend on the hearing evidence."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Danielle Lauren Henry & Johnathon Hall
COA12
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued that her due-process rights were violated because she was not admitted into a January 3, 2025 Zoom hearing where the court granted a continuance and the parties agreed that the husband would not pay February spousal support. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of that constitutional complaint because the wife waited until the May 7, 2025 judgment hearing—after the final trial had already occurred—to raise it. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, the court held that even constitutional due-process complaints must be raised through a timely, specific objection, motion, or request at a point when the trial court can still cure the problem. Because the complaint was raised months too late, the issue was not preserved for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume calling something a due-process violation preserves it automatically. In family-law cases—especially Zoom hearings, temporary-orders settings, and continuance hearings—counsel must object immediately, request a concrete cure, and make a record while the trial court can still fix the problem, or the complaint will likely be waived on appeal."
In the Interest of D.A., A.A., K.A., & G.A., Children
COA12
In In re D.A., the Tyler Court of Appeals considered whether the Department’s endangerment proof was sufficient to terminate a father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) when the evidence was largely circumstantial rather than direct. Father argued the absence of medical testimony, expert testimony, photographs, and eyewitnesses made the evidence legally and factually insufficient. The court rejected that argument, explaining that Texas law does not require direct evidence of endangerment and that circumstantial evidence may support a firm belief or conviction if the total record reasonably shows the parent knowingly allowed endangering conditions or engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct. Applying the J.F.C./C.H. sufficiency standards and relying on In re Lipsky, the court deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations and held the cumulative force of the record was sufficient to support termination under subsections (D) and (E), affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"You do not need a “smoking gun” witness or expert to prove or defeat endangerment. In Texas family cases, a well-developed pattern of indirect evidence can be enough—so the key fight is usually over the strength of the inferences, not the mere lack of direct proof."