Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
Bernadette Cagney-Reeves v. Eric Michael Reeves
COA14
In Cagney-Reeves v. Reeves, the ex-wife asked the court to “enforce” a divorce decree by voiding a deed from a completed post-divorce home sale and putting title back in her name, claiming forgery, coercion, incapacity, and broker noncompliance. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Chapter 9 allows only implementation or clarification of the property division actually made in the decree, not a new division of property. Because the decree required the home to be sold and the proceeds divided 60/40, an order undoing the sale and revesting title in one spouse would impermissibly alter the decree under section 9.007. The court also noted the movant failed to present competent evidence supporting forgery or any unmet decree term requiring enforcement, and it held her evidentiary and discovery complaints were not preserved for appeal. The denial of the enforcement motion was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Post-divorce enforcement is remedy-driven: if the relief sought would unwind a sale, restore title, or otherwise change the decree’s economic outcome, Chapter 9 is likely the wrong vehicle. Family-law litigants must tie enforcement requests to a specific unperformed decree obligation and support serious allegations like forgery or coercion with competent, preserved evidence."
In the Interest of D.A., A.A., K.A., & G.A., Children
COA12
In In re D.A., the Tyler Court of Appeals considered whether the Department’s endangerment proof was sufficient to terminate a father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) when the evidence was largely circumstantial rather than direct. Father argued the absence of medical testimony, expert testimony, photographs, and eyewitnesses made the evidence legally and factually insufficient. The court rejected that argument, explaining that Texas law does not require direct evidence of endangerment and that circumstantial evidence may support a firm belief or conviction if the total record reasonably shows the parent knowingly allowed endangering conditions or engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct. Applying the J.F.C./C.H. sufficiency standards and relying on In re Lipsky, the court deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations and held the cumulative force of the record was sufficient to support termination under subsections (D) and (E), affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"You do not need a “smoking gun” witness or expert to prove or defeat endangerment. In Texas family cases, a well-developed pattern of indirect evidence can be enough—so the key fight is usually over the strength of the inferences, not the mere lack of direct proof."
Mary G. Mauldin and Carl Adams v. James C. Nix, III, as Co-Trustee and on Behalf of the Nix Family Trust
COA05
In Mauldin v. Nix, a trust beneficiary sued his sister over alleged mismanagement of a family trust after years of discovery disputes that began in a Rule 202 presuit proceeding and continued after merits claims were filed. The trial court repeatedly ordered discovery, found ongoing noncompliance and delayed disclosure that financial records had been shredded, and ultimately struck the sister’s pleadings as a sanction. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s procedural handling of the Rule 202-to-merits transition and sustained the severe discovery sanctions, concluding the record showed persistent discovery abuse rather than a mere scope dispute. But the court reversed the $125,000 breach-of-fiduciary-duty damages award because legally sufficient evidence did not connect the alleged fiduciary breach to a compensable loss. The court rendered a take-nothing judgment on that damages claim, remanded attorney’s fees tied to that recovery, and otherwise left the conversion and sanctions-related rulings intact.
Litigation Takeaway
"Bad conduct and bad optics are not enough to win money damages. In family-law crossover cases involving hidden assets, waste, reimbursement, or fiduciary-duty theories, you still need proof that the alleged misconduct caused a measurable loss. At the same time, parties who keep resisting discovery after repeated court orders risk pleadings-striking sanctions, and Rule 202 is not a shield once full merits litigation is underway."
In the Interest of A.F., a child; In the Interest of M.M. and M.M., children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that Mother sold fentanyl while the children were present, left them with an apparently intoxicated boyfriend, had an existing neglectful-supervision case, admitted using fentanyl and methadone while caring for the children, and was incarcerated on drug-related sentences that prevented her from caring for or visiting them. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest factors, the court emphasized present and future danger, parental incapacity, and the children’s stable placement with a paternal aunt. Because the record supported a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest, the judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won by connecting misconduct to concrete parenting danger. Evidence of drug trafficking, active substance abuse, impaired supervision, incarceration, and prior Department involvement becomes especially powerful when paired with proof of a stable alternative placement. On appeal, unchallenged predicate findings can strongly reinforce a best-interest affirmance."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Albert Ray Garcia and Patricia Murguia Garcia
COA07
In this Texas divorce appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld a decree awarding the husband all of a premarital house titled in both parties’ names and a disproportionate share of a joint bank account. The court held that because the house was acquired before marriage, each party’s interest was separate property under the inception-of-title rule, and the deed’s presumption of equal ownership was rebutted by evidence that the husband alone paid the purchase price and did not intend a gift to the wife. Framed as a partition issue rather than a just-and-right division of community property, the trial court permissibly determined the parties’ true ownership interests and awarded the entire property to the husband. The court also rejected the wife’s challenge to the bank-account award because she attacked only one asset instead of showing that the overall community division was unjust.
