Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Moreno Construction Co., Inc. v. Baker
COA04
After a jury found Moreno Construction liable for defective residential construction and awarded homeowner Robin Baker $110,000 in repair and consulting costs, the trial court reduced Baker’s supported attorney’s-fee request from $325,991.01 to $150,000. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the compensatory damages, holding that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the repair-related awards. Applying Texas’s lodestar framework, however, the court held that a trial court may reject excessive, duplicative, unsegregated, or inadequately documented fees but cannot select an unexplained amount untethered to evidence concerning reasonable hours and rates. Because the record did not provide a rational basis for the $150,000 award, the court reversed that portion of the judgment and remanded for an evidence-based fee determination rather than rendering the full amount requested.
Litigation Takeaway
"Build—and attack—attorney’s-fee claims line by line. A sustainable award should identify reasonable hours, rates, timekeepers, tasks, segregation decisions, and specific reductions; broad discretion does not permit an arbitrary round-number cut. When challenging fees, offer evidence supporting particular exclusions or an alternative lodestar calculation. Even if an unexplained reduction is reversed, the claimant may receive only a remand, not automatic recovery of the entire request."
Chavez v. State
COA14
Isaiah Chavez was convicted of murder after shooting Justin Davidson and claiming self-defense. Chavez sought to introduce a psychologist’s testimony about his general mental condition and childhood exposure to family violence to explain why he believed deadly force was immediately necessary. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.36(b) did not authorize the testimony because the statute concerns family violence committed by the deceased against the defendant, not unrelated childhood violence. The court further concluded that the testimony lacked the case-specific fit required by Texas Rule of Evidence 702 because the expert did not connect Chavez’s history to Davidson, the encounter in the truck, or Chavez’s perception of an immediate deadly threat. Finding the exclusion within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert testimony about trauma or family violence must do more than establish a diagnosis, history, or general psychological principle. To satisfy Rule 702, counsel must create a reliable, case-specific analytical bridge between the expert’s opinions and the precise incident, conduct, risk, or statutory finding before the court. The report, examination, and offer of proof should expressly establish that nexus rather than relying on the expert’s credentials or asking the factfinder to infer it."
Weisbard v. Sutton Health Care Center Ltd. Co.
COA05
After the trial court dismissed the case for want of prosecution, the appellant timely filed a motion to reinstate but failed to verify it as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(3). The Fifth Court of Appeals held that adding a verification after the rule’s thirty-day deadline did not cure the defect, extend the trial court’s plenary power, or trigger the ninety-day appellate deadline under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a)(3). Because the trial court’s later order denying reinstatement and purporting to dismiss with prejudice was signed after plenary power expired, it was void and did not restart the appellate timetable. The notice of appeal was therefore untimely, and the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A timely motion to reinstate must also be verified within Rule 165a(3)’s thirty-day period. In any family-law case dismissed for want of prosecution, file a fully compliant verified motion, calculate appellate deadlines from the original dismissal, and consider a protective notice of appeal rather than relying on a later reinstatement order."
In the Interest of J.Z.L.-H., aka J.L.-H., a Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights after concluding that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and the nonexclusive Holley factors, the court considered Mother’s repeated cocaine-positive tests, unresolved mental-health and medication-compliance issues, incomplete services, deficient supervision, domestic-violence concerns, and history involving six older children no longer in her care. Although Mother had stable housing, attended counseling, regularly participated in appropriate supervised visits, and completed some services, the trial court could find that these recent improvements did not establish sustained behavioral change. The child’s success and stability in a foster-to-adopt placement further supported termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts evaluate best interest through the parent’s long-term pattern of conduct, not service-plan attendance or recent progress alone. A parent seeking to avoid termination should connect completed services to objective, sustained change—such as verified sobriety, treatment and medication compliance, safe supervision, stable income, and a concrete parenting plan. Litigators should build a detailed timeline, corroborate explanations for noncompliance, address prior child-welfare history, and present comparative evidence about the child’s current placement and need for permanence."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Claire Noel Callahan and Matthew John Lewis and in the Interest of A.C.C., a Child
COA06
In this divorce and SAPCR appeal, the mother challenged the trial court’s decision to change the parties’ infant child’s surname from Callahan to Lewis and its refusal to align the child’s possession schedule with that of an older half-sibling. Applying Texas Family Code § 45.004(a)(1), the Sixth Court of Appeals held that neither parent has a superior constitutional right to choose a child’s surname and that the controlling inquiry is the child’s best interest, evaluated through nonexclusive, fact-specific considerations rather than a mechanical factor count. The child’s young age, brief use of the Callahan surname, the mother’s unilateral naming decision and omission of the father from the birth paperwork, the father’s post-birth involvement, and conflicting testimony about any prior naming agreement provided sufficient evidence for the name change. The court also affirmed the possession schedule because sibling alignment, while relevant, did not control the broader best-interest analysis. It did not reach the father’s challenge to conditional appellate attorney’s fees because the triggering condition—an unsuccessful appeal by him—had not occurred.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child-name dispute must be proved through child-centered best-interest evidence, not parental tradition, preference, or claims of an exclusive constitutional naming right. Counsel should preserve communications and birth records, develop evidence of each parent’s involvement and the child’s family connections, and recognize that unilateral naming conduct may undermine credibility. Likewise, a request to coordinate half-siblings’ possession schedules requires concrete evidence of the benefit to the child; alignment is relevant but not automatically controlling."
