Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
In the Interest of K.A.B., a Child
COA05
In this SAPCR modification appeal, the mother argued the trial court violated due process by enforcing equal one-hour time limits that prevented her from fully testifying and offering additional exhibits. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that trial courts have broad discretion to impose reasonable, evenhanded trial limits, and the record showed the limits were applied equally, the mother was warned as her time expired, and she chose to spend her allotted time on cross-examination rather than her own affirmative proof. The court also emphasized preservation: the mother did not timely object to the time limits, did not make an offer of proof showing what excluded testimony or exhibits would have established, and did not preserve hearsay complaints by contemporaneous objection. Because the complaints were waived or inadequately briefed, and no abuse of discretion appeared on the record, the court affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family court imposes trial time limits, object early, explain specifically why more time is needed, and make an offer of proof for any excluded testimony or exhibits. On appeal, preservation usually matters more than generalized fairness complaints."
Weger v. Bradley
COA06
In Weger v. Bradley, a post-divorce property dispute arose over whether a receiver’s sale transferred only the 0.59-acre tract at 202 Banks Drive or also a separate 0.49-acre tract at 0 Banks Drive. The appellees argued the receiver had authority to sell both parcels, relying on the enforcement order, a later nunc pro tunc order attaching legal descriptions, and a correction deed. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that even assuming the receiver had authority, the summary-judgment evidence created a genuine fact issue about what property was actually included in the sale. The original deed, contract, title documents, purchase price, and escrow evidence pointed only to 202 Banks Drive, so traditional summary judgment was improper. The court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-decree real-estate enforcement cases, proving authority to sell is not enough—you must also prove the disputed parcel was actually included in the transaction that closed. If the decree, receiver order, deed package, title file, and consideration do not all match, a fact issue can defeat summary judgment."
Gopalan v. Marsh
SCOTX
In Gopalan v. Marsh, a jury found that the father had the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence, but the trial court’s decree awarded the mother about 57% of the possession time. The Texas Supreme Court analyzed Family Code section 105.002, the broader conservatorship statutes, and the ordinary meaning of “primary residence,” concluding that the term means the place where the child lives most of the time. Because the decree gave majority possession to the non-designating parent, it contravened the binding jury verdict. The Court reversed and remanded the possession order, related best-interest determinations on parental rights and duties, and the appellate attorney’s fee award, while otherwise affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a jury awards your client the exclusive right to designate a child’s primary residence, the final decree cannot give the other parent the majority of possession time. In Texas jury-tried conservatorship cases, lawyers must align the possession schedule with the primary-residence finding, preserve objections to any inconsistent decree, and recognize that possession errors can unravel related rulings on support, parental rights, and fees."
Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas v. The City of Austin and Austin Transit Partnership Local Government Corporation
SCOTX
In Paxton v. City of Austin, the Texas Supreme Court addressed a trial court’s refusal to rule on the Attorney General’s plea to the jurisdiction after the opposing parties openly urged the court to withhold a ruling so they could avoid an interlocutory appeal and automatic stay under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8). The Court held that because no written order granted or denied the plea, the court of appeals correctly concluded it lacked interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. But the Court also held that a trial court cannot defeat a governmental unit’s statutory appellate rights by deliberately refusing to rule on a properly presented jurisdictional plea. Mandamus was therefore appropriate to compel the trial court to rule, and appellate courts may either treat a premature appeal as a mandamus petition or abate the appeal and direct the trial court to issue a ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court cannot use a non-ruling to block appellate review of a threshold jurisdictional challenge. If the court refuses to rule on a properly presented plea to the jurisdiction—especially to avoid an interlocutory appeal or stay—build a clear record and seek mandamus to force a ruling."
Downstream Investments, LLC v. Krcmar
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals reversed a traditional summary judgment that had voided a land-sale contract based on the seller’s alleged mental incapacity. The court held that contractual incapacity is judged at the time of execution, and although the guardian offered strong evidence of the seller’s stroke-related cognitive deficits, later medical evaluations, and later guardianship findings, that evidence did not conclusively prove she lacked capacity when she signed the contract. Because affidavit testimony from the realtor supported a reasonable inference that the seller understood the nature and effect of the transaction, a genuine fact issue remained and the case had to be remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are attacking or defending a family-law agreement on incapacity grounds, the key evidence must be tied to the exact time the document was signed. Later guardianship orders, diagnoses, or generalized proof of cognitive decline may be persuasive, but they will not support traditional summary judgment if there is transaction-specific evidence that the person understood the deal when it was made."
