Weekly Digest
February 28 – March 6, 2026
27 opinions this week
In Re Rufel Louis Estrada
COA04
In In Re Rufel Louis Estrada, a father sought mandamus relief to overturn a child custody order, alleging the trial court failed to consider a history of family violence and child abuse. The San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7, which requires a relator to provide a sufficient record to establish a right to relief. Because the relator, acting pro se, was unable to properly admit evidence at the trial level in accordance with the Texas Rules of Evidence, the court held that the resulting record was too sparse to prove a clear abuse of discretion and denied the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“Evidence of family violence only carries legal weight if it is properly admitted into the record; failing to follow the Rules of Evidence at trial creates an "evidentiary vacuum" that makes it nearly impossible to succeed on appeal or mandamus.”
In re I.R.D. and C.R.D.
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's order terminating the parental rights of a mother and father following their failure to overcome substance abuse and domestic instability. The parents challenged the 'best interest' finding, but the appellate court ruled that their persistent methamphetamine use, a domestic violence incident involving the paternal grandmother, and their expulsion from Family Drug Court provided clear and convincing evidence that termination was necessary for the children's safety. The court emphasized that a parent's past conduct, particularly regarding drug use and failure to complete court-ordered services, is a reliable indicator of future performance.
Litigation Takeaway
“Failure to comply with court-ordered services, particularly expulsion from specialty programs like Family Drug Court, creates a nearly insurmountable evidentiary hurdle for parents in a termination suit. Once the court finds evidence of endangerment or drug use, those findings are heavily weighted in the 'best interest' analysis, making it vital for parents to demonstrate consistent, positive changes during the pendency of the case to avoid a permanent loss of rights.”
Castleberry v. State
COA04
In Castleberry v. State, the defendant challenged a pretrial suppression ruling regarding evidence obtained during an out-of-county investigative detention. At trial, however, defense counsel affirmatively stated 'no objection' when the State introduced the challenged evidence. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of waiver, determining that an affirmative statement of 'no objection' generally forfeits any complaint regarding a pretrial ruling unless the record clearly shows an intent to preserve the issue. The court further reviewed the merits of the detention, deferring to the trial court's resolution of conflicting testimony regarding when officers developed reasonable suspicion. The court held that the appellant waived his evidentiary challenges and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the detention lawful based on a suspected felony.
Litigation Takeaway
“Saying 'no objection' at trial is a trap that can instantly waive your right to appeal a pretrial ruling. Even if you fought a motion to suppress recorded calls or private data before trial, you must renew your objection or state that your lack of objection is 'subject to the prior motion' to preserve your record for appeal.”
In the Interest of A.F.C. and A.D.C., Children
COA04
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant attempted to vacate a trial court's judgment by filing a 'Motion for Nonsuit' in the appellate court. The appellee agreed to the dismissal of the appeal but vigorously objected to vacating the underlying order. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.1 and 43.2, concluding that an appellate court cannot unilaterally vacate a trial court's judgment without an agreement between the parties or an independent legal justification like mootness. Consequently, the court held that the motion would be treated strictly as a motion to dismiss the appeal, leaving the trial court's judgment intact and enforceable against the appellant.
Litigation Takeaway
“An appellate 'nonsuit' is not a reset button; unless you have a signed agreement from the opposing party to vacate the judgment, dismissing your appeal will leave the trial court's original order fully enforceable.”
In re Julie Shodrok
COA03
In the case of In re Julie Shodrok, the relator sought a writ of mandamus from the Third Court of Appeals to vacate specific trial court orders issued in a Nueces County proceeding and to strike the Texas Attorney General's intervention in the case. The appellate court analyzed the petition under the strict standard for extraordinary relief, which requires a showing of a clear abuse of discretion and the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court held that Shodrok failed to meet this high burden and denied both the petition for mandamus and the motion to strike the Attorney General's involvement, permitting the state to remain a party in the underlying family law matter.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that requires a 'smoking gun' legal error; appellate courts are particularly deferential to trial court decisions regarding the Attorney General's intervention in family law matters unless a clear abuse of discretion is proven.”
R.C. and P.K. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this parental termination case, the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) intervened due to methamphetamine use and domestic violence. Although the mother was granted a 'monitored return' of her children after showing initial progress, she eventually allowed the abusive father back into the home and continued to struggle with sobriety. The trial court terminated the rights of both parents, a decision the Third Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court found that the child's positive drug test and the mother's failure to shield the children from a violent partner constituted clear endangerment, holding that the children's safety and need for stability outweighed the parents' partial compliance with service plans.