In re Amber Gene Ward
COA07
In a post-divorce modification suit, the trial court temporarily transferred from Amber Gene Ward to Wayne Michael Fox, Jr. the exclusive right to designate their child’s primary residence based on concerns about the child’s hygiene, weight, eating habits, dental condition, a former residence, and an incident involving another child in Ward’s current household. Applying Texas Family Code § 156.006(b)(1), the Seventh Court of Appeals held that these allegations did not establish that the child’s present circumstances would significantly impair her physical health or emotional development: several concerns lacked a demonstrated connection to significant harm, the former residence did not reflect current conditions, and CPS had ruled out the investigated allegations. Because the trial court changed the primary-residence designation without sufficient evidence under the heightened statutory standard, and because the temporary order was not appealable, the court conditionally granted Ward mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"A temporary change of the parent who designates a child’s primary residence requires current, competent evidence connecting the child’s existing circumstances to significant physical or emotional impairment—not merely best-interest concerns, isolated observations, past living conditions, or evidence that another household may be preferable. Counsel seeking or opposing such relief should build a complete record around § 156.006(b)(1), preserve statutory objections, and be prepared to pursue mandamus because temporary custody orders generally cannot be challenged by interlocutory appeal."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Amanda Kay Davis and Jeffrey Ryan Davis
COA05
Before the marriage, Husband entered into an enforceable contract to purchase real property from his uncle’s estate, but the deed and purchase-money financing were completed after the marriage. The trial court treated only Husband’s original 30% beneficial interest as separate property and characterized the remaining 70% as community property, awarding Wife 35% of the net equity and authorizing a receiver and forced sale to enforce that award. Applying Texas Family Code §§ 3.001 and 3.003 and the inception-of-title doctrine, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that property character was fixed when Husband acquired the contractual right to purchase—not when the transaction later closed. Because the pre-marriage contract rebutted the community-property presumption as a matter of law, the entire property was Husband’s separate property. The court reversed and remanded for a new division of the community estate, vacated the related receivership and forced-sale provisions, and affirmed the remainder of the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a Texas divorce, the date of the deed or closing does not necessarily control real-property characterization. Counsel should trace the acquisition back to the first enforceable right to obtain title: a pre-marriage purchase contract can establish the entire property as separate even when the deed, loan, and community payments occur during marriage. Community contributions should be pursued through properly pleaded reimbursement or related claims, not by mischaracterizing separate property; any derivative receiver, sale, lien, or equalization remedy should also be challenged when it depends on that mischaracterization."
In re Dennis D. Spurling
COA14
Dennis D. Spurling sought mandamus relief compelling the trial court to rule on portions of a motion that had been pending for less than two months. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals recognized that a trial court has a ministerial duty to consider and rule on a properly filed, presented, and pending motion, but explained that mandamus requires an unreasonable delay assessed under the circumstances. Because the short passage of time did not itself show a refusal to act, and the record established no urgency, imminent prejudice, or other circumstance requiring expedited consideration, the court found no clear abuse of discretion. It denied the mandamus petition and Spurling’s motions for temporary relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus will not ordinarily compel a ruling merely because a motion has been pending for several weeks. Before seeking relief, counsel should document proper filing and presentment, make reasonable follow-up requests, and build evidence showing why continued delay creates concrete and imminent harm. The requested relief should generally seek a ruling—not a particular outcome."
In re L.B.
COA05
In a child-removal proceeding, the relator sought mandamus relief after the trial court allegedly refused to conduct an adversary hearing, reset it, and orally extended the children’s removal. The Fifth Court of Appeals explained that an oral ruling may be reviewed by mandamus only if the record establishes a clear, specific, and enforceable order. Because the relator provided neither a signed written order nor a properly authenticated reporter’s record documenting the trial court’s precise ruling, the court could not determine whether a reviewable order existed. It denied the mandamus petition without reaching the legality of the alleged rulings and denied the emergency motion for temporary relief as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Urgency does not excuse an inadequate mandamus record. Before seeking emergency appellate relief from an oral family-court ruling, counsel should obtain either a signed order or a properly authenticated reporter’s record showing that the ruling is definite, presently operative, and enforceable; counsel’s description, docket entries, emails, and unauthenticated transcripts are not substitutes."
In the Interest of K.A. and S.A., Children
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the two children under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court analyzed the Holley factors and focused on Mother’s continued cocaine use, relapse after treatment, missed drug tests, incomplete follow-through with substance-abuse and mental-health services, and instability in housing and employment. Although Mother completed some services and behaved appropriately during visits, the court concluded those facts did not outweigh evidence that the core risks prompting removal remained unresolved. The court also relied on proof that the children were thriving in a stable foster placement with an adoption plan, which supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, partial compliance is not enough if the main safety concerns remain unresolved. Relapse, missed drug tests, unstable housing or employment, and failure to continue treatment can strongly support a best-interest finding, especially when the child is doing well in a stable placement with a clear permanency plan."