Weekly Digest
March 7 – March 13, 2026
78 opinions this week
In re Arianna Victoria Law
COA02
Relator Arianna Victoria Law sought habeas corpus relief after being jailed for failing to pay child support, following a motion to revoke her community supervision. She argued that the underlying motion was legally deficient and that her due process rights were violated because the trial court allegedly failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing or provide a reporter's record. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the petition and found that Law failed to provide a sufficient record—consisting only of the contempt and commitment orders—to prove her claims. The court clarified that a sworn petition is not evidence and that the Relator had misidentified the applicable sections of the Texas Family Code. Consequently, the court denied the petition, holding that Law failed to carry her burden of providing a record sufficient to establish a right to relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“In habeas corpus and other original proceedings, the "record is king." A sworn petition is not evidence; if you are alleging a denial of due process or a lack of an evidentiary hearing, you must provide a comprehensive record—including motions, all underlying orders, and a reporter’s record (or proof that one was requested and denied)—to enable appellate review.”
Candella v. Ortner
COA03
After Stephini Candella appealed a judgment from the 345th District Court of Travis County, she failed to file her appellant's brief or a motion for extension of time by the December 2025 deadline. The Third Court of Appeals issued a formal delinquency notice, providing a final grace period and a warning that failure to comply would result in dismissal. When the appellant remained unresponsive, the court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b) and 38.8(a)(1). The Court held that dismissal for want of prosecution was necessary because the appellant failed to comply with procedural requirements and court notices, effectively abandoning the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate deadlines are strictly enforced; failing to file a brief or respond to a delinquency notice will result in the permanent dismissal of your appeal and the loss of your right to challenge a trial court's ruling.”
Shamim v. Chaudhry
COA05
In Shamim v. Chaudhry, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed whether 'findings' included within the text of a final judgment are valid on appeal. The case involved a breach of contract claim over a promissory note and counterclaims regarding separate oral loans. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendant, including three specific findings in the order itself. The Court of Appeals analyzed the procedural requirements of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 296 and 297 and the 'Casino Magic' rule, holding that findings recited within a judgment are procedurally meaningless and cannot substitute for formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Because no formal findings were requested, the court applied the 'implied findings' standard. It found that the defendant's counterclaims lacked more than a 'mere scintilla' of evidence, while the plaintiff conclusively established his claim. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never rely on findings or recitals written directly into a Final Decree or Order; if you prevail at a bench trial, you must timely request formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to ensure your evidentiary wins are preserved and protected from 'no-evidence' challenges on appeal.”
In re Christopher Vickers
COA13
In a dispute over child conservatorship and possession, Christopher Vickers sought a writ of mandamus to overturn trial court orders that modified his children's primary residence, claiming he was not provided proper notice of the proceedings. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals denied the petition, ruling that Vickers failed to provide a sufficient record to prove a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court. The court further noted that Vickers did not demonstrate why a standard appeal following a final judgment would be an inadequate remedy to address his due process concerns.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that requires an impeccable trial court record; if the appellate record is ambiguous or the harm can be addressed through a standard appeal, the court will likely deny relief.”
In re Christopher Vickers
COA13
Christopher Vickers petitioned for a writ of mandamus to overturn a trial court’s order modifying child conservatorship and the right to designate primary residence, claiming he received no notice of the proceedings. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under the established mandamus standard, which requires the relator to prove both a clear abuse of discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal. The court held that Vickers failed to provide an appellate record sufficient to support his claims or demonstrate why a standard appeal would be an inadequate remedy, ultimately denying the petition and lifting a previously imposed stay.
Litigation Takeaway
“Alleging a lack of notice or an abuse of discretion is insufficient to secure mandamus relief in a custody dispute; the relator must provide a comprehensive, authenticated record and specifically prove that the legal error cannot be corrected through a standard post-judgment appeal.”
Bunch v. Goen
COA03
In Bunch v. Goen, a non-attorney acting as a court-appointed conservator attempted to file a pro se appeal on behalf of a ward. The Third Court of Appeals faced two primary issues: a non-final judgment and a jurisdictional defect regarding the appellant's representative capacity. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 7 and the Texas Government Code, concluding that the privilege to appear pro se is strictly personal and does not extend to fiduciaries representing the interests of others. The court held that appellate documents filed by a non-lawyer in a representative capacity are a legal nullity and ineffective to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court held that while it has the discretion to abate an appeal to allow a trial court to cure a finality defect, it cannot overlook the unauthorized practice of law.
Litigation Takeaway
“A non-lawyer—even one with legal status as a conservator, 'next friend,' or power of attorney—cannot represent another person in court; any pro se notice of appeal filed in such a representative capacity is a nullity that fails to protect the party's right to appeal.”
In re Christopher Vickers
COA13
Christopher Vickers sought a writ of mandamus to overturn trial court orders that modified his children's conservatorship and primary residency, claiming he was denied proper legal notice. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals denied the request, finding that Vickers failed to prove the trial court's actions were a clear abuse of discretion. Additionally, the court ruled that Vickers failed to show why the alleged errors could not be corrected through a standard appeal process rather than this extraordinary measure. Consequently, the modification orders remained in place.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus relief is an 'extraordinary remedy' and should not be viewed as a safety net for every unfavorable ruling. To successfully challenge a custody modification through mandamus, you must provide a meticulous record proving that the trial court's error was not only a clear abuse of discretion but also one that cannot be fixed through the standard appellate process. Procedural errors like lack of notice must be formally documented at the trial level to preserve them for any future appeal.”
Office of the Attorney General v. PFLAG, Inc.
SCOTX
In Office of the Attorney General v. PFLAG, Inc., the Supreme Court of Texas addressed whether a trial court could enjoin a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) based on the 'political sensitivity' of an investigation into gender-transition care providers. The Court analyzed the CID as a standard discovery tool governed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure rather than a matter for judicial second-guessing of executive branch motives. The Court held that the Attorney General has broad discretion to investigate potential statutory violations, and courts may only limit these demands based on established rules of relevance and privilege, not on the perceived wisdom or political nature of the investigation.
Litigation Takeaway
“The State’s power to investigate third-party records via Civil Investigative Demands is broad and treated like standard discovery; practitioners cannot rely on 'political harassment' defenses to shield sensitive client data. Instead, they must utilize rigorous discovery mechanics, such as privilege logs and redaction agreements, to protect information that could eventually be used as leverage in high-stakes custody or 'best interest' litigation.”
Ishmael Jackson v. Petar Kralev
COA03
In Ishmael Jackson v. Petar Kralev, the appellant failed to file his appellate brief despite receiving multiple extensions from the Third Court of Appeals. The court analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b), which allows for the dismissal of an appeal if an appellant fails to comply with procedural rules or court-ordered deadlines. Because the appellant missed the final December 2025 deadline and provided no communication to the court for three months, the court held that the appeal should be dismissed for want of prosecution.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate deadlines are not suggestions; even in family law matters where stakes are high, failing to meet a final briefing extension will result in the permanent forfeiture of your right to appeal.”
In re Christine Michelle Paxton
COA05
Relator Christine Michelle Paxton sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Collin County district court to vacate its order granting a new trial, which had effectively set aside a previously issued protective order. The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the trial court abused its discretion, noting that Texas trial courts possess broad inherent power to grant new trials during their plenary period. The court held that the Relator failed to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion or the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal, denying the petition and requiring the parties to re-litigate the merits of the protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
“A protective order is not truly final until the trial court's plenary power expires; practitioners must be aware that trial judges have broad discretion to grant a new trial and "reset" the litigation, a decision that is rarely overturned by higher courts via mandamus.”
S&B Engineers & Constructors, Ltd. and Zurich American Insurance Company v. Scallon Controls, Inc.
SCOTX
In S&B Engineers & Constructors v. Scallon Controls, the Supreme Court of Texas addressed whether a party who voluntarily settles a lawsuit loses their right to seek reimbursement (indemnity) from another party under a contract. The conflict arose when a contractor settled claims with injured workers and then sought to recover a proportional share of that settlement from a subcontractor based on their written agreement. The lower court ruled that the settlement extinguished the right to indemnity, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision. The Court analyzed that Texas public policy favors the freedom of contract and the allocation of risk. It held that a voluntary settlement does not bar a contractual indemnity claim, provided the settling party can prove the settlement was reasonable, made in good faith, and that the underlying liability was attributable to the other party.
