Opinion Library

Evidence

Sells v. State

COA09

In Sells v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child and held that testimony from another alleged victim was admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was offered for a noncharacter purpose, including showing a pattern of access-based abuse, relationship dynamics, and rebutting fabrication rather than merely proving propensity. The court also held that the defendant could not obtain reversal based on the absence of a limiting instruction in the jury charge because he failed to request the instruction or object to its omission, and any unpreserved error did not amount to egregious harm under Almanza. Finally, the court found the evidence legally sufficient, relying on the complainant’s testimony and corroborating context from other witnesses.

Litigation Takeaway

"For family-law abuse cases, Sells is a strong roadmap for admitting other-victim evidence when you can tie it to a specific noncharacter theory like grooming pattern, opportunity, plan, credibility, or rebuttal of fabrication. It is also a preservation warning: if you want the factfinder instructed on the limited use of that evidence, you must request the instruction clearly and timely or appellate review becomes much harder."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Joseph v. State

COA04

In Joseph v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed an aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction arising from a violent incident between unmarried dating partners who lived together. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient, challenged authentication of exhibits, and claimed ineffective assistance. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court held the complainant’s testimony alone was enough for a rational jury to find that he used or exhibited a firearm while intentionally or knowingly threatening her with imminent bodily injury, and the jury was entitled to believe her over his denial. The court also rejected the authentication and new-trial complaints, leaving the conviction intact. For family-law crossover purposes, the opinion reinforces that cohabiting dating partners fit comfortably within a household/family-violence context and that one credible witness, supported by domestic-scene evidence, can sustain consequential violence findings.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases, do not underestimate the power of one detailed, credible account of domestic violence—especially where the parties were dating and living together. Cohabitation can place the dispute squarely in a family-violence framework, and corroborating videos, property damage, officer observations, and firearm evidence can strongly influence protective orders, possession limits, and best-interest rulings even if some allegations are disputed or only partially proven."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Recarido Antonio Terrell v. The State of Texas

COA09

In Terrell v. State, the Beaumont court affirmed an aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction arising from a dating-violence shooting. The defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence, but the court held that the record—combining the complainant’s on-scene identifications, a 911 call, body-camera footage, prior testimony from an unavailable officer, medical evidence of a gunshot wound and road-rash-type abrasions, and circumstantial evidence tying the defendant and his red vehicle to the timeline—was enough for a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under Jackson v. Virginia. The court emphasized that appellate review does not reweigh credibility disputes or inconsistencies where the jury could reasonably credit the State’s corroborated version of events. The court also upheld the admission of punishment-phase extraneous-offense evidence.

Litigation Takeaway

"For family-law litigators, the case is a strong reminder that violence allegations do not rise or fall on perfect eyewitness testimony. Courts can credit a cumulative record built from emergency statements, responder observations, medical proof, recordings, and digital or physical corroboration—even when later testimony is incomplete or inconsistent. If you are proving family violence, build a layered evidentiary mosaic; if you are defending, attack foundation, attribution, and chronology rather than relying only on generalized credibility complaints."

Quesada v. Bonilla

COA04

In Quesada v. Bonilla, a contractor and homeowners signed a mediated settlement agreement resolving a construction dispute, but before judgment was rendered the contractor filed a motion to set aside the agreement and expressly withdrew consent, claiming duress, coercion, and lack of understanding. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that this revocation barred the trial court from rendering an agreed judgment on the MSA under Padilla and Quintero. Although the homeowners’ motion to enforce was likely sufficient to plead a contract-enforcement theory, the trial court still could not decide the disputed enforceability issues through a bare motion hearing based only on argument and the agreement itself. Because the court enforced the MSA without a proper evidentiary or merits-based procedure, the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Litigation Takeaway

"A signed settlement is not the same thing as consent to judgment. If a party revokes consent before rendition, the court generally cannot enforce the deal through a quick motion-to-enter hearing; the proponent must plead and prove contract enforcement through a proper merits process. For family lawyers, this is a strong procedural authority against shortcut enforcement of disputed non-statutory settlements and a reminder to preserve revocation in writing before judgment."

In the Matter of W.M., A Juvenile

COA05

In In the Matter of W.M., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order transferring a juvenile to criminal district court for murder and three aggravated-assault charges arising from an apartment-complex shooting. W.M. argued the evidence was insufficient to support the probable-cause finding required by Family Code section 54.02. The court rejected that challenge, explaining that a transfer hearing requires only evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the juvenile committed the charged offenses, not trial-level proof of guilt. Applying that standard, the court relied on Ring-camera footage showing W.M. arrive in and drive a black Acura, approach the complex with another suspect, and flee immediately after gunshots; eyewitness testimony that two masked men with guns were present before and after the shooting; ballistics showing two firearms were used; and evidence tying the Acura and related conduct to W.M. The court held that this direct and circumstantial evidence, including a law-of-parties theory, was enough to support probable cause and affirmed the transfer order.