Litigation Takeaway
“Technical compliance with a service plan (like getting housing or attending classes) does not protect a parent from termination if they fail to address the underlying dangers of drug use or abusive relationships; a 'monitored return' is a period of high scrutiny where any contact with a prohibited abuser or a positive drug test can be fatal to the case.”
In re Curtis Johnson
COA04
In this Bexar County divorce case, the Relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to rule on a pending request. The Relator filed the petition for mandamus only ten days after making the formal request to the trial court. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the claim under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a), noting that for mandamus relief to be granted, a relator must prove the trial court failed to perform a ministerial act within a 'reasonable time.' The court held that a ten-day window does not constitute an unreasonable delay or a refusal to act, and therefore denied the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate courts will not use mandamus to manage a trial court's docket or reward litigation impatience; you must allow a reasonable period—usually significantly longer than ten days—to pass and build a record of the court's failure to act before seeking extraordinary relief.”
Ex parte Victor Elias Martinez
COA03
Victor Elias Martinez was detained for kidnapping in September 2024. Several months later, while still in custody, he was charged with aggravated sexual assault arising from the same series of events. Martinez argued that under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.151, he was entitled to a bond reduction because the State was not ready for trial within 90 days of his initial arrest. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory distinction between a 'criminal action' (the specific prosecution) and a 'criminal episode' (the underlying facts). The court held that the 90-day clock for the State's readiness applies to the specific charge for which the person is detained, and the clock resets with each new, distinct criminal charge. Therefore, the State's failure to indict on the initial kidnapping charge did not require a bond reduction for the later sexual assault charge.
Litigation Takeaway
“The 90-day 'mandatory release' rule for defendants in custody is not an absolute shield; filing new, distinct charges for related conduct resets the clock, providing family law litigants a strategic path to maintain the detention of a dangerous party during a divorce or custody battle.”
City of Houston v. Varnado
COA14
After Rodney Varnado was injured in a collision involving a high-speed police pursuit, he sued the City of Houston for negligence. The City filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the lawsuit failed to overcome governmental immunity. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) and the Transportation Code, determining that when a plaintiff's own factual allegations "plausibly implicate" an emergency response, the plaintiff has the initial burden to specifically plead facts that negate the TTCA’s immunity exceptions. The court held that because Varnado's petition described a pursuit but failed to allege specific "reckless disregard" or violations of statutes governing emergency vehicles, the claim was legally baseless and must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“When suing governmental agents for injuries during high-conflict enforcement actions, like serving a protective order or executing a child-attachment writ, general negligence pleading is insufficient; you must specifically plead facts that negate the 'emergency-response exception' or risk immediate dismissal under Rule 91a.”
Elaine T. Marshall, et al. v. Preston Marshall
COA14
In this long-running fiduciary dispute, a beneficiary challenged a trustee’s "Wyoming Maneuver"—the merger of Texas-based trusts into Wyoming entities to avoid local oversight. After the trial court issued a temporary injunction in 2017 to preserve the status quo, the trustees later moved to dissolve it, arguing that several trusts had since terminated and the litigation had matured. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the request using the mootness doctrine for the terminated trusts and the "change in circumstances" standard for the active ones. The court held that while the injunction must be dissolved for trusts that have reached their natural termination, it remains in force for active trusts because the passage of time and completion of discovery do not eliminate the underlying risk of asset dissipation or fiduciary breach.
Litigation Takeaway
“A temporary injunction is a resilient tool that does not expire simply because a case lingers for years; it remains the most effective way to prevent a spouse or trustee from 'decanting' assets into out-of-state jurisdictions. To dissolve an aging injunction, you must prove a qualitative change in the case's risk profile or show that the specific assets have already been distributed according to trust terms.”
Holton v. State
COA14
In Holton v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed the preservation of error regarding expert testimony and jury charge instructions. Morris Holton III, convicted of aggravated sexual assault, argued on appeal that a police officer improperly bolstered a witness's credibility by testifying that her behavior was consistent with trauma and that his defense was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard for extraneous offenses. The court held that the defense's trial objection—that the testimony 'invaded the province of the jury'—was a legal nullity that failed to preserve any error for appeal. Furthermore, while the trial court erred by not providing the required jury instruction regarding extraneous offenses, the error did not result in egregious harm because the evidence of those offenses was overwhelming.