Litigation Takeaway
“A voluntary settlement is not a 'get out of jail free' card for an indemnitor. If you settle a debt or lawsuit that your ex-spouse was contractually obligated to pay under a divorce decree or MSA, you do not waive your right to reimbursement. As long as your settlement was reasonable and the debt belonged to them, you can still enforce your right to be made whole.”
In re Phillip Clay Spedale
COA01
Phillip Spedale challenged a trial court's temporary order requiring him to pay spousal support during his pending divorce. He sought a writ of mandamus, claiming the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the support. The First Court of Appeals denied the petition, ruling that Phillip failed to meet the heavy burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion. The court noted that under Texas Family Code § 6.502, trial courts have broad authority to issue temporary orders for party protection and property preservation. Because the appellate court does not re-weigh evidence on mandamus, the lack of a record showing a manifest abuse of discretion meant the order remained in effect.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is rarely granted to overturn temporary spousal support orders; success depends on proving a complete disregard for legal principles rather than just a disagreement with the award amount.”
City of Houston v. Castillo
COA14
After a motor-vehicle collision involving a City of Houston employee, the plaintiff sued under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). The City filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff failed to negate the 'emergency' exception to the waiver of immunity and that the plaintiff judicially admitted the officer's immunity. While the City's interlocutory appeal was pending, the trial court issued a discovery order. The Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff is not required to preemptively negate TTCA exceptions unless their own pleadings plausibly implicate those exceptions. Crucially, the court also determined that a Rule 91a motion challenging immunity is a jurisdictional challenge that triggers an automatic statutory stay of all trial court proceedings under Section 51.014(b). The court affirmed the denial of the dismissal but granted mandamus relief to vacate the discovery order entered during the stay.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a governmental unit appeals the denial of a Rule 91a motion based on immunity, it triggers an automatic stay of all trial court proceedings under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b). Any orders signed during this stay, such as discovery or scheduling orders, are subject to vacatur via mandamus. Additionally, when suing a governmental entity, avoid pleading facts that suggest an emergency or 911 response unless you are prepared to affirmatively negate those specific immunity exceptions in your petition.”
Hall v. State
COA10
In Hall v. State, an appellant challenged a conviction arguing that the trial court improperly restricted the impeachment of a witness via a prior inconsistent statement. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed the trial record under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, which requires a specific and timely objection to preserve error for appellate review. Because the defense counsel failed to explicitly characterize the evidence as "impeachment," mention a "prior inconsistent statement," or cite Rule 613 during the trial, the court held that the legal theory was never properly presented to the trial judge. Consequently, the court held the error was not preserved and affirmed the lower court's judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“To preserve a complaint about excluded impeachment evidence for appeal, you must explicitly state on the record that the evidence is being offered for "impeachment" as a "prior inconsistent statement" under "Rule 613." Do not rely on the trial judge to infer your legal theory from the context of your questions.”
Ex parte Paul Daniel Dedrick
COA02
In a prosecution for child sexual abuse, the defense was granted a mistrial after the State disclosed bodycam footage mid-trial that it had previously represented was unavailable. The defendant subsequently sought habeas relief, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a retrial. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the prosecutor's late disclosure was intentionally designed to 'goad' the defense into moving for a mistrial. The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief, holding that because the delay resulted from technical errors, agency communication failures, and ransomware issues—rather than a deliberate tactical ambush—double jeopardy did not bar the State from retrying the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“When seeking 'nuclear' remedies like striking pleadings or excluding evidence due to late-disclosed government records (such as bodycam or CPS files), you must build a record of deliberate gamesmanship; mere bureaucratic dysfunction or technical errors will typically only result in a continuance or fee-shifting rather than case-ending sanctions.”
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
A Mother sought to modify a residency restriction to move her child, who has severe autism and is nonverbal, from Texas to Florida to access specialized therapeutic and educational resources. The Father opposed the move and sought to further restrict the residency area. The trial court expanded the residency restriction to the continental United States, ordering the Mother to reimburse certain travel costs for the Father. The appellate court analyzed the case under the Lenz v. Lenz factors, noting that the child's specific medical needs, the Father's own relocation outside the restricted area, and his history of inconsistent visitation supported the move. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as the expansion was in the child's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“In relocation cases involving special needs children, Texas courts may prioritize "resource disparity" over geographical proximity; practitioners should be aware that a non-custodial parent's own relocation can significantly weaken their ability to enforce or maintain local residency restrictions.”
In re A.Y.
COA01
The Texas First Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decree terminating a mother’s parental rights due to child endangerment and failure to complete a court-ordered service plan. The case arose after the mother brought her infant to a residence where a violent shooting occurred and tested positive for methamphetamines during two separate pregnancies. The court analyzed whether her conduct and her failure to follow the service plan—which she blamed on medical bed rest—met the "clear and convincing" evidence standard. The court held that the mother’s persistent drug use and exposure of the child to dangerous environments provided sufficient grounds for termination, concluding that the child's best interests were served by the stability of a drug-free foster home.
Litigation Takeaway
“A parent’s pattern of behavior, particularly ongoing drug use and associating with violent individuals, creates a high hurdle that medical or administrative excuses for non-compliance with a service plan cannot easily overcome. Courts prioritize a child’s immediate need for safety and stability over a parent's claims of 'substantial compliance' or physical limitations.”
David Terrell Christian v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Christian v. State, a defendant convicted of unlawful firearm possession argued that his presence as a passenger in a vehicle containing a handgun was insufficient to prove he possessed the weapon. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the sufficiency of the evidence using the 'affirmative links' doctrine, which looks for independent facts and circumstances linking a person to contraband in shared spaces. The court found that the defendant's proximity to the gun, the presence of a loaded magazine on his seat, and specific 911 calls identifying him brandishing a weapon provided the 'logical force' necessary to prove possession. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“To overcome the 'it wasn't mine' defense in shared-space environments, practitioners should use the 'affirmative links' doctrine to connect a party to contraband through proximity, spatial orientation, and corroborating witness reports or 911 calls.”
In the Interest of F.H. and D.K.A.
COA01
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the evidence was insufficient because her related criminal charges had been dismissed and she had partially participated in her service plan. The First Court of Appeals rejected these arguments, focusing on the mother's long-term 'course of conduct.' The court analyzed her history of neglectful supervision, her failure to follow psychiatric recommendations, and her ongoing substance abuse—including positive tests for cocaine and marijuana. Ultimately, the court held that the mother’s persistent pattern of instability and failure to complete court-ordered services provided enough evidence of endangerment to justify termination in the children's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“Victory in criminal court does not guarantee victory in a CPS case; family courts look at the 'totality of the circumstances,' meaning that a history of neglect and a failure to strictly follow every psychiatric or drug-related recommendation in a service plan can lead to the permanent loss of parental rights.”
McVea v. State
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed a murder conviction, rejecting the defendant's claims of self-defense and defense of a third person. The court's analysis focused on the defendant's multiple, materially inconsistent accounts of the shooting, which were contradicted by forensic evidence and digital records—including text messages discussing a "play" (robbery) and instructions to "unsend" messages. The court held that the jury was justified in rejecting the self-defense claim due to the defendant's lack of credibility. Furthermore, the court held that a "defense of a third person" jury instruction was properly denied because there was no evidence of an immediate threat of force against a third party at the time the shots were fired.
Litigation Takeaway
“Justification narratives—such as claiming you acted to protect yourself or your children—require both consistency and proof of an 'immediate' threat. In modern trials, digital evidence like text messages and location data often serve as the 'objective anchor' that can either confirm or destroy a witness's credibility regardless of their testimony.”
Walther v. Walther
COA02
In Walther v. Walther, the Second Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s divorce decree that featured a "just and right" property division and permanent injunctions. The case involved significant marital misconduct, including the wife's unauthorized spending of $200,000 in community funds on luxury items and cosmetic surgery, as well as a history of family violence involving terroristic threats. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the sale of the marital residence to compensate the husband for the wife's financial waste or by issuing permanent injunctions to ensure the husband's safety. Additionally, the court upheld the exclusion of an unsigned separation agreement, noting it failed to meet the evidentiary standards for authentication.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas trial courts possess broad authority to order the sale of a marital home and issue permanent protective injunctions when there is documented evidence of financial waste, fraud, and family violence. Furthermore, practitioners and parties should be cautioned that unsigned settlement agreements are generally inadmissible without extrinsic evidence proving they represent a final, binding contract.”
