Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
In re The Commitment of Raul Eliss Dominguez
COA03
In an SVP civil-commitment jury trial under Texas Health & Safety Code Chapter 841, the State’s expert psychologist referenced an unadjudicated allegation that Raul Eliss Dominguez sexually abused his four-year-old nephew. Although the issue was discussed outside the jury’s presence in a pretrial/limine setting, the trial court only cautioned counsel to object if testimony became inadmissible. When the expert mentioned the nephew allegation in front of the jury, Dominguez did not make a timely, specific objection, did not request a running objection, and did not obtain a ruling tied to the complained-of testimony. Applying TRAP 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103, the Third Court of Appeals held the complaint was not preserved and affirmed the commitment order. The court also held that, even assuming the expert’s testimony was admitted in error, any error was harmless (and effectively waived) because Dominguez later introduced the same or similar evidence through his own testimony without objection, triggering the “same evidence” rule.
Litigation Takeaway
"Motions in limine don’t preserve error. If an expert starts weaving unadjudicated “bad act” allegations into the basis for an opinion, you must object in real time, obtain a ruling (and a running objection if it will recur), and avoid later “opening the door” by eliciting the same facts yourself—otherwise you likely lose the issue both on preservation and on harmlessness under the same-evidence rule."
Thomas Joseph Radford, Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Radford, the complainant testified she ingested Xanax supplied by the defendant, lost consciousness, and woke to find the defendant penetrating her while her clothing was displaced. The defendant immediately stopped and acted as if nothing had happened when she opened her eyes. On appeal from a sexual-assault conviction, the Houston First Court of Appeals applied the legal-sufficiency standard (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict) and focused on Texas Penal Code § 22.011(b)(3) and (5), which define “without consent” to include situations where the actor knows the complainant is unconscious/physically unable to resist or unaware the assault is occurring. The court rejected the argument that the complainant’s inability to describe the precise start of intercourse created an evidentiary gap; unconsciousness at the outset is itself affirmative proof of nonconsent under the statute. The court further held the jury could infer the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent from circumstantial evidence and consciousness-of-guilt conduct, including that intercourse began while she was unconscious (after drugs he provided) and that he abruptly stopped and normalized the situation upon her awakening. The court affirmed, holding the evidence legally sufficient to prove both lack of consent and the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the evidence shows a person was unconscious or unaware at the outset, Texas law treats that incapacity as affirmative proof of “without consent”—the case does not fail just because the complainant cannot testify to what happened during unconsciousness. Knowledge/intent is commonly proven circumstantially; abrupt stopping, concealment, minimization, or “acting like nothing happened” can support an inference the actor knew the other person could not consent. In family-violence/SAPCR disputes, build the record around impairment, waking-condition details, and post-incident conduct to support findings even where memory is partial."
Howard v. State
COA14
After a jury convicted Howard of two aggravated sexual assaults and aggravated robbery, he elected judge sentencing. At the punishment setting the judge discussed the punishment range, commented the case carried high exposure, and encouraged counsel-client consultation and negotiation. After a recess the parties announced a post-verdict punishment agreement, and the court imposed a 50-year sentence “in accordance with the plea agreement.” On appeal Howard argued (1) due process “judicial vindictiveness” for having gone to trial and (2) that the punishment agreement was involuntary and the court failed to conduct a voluntariness inquiry. The Fourteenth Court held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not a retrial with an increased sentence after a successful appeal; therefore Howard had to prove actual vindictiveness. The record showed the judge’s remarks were facilitative/admonitory, repeatedly disclaiming any predetermined punishment, and the 50-year term matched the parties’ post-verdict agreement—so no actual vindictiveness was shown. The court also held voluntariness and “failure to inquire” complaints were forfeited because Howard made no contemporaneous objection when the agreement was adopted and filed no post-judgment motion raising involuntariness. Judgments affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you intend to later claim an on-the-record agreement (Rule 11/MBA/MSA or post-ruling deal) was coerced or involuntary, you must object immediately and/or file a timely post-judgment motion—otherwise the complaint is likely waived. And “judicial vindictiveness” is a narrow doctrine; absent a true Pearce posture, you must prove actual retaliation from the record, not just tough judicial commentary or settlement encouragement."