Litigation Takeaway
“To preserve a challenge to expert testimony or witness bolstering, counsel must object before the witness answers and use specific grounds under the Rules of Evidence (such as Rule 702 or 403) rather than the obsolete 'province of the jury' objection. Additionally, always proactively request 'reasonable doubt' instructions for extraneous 'bad acts' in any phase of trial to avoid the difficult 'egregious harm' standard on appeal.”
In the Matter of F.C.
COA14
In this juvenile law matter, the appellant inadvertently had two separate appellate cause numbers pending for the same trial court judgment. To streamline the process, the appellant filed a voluntary motion to dismiss the second, redundant appeal. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1, which allows for the voluntary dismissal of an appeal, and determined that maintaining duplicative filings would waste judicial resources and cause administrative confusion. Consequently, the court granted the motion and dismissed the duplicative appeal, allowing the litigation to proceed under a single appellate cause number.
Litigation Takeaway
“Efficiency and organization are critical in appellate practice; when multiple notices of appeal are filed for the same judgment, counsel should promptly identify and dismiss redundant filings to avoid administrative confusion and unnecessary costs.”
Everett v. State
COA08
In Everett v. State, the court addressed whether a trial court's strict time limits on jury selection (voir dire) violated a party's right to a fair trial. The defense attorney argued that the "chess clock" approach prevented him from properly vetting jurors, but he failed to provide a specific list of the questions he was unable to ask. The Eighth Court of Appeals held that simply objecting to a time limit or identifying general topics is insufficient to preserve a legal error for appeal. To successfully challenge a time limit, counsel must place the exact, unasked questions into the record. Furthermore, the court ruled that any objections to the jury selection process are waived if a party affirmatively states they have 'no objection' to the final jury panel.
Litigation Takeaway
“To protect your right to appeal a rushed jury selection, you must read your specific, unasked questions into the record at the first opportunity. Additionally, never say 'no objection' when the final jury is seated; instead, state that you accept the panel 'subject to' your previous objections to avoid waiving your client's rights.”
Jones v. State
COA08
In Jones v. State, the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed a murder conviction, rejecting a self-defense claim where the defendant shot a victim several hours after an alleged robbery. The court analyzed the 'immediate necessity' requirement of the Texas Penal Code, concluding that a temporal gap of four to nine hours between a provocation and a 'preemptive strike' precludes a self-defense justification as a matter of law. Additionally, the court applied the 'Posey' rule, holding that trial judges have no duty to provide jury instructions on defensive justifications—such as the protection of property—unless they are affirmatively requested by the defendant.
Litigation Takeaway
“Past provocation is not a legal license for future violence; self-defense requires a 'split-second' immediate necessity rather than a retaliatory strike. Furthermore, trial counsel must specifically request defensive jury instructions on the record, as appellate courts will not rescue a party who fails to ask for these protections at trial.”
In the Interest of B.D.A., a Child
COA05
In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), the appellant failed to file an opening brief after the trial records were submitted. Despite receiving a formal delinquency notice from the Dallas Court of Appeals providing a ten-day grace period to cure the defect, the appellant did not respond or file a brief. The court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.8 and 42.3, which allow for involuntary dismissal when a party fails to prosecute an appeal or comply with court notices. Consequently, the court held that the appeal must be dismissed for want of prosecution.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate deadlines are strictly enforced in family law cases; failing to file a brief or respond to a delinquency notice will result in the immediate dismissal of your appeal, leaving the trial court's ruling final and unchangeable.”
Elaine T. Marshall v. Preston Marshall
COA14
In a dispute involving a statutory trust accounting under Texas Property Code § 113.151, a beneficiary sought to compel a trustee to provide a financial statement of the trust. By the time of the appeal, the trust had terminated and the accounting had been provided, leading the trustee to argue the claim was moot. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the claim survived for the purposes of attorney's fees and compensatory damages. The court held that while the request for the accounting itself was satisfied, the claim remained a "live controversy" regarding the recovery of attorney's fees. However, the court clarified that the statute only provides for the production of the accounting and does not authorize the recovery of monetary damages.
Litigation Takeaway
“A statutory accounting claim is a potent tool for transparency and fee-shifting in trust litigation, as the right to attorney's fees survives even if the trustee eventually complies or the trust terminates. However, this claim alone cannot be used to recover money damages; litigators must plead separate causes of action, such as breach of fiduciary duty, to recover financial losses.”