City of Kingsville, et al. v. Tijerina
COA13
In a dispute over the timeliness of recall petitions, a petitioner filed her documents 31 days after the initiating affidavit, exceeding the 30-day mandatory window established by the City of Kingsville Charter. Although a city official provided the petitioner with a form stating the deadline began at a later date, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the Charter’s plain language controlled and required strict compliance. The court analyzed the Charter as organic law, concluding that official misinformation cannot override mandatory filing deadlines or create a ministerial duty where the petitioner failed to satisfy the law. The court reversed the trial court's grant of mandamus, holding it was an abuse of discretion to excuse a late filing based on equitable considerations.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never rely on a clerk or court coordinator’s calculation of a deadline; official misinformation or misleading forms provided by court staff do not excuse a failure to strictly comply with mandatory statutory or jurisdictional timelines.”
Rios-Munoz v. Elias
COA05
In this case, a trial court dismissed a plaintiff's lawsuit for want of prosecution (DWOP) because the plaintiff was not physically present when the case was called for trial, despite the plaintiff's attorney being present and ready to proceed. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 7, which permits a party to appear in court 'either in person or by an attorney,' and Rule 3a(b), which mandates that local rules and practices must not conflict with statewide rules. The court held that because the attorney appeared and announced ready, the plaintiff had legally 'appeared' for the purposes of the trial setting. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by elevating a local 'must-appear' practice over statewide procedural rights, and the DWOP was reversed.
Litigation Takeaway
“An attorney’s presence and readiness to proceed constitutes a legal appearance for the client under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 7. Trial courts cannot dismiss a case for want of prosecution based solely on a client's physical absence if their counsel is present and ready, as local 'must-appear' customs cannot override statewide procedural rules.”
In Re Kelvin Lorran White
COA05
Relator Kelvin Lorran White sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to rule on pending motions and comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a regarding a motion to recuse. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed whether the trial court's subsequent referral of the recusal motion rendered the petition moot and whether a delay of less than one month constituted an abuse of discretion. The court held that the Rule 18a issue was moot because the trial court acted after the mandamus was filed. Furthermore, the court denied the remaining claims because the Relator failed to provide a record showing a formal demand for a ruling or an unreasonable period of delay.
Litigation Takeaway
“To compel a trial court to rule via mandamus, you must create a meticulous record showing a formal demand for a ruling and an unreasonable delay (typically months, not weeks); however, simply filing a mandamus petition can often 'break the pocket veto' by prompting a trial judge to finally take the required action.”
Foley v. State
COA10
In Foley v. State, the Tenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a conviction for failure to stop and render aid requires proof that a driver had subjective knowledge they struck a person. The defendant argued he was unaware he had hit a cyclist due to poor lighting and road conditions. The court analyzed Texas Transportation Code § 550.021 and clarified that the State must only prove the driver knew an accident occurred and that the circumstances were such that injury or death was "reasonably likely." Holding that the extensive vehicle damage and debris field created a "reasonable likelihood" of injury, the court affirmed the conviction, ruling that a defendant\'s self-serving denial of knowledge does not override objective evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party\'s subjective claim of ignorance regarding harm can be overcome by objective evidence; in family law cases involving reckless conduct or vehicular altercations, focus on proving that the circumstances made injury "reasonably likely" rather than trying to prove the perpetrator\'s internal state of mind.”
In the Matter of E.A., a Juvenile
COA10
In this case, a sixteen-year-old (E.A.) challenged a juvenile court’s decision to transfer his murder prosecution to an adult criminal court. E.A. argued that his below-average IQ and lack of a formal juvenile record should have kept him in the juvenile system. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed the transfer under Texas Family Code § 54.02, specifically evaluating the minor’s 'sophistication' and 'prior history.' The court determined that E.A.’s actions—such as hiding the murder weapon and fleeing the scene—demonstrated a legal sophistication and an understanding of right and wrong that outweighed his test scores. Furthermore, the court held that a history of nearly thirty school fights and numerous police visits to his home constituted a 'prior history,' even without formal arrests. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer E.A. to criminal court.
Litigation Takeaway
“In juvenile transfer proceedings, 'sophistication' is a legal determination based on conduct—like concealing evidence—rather than just an IQ score; additionally, school disciplinary records and non-arrest police contacts can be used to establish a 'prior history' sufficient to justify adult prosecution.”
Castillo v. Martinez
COA08
In Castillo v. Martinez, the Appellants attempted to appeal a trial court's dismissal order several months after the deadline, arguing that the underlying judgment was 'void' and that a subsequent order denying their motion to vacate restarted the appellate clock. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, which dictates strict timelines for filing a notice of appeal. The court held that even if a judgment is legally defective or void, it still becomes final for purposes of appeal and triggers the mandatory 30- or 90-day filing window. Because the Appellants failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the original judgment, the court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, ruling that a party cannot circumvent appellate deadlines by simply labeling a judgment void.
Litigation Takeaway
“A judgment's alleged 'voidness' does not stop the appellate clock; practitioners must file their notice of appeal within the standard 30- or 90-day window following the final decree, as a later order denying a motion to vacate will not restart the timetable for a direct appeal.”
Hill v. State
COA10
In Hill v. State, a defendant appealed the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge, alleging bias based on the judge's involvement in plea negotiations, the removal of the defendant’s spouse from the courtroom for a policy violation in an unrelated matter, and an ex parte text message to the prosecutor asking for a status update. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed these incidents under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b, determining that the judge's responses to settlement inquiries were invited by counsel and that the courtroom enforcement was routine administration rather than personal animus. The court held that the denial of the recusal motion was not an abuse of discretion because the evidence did not establish that the judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned or that he possessed a disqualifying personal bias.
Litigation Takeaway
“To successfully recuse a judge, you must build a record showing specific, targeted bias against a party rather than mere courtroom administration or a judge's refusal to accept certain settlement terms. Routine enforcement of courtroom decorum and non-substantive 'status-update' communications are generally insufficient to prove that a judge's impartiality is reasonably in question.”
T & T Construction and Development v. Delossantos
COA14
T & T Construction and Development (T&T) sued multiple defendants alleging misrepresentations regarding sewer and water services for a property purchase. The defendants filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment specifically attacking the element of 'reliance.' T&T subsequently amended its petition to swap theories for fraud-by-nondisclosure and negligent misrepresentation, then argued the summary judgment motion was ineffective because it did not explicitly address the newly added claims. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether a no-evidence motion can reach later-added causes of action that share common elements. The court held that because 'reliance' was an essential element of both the original and the newly pleaded claims, and because the claims arose from the same factual nucleus, the no-evidence motion was broad enough to cover the amended petition. The court affirmed the dismissal of all claims because T&T failed to produce evidence of reliance.
Litigation Takeaway
“You cannot avoid a no-evidence motion for summary judgment by simply amending your pleadings to new legal theories if those new claims share a common essential element (like reliance) already targeted by the motion; when faced with such a motion, you must provide actual evidence rather than relying on procedural maneuvers.”
Thomas v. Clark
COA02
In Thomas v. Clark, the plaintiff's defamation suit was dismissed for want of prosecution (DWOP) after he failed to request timely citation, failed to submit a scheduling order, and missed a dismissal hearing. Thomas filed an unverified motion to reinstate, arguing excusable neglect. The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that a trial court possesses both inherent authority and statutory power under Rule 165a to manage its docket regardless of the case's underlying merits. The court held that because Rule 165a(3) explicitly requires a motion to reinstate to be verified, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion due to the verification defect, even if the non-appearance was accidental.
Litigation Takeaway
“Procedural technicalities can defeat even the most meritorious claims. If a case is dismissed for want of prosecution, the motion to reinstate must be verified; failing to include a proper verification is a fatal error that allows the court to deny reinstatement regardless of your excuse for the delay.”
Romano v. Arrowhead Hill Farm, Inc.
