Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Ridgway v. Frolova
COA03
In Ridgway v. Frolova, divorcing spouses each claimed separate-property interests in their marital residence based on funds deposited into a commingled joint account. Their experts offered conflicting calculations, and the stipulated expert’s proportional-tracing method assumed—without transaction-specific proof—that the purchase withdrawal came proportionally from each spouse’s separate-property balance after community funds were exhausted. Applying Texas Family Code § 3.003, the court held that evidence showing separate funds were present in the account did not compel a finding that those funds paid identifiable portions of the purchase price. Because the trial court could reject the experts’ assumptions and find that neither spouse rebutted the community-property presumption by clear and convincing evidence, it properly characterized the entire residence as community property. The court also upheld the decree allowing Ridgway to retain the residence only if he refinanced and paid Frolova the specified amount, otherwise requiring its sale, and affirmed the decree’s treatment of the parties’ 2024 income for tax purposes.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mathematical precision is not a substitute for legally sufficient tracing. A spouse claiming a separate-property interest in an asset purchased through a commingled account should connect specific separate funds to the acquisition with transaction-level records and corroborating evidence; an expert’s unsupported proportional-allocation assumption may not overcome the community-property presumption. Counsel should also plead reimbursement in the alternative, reconcile conflicting expert reports, and propose workable refinancing and contingent-sale terms."
In the Interest of J.B. and B.B., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of a mother’s parental rights after the Department presented evidence of persistent substance abuse, repeated positive drug tests, incomplete treatment, relapse, a fentanyl overdose shortly before trial, unstable housing, and the children’s exposure to controlled substances. Considering the case as a whole, the court concluded that the Department’s placement searches, service plan, referrals, drug testing, visitation arrangements, and transportation assistance constituted reasonable reunification efforts. The mother’s recent employment, treatment participation, visitation, and efforts to obtain housing did not overcome the longer pattern of relapse or her admission that she could not yet provide a safe and stable home. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, the court held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the findings of continuing danger and best interest under Texas Family Code Section 161.001 and affirmed the termination order; the mother did not challenge the predicate endangerment findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Recent improvement does not necessarily outweigh a sustained record of relapse, instability, and present inability to provide a safe home. Counsel seeking termination or protective custody restrictions should prove a dated, specific chronology of services offered, the parent’s response, and the risks that remained despite those efforts. Parent’s counsel should document service failures and seek court intervention while the case is pending, present corroborated evidence of sustained—not merely recent—sobriety and stability, and challenge every finding necessary to support termination on appeal."
Flanagan v. State
COA14
Deontray Flanagan challenged the admission of Walmart surveillance video showing an altercation and a FaceTime screenshot depicting him with his visibly injured two-year-old daughter in his capital-murder trial. Applying Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 and the Gigliobianco balancing factors, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals concluded that the exhibits directly informed disputed questions of intent, causation, and the circumstances surrounding the child’s injuries. Although emotionally powerful, the evidence did not invite a decision on an improper basis, confuse the jury, consume excessive time, or merely duplicate other proof. The court held that the exhibits’ probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, upheld their admission, rejected Flanagan’s challenge to court costs, and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Graphic or emotionally charged visual evidence is not automatically inadmissible as unfairly prejudicial. In family-law cases involving alleged abuse, conservatorship, possession, or protective orders, counsel should identify the precise disputed fact that a video, photograph, or screenshot proves and explain why its probative force outweighs any Rule 403 risk. An opponent seeking exclusion should identify a specific danger—such as misleading context, needless repetition, or confusion—and consider requesting redaction, a shorter excerpt, or a limiting instruction rather than relying only on the evidence’s emotional impact."
In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children
COA10
The Texas Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights after evidence showed recurring illegal drug use and relapse, missed drug tests, disengagement from services, domestic-violence and assaultive conduct, and four months without contact with her children. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), the Tenth Court of Appeals held that drug use was not considered in isolation; Mother’s relapse pattern, admission that stress triggered her drug use, failure to test after treatment, inability to visit because of testing noncompliance, and broader instability established a nexus between her conduct and a danger to the children’s physical or emotional well-being. Her completion of inpatient rehabilitation and some negative tests did not require reversal because the trial court could infer continuing danger from her history and post-treatment conduct. The court also found sufficient evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest and affirmed the judgment without reaching the alternative predicate grounds under Subsections (D) and (N).
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug use alone does not automatically establish endangerment, but repeated relapse combined with missed testing, stress-related use, violence, service disengagement, or lost visitation can prove an endangering course of conduct. A parent relying on rehabilitation should present sustained post-treatment sobriety, consistent random testing, aftercare, stable routines, and reliable visitation—not merely a completion certificate and a few negative tests. Counsel seeking restrictions or termination should clearly connect substance use and testing failures to concrete parenting risks and consequences."
Redbird Royalty L.P., Mary Seay Brockett and Matthew Seay v. Sabalo II Energy LLC
COA08
The parties appealed an order that denied their summary-judgment motions and granted the opposing party’s motion but did not identify the claims decided, award or deny any remedy, or dispose of the case. Applying Texas finality principles, including Matter of Guardianship of Jones and Naaman v. Grider, the Eighth Court of Appeals explained that granting a motion is not the same as rendering judgment; a final order must contain operative, decretal language adjudicating the parties’ rights. Because the order lacked such language and was not an independently appealable interlocutory order, the court held that it was not final and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"A signed order that merely says a motion or petition is “granted” may not trigger the deadline to appeal. In divorce, custody, support, modification, and enforcement cases, counsel should ensure the order expressly states the relief awarded or denied and resolves every necessary claim and party. Before filing an appeal or calculating appellate deadlines, compare the operative language of the order with the live pleadings and obtain a clarified or corrected order if finality is uncertain."