Truong v. Nguyen
COA14
In Truong v. Nguyen, the appellants filed a TCPA motion to dismiss domestic tort claims but failed to ensure a hearing was held on the motion. Several months later, they attempted an interlocutory appeal, arguing the motion was denied by operation of law. The Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 27, concluding that the statutory 30-day countdown for a 'denial by operation of law' is only triggered after a hearing occurs. Because no hearing was held, the court held that the motion was forfeited rather than denied, resulting in no appealable order. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A TCPA motion is not self-executing; you must be the aggressor in scheduling a hearing. Failure to hold a hearing within the statutory window results in a forfeiture of the motion and the loss of your right to an interlocutory appeal, meaning you cannot use the motion to indefinitely stall trial court proceedings or discovery.”
Tims v. State
COA14
In Tims v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court must declare a mistrial when a witness unexpectedly mentions a party's prior jail or prison stays. During a trial for aggravated sexual assault, the complainant twice referenced the defendant’s history of incarceration. Although the defense moved for a mistrial both times, the trial court instead opted to give the jury prompt instructions to disregard the statements. On appeal, the court analyzed whether these 'uninvited and unembellished' remarks were so prejudicial that they couldn't be cured by a simple instruction. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, affirming that a prompt instruction to disregard is generally sufficient to neutralize the harm caused by spontaneous mentions of a party's criminal past.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a witness makes an uninvited outburst regarding a party's criminal history, you must immediately move for an instruction to disregard and then move for a mistrial to preserve the error. However, be aware that Texas law maintains a strong presumption that a jury instruction can 'cure' the error, making a mistrial difficult to obtain unless the testimony is exceptionally inflammatory.”
In the Interest of C.G.H., B.G.H., M.J.H. and C.K.H., Children
COA05
An appellant sought to overturn a final divorce decree and child custody order but failed to provide the appellate court with a reporter’s record (the trial transcript) or a brief that complied with court rules. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that without a record of the trial proceedings, it must be presumed that the evidence supported the judge's decision. Additionally, the court held that while pro se litigants are given some leeway, they must still follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure; because the appellant failed to provide proper legal authorities or record citations even after being warned, her issues were waived.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never attempt an appeal without ensuring a complete reporter’s record is filed; without a transcript of the trial, the appellate court will presume the trial judge was correct. Furthermore, pro se litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys—failing to follow briefing rules and provide specific record citations will result in the loss of your right to have your claims reviewed.”
In the Matter of F.C.
COA14
In a juvenile matter involving a judgment from the 315th District Court, the appellant inadvertently triggered two separate appellate cause numbers for the same underlying judgment. To resolve this redundancy, the appellant filed a voluntary motion to dismiss the second, duplicative appeal. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the request under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1, confirming that both files involved the same parties and the same September 17, 2025, judgment. The Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, holding that dismissal was appropriate to streamline the litigation and prevent an inefficient use of judicial resources.
Litigation Takeaway
“Practitioners must conduct regular "appellate housekeeping" to identify and resolve duplicative filings. If multiple appellate cause numbers are assigned to the same judgment, counsel should promptly move to dismiss or consolidate the redundant causes to avoid unnecessary filing fees, preparation costs for multiple records, and the risk of conflicting briefing deadlines.”
In re Rocio Gomez
COA01
Relator Rocio Gomez sought a writ of mandamus from the First Court of Appeals to vacate a divorce decree while she simultaneously had a motion to vacate the same decree pending in the trial court. The appellate court analyzed the petition under the principle that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy intended only for situations where no adequate legal remedy exists. The court determined that because the trial court still held plenary power and had already scheduled a hearing on the motion to vacate, the request for appellate intervention was premature. The court held that the trial court must be afforded the first opportunity to address and correct its own judgment through standard post-trial procedures, leading to the denial of the mandamus petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“Always exhaust your trial court remedies, such as a Motion for New Trial or Motion to Vacate, before seeking a writ of mandamus; otherwise, the appellate court will likely deny your petition as premature.”
In Re Vandever
COA07
Kathleen Vandever filed an original proceeding in the Seventh Court of Appeals seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the return of a minor child located in Tarrant County. Although the Seventh Court was handling the underlying appeal due to a docket equalization transfer, the court analyzed its authority under Government Code § 22.221 and Family Code § 157.371. The court determined that its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus is strictly limited to its geographic district unless the writ is necessary to enforce its existing jurisdiction. Because the child was located in the Second Court of Appeals' district and the Relator did not prove the writ was necessary to protect the pending appeal, the court dismissed the petition for want of territorial jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A docket equalization transfer of an appeal does not expand an appellate court's territorial jurisdiction for original proceedings. When seeking an emergency writ of habeas corpus for a child, practitioners must file in the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction or the appellate district where the child is physically located.”