COA09
In Romano v. Arrowhead Hill Farm, Inc., the Appellants challenged a no-evidence summary judgment, arguing the motion was legally insufficient because it failed to separately list the specific elements of three distinct DTPA sub-claims. The Beaumont Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i) in conjunction with the DTPA's statutory requirements. The court found that because 'producing cause' is an essential element common to all claims under Texas Business & Commerce Code § 17.50(a), specifically challenging that single element was sufficient to put the Appellants on notice. The court held that a no-evidence motion is sufficiently specific if it identifies a single element common to multiple theories of recovery, and affirmed the judgment because the Appellants failed to provide evidence in response.
Litigation Takeaway
“Defeat "kitchen sink" pleadings efficiently by using a precision-strike no-evidence motion for summary judgment that targets a single essential element—such as damages or causation—common to multiple overlapping claims.”
In re Scott Mitchell Obeginski
COA09
In this mandamus proceeding, a litigant challenged a trial court sanction imposed after he repeatedly cited fictional legal authorities. The sanction required him to attach highlighted copies of all cited authorities to any future filings in any court. The Beaumont Court of Appeals analyzed the order under the TransAmerican 'just sanctions' framework, which requires that sanctions bear a direct relationship to the abuse and not be excessive. The court held that the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction or unconstitutionally restrict court access because the requirement was a targeted verification mechanism directly related to the litigant's history of citation fraud. Mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“Citing fictional or 'AI-hallucinated' cases is a fast track to a 'prove-your-citations' sanction. Courts can require you to attach and highlight every cited authority in future filings as a narrowly tailored remedy that survives constitutional 'access to courts' challenges.”
Knight v. State
COA02
In Knight v. State, the defendant appealed a stalking conviction resulting from a two-year campaign of harassment that included over 200 emails, vexatious litigation, and the use of digital tracking software to monitor the victim's email activity. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed whether Texas Penal Code § 42.072 violated the First Amendment as applied to the defendant's conduct. The court held that the statute is constitutional, ruling that the defendant's actions—specifically sending photos of the victim's home coupled with 'I know where you live' rhetoric and digital surveillance—constituted 'true threats' and a regulable course of conduct rather than protected free speech.
Litigation Takeaway
“Digital surveillance and 'litigation abuse' are not protected by the First Amendment; evidence of email tracking, surreptitious photography, and repetitive harassing filings can support stalking findings, which are powerful tools for obtaining protective orders and challenging custody presumptions in high-conflict family law cases.”
David Hobbs Ray v. State
COA02
David Hobbs Ray pleaded guilty to multiple counts of child pornography. While the trial court orally sentenced him to five years of confinement for "Count Ten," the subsequently signed written judgment reflected a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict between the oral rendition and the written decree, applying the long-standing Texas rule that an oral pronouncement controls. The court held that appellate courts possess the authority under Rule 43.2 to reform written judgments to "speak the truth" when the record provides the necessary data, and modified Ray’s sentence back to the five years originally ordered from the bench.
Litigation Takeaway
“The court’s oral ruling is the ultimate authority; family law practitioners should always obtain a transcript of the judge’s rendition to ensure the final written decree is accurate and to provide the necessary evidence to correct clerical errors on appeal.”
Ray v. State
COA02
In Ray v. State, the Second Court of Appeals addressed a discrepancy between a trial court's oral pronouncement of a five-year sentence for child pornography and a written judgment that erroneously recorded a ten-year sentence. The court analyzed the 'oral pronouncement doctrine,' which dictates that the sentence delivered in open court controls over a conflicting written document. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), the court held that it had the authority to modify the written judgment to 'speak the truth' and reflect the actual five-year sentence, even within an Anders proceeding where the appeal was otherwise found to be frivolous.
Litigation Takeaway
“Always verify a party's criminal sentence by reviewing the reporter's record of the oral pronouncement rather than relying solely on the written judgment; a clerical error in the written record could significantly shorten a perpetrator's incarceration, potentially compromising safety plans and visitation schedules in related family law litigation.”
JAJWK, LLC v. Primeway Federal Credit Union
COA01
In this enforcement action, a judgment creditor (Primeway) utilized a post-judgment receiver to identify luxury vehicles held by non-party entities (JAJWK) but titled to the debtor. The trial court issued a turnover order voiding JAJWK's liens on the vehicles and ordering their sale. The Houston First Court of Appeals reversed, analyzing Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 31.002 (the turnover statute). The court held that the statute is a procedural mechanism, not a substantive one, and cannot be used to adjudicate the property rights of third parties or 'clean up' title. Because the property was in the possession of a non-party and not under the debtor's exclusive control, the trial court exceeded its authority and violated due process.
Litigation Takeaway
“The turnover statute is not a shortcut to extinguish third-party liens or claims. To challenge the validity of a non-party's interest in property—even if you believe it is a sham—you must initiate a separate plenary action like a declaratory judgment or a fraudulent transfer suit rather than relying on a summary turnover motion.”
JLV Asset Management, Inc. v. The Chicken Place, Inc.
COA07
In a dispute over a promissory note, the parties disagreed on whether a payment made on the one-year anniversary of the contract's effective date satisfied a requirement to pay 'within one year.' The court applied the 'anniversary rule,' which dictates that unless a contract specifies a different count (like 365 days), 'one year' includes the calendar anniversary of the start date. Although the trial court erred by allowing a jury to interpret the unambiguous contract, the appellate court held the error was harmless because the jury’s conclusion aligned with the correct legal construction. The court ultimately held that the anniversary-date payment was timely as a matter of law.
Litigation Takeaway
“Under the Texas 'anniversary rule,' an obligation to perform 'within one year' includes the calendar anniversary of the effective date. To avoid deadline disputes in Mediated Settlement Agreements or Divorce Decrees, practitioners should define 'year' specifically or, preferably, use certain dates and times for performance rather than relative windows.”
In re CHRISTUS Health Southeast Texas
COA09
In this mandamus proceeding, a hospital (CHRISTUS) attempted to intervene in a lawsuit involving a non-compete dispute between an anesthesia group and its former employees, arguing that the resulting injunction caused the hospital significant financial and operational hardship. The Court of Appeals analyzed the 'justiciable interest' test under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60, which requires that an intervenor must be able to maintain the action (or a part of it) in their own name as a sole plaintiff. The court held that because CHRISTUS was not a party to the employment contracts, its collateral economic interest did not grant it standing to intervene. The trial court's decision to strike the intervention was upheld, affirming that mere economic impact is insufficient to force one's way into someone else's litigation.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family law litigation, third parties like business partners or grandparents cannot intervene simply because a court's order will cost them money or cause inconvenience; they must demonstrate a specific legal right that would allow them to sue for that same relief independently.”
City of Houston v. Castillo
COA14
In City of Houston v. Castillo, a plaintiff sued the City following a motor vehicle collision, prompting the City to file a Rule 91a motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity. The City argued the plaintiff failed to affirmatively negate statutory exceptions for emergency responses. When the trial court denied the motion, the City filed an interlocutory appeal and subsequently sought mandamus relief after the trial court issued discovery orders during the appeal's pendency. The court of appeals held that a Rule 91a motion asserting immunity is a jurisdictional challenge that triggers the mandatory automatic stay of all trial proceedings under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b). While the court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss—finding the plaintiff was not required to negate exceptions not implicated by the petition—it granted mandamus relief to vacate the discovery orders entered in violation of the statutory stay.
Litigation Takeaway
“An immunity-based Rule 91a motion serves as a powerful jurisdictional "pause button." If a governmental entity appeals the denial of such a motion, Section 51.014(b) triggers an automatic stay that strips the trial court of the power to act; any discovery or enforcement orders entered during this time are vulnerable to being vacated via mandamus.”
Heard v. State
COA06
Eddie Marie Heard's community supervision was revoked after she entered a 'plea of true' to several violations, including failure to report. Despite Heard's testimony that medical issues (COVID-19 and pneumonia) prevented her from reporting, the trial court revoked her supervision and sentenced her to state jail. On appeal, the Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed whether a plea of true provides sufficient evidence for revocation when a respondent offers an uncontradicted excuse. The court held that a plea of true, standing alone, constitutes legally sufficient evidence to support revocation and effectively waives any subsequent challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, as the trial court remains the sole judge of witness credibility.