Norman v. Kahn Scheepvaart BV
COA14
In Norman v. Kahn Scheepvaart BV, a longshore worker appealed a take-nothing judgment after a jury found neither she nor the vessel owner’s negligence proximately caused her injury. On appeal, she attacked the jury charge as confusing and as improperly permitting certain theories/defenses and a “no one responsible” outcome, and she also sought a new trial based on alleged juror and bailiff misconduct. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused first on error preservation under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 272–278 and the State Dep’t of Highways v. Payne framework, holding that most complaints were waived because counsel did not make timely, specific objections at the charge conference, did not ensure any requested charge language was in the clerk’s record in substantially correct form, and did not obtain an express ruling or endorsed refusal. The court rejected “preservation-by-paperwork,” explaining that pretrial filings and an unrecorded “tender” did not alert the trial court at the charge conference or create an appellate record under Cruz. The court declined to treat the alleged defects as fundamental error. As to the few issues arguably preserved, the court found no reversible charge error (one was not error; any other assumed error was harmless). The court also held the alleged juror/bailiff misconduct did not justify a new trial and affirmed the denial of the motion for new trial. The take-nothing judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Jury-charge complaints live or die on preservation: object on the record before submission, state the defect plainly and specifically, tender substantially correct requested language, make sure it is file-stamped and included in the clerk’s record, and get a clear ruling/refusal. Pretrial proposed charges and vague “tenders” that don’t make it into the record won’t save an appeal, and misconduct/new-trial arguments require admissible proof tied to harm."
Moises Galvan v. The State of Texas
COA08
In a bar‑shooting prosecution, Moises Galvan admitted shooting two men (killing one) but claimed self‑defense. After a mistrial in 2019, he was retried and convicted in 2023. On appeal, the El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed (1) claimed jury‑charge defects under Texas’s preservation‑dependent harm framework, (2) exclusion of a defense expert opinion under abuse‑of‑discretion gatekeeping and the need for a reliable, issue‑specific “fit” plus a proper offer of proof, (3) cumulative error, and (4) a Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claim under the Barker v. Wingo balancing test. The court held Galvan failed to show reversible charge error or harm, the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding the defense expert (and any error was not shown harmful in light of the video/forensic and impeachment evidence), cumulative‑error relief was unavailable without multiple harmful errors, and the Barker factors did not warrant the drastic remedy of dismissal with prejudice despite the lengthy delay between indictment and retrial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Crossover lesson for family‑violence dockets: (1) If you need an expert to support a self‑defense/“reasonable perception” narrative, you must build a tight admissibility foundation and preserve the excluded opinion with a detailed offer of proof—otherwise exclusion will usually stand on appeal. (2) Delay‑based fairness arguments require a record of assertion of the right and concrete prejudice (lost evidence/witnesses, impaired presentation, child‑focused harm), not generalized complaints. (3) “Cumulative error” rarely rescues a case when each individual ruling fails on preservation, error, or harm."
Sergio Adrian Contreras v. The State of Texas
COA13
In a criminal appeal arising from a continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction under Texas Penal Code § 21.02, the defendant challenged (1) alleged jury-charge error, (2) legal sufficiency on the statute’s “continuous period of 30 or more days”/multiple-acts element, (3) limits the trial court placed on voir dire of venire members with sexual-assault experiences, and (4) claimed prosecutorial misconduct. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the charge complaints under Texas jury-charge harm standards (including the egregious-harm framework for unpreserved error), reviewed sufficiency under the Jackson v. Virginia rational-juror standard, and deferred to the trial court’s broad discretion to control voir dire absent a showing that limits prevented meaningful bias exploration and caused harm. On the evidence, the court treated the State’s proof as a corroborative disclosure pathway—school counselor/wellness disclosure leading to CAC forensic interviews and a child-abuse pediatric evaluation—and held that delayed outcry, developmental “fuzziness,” and qualifying language (“I think,” “I’m not sure”) did not render the children’s accounts legally insufficient. The court also found no reversible prosecutorial-misconduct error due to context, lack of preservation, curative measures, or lack of prejudice. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence/child-sex-abuse custody and protective-order cases, courts can credit a “disclosure pathway” (school disclosure → CAC interview → medical/clinical testimony) even when the child reports late and is imprecise on details; don’t assume “I’m not sure” impeachment will defeat safety findings. If you’re defending, focus on challenging the reliability of the disclosure process (suggestibility/contamination, anchoring, leading questions) and preserve a clean record—especially for voir dire and evidentiary limits—because appellate courts give wide deference without specific offers of proof."
Oscar Antonio Rodriguez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a prosecution for continuous sexual abuse of a child, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the complainant had previously viewed pornography on a relative’s phone to support a fabrication theory. The State invoked former Texas Rule of Evidence 412 (rape-shield rule), and after a hearing outside the jury’s presence the trial court excluded the evidence, finding it did not fit any exception and did not show bias or motive to lie. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that pornography exposure, at most, provides an “alternative source of sexual knowledge,” which does not satisfy Rule 412’s motive/bias exception absent a logical nexus showing why the exposure would lead the complainant to falsely accuse this defendant. The court also held any constitutional “right to present a defense” complaint was waived because the defense did not expressly raise that constitutional ground in the trial court and obtain a ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"Porn/sexual-content exposure is not automatically admissible to undermine a child-complainant; without a concrete, non-speculative link to a specific motive or bias to fabricate against the accused, it is simply an alternative-knowledge theory and can be excluded under rape-shield/Rule 403 principles. Also, if you intend to argue evidence is “constitutionally required” (due process/confrontation/right to present a defense), you must clearly assert that ground, make a full offer of proof, and obtain an express ruling—or the issue is waived on appeal."
Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm v. Michael A. Pohl and The Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
COA01
A Texas lawyer obtained another lawyer’s vendor-held files—attorney–client fee contracts and extensive client lists—through a marketing vendor involved in a prior dispute and used the information to target those individuals with notices that triggered hundreds of responses and follow-on barratry-related litigation and grievances. A Harris County jury found the contracts and lists were protectable trade secrets under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) and that the defendant misappropriated them, awarding multiple damages categories plus exemplary damages and fees. The First Court of Appeals agreed that client fee contracts and client lists can qualify as TUTSA trade secrets when they have independent economic value from secrecy and the owner takes reasonable confidentiality measures (including instructions and agreements with vendors and controlled access), and that evidence of acquiring the materials from a third party and then using them to conduct targeted outreach supported misappropriation. However, the court partially reversed the judgment because parts of the damages package and related relief were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and/or did not fit TUTSA’s permitted damages frameworks, and it remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Litigation Takeaway
"Client lists, intake/CRM exports, and even signed fee agreements can be trade secrets in Texas—especially in “client poaching” fights involving vendors or departing lawyers—but winning liability is only half the battle. To survive appeal, the firm must prove (1) real secrecy measures (including vendor confidentiality controls) and (2) a damages model that matches TUTSA (actual loss, unjust enrichment, or reasonable royalty) without double-counting; otherwise, even a strong verdict can be pared back or sent back for a do-over."
Bouknight v. Llanelly Enterprises
COA01
Bouknight, a judgment creditor, sued Llanelly Enterprises for declaratory relief to establish that debtor Wilmot held a legal or beneficial ownership interest in a Houston house titled in Llanelly’s name, so the asset could be reached through turnover-style relief. Although the evidence showed Wilmot initially contracted to buy the home and participated in the transaction before title was shifted to Llanelly, the jury charge submitted only one liability question: whether the deed was “ineffective” to convey the property to Llanelly. The jury answered yes, but the charge did not ask—and the jury did not find—who owned the property (legal title, equitable title, beneficial ownership, nominee status, resulting/constructive trust, etc.). Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301 and JNOV/legal-sufficiency principles, the Houston First Court of Appeals held that because the verdict failed to resolve the only live, controlling issue pleaded (ownership), the verdict could not support a judgment for Bouknight and the trial court properly granted JNOV and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court also accepted Llanelly’s argument as an affirming cross-point because it would vitiate the verdict and independently support affirmance.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any case where the real fight is “Who owns the asset?” you must submit jury questions that directly obtain an ownership finding that supports the requested judgment. A win on a proxy question (e.g., “ineffective deed,” “sham transfer,” “invalid document”) can still lose at the judgment stage because it does not establish the dispositive ultimate issue. For divorce and enforcement cases involving third-party/LLC title or nominee ownership, charge planning is outcome-determinative: plead the ownership theory and get verdict-grade findings (legal/equitable/beneficial ownership, alter ego, resulting/constructive trust, characterization) or expect a JNOV vulnerability."
Harrell v. Brinson
COA01
In Harrell v. Brinson, an inmate repeatedly sued a former landlord over the same underlying 2004 salon lease/break‑in events that led to his 2005 criminal conviction, despite prior final adverse rulings (including summary judgment and an unsuccessful bill of review). In a new 2021 suit repackaged as fraud and conspiracy based on alleged false testimony and collusion with a prosecutor, the defendant moved under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 11 to have Harrell declared a vexatious litigant and to dismiss. Applying Chapter 11, the First Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion because the record supported the required findings: there was no reasonable probability Harrell would prevail and he was attempting to relitigate the same controversy against the same defendant after prior final determinations. The court also addressed appellate jurisdiction: an earlier appeal was premature because claims against another defendant remained, but a later severance created a final judgment in the severed cause, and Harrell’s notice of appeal was timely under the prisoner mailbox rule based on proof he delivered it to prison authorities within the deadline. The court affirmed the vexatious‑litigant order and the dismissal with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"Chapter 11 is a powerful early tool to stop serial, pro se “relabeling” lawsuits that try to re-fight issues already finally decided; build a record of prior final determinations and show the new pleading is the same dispute in disguise, and the court can impose vexatious‑litigant restrictions and dismiss with prejudice. Procedurally, if an order isn’t final because other parties/claims remain, severance can create an appealable final judgment—and when the opposing party is incarcerated, plan for the prisoner mailbox rule to affect filing deadlines."