Litigation Takeaway

"When a court is making a threshold safety or responsibility finding under the Family Code, a connected circumstantial record can be enough. Video, timing, access to a vehicle, association with a co-actor, and flight may collectively support a serious adverse ruling even without definitive proof of who pulled the trigger. Family lawyers should build—or dismantle—the full narrative, not just one piece of evidence."

Evidence

Kyron Henderson v. The State of Texas

COA05

In *Kyron Henderson v. The State of Texas*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Instagram evidence was properly authenticated under Texas Rule of Evidence 901 through circumstantial evidence rather than direct testimony from someone who personally saw the defendant use the account. The court relied on the account’s self-identifying posts, photos and videos depicting Henderson, direct messages discussing his bond and incarceration, jail-call references to the same account, and Instagram business records. Applying the liberal Rule 901 standard from *Butler*, *Fowler*, and *Tienda*, the court concluded the State only needed to present enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find the account was Henderson’s, not conclusive proof of ownership or exclusive control. Because the surrounding circumstances sufficiently tied the account and its contents to Henderson, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits, and the judgment was affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"Social-media evidence can be authenticated with a circumstantial mosaic; you do not need an eyewitness who saw the other party type the post. In family cases, lawyers should connect screenshots, DMs, and videos to the party through self-identifiers, images, case-specific references, platform records, and outside corroboration, while challengers must attack the specific gaps in that linkage rather than relying on a generic 'anyone could have made the account' objection."

Branch v. State

COA06

In Branch v. State, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court improperly allowed a child witness’s father to remain in the courtroom as a support person without making the findings required by Article 38.074. But at trial, counsel objected only under Rule 614 sequestration grounds and never specifically complained that Article 38.074 required predicate findings or asked the court to make them. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the appellate complaint did not comport with the trial objection, so the issue was waived under Rule 33.1(a). The court also held that complaints about the State’s references to other support persons were unpreserved because no contemporaneous objection was made.

Litigation Takeaway

"Specificity preserves error. In family cases involving child testimony, courtroom accommodations, sequestration exceptions, or trauma-informed procedures, a general objection will not preserve a narrower complaint that the court failed to follow a particular statute or make required findings. If you want appellate review, identify the exact authority, state the precise defect, request findings on the record, and obtain a ruling."

Kian Motors, Inc. v. VBI Group, Inc.

COA05

In this restricted appeal from a no-answer default judgment, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that service through the Texas Secretary of State was defective because the record showed process was forwarded to the wrong address. VBI’s filings identified Kian Motors’ address as 1212 Commerce Drive, but the Whitney certificate showed the Secretary mailed citation to 1213 Commerce Drive. Applying Texas’s strict-compliance rules for default judgments and statutory service under Business Organizations Code §§ 5.251 and 5.253, the court rejected any presumption that the Whitney certificate cured the problem and concluded the face of the record affirmatively showed lack of proper service. Because personal jurisdiction was absent, the default judgment was reversed and the case remanded.

Litigation Takeaway

"Default judgments live or die on exact service compliance. In family cases, even a one-digit address mismatch in substitute or statutory service can destroy a default on restricted appeal, so lawyers should audit the clerk’s record line by line before prove-up and immediately after any default is entered."

Rosenda Lemus a/k/a Rosenda Hernandez v. Ivis Enrique Lopez

COA05

In Lemus v. Lopez, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a case dismissed for want of prosecution cannot be reinstated unless the party files a verified motion to reinstate within 30 days of the dismissal order under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(3). Here, the motion to reinstate was filed 43 days after the DWOP and was unverified. The court treated those defects as jurisdictional, concluded the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after dismissal, and held the later reinstatement order was void. Because the case was never validly reinstated, the final judgment entered years later was also void, so the court vacated the judgment and dismissed the appeal.

Litigation Takeaway

"After a DWOP, reinstatement is not a clerical cleanup step. In Texas family cases, if the motion to reinstate is not both verified and filed within 30 days, the court loses plenary power and every later order may be void. Lawyers should immediately calendar the deadline, verify the motion, and audit any prior reinstatement before spending time and money on litigation."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Schubiner v. Julis

COA05

In Schubiner v. Julis, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a five-year Chapter 7B protective order after finding legally and factually sufficient evidence that the respondent engaged in stalking through a coordinated campaign of doxxing, mass emails and texts, social-media harassment, and use of third parties to confront the applicants in person. The court analyzed the conduct cumulatively rather than as isolated speech acts, emphasizing that publishing home addresses and family photos, urging public confrontations, contacting relatives and associates, and arranging in-person disruptions could reasonably be viewed as threatening, harassing, alarming, tormenting, or embarrassing conduct under Texas stalking law. The court also rejected vagueness, overbreadth, and prior-restraint challenges, holding in effect that an order tailored to proven, threat-facilitating harassment would stand.

Litigation Takeaway

"Texas courts can treat digital harassment as stalking when the evidence shows a repeated, targeted campaign—not just offensive speech. For family-law cases, doxxing, mass messaging, posting locations, and using third parties to pressure or confront a spouse, co-parent, or family members can support protective relief if you build a record showing repetition, escalation, targeting, and real-world safety concerns."