Litigation Takeaway
“Beware the 'Admission Trap': In enforcement or revocation proceedings, entering a 'plea of true' provides a bulletproof evidentiary basis for the court's judgment. If a client admits the violation while attempting to explain it away (confession and avoidance), they waive the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, leaving the outcome entirely to the trial judge's discretionary credibility assessment.”
In the Interest of S.D.F. and K.M.F.
COA06
In this Texas modification case, a mother filed to modify a previous court order, alleging a 'material and substantial change' in circumstances. Although her petition specifically requested certain changes to child support and possession, the trial court's final default judgment granted additional relief not explicitly mentioned in her pleadings, including an increase in monthly support. The Father appealed, arguing he lacked fair notice of these specific requests. The Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that in suits affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), the 'best interest of the child' is the primary consideration. The court held that general pleadings invoking the court's jurisdiction over the child's welfare allow the judge broad power to adjust any terms of support or possession, regardless of technical pleading deficiencies.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never ignore a legal notice or motion to modify based on the assumption that the court is limited to the specific requests listed in the petition. In Texas family law, the 'best interest' standard gives judges wide latitude to rewrite child support and custody orders once their jurisdiction is invoked by a general allegation of changed circumstances. Failing to answer a 'minor' petition can result in a major, unexpected legal obligation that is nearly impossible to reverse on appeal.”
Admiral Insurance Company v. Lippert Components, Inc., et al.
COA10
In Admiral Insurance Company v. Lippert Components, Inc., an insurer denied a defense in a personal injury lawsuit based on an 'Injury to Workers Exclusion,' attempting to use extrinsic evidence to prove the claimant's employment status. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed the dispute under the 'eight-corners rule,' which limits the duty-to-defend analysis to the four corners of the plaintiff's petition and the four corners of the insurance policy. The court held that because the petition did not 'unambiguously' allege facts that triggered the exclusion, and because extrinsic evidence is generally inadmissible to negate the duty to defend in Texas, the insurer was required to provide a defense.
Litigation Takeaway
“To trigger an opposing party's insurance coverage in a domestic tort case, draft the petition to include allegations of negligence or recklessness; under the 'eight-corners rule,' if the petition does not 'unambiguously' trigger an intentional act exclusion, the insurer must provide a defense, regardless of what external evidence might later prove.”
Mizell v. Coggins
COA10
Appellant Kristina Mizell sought to appeal a protective order, but failed to file the mandatory docketing statement required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. Despite receiving formal warnings from the Tenth Court of Appeals that non-compliance would result in dismissal, Mizell only paid the filing fee and failed to submit the required statement or a motion for extension. The court analyzed the case under Rule 42.3(c), which allows for dismissal when an appellant fails to follow administrative requirements or clerk's notices. Consequently, the court held that dismissal was warranted due to the appellant's persistent failure to comply with procedural mandates.
Litigation Takeaway
“Procedural discipline is mandatory in appellate law; even if filing fees are paid, failing to submit required administrative documents like a docketing statement can result in the summary dismissal of your entire case.”
In the Interest of I.H. and K.H., Children
COA13
In this Texas appellate case, an appellant (J.W.) filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their appeal and requested that the court tax costs against the party who incurred them. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(d), which establishes that, absent an agreement between the parties, the court must tax costs against the appellant. Because J.W. did not provide evidence of an agreement with the appellee regarding costs, the court denied the request to deviate from the default rule. However, because J.W. had filed a valid Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs under Rule 20.1, the court held that no costs would actually be assessed. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was shielded from costs due to their indigent status.
Litigation Takeaway
“When seeking a voluntary dismissal of an appeal, an appellant cannot unilaterally decide how court costs are distributed; without a formal agreement from the other party, the appellant is responsible for costs by default. However, maintaining a current Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs is a critical protection for indigent clients, as it overrides the default taxation rule and prevents the assessment of appellate fees.”
Cossette v. State
COA01
In Cossette v. State, the defendant appealed a murder conviction, arguing he acted in self-defense after a woman allegedly brandished a knife during a dispute. The court analyzed the 'degree of force' used, noting the defendant admitted to strangling the victim while she was already semi-conscious or incapacitated. The court also examined the defendant's post-incident conduct, including dismembering the body and conducting digital searches on how to avoid detection, as evidence of a 'consciousness of guilt.' The court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to reject the self-defense claim, affirming that once a threat is neutralized, deadly force is no longer justified and that post-offense concealment can affirmatively refute a justification defense.
Litigation Takeaway
“To defeat a self-defense claim in family violence or domestic tort litigation, focus on the 'degree of force'—such as strangulation after a victim is incapacitated—and use digital forensics or inconsistent post-incident narratives to establish a 'consciousness of guilt' that undermines a party's claim of reasonable fear.”
John William Reblin v. The State of Texas
COA13
In a criminal appeal arising from long-term sexual-abuse allegations involving a minor, the defendant challenged key evidentiary rulings: (1) admission of the child’s first detailed disclosure to the first adult he told as a Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072 “outcry” statement, and (2) admission of text messages containing inculpatory, apologetic statements that the defendant claimed were inadequately authenticated or too ambiguous to be probative. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals applied the abuse-of-discretion standard and focused on whether the trial court built the required predicate record—especially through the outcry hearing and sponsoring-witness testimony. For the outcry, the court emphasized that the trial court properly identified the qualifying outcry witness (the first adult recipient) and limited the admissible outcry to the child’s first detailed description of the sexual abuse (including frequency and the transactional “gifts” component), which satisfied article 38.072’s requirements. For the texts, the court held the messages were sufficiently authenticated under Texas Rule of Evidence 901 through the recipient’s testimony identifying the participants and providing contextual anchors tying the content to the abuse disclosure and relationship events; the court also accepted that admissions can be contextual and need not be a full confession to be relevant. Finally, even assuming some evidentiary misstep, the court concluded any error was not reversible under the applicable harm analysis given the strength of the remaining, layered evidence. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In child-abuse-driven SAPCR/protective-order litigation, win the evidentiary war by (1) anchoring the case in the earliest detailed disclosure and presenting it through the cleanest “first adult told” witness, (2) laying tight foundation for texts/screenshots with a sponsoring witness plus context that ties ambiguous apologies to the conduct at issue, and (3) building redundancy so any one evidentiary ruling is unlikely to sink the result on appeal.”
Julio Chapa v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Chapa v. State, a defendant appealed his convictions for indecency with a child, asserting that the evidence was legally insufficient because it relied on inconsistent child testimonies and lacked physical medical findings. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, ruling that the jury has the sole authority to weigh witness credibility and resolve conflicts in evidence. The court found that the combination of the children’s in-court testimony, their immediate 'outcry' disclosures to their adoptive mother, and consistent patient histories recorded in SANE (Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner) records provided a sufficient basis for the jury's verdict.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family law cases involving abuse allegations—such as custody disputes or protective orders—physical evidence is not a prerequisite for a finding of abuse; consistent child disclosures coupled with corroborating medical narratives can withstand credibility attacks and support significant restrictions on parental rights.”
In re PVF Industrial Supply, Inc.
COA06
In a personal injury case with broad implications for family law tort and business disputes, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant can designate a responsible third party (RTP) after the statute of limitations has expired. The trial court had denied the designation because the defendant did not identify the RTP in its initial disclosures. The appellate court conditionally granted mandamus relief, reasoning that Section 33.004(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code only bars late designations if a defendant fails to comply with a 'timely disclosure' obligation. Because the defendant’s Rule 194 disclosure deadline fell after the limitations period had already passed, there was no breach of duty. The court held that an erroneous denial of an RTP designation 'skews' the comparative-responsibility framework of the trial, making mandamus the appropriate remedy as the error cannot be adequately cured on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“A defendant's duty to disclose responsible third parties is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, not the expiration of the statute of limitations; if your disclosure deadline falls after limitations expires, you are not barred from designating an RTP, and a trial court's refusal to allow that designation is a 'skewing' error that justifies immediate mandamus relief.”
