Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
In the Interest of W.R.I.F.
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights to a medically vulnerable infant after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (M), and (R), and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The court emphasized Mother’s two-decade methamphetamine addiction, admitted drug use during pregnancy, prior endangerment-based terminations as to two other children, missed drug testing, unstable housing, and her failure during a monitored return to consistently meet the child’s significant medical needs, including therapy attendance and inhaler management. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard, the court treated these facts as a continuing course of endangering conduct rather than isolated lapses, and it held that the stable foster placement with the child’s sibling strongly supported best interest. The court also rejected Mother’s due-process complaint about a post-trial clarification hearing and her ineffective-assistance claim because she failed to show any substantive deprivation or prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, courts look at the whole pattern, not just recent improvement. Long-term drug use, prior endangerment findings, unstable housing, and a parent’s inability to handle a child’s actual medical needs can outweigh short-term compliance and strongly support findings of danger and best interest. If you are trying the case, build a timeline, tie the conduct to the child’s real-world needs, and make a concrete record of harm for any procedural complaint."
Pegram v. Pegram
COA05
In Pegram v. Pegram, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a county-court default judgment entered after the defendant failed to appear for a trial de novo from justice court. The court held the judgment was a post-answer default, not a no-answer default, because the defendant’s justice-court motion to dismiss functioned as an answer and carried forward into the county-court proceeding. Because a post-answer default requires the plaintiff to prove every element with evidence, and no reporter’s record existed, the court could not review the defendant’s legal-sufficiency challenge. The absence of a record required reversal and remand.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the opposing party has filed anything that counts as an answer, a later nonappearance does not create a no-answer default. In family cases, that means you must present admissible evidence on every element of requested relief and make a reporter’s record, or you risk reversal on appeal."
In the Interest of R.D., a Child
COA07
In this parental-termination appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the reporter’s record was overdue and the court reporter ignored the court’s status request. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 35.3(c) and 37.3(a)(2), the court held that it had to take action to avoid further delay and protect the parties’ rights in an accelerated appeal. The court abated the appeal and remanded for the trial court to determine what work remained on the record, why the delay occurred, how long completion would take, and whether the original reporter could timely finish it. The court also required the trial court to arrange a substitute reporter if the original reporter needed more than twenty additional days to complete, certify, and file the record.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family appeals, especially accelerated termination cases, lawyers cannot treat the reporter’s record as a back-office issue. Monitor record deadlines aggressively, document all communications, and raise delay problems early, because appellate courts may abate the case, remand for findings, and even require a substitute reporter to keep the appeal moving."
Martinez v. State
COA07
In Martinez v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant on community supervision could refuse a treatment-required instant-offense polygraph by invoking the Fifth Amendment after his conviction for indecency with a child was already final on direct appeal. The court focused on the narrow scope of the polygraph, which was limited to the adjudicated offense and did not reach other potentially chargeable conduct. Relying on Fifth Amendment principles discussed in Ex parte Dangelo and In re Medina, the court held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to questioning about an offense that can no longer expose the defendant to future criminal liability because direct appeals are exhausted. On that basis, the court concluded the refusal to participate supported revocation of community supervision. The court also modified the judgment and bill of costs to remove language suggesting future appointed-attorney’s fees could be assessed despite an indigency finding and no evidence of changed financial circumstances.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Fifth Amendment objection is not a blanket shield when the questioning is tightly limited to a finalized criminal offense. In family-law cases, lawyers should frame discovery, evaluations, and examinations with precision: if the inquiry concerns only an adjudicated offense with no remaining criminal exposure, a broad privilege claim may fail and noncooperation can carry real litigation consequences."
In re J.H., A.H., J.H., and Z.H.
COA01
In this parental termination case, parents challenged the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that a trial recess made the initial start of the trial a 'sham' intended to circumvent the statutory dismissal deadline under Texas Family Code section 263.401. The parents also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding endangerment and the best interests of the children. The First Court of Appeals held that because the trial court had legitimately begun hearing the merits of the case before the deadline, it did not lose jurisdiction simply because the final decree was signed later. In reviewing the merits, the court found that the parents' history of substance abuse, criminal child endangerment, and ongoing incidents of physical injury to the children provided clear and convincing evidence to support termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"To preserve jurisdiction in CPS cases, the trial must meaningfully commence on the merits before the statutory dismissal deadline; appellate courts will reject 'sham' trial challenges if the record reflects genuine judicial activity. Furthermore, evidence of a parent's instability or misconduct during the pendency of the suit is often dispositive in endangerment and best-interest analyses."
