In the Interest of I.H. and K.H., Children

In the Interest of I.H. and K.H., Children, 13-25-00578-CV, March 12, 2026.

On appeal from the 472nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas.

Synopsis

An appellant seeking a voluntary dismissal of an appeal cannot unilaterally dictate the taxation of costs; absent a formal agreement between the parties, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(d) mandates that costs be taxed against the appellant. However, a properly filed statement of inability to afford payment under Rule 20.1 provides an absolute shield against the assessment of those costs, regardless of the lack of a cost-sharing agreement.

Relevance to Family Law

In the volatile environment of SAPCR or matrimonial litigation, parties frequently elect to nonsuit appeals as settlement negotiations finalize or as the financial burden of litigation becomes untenable. For family law practitioners, this case serves as a critical reminder that "each party bearing their own costs" is a negotiated privilege, not a unilateral right. However, for indigent clients—often seen in court-appointed or high-conflict custody matters—the Rule 20.1 statement remains the most potent tool to exit the appellate process without the lingering liability of clerk and court fees.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Appellant J.W. initiated an appeal regarding the interest of two children, I.H. and K.H., originating from the 472nd District Court. During the pendency of the appeal, which had been transferred to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals from the Tenth Court via a docket equalization order, J.W. filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in its entirety. Within that motion, J.W. included a specific request that the court tax all appellate costs against the party who incurred them. Critically, J.W. had previously filed a statement of inability to afford payment of court costs. The motion did not indicate that the opposing parties had agreed to the proposed distribution of costs, nor did it suggest a settlement had been reached that addressed cost taxation.

Issues Decided

1. Does an appellant have the authority to unilaterally direct the court to tax costs against the party who incurred them upon voluntary dismissal?
2. How does a statement of inability to afford payment of court costs interact with the default cost-taxation provisions of Rule 42.1?

Rules Applied

• Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1): Permits the appellate court to dismiss an appeal upon motion of the appellant, provided the dismissal does not prevent a party from seeking affirmative relief to which it would otherwise be entitled.
• Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(d): Establishes the default rule that, absent an agreement of the parties, the court will tax costs against the appellant.
• Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1: Governs the procedures for a party who is unable to afford costs, ensuring that such parties are not barred from the judicial process due to indigency.

Application

The court’s analysis centered on the tension between J.W.’s procedural request and the strictures of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under Rule 42.1(a)(1), an appellant has the right to abandon their appeal, a request the court is generally inclined to grant. However, J.W.’s request to have costs taxed "against the party who incurred them" ran afoul of Rule 42.1(d). The court noted that because there was no evidence of a mutual agreement between the parties regarding the assessment of costs, it was bound by the default rule to tax costs against the appellant. The "legal story" here, however, shifted with the application of Rule 20.1. While the court denied J.W.’s specific request to dictate cost-shifting (because it lacked the requisite agreement from the appellee), it simultaneously recognized J.W.’s status as an indigent litigant. Because J.W. had filed a statement of inability to afford payment, the court’s hands were tied in a different direction: it could not actually assess costs against J.W. despite the default rule of 42.1(d). Consequently, J.W. achieved the desired economic result, but only because of the indigency filing rather than the specific request in the motion to dismiss.

Holding

The Court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal under Rule 42.1(a)(1) but expressly denied the request to tax costs against the party who incurred them, holding that in the absence of a written agreement among the parties, Rule 42.1(d) requires costs to be taxed against the appellant. Furthermore, the Court held that notwithstanding the default taxation rule, no costs would be assessed against the appellant because a valid statement of inability to afford payment of court costs had been filed pursuant to Rule 20.1.

Practical Application

When representing a client in a family law appeal who wishes to dismiss, practitioners must distinguish between a unilateral dismissal and a dismissal by agreement. If your client is paying costs, do not assume a motion to dismiss will end the financial exposure; without a signature from the appellee, your client will be taxed all costs of the appeal. If your client is indigent, ensure the Rule 20.1 statement is properly filed in the trial court and the clerk’s record accurately reflects this status. This case illustrates that even if your motion is technically "denied in part" regarding costs, the indigency statement provides a secondary layer of protection that the appellate court must honor.

Checklists

Negotiating Voluntary Dismissal

• Determine if the dismissal is part of a broader settlement or a unilateral decision.
• If settlement exists, draft a "Joint Motion to Dismiss" rather than a unilateral motion.
• Include an express provision in the motion stating: "The parties have agreed that costs shall be taxed against the party who incurred them" to override the Rule 42.1(d) default.
• Verify that all parties have signed the motion or that the motion contains a representation of the appellee's agreement.

Managing Costs for Indigent Clients

• Confirm that the Statement of Inability to Afford Payment was filed in accordance with Rule 20.1.
• Ensure the record includes the statement to prevent the appellate clerk from attempting to collect filing or record fees.
• In any motion to dismiss, even if unilateral, remind the court of the Rule 20.1 status to ensure the final memorandum opinion clarifies that no costs are assessed.

Citation

In the Interest of I.H. and K.H., Children, No. 13-25-00578-CV, 2026 WL ______ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 12, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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