Padilla-Madden v. Sandoval
COA04
A Texas resident sued an Alabama resident for breach of an oral agreement to share compensation earned as a trustee. The nonresident defendant challenged Texas jurisdiction via a special appearance, which the trial court denied. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the defendant purposefully availed herself of the Texas forum by traveling to San Antonio to execute the trust agreement and by managing trust assets stored in a San Antonio safe deposit box. The court held that the breach of contract claim related directly to these contacts because the defendant’s appointment and performance as trustee—the source of the disputed funds—were anchored in Texas.
Litigation Takeaway
“Nonresidents who physically travel to Texas to execute legal documents or manage assets in Texas-based safe deposit boxes provide sufficient 'minimum contacts' for Texas courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over them in disputes related to those documents or assets.”
Camacho v. State
COA07
Celia Camacho appealed the adjudication of her guilt for theft, arguing that she did not 'appropriate' furniture and appliances because her husband was the one who physically moved them and she lacked a key to the residence where they were found. The Amarillo Court of Appeals analyzed whether 'appropriation' under the Texas Penal Code requires physical movement or exclusive possession. The court held that under the preponderance of the evidence standard, 'control' is a functional concept that does not require physical labor or exclusive access. Because Camacho was the primary negotiator for the property and her personal effects and social media activity linked her to the new location, the court affirmed that she exercised 'joint possession' and control over the stolen goods.
Litigation Takeaway
“Exclusive physical possession is not required to prove control over an asset; litigators can use circumstantial 'affirmative links'—such as personal items, social media posts, and prior negotiations—to legally connect a spouse to hidden or transferred property held by third parties.”
Lamar Advantage Outdoor Co., L.P. v. LaCore Enterprises, LLC, et al.
COA05
A billboard lessee (Lamar) sued a property owner and a third-party purchaser for breach of contract and conversion after the owner sold the property without providing a contractually mandated 'desire to sell' notice. This notice was a condition precedent to the lessee's 30-day window to exercise an option for a perpetual easement. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the lease's plain language and determined that because the lessor failed to provide the required notice, the lessee's exercise window never expired. The court reversed the trial court's summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact regarding the breach and the lessee's right to possession precluded judgment as a matter of law.
Litigation Takeaway
“In complex property divisions, practitioners must perform exhaustive due diligence for 'poison pill' clauses like rights of first refusal or purchase options; a failure to provide mandated notice to third-party lessees during a post-divorce sale or transfer can lead to litigation that clouds the title and strips the community asset of its value.”
Eddie Davis v. The State of Texas
COA12
Eddie Davis was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for assault family violence but subsequently failed to comply with several conditions, most notably the Batterer Intervention and Prevention Program (BIPP). The trial court adjudicated his guilt and sentenced him to eight years in prison. On appeal, the court performed an independent review of the record under the Anders framework and determined that because the State proved multiple violations by a preponderance of the evidence—and even a single violation is sufficient to support revocation—the trial court acted within its discretion. The appellate court affirmed the adjudication and the resulting felony sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
“In SAPCR and divorce litigation, a party's failure to complete a court-ordered BIPP in a criminal case is a critical "catalyst" moment; it can transform a deferred adjudication into a final felony conviction, which triggers the Texas Family Code § 153.004 rebuttable presumption against Joint Managing Conservatorship and creates a material change in circumstances for modification suits.”
In Re Michelle Chase
COA05
In a Dallas County Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR), Michelle Chase challenged the trial court's jurisdiction. After her plea was denied, she sought a writ of mandamus from the Fifth Court of Appeals to compel a dismissal. The appellate court denied the request, finding that Chase failed to meet the high 'Prudential' standard: proving a clear abuse of discretion and showing that a regular appeal would not provide an adequate remedy. Additionally, the court struck her petition and record because they contained unredacted sensitive information—including Social Security numbers and children's names—violating Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9.
Litigation Takeaway
“Seeking emergency mandamus relief for jurisdictional disputes is an uphill battle that rarely bypasses the standard appeal process; more importantly, a failure to strictly redact a child's sensitive information can result in the court striking your filings and delaying your case.”
Howard v. Kimball
COA07
In Howard v. Kimball, the Seventh Court of Appeals addressed an "accidental finality" trap where a trial court order both denied a plea to the jurisdiction and included language stating the suit was "dismissed." To resolve this ambiguity, the appellate court applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.2, abating the appeal and remanding the case to the trial court for clarification. Under the Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. standard, the court analyzed whether the order clearly and unequivocally disposed of all parties and claims. Once the trial court issued amended orders explicitly stating the case would "continue to trial," the appellate court held that the order was interlocutory and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“To avoid "accidental finality" caused by clerical or drafting errors, always include explicit language in non-final orders stating that the matter remains on the active docket and "shall continue to trial." If you encounter an ambiguous order that inadvertently triggers an appeal, use a TRAP 27.2 abatement as a procedural tool to secure a trial court clarification and return the case to the active docket.”
In re S.L.R., B.L.R. & K.L.R.
COA12
After a final order was entered regarding three children, the appellant (R.L.R., Jr.) filed an appeal but failed to pay the required filing fee or file a statement of inability to pay. Despite a formal notice from the Clerk of the Twelfth Court of Appeals warning that the case would be dismissed if the fee remained unpaid, the appellant—acting pro se—did not respond. The court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 5 and 42.3(c), concluding that filing fees are mandatory administrative prerequisites. The court held that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and dismissed the appeal for failure to comply with procedural requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
“Procedural rules are not mere suggestions; even if you are representing yourself, failing to pay required filing fees or properly document financial hardship can result in your appeal being dismissed before the court ever considers the merits of your case.”
Salinas v. Tovar
COA13
In Salinas v. Tovar, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could compel a defendant to produce his cell phone and iCloud data for forensic examination in an invasion of privacy suit involving allegations of illegal recording. The court analyzed the "act of production" doctrine under the Fifth Amendment, which provides that the physical act of handing over a device is a testimonial communication that confirms the device's existence and the party's control over it. Because the defendant faced potential criminal liability, and the plaintiff failed to prove that his possession of the phone was a "foregone conclusion," the court held that the order compelling production violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The court distinguished between permissible orders to preserve evidence and unconstitutional orders to affirmatively produce it.
Litigation Takeaway
“The Fifth Amendment's "act of production" doctrine can shield cell phones and digital devices from forensic discovery in civil cases if the act of turning them over confirms the party's possession of potentially incriminating evidence. To successfully compel production, a litigator must establish the device's existence and the opponent's possession through independent evidence—such as service provider records—to satisfy the "foregone conclusion" exception.”
King v. State
COA06
In King v. State, a father was convicted of knowingly causing serious bodily injury to his 28-month-old child by omission after failing to provide food or water for over 15 hours, resulting in severe dehydration and malnutrition. On appeal, King challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence regarding his mental state. The Texarkana Court of Appeals analyzed the case using the 'cumulative force' doctrine for circumstantial evidence, looking at the child's confinement, the father's exclusive control, and the obviousness of the child's physical deterioration. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that a rational jury could infer the defendant acted 'knowingly' because he was aware his failure to provide basic necessities was reasonably certain to cause serious bodily injury.
Litigation Takeaway
“In neglect-based family law litigation, you can prove a parent's 'knowing' endangerment without a confession by building a narrative around exclusive control, a documented timeline of deprivation, and the objective, observable physical decline of the child.”
In the Interest of J.M., a Child
COA12
After the Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate a mother's parental rights due to substance abuse and family violence, the parties executed a statutory Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) appointing the mother as a possessory conservator. Despite the agreement, the mother appealed the final order. The Twelfth Court of Appeals performed an independent review of the record and found the appeal frivolous under Anders v. California. The court held that because the MSA complied with Texas Family Code § 153.0071—including the required non-revocation language and voluntary signatures—it was binding on the trial court. While the court affirmed the judgment, it denied appointed counsel's motion to withdraw, clarifying that the right to counsel in government-initiated suits persists through the exhaustion of proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court.
Litigation Takeaway
“A statutory Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) is nearly unassailable on appeal if it contains the proper non-revocation language and is signed by all parties; furthermore, appointed counsel in CPS cases must remain on the case through the Texas Supreme Court level even if they believe the appeal is frivolous.”