L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Austin Court of Appeals held that under the 2023 amendments to Texas Family Code § 161.001, a DFPS-filed termination case requires more than proof of a predicate ground and best interest: the trial court must also make a separate written finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent. The court examined the decree and the record, which showed DFPS created a tailored service plan, referred and paid for services, arranged individual and family therapy, maintained contact, provided visitation, and pursued relative placement with reunification in mind. Rejecting the mother’s argument that the efforts were not reasonable, the court emphasized that the statute requires reasonable efforts, not successful reunification, and deferred to the trial court’s adverse credibility finding against the mother. The court held the written findings were sufficiently specific and that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the reasonable-efforts finding, so it affirmed the termination decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If reunification efforts matter, build and document them with specificity. For DFPS and child’s counsel, L.G. shows that a detailed service plan, therapy referrals, payment for services, visitation, contact logs, and relative-placement efforts can satisfy § 161.001(f). For parent-side counsel, broad complaints about unfair services are not enough—challenge the fit, accessibility, timing, and execution of the services in real time and preserve those issues in the trial court."
Ryan Tolle v. Perth Tolle
COA14
In this pre-September 1, 2023 Texas SAPCR modification case, the father sought to modify conservatorship but his Rule 194 disclosures merely repeated the statutory standards of material and substantial change and best interest without identifying any underlying facts. The court held that former Rule 194.2(b)(3) required a general factual narrative supporting the claim, not just boilerplate legal conclusions. Because the suit was filed in 2022, the old disclosure rules applied despite a later amended petition. After the father failed to show good cause or lack of unfair surprise under Rule 193.6, the trial court properly excluded his modification evidence, and with no evidence left on essential elements, properly granted a directed verdict against him.
Litigation Takeaway
"In legacy family cases filed before September 1, 2023, disclosures must tell the factual story behind a modification claim. If you only recite statutory buzzwords like material and substantial change or best interest, the court can exclude your evidence and your case may be over before it reaches the factfinder."
Gustavo Gonzalez, Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA03
In Gustavo Gonzalez, Jr. v. State of Texas, the Third Court of Appeals held that legally sufficient evidence supported aggravated sexual assault findings even though the child complainant used age-appropriate, nontechnical terms like “private” and “butt” instead of anatomical language. Reviewing the full record in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court relied on the child’s outcry, written SANE statement, body-diagram markings, and descriptions of pressure, stretching, and pain to conclude the jury could reasonably infer penetration of both the sexual organ and anus. The court also rejected the argument that the jury charge needed a special definition of “penetration,” holding the term carries its ordinary meaning and requires no additional instruction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, do not discount a child’s disclosure just because the child lacks anatomical precision. Texas courts will evaluate the child’s words in context, and age-appropriate terminology can carry major evidentiary weight when supported by diagrams, outcry testimony, medical or forensic witnesses, and sensory details like pain, pressure, or stretching. For family-law litigators, this is strong crossover authority for supervised possession, protective orders, emergency relief, and endangerment-based conservatorship restrictions."
Jonathan Edward Norton v. The State of Texas
COA10
In Norton v. State, the appellant challenged a six-year prison sentence imposed after revocation of community supervision as grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. The Tenth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because Norton never objected when sentence was pronounced and never raised the constitutional complaint in a motion for new trial or other post-trial filing. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a)(1) and preservation authorities, the court held that constitutional disproportionality complaints are waived unless timely and specifically presented to the trial court. The revocation judgment and sentence were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you believe a ruling or punishment is constitutionally excessive, say so in the trial court—clearly, specifically, and on the record. Norton is a preservation case: even serious constitutional complaints, including disproportionality, due-process, or punitive-sanctions arguments, can be lost on appeal if counsel does not object at the hearing and, when appropriate, re-urge the issue in a post-judgment motion."
Victor Hugo Prado v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this injury-to-a-child appeal, the court rejected challenges to Prado’s convictions based on jury unanimity, legal sufficiency, and accomplice-witness corroboration, holding that commission and omission were alternative manner-and-means, that the evidence of prolonged malnourishment, visible injuries, deprivation, and Prado’s control over the children’s environment was sufficient to prove knowing or intentional injury by omission, and that independent testimony and documentary evidence adequately corroborated the mother’s testimony. The court did, however, agree that because both convictions arose from a single criminal action, duplicative court costs could not be imposed in both judgments under article 102.073, so it modified one judgment to delete those costs and affirmed as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"For Texas family-law cases, this opinion is a strong roadmap for proving endangerment through omission, not just direct abuse. A parent or paramour who controls the home and knowingly fails to feed, protect, or obtain care for a child can be framed as dangerous based on pattern evidence from daycare workers, relatives, photos, records, and other third parties. It also reminds lawyers to build corroboration beyond one compromised household witness and to audit multiple orders for duplicative cost or fee assessments."