In re Roland Joseph Seymour
COA14
After the 387th District Court of Fort Bend County denied a motion for enforcement in a family law matter, Roland Joseph Seymour filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the trial court's order. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under the strict dual requirements for mandamus relief: a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court found that Seymour failed to provide a record sufficient to prove that the trial court's refusal to enforce the prior order was a violation of a clear legal duty or a departure from settled legal principles. Because the relator did not satisfy these high procedural burdens, the appellate court denied the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, not a substitute for a standard appeal. To successfully challenge a trial court's refusal to enforce an order, a party must provide a comprehensive record—including hearing transcripts—that proves the court didn't just make an unfavorable decision, but committed a clear legal error for which no other remedy exists.”
In re L.C.
COA12
After the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) removed her children following a suspicious burn injury, a mother sought their return at an adversary hearing. Despite conflicting medical testimony and the mother’s lack of criminal or Department history, the trial court granted temporary managing conservatorship to DFPS. On mandamus, the Twelfth Court of Appeals conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court analyzed the case under Texas Family Code Section 262.201(g) and concluded that DFPS failed to satisfy the cumulative three-prong test for continued removal. Specifically, the court found that evidence of a past injury with disputed origins was insufficient to prove a "substantial risk of continuing danger" to the children, particularly given the mother's cooperation with safety plans and the absence of any prior history of violence.
Litigation Takeaway
“Evidence of a past injury is not a "blank check" for DFPS to maintain conservatorship; practitioners must hold the Department to the strict, cumulative three-prong test of Section 262.201(g), emphasizing that the Department must prove a prospective "substantial risk of continuing danger" that cannot be mitigated by reasonable efforts.”
In re J Martinez Trucking, Inc.
COA14
In a dispute involving breach of contract and fraud claims, a defendant sought to designate a former co-defendant as a responsible third party (RTP). The motion was filed more than 60 days before trial, but the plaintiff failed to file an objection within the 15-day statutory window. The trial court denied the motion, prompting a petition for writ of mandamus. The Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 33.004(f), which states that a court 'shall' grant leave to designate an RTP if no objection is filed within 15 days. The court held that after the 15-day period expires, the trial court’s duty to grant the motion becomes ministerial. Because the erroneous denial of an RTP designation skews trial proceedings and cannot be remedied on regular appeal, the court granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Deadlines for objecting to a Responsible Third Party designation are strictly enforced in Texas. If you are involved in a case with 'tort-adjacent' claims—such as fraud on the community or waste of assets in a divorce—you must object to an RTP motion within 15 days of service. Failure to act within this narrow window results in a mandatory designation, allowing the other party to shift blame and potentially dilute their financial liability before a jury or judge.”
In re C.J.G.
COA08
In this case, the appellant filed a vague document seeking an 'in camera review in equity' but failed to identify a specific trial court order, demonstrate appellate jurisdiction, or pay the required filing fees. The Eighth Court of Appeals analyzed the filing under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3 and provided the appellant an opportunity to cure the procedural and jurisdictional defects. When the appellant ignored the court's order and failed to respond, the court held that dismissal was mandatory for want of jurisdiction and failure to comply with procedural rules. The court further denied any potential request for extraordinary relief (mandamus), noting that the appellant failed to meet the strict requirements for original proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate rules are not suggestions; they are jurisdictional mandates. Whether seeking a standard appeal or a writ of mandamus, a party must clearly identify an appealable order, pay filing fees, and strictly follow court deadlines. Failing to respond to a court's notice of procedural defects will result in the summary dismissal of your case, regardless of the perceived 'equitable' merits of your claim.”
De La Vega v. Imming
COA08
In De La Vega v. Imming, a party appealed a judgment and posted a $20,000 cash bond to pause the legal process. While the appeal was pending, the parties reached a settlement. The person who appealed filed a motion to dismiss the case and asked the appellate court to return their bond money and split the court costs. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and determined that because the motion was filed by only one party (even though it was "unopposed"), the court did not have the authority to return the money or change the default rule that the person who appeals pays all costs. The court held that while the appeal could be dismissed, the request for the bond refund must be handled by the original trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
“When settling a case on appeal, a simple "motion to dismiss" is not enough to protect your interests. To ensure your bond money is returned promptly and costs are shared, you must file a joint agreement signed by both parties. Failing to do so can leave your cash locked in a court registry for months and leave you responsible for 100% of the appellate costs.”