Strickland v. State
COA07
In Strickland v. State, a trial court attempted to stack a defendant's sentences by 'judicially noticing' prior convictions from a different term of court. The Seventh Court of Appeals held that judicial notice cannot be used as a shortcut to prove matters outside the operative record or term of court. Instead, the proponent must introduce competent evidence and establish a link between the party and the records. Although the trial court erred in its method, the appellate court affirmed the sentence because the State introduced the actual judgments containing matching identifiers (such as SID and Social Security numbers), which provided sufficient proof of the prior convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not rely on a judge 'knowing the file' or taking judicial notice of records from other cases or prior terms; to survive appeal, you must formally introduce certified records and provide specific testimony or identifiers that link those documents to the party.”
Lomerson v. Lyle Reid & Associates, L.L.C.
COA07
In a property damage dispute involving complex water drainage issues, the plaintiff failed to timely designate expert witnesses required to prove causation. The defendants moved for a no-evidence summary judgment, arguing that without admissible expert testimony, the plaintiff could not meet his burden of proof. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6, which mandates the automatic exclusion of untimely evidence unless the proponent establishes 'good cause' or a 'lack of unfair surprise or prejudice.' The court held that the plaintiff's claim of 'mistake' or counsel inadvertence did not satisfy these exceptions. Because expert testimony was necessary for the technical issue of causation, the court affirmed the summary judgment, effectively dismissing the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“Missing an expert designation deadline is more than a discovery hiccup—it is a potential case-killer. Under TRCP 193.6, late-filed experts are automatically excluded from consideration at the summary judgment stage unless you can prove a specific legal exception. In family law matters involving business valuations, property tracing, or custody evaluations, failing to adhere to the scheduling order can result in a 'no-evidence' judgment that ends your claim before trial.”
Bevers v. P.M.
COA05
Robert Bevers sought to appeal a protective order, but failed to file his notice of appeal until forty-six days after the expiration of the fifteen-day 'grace period' allowed under Rule 26.3. The Fifth Court of Appeals applied Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 26.3, concluding that because the appellant did not file any post-judgment motions to extend the deadline, the notice of appeal was significantly overdue. Holding that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate deadlines in Texas are jurisdictional and absolute; missing the window to file a notice of appeal by even a single day results in the permanent loss of the right to challenge a trial court's order.”
Salinas v. Tovar
COA13
In a civil suit alleging invasion of privacy, a defendant challenged a trial court's temporary injunction that compelled him to turn over his cell phone and iCloud data to a court-appointed forensic examiner. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether this compelled production violated the Fifth Amendment's act-of-production doctrine. The court reasoned that by forcing the defendant to produce the specific device used on the date of the alleged incident, the act would implicitly communicate and authenticate the device's existence, the defendant's possession of it, and its link to the allegations. The court held that the turnover requirement constituted a testimonial communication protected by the privilege against self-incrimination and reversed that portion of the trial court's order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Compelling a party to produce a specific digital device for forensic imaging may violate the Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege because the act of production itself can be an incriminating testimonial communication regarding the device's existence, possession, and authenticity.”
Sebastian Linke v. Kyle Folmer
COA04
In Sebastian Linke v. Kyle Folmer, the San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed whether a judgment is final for appeal purposes when it expressly reserves a ruling on a prevailing party’s attorney’s fees. Despite the judgment containing boilerplate language stating it was 'final and appealable,' the court analyzed the record under the Lehmann and Sealy Emergency Room standards. It determined that because the prevailing party had a mandatory contractual claim for fees that the trial court explicitly deferred for a later hearing, the judgment did not actually dispose of all claims. Consequently, the court held that the judgment was not final and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never rely on 'final and appealable' boilerplate language if the trial court has reserved a ruling on mandatory attorney's fees. To avoid a jurisdictional trap or a dismissed appeal, ensure the final decree expressly grants, denies, or severs all pending fee claims.”
Davis v. State
COA09
In Davis v. State, a defendant challenged the warrantless seizure of his cell phone during a child sexual assault investigation, arguing the evidence obtained from a subsequent search warrant should be suppressed. The Ninth Court of Appeals analyzed the seizure under the Fourth Amendment's exigent circumstances exception, which allows warrantless action to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. The court found that because the defendant admitted to using the phone to communicate with the victim and had already deleted messages and blocked her, officers had both probable cause and a reasonable belief that evidence faced immediate destruction. The court held the warrantless seizure was permissible to preserve the status quo until a warrant could be obtained, affirming the denial of the motion to suppress.
Litigation Takeaway
“To secure immediate preservation of digital evidence in family violence or abuse cases, litigators should build a record of specific "deletion risk"—such as prior deletions or admissions of blocking contacts—to justify emergency relief or turnover orders under an exigent circumstances framework.”
In Re Sufian Khalaf
COA04
In a commercial motor vehicle accident case, an individual driver-defendant sought mandatory bifurcation of compensatory and exemplary damages under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 72.052. The plaintiff argued the statutory right to bifurcation applied only to employer-entities, a position the trial court adopted in denying the motion. On mandamus review, the San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed the plain language of the statute, noting the mandatory directive 'shall' and the broad definition of 'a defendant' which includes vehicle operators. The court held that trial courts have no discretion to deny a timely bifurcation motion filed by an individual driver and granted mandamus relief to prevent the prejudice of 'tainted' jury deliberations.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family law cases involving interspousal torts or joined third-party claims, attorneys should move for mandatory bifurcation of punitive damages to prevent inflammatory 'bad act' evidence from unfairly influencing the jury's perception of the 'just and right' division of the community estate.”
In re Amrock, LLC
COA04
Relator Amrock, LLC filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a trial court's order that required the production of documents the Relator claimed were privileged. The San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under Texas mandamus standards, which require the relator to provide a record sufficient to establish an abuse of discretion. Because the Relator failed to include the actual documents reviewed in camera by the trial court in the appellate record, the court held it was legally impossible to determine if the trial court's ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable. Consequently, the court denied the petition and lifted the stay on the discovery order.
Litigation Takeaway
“When seeking mandamus relief to protect privileged documents, you must ensure the documents reviewed in camera are properly sealed and included in the appellate record; otherwise, the appellate court cannot find an abuse of discretion and will deny the petition.”
In the Interest of V.R.C.
COA05
In a high-stakes custody dispute, a mother lost all access to her child after revoking a settlement agreement on the morning of her trial. She argued that her due process rights were violated because she expected the trial to be postponed due to the settlement. However, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that since the postponement was contingent on the settlement she chose to break, the trial court was right to proceed immediately. The court also found that the mother failed to properly challenge evidence against her because she made "shotgun" objections rather than specific legal arguments for each document. Ultimately, the court upheld the decree denying her access to the child based on evidence of untreated addiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A "ready" announcement for trial remains binding even if a settlement is reached; if that settlement fails, you must be prepared to go to trial immediately. Furthermore, general objections to a group of exhibits are insufficient to preserve your rights for an appeal—each piece of evidence requires a specific, individual objection.”
Protection of Sarah K. Wallis v. Alexis M. Etheridge
COA12
After Sarah Wallis applied for a protective order against Alexis Etheridge, the trial court denied the application but ordered Wallis—the unsuccessful petitioner—to pay $1,110 in attorney's fees to Etheridge’s counsel. Wallis appealed both the denial and the fee award. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the protective order because Wallis failed to file a reporter's record, forcing the court to presume the evidence supported the trial court’s ruling. However, the court reversed the attorney’s fee award, ruling that Texas Family Code § 81.005 only authorizes fees against a party found to have committed family violence. Since there was no finding that Wallis committed violence, the trial court abused its discretion by shifting the fee burden to her.
Litigation Takeaway
“Prevailing as a respondent in a protective order case does not automatically trigger a right to attorney's fees. Under the Texas Family Code, fees are generally reserved for 'bad actors' found to have committed family violence; otherwise, a respondent must successfully pursue formal sanctions for groundless or bad-faith filings to recover their legal costs.”
F.M.H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her two children after she failed to complete any court-ordered rehabilitation services, including drug testing and domestic violence classes. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the record after her appointed counsel filed an Anders brief, which argued that the appeal was frivolous. The court reviewed the mother's history of neglectful supervision, crack cocaine use, and sporadic contact with her children against the evidence that the children were thriving in stable, prospective adoptive homes. Ultimately, the court held that the mother's total failure to engage in her service plan and the children's best interests justified the termination of her parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“A parent's total failure to participate in court-ordered services and drug testing creates a nearly insurmountable hurdle on appeal, as the court will likely find no arguable grounds to reverse a termination when the children have achieved stability elsewhere.”