In re Adeel Zaidi, A.K. Chagla and Prestige Consulting d/b/a Turnaround Management Group
SCOTX
In an original mandamus proceeding, relators challenged a trial court order disqualifying their lawyer after his legal assistant—who previously worked for opposing counsel on the same case and had access to privileged strategy and work product—later performed services on the matter at the relators’ firm without any evidence she was admonished or screened before touching the file. The Texas Supreme Court applied the Phoenix Founders bright-line rule governing side-switching nonlawyer staff: when a nonlawyer worked on the same matter for the other side, the nonlawyer is conclusively presumed to have obtained confidences, and the hiring firm can avoid disqualification only by timely prophylactic measures, including admonishing the employee before the employee begins work on the conflicted matter. Because the record showed the assistant performed work on the case multiple times and there was no evidence of any pre-work admonition or timely screen, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in disqualifying counsel. The Court also rejected the argument that e-filing service notices listing the assistant as the “filer” conclusively established waiver; such notices do not, as a matter of law, prove the opposing party had actual knowledge of the disqualifying facts and then unreasonably delayed. Mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your firm hires (or shares) a paralegal/legal assistant who previously worked on the other side of the same case, you must admonish and screen that employee before they do anything on the file—even “ministerial” tasks like e-filing—or you risk automatic disqualification under the Phoenix Founders bright-line rule. And if you’re seeking disqualification, don’t assume routine e-filing notices will defeat you on waiver; waiver requires proof of actual knowledge plus unreasonable delay, not just metadata."
Lopez v. Lengyel
COA03
In a dispute between two professional online streamers, the Austin Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of an informal marriage claim. The trial court had granted a no-evidence summary judgment, finding there was insufficient proof of an agreement to be married or a public 'holding out' as spouses. However, the appellate court analyzed the 'mosaic' of evidence provided by the claimant—including testimony about an agreement made to facilitate international travel during COVID-19, representations made to family and household staff, and the use of the partner's surname. The court held that even though the parties used inconsistent labels online (such as 'boyfriend') for professional branding purposes, the accumulated evidence was enough to create a factual dispute that must be decided at trial rather than dismissed early.
Litigation Takeaway
"Proving a common-law marriage depends on the 'cumulative force' of evidence, such as statements to family, household staff, and government officials. Inconsistent public messaging—especially when motivated by privacy or professional branding—does not automatically defeat a marriage claim; instead, it creates a credibility issue that should be resolved at trial."
In the Interest of J.K.C.
COA08
In In the Interest of J.K.C., the Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous issues for appeal. The court independently reviewed the full record, including the endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the constructive-abandonment finding under subsection (N), and the best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). After that review, the court concluded there was no arguable basis to challenge the trial court’s ruling and affirmed the termination order. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding that appointed counsel in termination cases must continue representation through the petition-for-review stage under In re P.M. and Family Code § 107.016(2)(B).
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination appeals are won or lost on the trial record. If trial counsel does not preserve error, develop evidence against endangerment and best interest, and create a meaningful appellate record, the court of appeals may find no arguable issue at all—even under its own independent Anders review. The case also reminds appointed counsel that representation in termination cases continues beyond the court of appeals."
In re Leo Lapuerta, M.D., F.A.C.S., and The Plastic Surgery Institute of Southeast Texas, P.A.
SCOTX
In an underlying medical-negligence case, a jury returned an 11–1 defense verdict finding no proximate cause and the trial court signed a take-nothing judgment. After the plaintiff moved for new trial—re-urging charge objections and submitting a lone dissenting juror’s post-verdict letter describing deliberations—the trial court granted a new trial and later issued an amended order listing seven reasons, largely framed as charge confusion tied to Texas “loss of chance”/medical-causation principles. The Texas Supreme Court held the new-trial order was an abuse of discretion because its stated reasons rested on a misapprehension of Texas causation law; a trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial on an incorrect legal premise. The Court also condemned the submission of juror-deliberation evidence as “flagrantly improper” and refused to discount the risk that such material influenced the new-trial ruling. The Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to render judgment on (reinstate) the jury’s take-nothing verdict.
Litigation Takeaway
"New-trial orders must rest on a legally correct, record-supported, and specifically articulated rationale—not a judge’s mistaken view of the law or post-verdict narratives about what jurors discussed. If the losing party tries to prove “jury confusion” with juror letters/affidavits about deliberations, object and move to strike; and if a new trial is granted anyway, mandamus is often the proper—and fast—remedy to reinstate the verdict and avoid a wasteful redo."
Cory Cornell Parker v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Cory Cornell Parker v. State, the defendant attended jury selection and the State’s case-in-chief but failed to return when trial resumed for the defense case, claiming by text that he was being taken by ambulance to a hospital. Despite hours of opportunity and repeated requests, neither Parker nor counsel provided basic, verifiable information (hospital name/location, provider contact, admission/discharge details, documentation), and counsel’s continuance requests were oral and unsupported. The trial court denied a continuance, declined to conduct an unverified phone call, found Parker’s mid-trial absence voluntary, and proceeded; Parker returned after deliberations began. On appeal, the First Court of Appeals held the record supported the trial court’s discretionary finding that Parker voluntarily absented himself and that denying the unsupported oral continuance requests was not an abuse of discretion. The court also rejected Parker’s ineffective-assistance claims based on counsel’s failure to file a written continuance motion or seek a writ of attachment because Parker did not show deficient performance and, critically, failed to show prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different result). The court further found no reversible error regarding assessed costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the other side claims a last-minute “emergency” to stop a hearing or trial, frame it as a proof-and-diligence issue: insist on real-time, verifiable details and competent documentation, make the timeline record, and push for express findings. Unsupported, oral continuance requests—especially timed to derail an evidentiary turning point—can properly be denied, and a party who withholds readily confirmable information risks a finding that the absence is voluntary/strategic."