Litigation Takeaway
"Joint title on premarital real estate does not guarantee a 50/50 result in divorce. If the property was acquired before marriage, lawyers should plead partition, trace the acquisition funds, and build evidence on ownership percentages and gift intent; on appeal, challenges to property division must address the overall estate, not just one account or asset."
In the Interest of A.F., a child; In the Interest of M.M. and M.M., children
COA07
The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on Mother’s fentanyl trafficking while the children were present, her leaving them with an impaired boyfriend, her admissions that she used fentanyl and methadone while caring for them and was high during the incident, her ongoing incarceration and delayed parole eligibility, prior Department involvement for neglectful supervision, and the children’s stable placement with a paternal aunt. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and Holley best-interest factors, the court concluded the record allowed the factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that termination served the children’s need for safety, stability, and permanence.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases get much stronger when misconduct is tied to concrete danger to the child, parental unavailability, and a stable alternative placement. In custody and modification disputes, this case is a strong reminder that substance abuse, criminal conduct, unsafe third-party caregivers, and incarceration can heavily influence child-centered rulings even outside termination cases."
Keith Richard Nemcek v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Richard v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a family-violence fine imposed under article 42.504 could not stand because the written criminal judgment did not include the required affirmative deadly-weapon finding. Although the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault with a deadly weapon and the evidence described severe abuse within an intimate relationship, the court distinguished between the elements of the offense and the separate formal finding required in the judgment to authorize the fine. The court modified the judgment to delete the fine and otherwise affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a criminal offense label proves every fact or finding you want to use in family court. Check the signed judgment for the exact findings it contains, because collateral consequences often turn on formal written findings, not just the indictment, testimony, or offense title."
Venson v. State
COA06
In Venson v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child by contact after the defendant argued that inconsistencies between the child’s trial testimony and prior forensic-interview statements made the evidence legally insufficient. The court applied the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard, measured the evidence against a hypothetically correct jury charge, and held that credibility conflicts and evolving details in a child’s disclosures are matters for the jury, not grounds for appellate reversal. The court also upheld the trial court’s designation of the forensic interviewer as the outcry witness because the mother received only a brief, nonspecific disclosure, while the interviewer obtained the first detailed account of the abuse. The conviction was affirmed in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, do not assume that inconsistencies alone destroy a child’s credibility or the legal force of the disclosure. Venson is strong crossover authority for the point that incremental or imperfectly consistent disclosures may still support protective relief, and that the key outcry question is who first received a sufficiently detailed description of the alleged conduct."
Darwin Deason v. Barbara D'Amato
COA05
In Deason v. D'Amato, the former wife filed a post-divorce suit seeking ownership or the value of five pieces of jewelry, claiming the divorce papers had not actually resolved rights to those items. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that res judicata barred the claim because the jewelry had already been specifically identified as the husband’s separate property in both the premarital agreement and the Agreement Incident to Divorce, which was approved in the divorce decree. The court rejected the argument that a general reservation of a potential future claim preserved later litigation over the jewelry, explaining that property expressly allocated in the divorce documents is not “undivided property” under Family Code chapter 9. The court also clarified that chapter 9 is not jurisdictional, but reversed and vacated the $2.73 million jewelry award and reversed related fees and interest because the later suit was an impermissible relitigation of property already awarded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree or incorporated agreements specifically identify and award property, a later suit cannot repackage that dispute as an omitted-property or chapter 9 claim. Generic reservation language will not override a detailed property allocation, so lawyers must draft any true carve-out with precision and make sure the asset is not otherwise awarded elsewhere in the decree package."
Nicholas Field v. Brandi Pinsker
COA03
In Field v. Pinsker, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed a modification order requiring above-guideline support for an adult disabled child under Texas Family Code § 154.306. The dispute centered on whether post-majority support for Eric, a severely autistic young adult with significant behavioral and functional limitations, could exceed ordinary guideline child support. The court analyzed the statute through an abuse-of-discretion lens and held that § 154.306 allows trial courts to consider the child’s proven disability-related needs, including constant one-on-one supervision, structured care, caregiver scarcity, and safety-related expenses, rather than limiting support to guideline amounts. Because the evidence showed Eric was incapable of self-support, required substantial ongoing care, and Field had the ability to pay more, the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering above-guideline support.
Litigation Takeaway
"Section 154.306 cases turn on detailed proof of functional incapacity and real-world care costs, not diagnosis alone. If you want above-guideline adult disabled child support, build a concrete record showing supervision needs, safety risks, caregiver costs, and the obligor’s ability to pay; if you oppose it, attack the specificity, necessity, and reasonableness of those claimed expenses rather than relying on a simple guideline-cap argument."