F.M.H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
This case involved an appeal by a mother whose parental rights were terminated following a bench trial she failed to attend. The Department of Family and Protective Services sought termination based on neglectful supervision, drug use, and the mother's failure to engage in any court-ordered services, such as therapy and drug testing. After the trial court terminated her rights, her court-appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, asserting that the appeal was frivolous. The Third Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record, evaluating the evidence under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b) regarding endangerment and constructive abandonment. The court found that the mother's total lack of participation in services and the children's successful placement in stable, prospective adoptive homes provided legally and factually sufficient evidence for termination. The court held that no arguable grounds for appeal existed and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“A parent’s total failure to engage in court-ordered services and absence from trial creates an evidentiary record that is nearly impossible to challenge on appeal. For practitioners, meticulously documenting "referral fatigue"—the repeated offering and subsequent rejection of rehabilitative resources—and treating missed drug tests as evidence of endangerment are critical steps to ensuring a termination decree survives an Anders review and provides permanency for the children.”
In the Interest of E.K.Y.O.
COA04
In a SAPCR modification proceeding, the trial court ordered a father to pay $20,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. The father appealed, contending that his previously filed Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs—which was uncontested—exempted him from such an award under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. However, the father had filed the Statement in a separate cause number involving the registration of a foreign judgment, rather than the specific modification case. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed Rule 145, concluding that indigency protections are case-specific and do not automatically follow a party into separate, even if related, litigation. The court held that because the father failed to file the Statement in the correct cause number, he was not shielded from the fee award and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Indigency status under Rule 145 is case-specific; to protect a client from fee awards or court costs, you must file a Statement of Inability in every individual cause number, as a filing in a related or precursor case will not provide protection in a separate proceeding.”
T.L.H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this case, a father (Timothy) appealed the trial court's order terminating his parental rights. His court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, stating that the appeal was frivolous and lacked merit. The Third Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record, specifically analyzing the trial court's endangerment findings under Subsections (D) and (E) as mandated by the 'In re N.G.' standard. The court also addressed the duration of appointed counsel's obligations under 'In re P.M.' The court held that the appeal was indeed frivolous, affirmed the termination order, and clarified that counsel's duties extend through the filing of a potential petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court.
Litigation Takeaway
“In parental termination appeals, an Anders brief does not trigger an automatic withdrawal; the appellate court must still perform a rigorous independent review of endangerment findings, and appointed counsel remains obligated to represent the client through the Texas Supreme Court level.”
McCarver v. McCarver
COA12
After a husband failed to pay a $90,000 "financial security" judgment required by a divorce decree and premarital agreement, the wife sought a post-judgment turnover order and the appointment of a receiver. The husband attempted to block the order by asserting affirmative defenses such as waiver and release, arguing the premarital agreement's separate property protections shielded his assets. The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order, analyzing the doctrine of res judicata. The court held that because the premarital agreement's terms were already litigated (or could have been) during the divorce, the husband was barred from raising those contractual defenses to challenge an enforcement proceeding. Additionally, the court clarified that a turnover order is a final, appealable judgment, allowing for standard appellate timeline extensions.
Litigation Takeaway
“You only get "one bite at the apple" regarding premarital agreement defenses. If a party intends to use a prenuptial agreement to protect assets or waive liabilities, those arguments must be fully exhausted before the divorce decree becomes final; once a turnover proceeding begins, the court will only consider statutory exemptions, not contract-based defenses that were already adjudicated.”
McNamara v. Bartolomei
COA04
McNamara sued his former attorney for defamation per se following a statement made in a court-ordered response during a habeas proceeding. The trial court granted summary judgment for the attorney on two independent grounds: attorney immunity and the judicial-proceedings privilege. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that McNamara's failure to challenge the judicial-proceedings privilege on appeal required affirmance under the unchallenged independent-ground rule. Substantively, the court held that the judicial-proceedings privilege provides absolute immunity for statements made in the course of litigation, meaning defamation claims based on such statements are barred even if the statements are false or made with malice.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas, statements made in pleadings, affidavits, or other court filings are protected by an absolute judicial-proceedings privilege, shielding parties and counsel from defamation liability regardless of malice. Furthermore, if a trial court grants summary judgment on multiple grounds, an appellant must challenge every single ground in their brief, or the appellate court will automatically affirm the ruling.”
Antonio Munoz Aserradero, LLC v. Thomas
COA12
In Antonio Munoz Aserradero, LLC v. Thomas, a worker was injured during a 'try-out' day at a sawmill. The employer sought to dismiss the worker's negligence lawsuit, arguing that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy applied because the worker was an 'employee' as a matter of law, pointing to a generated pay stub and the payment of medical benefits. The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant a directed verdict for the employer. The court reasoned that 'employee' status requires a 'contract of hire' based on mutual assent and a promise of payment. Because testimony suggested the parties were only testing the arrangement and would 'talk about employment' later, there was a genuine dispute for the jury to decide whether a contract actually existed at the time of the injury.
Litigation Takeaway
“Employment status is determined by the fundamentals of contract formation—offer, acceptance, and a clear agreement on pay—rather than just payroll records or insurance payments. In family law disputes over income or earning capacity, you can challenge a spouse's claimed 'employment' (or lack thereof) by looking past administrative labels to see if a valid 'contract of hire' was ever actually formed.”
Cisneros v. Leal
COA04
After a minor passenger suffered catastrophic injuries in a car crash caused by a minor driver who had been drinking at several adults' homes, the victim sued the homeowners under Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code § 2.02(c). The trial court granted summary judgment for the homeowners, but the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed. The court analyzed the plain text of the 2005 statutory amendment, concluding that the Texas Legislature specifically created a civil cause of action against non-parent adults (21+) who knowingly provide alcohol to, or allow alcohol to be provided to, minors under 18 on premises they own or lease.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas law provides a clear statutory path to hold non-parent adults liable for hosting underage drinking; family law practitioners can use this 'social host' liability to argue for restricted possession or supervision requirements when a parent’s household or social circle endangers a child through permissive alcohol use.”
Thomas v. State
COA04
In Thomas v. State, the defendant challenged his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove 'penetration' because the victim testified he only 'tried' to penetrate and did not go 'all the way.' The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the 'however slight' standard under Texas Penal Code § 22.021, noting that penetration is satisfied by any contact more intrusive than the outer vaginal lips. The court held that descriptions of prolonged inward pressure and intrusive contact were sufficient for a rational jury to infer penetration, regardless of the witness's equivocal phrasing. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to limit a jury readback to the specific portion of testimony responsive to the jury's disagreement. The court affirmed the convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
“The legal definition of 'penetration' in sexual assault cases is broader than many realize, requiring only intrusion beyond the outer labia; in parallel family law proceedings, attorneys should focus on eliciting specific sensory details of inward pressure and duration to support safety-based custody restrictions, even if a child witness avoids using clinical terms for 'full entry.'”
Thomas v. State
COA04
In Thomas v. State, a defendant challenged his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove 'penetration' because the complainant denied full vaginal entry and used the phrase 'tried to penetrate.' The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the Penal Code and established case law, determining that penetration does not require full entry; rather, any contact more intrusive than the outer vaginal lips is sufficient. The court found that the complainant's testimony regarding 'pushing in' and sustained inward pressure for ten to twenty minutes allowed a rational jury to infer penetration. Additionally, the court addressed a dispute over jury readbacks, holding that trial courts have broad discretion under Article 36.28 to provide only the specific testimony in dispute rather than a comprehensive replay. The court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence legally sufficient and no abuse of discretion in the trial court's limited readback.
Litigation Takeaway
“Legal 'penetration' in sexual abuse allegations—whether in a criminal trial or a family law SAPCR—does not require full entry; evidence of any intrusion beyond the outer labia, such as sustained inward pressure or 'pushing in,' is sufficient to support a finding of abuse. When dealing with jury readbacks or selective quoting of the record, attorneys must make specific objections that match their appellate theories to avoid preservation traps.”