Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Candice Griffith and Forney Eye Associates, PLLC v. Steve Olkewicz
COA05
After a dispute during an eye-clinic visit, Steve Olkewicz alleged that clinic personnel made false statements about his conduct to his employer, resulting in his termination and reputational harm. Candice Griffith and Forney Eye Associates argued that his defamation and related tort claims were health care liability claims governed by Chapter 74 and sought dismissal because he had not served an expert report. Examining the claims’ underlying nature rather than their labels or the defendants’ status as health care providers, the Fifth Court of Appeals concluded that the claims concerned post-visit, nonclinical communications—not treatment, diagnosis, clinical judgment, or a departure from professional standards directly related to health care. The court therefore held that Chapter 74’s expert-report requirement, discovery stay, and dismissal remedy did not apply and affirmed the orders denying dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A claim against a health care provider is not automatically governed by Chapter 74. Courts examine the precise duty and conduct at issue: allegedly false, nonclinical statements to a third party may support ordinary tort claims without a Chapter 74 expert report, even when the parties met in a clinical setting. Counsel should classify each claim early, determine whether proof requires a professional health care standard, and preserve all procedural objections in the trial court."
Roel Guerra v. Maria Fabiola Guerra and Elma Guerra Chavez
COA07
A dispute among siblings over a family limited partnership and trust led the district court to enter a temporary injunction and related winding-up relief against Roel Guerra. On interlocutory appeal, Guerra challenged the injunction, the district court’s plenary power, the finality of earlier accounting and attorney’s-fee orders, and the court’s jurisdiction in light of a related probate proceeding. Because Guerra did not provide the reporter’s record from the multi-day evidentiary hearing, the court of appeals presumed the omitted testimony and exhibits supported the injunction and its findings. The court also concluded that the prior orders were interlocutory because they neither disposed of all claims and parties nor contained unequivocal finality language, so the district court retained plenary power. Finally, the pending probate matter did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the county court because the trust was a nonprobate asset, while the district court had statutory jurisdiction over the trust, receivership, and partnership-winding-up claims. The appellate court affirmed the challenged orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"An appellant cannot overturn an evidence-based temporary injunction without supplying the complete reporter’s record, including all hearing dates and exhibits; absent that record, the appellate court will presume the evidence supports the trial court. Counsel should also avoid assuming that an accounting, fee award, or winding-up order is final merely because it resolves an important issue. Before seeking review in a family-law or family-wealth dispute, determine whether the order is appealable or reviewable only by mandamus, secure a complete record, and carefully analyze finality and probate-versus-district-court jurisdiction."
Masimula v. Masimula
COA08
After a prior appeal removed only the future spousal-maintenance award and affirmed the divorce decree as modified, the trial court entered a modified decree implementing the appellate mandate. The former husband appealed again, renewing challenges under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, seeking to set aside the post-answer default decree, and attacking the evidentiary sufficiency of the property division. The Eighth Court of Appeals held that the law-of-the-case doctrine and mandate rule barred relitigation of matters resolved or left intact in the first appeal. It further concluded that the husband had not satisfied 50 U.S.C. § 3932’s requirements for an initial stay, so he was not entitled to an additional stay or mandatory appointed counsel, and the trial court was not required to grant a stay sua sponte based solely on his military status. Because the modified decree faithfully implemented the mandate without reopening the affirmed property division or default judgment, the court affirmed it.
Litigation Takeaway
"The first appeal is generally the only opportunity to challenge all appealable portions of a divorce decree. After a limited appellate disposition, the trial court may implement only the mandate, and a modified decree does not create a second chance to attack affirmed rulings. Servicemembers seeking an SCRA stay should also submit the statute’s required written statements and command documentation; military status alone does not compel a stay or appointment of counsel."
A.G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services obtained termination of Father’s parental rights on constructive abandonment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(N), even though its live petition did not expressly plead that ground. Father argued on appeal that the resulting lack of notice was fundamental error reviewable despite his failure to object at trial. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and Civil Procedure 67 and 301, the Third Court of Appeals held that parental-rights cases remain subject to ordinary error-preservation requirements and that the narrow fundamental-error doctrine did not apply. Because the petition gave notice of possible constructive abandonment, the issue was developed and submitted without a timely pleading or notice objection, and the Department expressly sought termination on that ground in closing, subsection (N) was tried by consent. The court affirmed the termination based on subsection (N) and the unchallenged best-interest finding without reaching Father’s challenge to the separate subsection (P) finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Object promptly when an opposing party introduces evidence or requests relief on an unpleaded theory. Even in a parental-rights termination case, characterizing the defect as a constitutional notice violation will not excuse failure to preserve the complaint, and silence may allow the issue to be tried by consent. Counsel should identify the pleading variance, explain prejudice, request exclusion, a continuance, or an opportunity to respond, and obtain a ruling. On appeal, challenge every predicate finding necessary to reverse the judgment."
State v. Olivarez
COA10
In this criminal appeal with direct lessons for Texas family-law trials, the defendant obtained the complainant’s counseling records while the State was still presenting its case and before the defense began presenting evidence, but she did not request a continuance, recess, witness recall, or other relief to permit further review and use of the records. The Tenth Court of Appeals held that, even assuming a disclosure failure under Brady or article 39.14, a new trial required proof that the delayed disclosure prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights. Because the defense had an opportunity to use the records and failed to create a record showing that the timing caused an uncured disadvantage, no reasonable view of the record supported a new trial. The court also ruled that untimely grounds added to the new-trial motion could not support relief over the State’s objection, reversed the new-trial order, and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"When important evidence is produced during trial, do not simply proceed and rely on a later motion for new trial. Promptly request a recess, continuance, additional discovery, permission to recall witnesses, or another tailored remedy; explain exactly what additional work is needed; obtain a ruling; and connect the late disclosure to a specific, uncured effect on the case. Also include every legal ground in a timely motion for new trial. Late production alone does not establish reversible harm."