The University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio v. Magdaleno
COA04
A parent, individually and as next friend of his child, sued the University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio on a vicarious-liability theory after Dr. Mark Miller—who was licensed as both a physician and a dentist—allegedly extracted the wrong tooth. The claimant served Chapter 74 expert reports from a dentist who was not a physician. Reading Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 74.351 and 74.401 together, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that when a health care liability claim is based on a physician’s conduct, a physician must provide the required opinions on standard of care, breach, and causation. The court rejected an “acting as” exception based on the defendant’s dual licensure or the dental nature of the procedure. Because the claimant did not cure the expert’s threshold qualification defect during the statutory thirty-day extension, the court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss, rendered a dismissal with prejudice, and remanded for an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"Choose a Chapter 74 expert according to the defendant’s statutory professional status, not merely the procedure performed or the proposed expert’s overlapping experience. If the challenged provider is a physician, the report’s standard-of-care, breach, and causation opinions must come from a qualified physician—even when the defendant also holds another license and a nonphysician can perform the same procedure. An extension will not save the claim unless the qualification defect is actually cured; failure to do so requires dismissal with prejudice and an award of fees and costs."
In re Vanessa Lynn Clark
COA04
In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, Vanessa Lynn Clark sought mandamus relief, while the real party in interest requested Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.11 sanctions based on an allegedly groundless petition, serial litigation, and Clark’s threatening and offensive communications. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that Clark failed to establish entitlement to mandamus relief and denied her petition. Although the court condemned her communications, it explained that Rule 52.11 sanctions must be tied directly to petition-related misconduct—principally the bad-faith filing of a clearly groundless mandamus petition—and that an unsuccessful petition is not necessarily sanctionable. Because the sanctions evidence focused largely on collateral communications rather than the petition’s legal or factual basis, the court denied sanctions and declined to impose filing restrictions, e-filing limitations, or a criminal referral, noting that trial-court remedies or Texas’s vexatious-litigant statutes might be better suited to that conduct. The court also denied Clark’s requests to disqualify opposing counsel, make a disciplinary referral, and strike the sanctions exhibits.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 52.11 sanctions request must focus on why the mandamus petition itself was clearly groundless and filed in bad faith; offensive communications, serial litigation, and other collateral misconduct are not enough without a direct connection to the petition. Lawyers should match each alleged abuse to the proper remedy and seek broad filing restrictions or vexatious-litigant relief through the procedure and forum authorized to grant it."
Strong Builders, LLC v. CO3 Holdings, LLC
COA08
CO3 Holdings obtained a summary judgment against Strong Builders and related defendants, but its motion did not address every cause of action in CO3’s live pleading. Applying Texas finality rules, the Eighth Court of Appeals held that describing the judgment as “final,” stating that it “addresses all parties and claims,” and including a Mother Hubbard clause did not clearly and unequivocally dispose of the entire case. Because the record showed unresolved claims and the trial court never signed the requested severance order, the judgment remained interlocutory. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before appealing, confirm that the signed judgment actually disposes of every claim and party or contains unequivocal finality language. Do not rely on a “final” label or Mother Hubbard clause to resolve claims omitted from a summary-judgment motion; if claims remain, obtain a signed severance order, complete their disposition, or identify a valid basis for interlocutory review."
In the Interest of C. L. P., a Child
COA08
The Department sought termination of both parents’ rights, and an associate judge announced termination and later signed a written termination order. Father, however, timely requested de novo review by the referring court under Texas Family Code §§ 201.015 and 201.2041. The Eighth Court of Appeals held that Father’s request prevented the associate judge’s proposed order from becoming the referring court’s order by operation of law, even though Mother—the appellant—did not request review. Because the referring court had neither ratified the proposed order nor rendered a final judgment after de novo proceedings, the order remained interlocutory and was not appealable. The court also declined to abate because substantive issues remained for the referring court, rather than a merely formal or ministerial defect, and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before appealing an associate judge’s ruling, review the entire docket for a timely de novo request by any party and confirm that the referring court has rendered a final judgment. Another party’s request can prevent finality for the case as a whole, and appellate abatement generally will not rescue a premature appeal when the referring court must still decide substantive issues."
Moreno Construction Co., Inc. v. Baker
COA04
After a jury found Moreno Construction liable for defective residential construction and awarded homeowner Robin Baker $110,000 in repair and consulting costs, the trial court reduced Baker’s supported attorney’s-fee request from $325,991.01 to $150,000. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the compensatory damages, holding that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the repair-related awards. Applying Texas’s lodestar framework, however, the court held that a trial court may reject excessive, duplicative, unsegregated, or inadequately documented fees but cannot select an unexplained amount untethered to evidence concerning reasonable hours and rates. Because the record did not provide a rational basis for the $150,000 award, the court reversed that portion of the judgment and remanded for an evidence-based fee determination rather than rendering the full amount requested.
Litigation Takeaway
"Build—and attack—attorney’s-fee claims line by line. A sustainable award should identify reasonable hours, rates, timekeepers, tasks, segregation decisions, and specific reductions; broad discretion does not permit an arbitrary round-number cut. When challenging fees, offer evidence supporting particular exclusions or an alternative lodestar calculation. Even if an unexplained reduction is reversed, the claimant may receive only a remand, not automatic recovery of the entire request."