Purnell v. 1000 Main, LLC
COA14
After the trial court set Purnell’s case for July 21, her attorney timely designated that week as summer vacation under Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region Rule 14(b) and later sought a continuance. The trial court denied the request and dismissed Purnell’s claims with prejudice when counsel declined to proceed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Rule 14(b)’s mandatory protection applies even when the trial setting predates the vacation designation. Counsel did not waive that protection because he never affirmatively agreed to the setting, repeatedly asserted the conflict, and appeared on the trial date only to preserve the objection. Accordingly, denying the continuance and dismissing the claims constituted an abuse of discretion; the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"A timely summer vacation designation can override an earlier trial setting when the governing regional rule expressly provides mandatory protection. Counsel should promptly move to continue, document compliance, obtain a ruling, preserve the objection, and avoid any post-designation statement or agreement that could constitute waiver. Courts may not use general docket-management authority—or dismiss a client’s case for refusing to proceed—to circumvent the rule."
In the Interest of A.L.O., a Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court concluded that clear and convincing evidence of endangerment included Mother’s prenatal methamphetamine use, which caused the child to suffer neonatal withdrawal, seizures, feeding difficulties, and extended NICU care; the objectively hazardous condition of Mother’s residence; and Mother’s continued cohabitation with a drug-using partner who refused testing and services and obstructed a home visit. Although Mother had become sober, obtained employment, visited consistently, and substantially completed her service plan, the court held that these improvements did not overcome her failure to remedy the unsafe home and relationship. Given the child’s vulnerability and the stability of her foster-to-adopt placement, the evidence also supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Completing services and achieving recent sobriety may not defeat termination when a parent has not translated that progress into a safe home and protective decisions. Counsel should present concrete evidence of lasting behavioral change, suitable housing, and enforceable separation from unsafe household members; conversely, parties alleging endangerment should document specific hazards, the parent’s knowledge, prenatal drug-related harm, and continuing exposure to drug-using or noncompliant partners. Poverty alone is not endangerment, but objectively dangerous living conditions cannot be dismissed as mere economic hardship."
Azhar v. Choudhri
SCOTX
Hira Azhar alleged that Mohammad Ali Choudhri secretly obtained a unilateral divorce in Pakistan while the Texas-domiciled couple had accumulated substantial community assets. Azhar was not personally served, did not participate, and learned of the divorce about two years later; the only purported notice was publication in a small local newspaper five days before the proceeding. The trial court extended comity to the Pakistani divorce and related rulings, dismissed Azhar’s Texas divorce petition, and denied her property claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. Applying Texas comity principles and the State’s fundamental public policy favoring meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard, the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that formal publication was insufficient where the circumstances indicated gamesmanship rather than a genuine effort to locate the affected spouse. The court reversed and remanded, holding that a foreign-country divorce judgment obtained without meaningful notice or an opportunity to be heard cannot receive comity in Texas.
Litigation Takeaway
"A foreign divorce decree is not automatically entitled to recognition merely because it is final and authenticated. When recognition would defeat Texas marital-property claims, counsel should build an evidentiary record addressing jurisdiction, service, actual notice, available means of contact, participation rights, and any effort to conceal the proceeding. Publication will not satisfy Texas public policy when the proponent knew how to locate the spouse but failed to make a genuine attempt to provide notice."
Baker v. State
COA06
Cindi Rawlins Baker appealed her murder conviction after the trial court prevented her domestic-violence expert from identifying Baker as the victim in her marriage. The Sixth Court of Appeals held that, although Texas Rule of Evidence 702 permitted the expert to educate the jury about domestic violence, trauma, and their behavioral effects, Rule 705(c) allowed exclusion of the case-specific label because it rested primarily on one two-hour interview with Baker, without review of police reports, recordings, collateral witnesses, or materially conflicting evidence suggesting mutual violence or aggression by Baker. The court also held that Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.371 did not override the Rules of Evidence and that Baker’s article 38.36 argument was unpreserved. Because the tailored limitation fell within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expertise in abuse dynamics does not, by itself, establish a reliable basis to label a spouse or parent the victim, abuser, or primary aggressor. Counsel offering a case-specific opinion should show that the expert reviewed adequate records, tested competing accounts, considered conflicting evidence, and used a reliable methodology. Opposing counsel should invoke Rules 702 and 705(c), examine the expert’s factual foundation outside the factfinder’s presence, and seek a tailored ruling permitting general educational testimony while excluding unsupported case-specific conclusions."
Burgess v. Andersson
COA03
The trial court granted summary judgment for two defendants and labeled its order final, but the plaintiff’s claims against a third defendant remained pending. Although the plaintiff later nonsuited those claims and filed a notice of appeal, no signed dismissal order or final judgment had been entered. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1, 27.1, and 27.2 and the finality principles in Farmer, In re Bennett, and In re Guardianship of Jones, the Third Court of Appeals concluded that the summary-judgment order neither disposed of every claim and party nor contained sufficiently specific decretal language. The nonsuit filing alone did not begin the appellate timetable. Rather than dismissing the premature appeal, the court abated and remanded for entry of a signed final order, after which the existing notice of appeal could relate forward and be treated as timely.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before appealing a family-law order, confirm that a signed judgment expressly disposes of every claim and every party and states the relief in operative decretal language. Nonsuiting the last unresolved claim does not itself start the appellate timetable; counsel must obtain a signed dismissal order or final judgment. If an appeal was filed too early, promptly seek abatement under Rule 27.2 and entry of a final order so Rule 27.1 may preserve the premature notice—but treat that procedure as a discretionary safety net, not a substitute for a finality review."