Weekly Digest
February 21 – February 27, 2026
96 opinions this week
In the Interest of A.G.T. and A.K.T.
COA05
In this case, an appellant sought to challenge multiple trial court rulings in an ongoing divorce and SAPCR (Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship) proceeding. The Fifth Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal after finding that the trial court had not yet issued a final judgment disposing of all claims and parties. The court's analysis focused on the 'final judgment rule,' noting that the appellant was improperly attempting to use a direct appeal to challenge contempt orders—which must typically be handled through original proceedings like mandamus or habeas corpus—while the main litigation remained active. Consequently, the court held it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family law litigation, timing is everything: you generally cannot appeal trial court rulings until a final decree is signed that resolves all issues. Attempting to appeal interim rulings or contempt orders through a standard notice of appeal will lead to dismissal; these specific issues usually require a petition for writ of mandamus or habeas corpus instead.”
In re John F. Ross
COA05
In 'In re John F. Ross', the Relator sought mandamus relief and emergency stays regarding orders from a Collin County district court. However, the Relator submitted a record that was neither sworn nor certified and contained unredacted sensitive data, such as social security numbers and birth dates. The Fifth Court of Appeals strictly applied Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52 and 9.9, concluding that a court cannot grant extraordinary relief based on an unauthenticated record. Consequently, the court denied the petition and struck the entire filing to protect party privacy, rendering all emergency motions moot without ever reaching the substantive merits of the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“In appellate litigation, procedural compliance is as important as the merits of your argument; failing to properly authenticate a record or redact sensitive private information will lead to an immediate dismissal, regardless of the urgency of the underlying family law dispute.”
In re Veronica Chavez Vara
COA08
Relator Veronica Vara, a declared vexatious litigant, filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel trial court action regarding a divorce property division and to vacate orders from a local administrative judge denying her permission to file new litigation. The Eighth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 11, which requires vexatious litigants to obtain prefiling permission and mandates a 30-day deadline to challenge any denial of that permission via mandamus. The court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, holding that the lack of a prefiling order was a fatal jurisdictional defect and that Vara's challenge to the administrative judge's prior denials was filed months after the statutory deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas courts strictly enforce the jurisdictional requirements of the vexatious litigant statute; practitioners should monitor the 30-day deadline for challenges to administrative denials and ensure that any filing by a restricted party is accompanied by the mandatory prefiling permission order.”
Williams v. Bowers
COA03
In Williams v. Bowers, a buyer sought specific performance of a real estate contract after a family-controlled church board refused to authorize the sale. The initial lawsuit was dismissed by an appellate court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the property value exceeded the county court’s jurisdictional limit. The buyer refiled in district court eight days later. The Sellers argued the claim was barred by limitations and that they lacked the 'ability' to perform without a board resolution. The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the buyer, holding that the Texas Savings Statute (TCPR § 16.064) tolled the statute of limitations because the refiling occurred within 60 days and the initial filing was a mistake of law rather than 'intentional disregard' of jurisdiction. The court further held that a seller cannot use obstruction from its own family-controlled board to avoid contractual obligations.
Litigation Takeaway
“A jurisdictional dismissal is not necessarily fatal to a high-value property claim; the Texas Savings Statute provides a 60-day window to refile in the correct court. Additionally, parties cannot use 'corporate formalities' or family-controlled boards to stonewall a valid transfer of property.”
In re K.H., K.A., and K.A.
COA11
In this case, a mother appealed a trial court's decree terminating her parental rights, specifically challenging whether the decision was in the 'best interest' of her children. The Eleventh Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence under the established Holley factors, focusing on the mother's history of substance abuse, her failure to complete court-ordered service plans, and her decision to leave her children in a home where they were exposed to dangerous drugs. The court analyzed how the mother's past endangering conduct and lack of stable housing predicted future risks to the children's safety. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the termination, holding that the evidence of neglect and the children's exposure to controlled substances was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“In parental termination cases, 'past is prologue.' Texas courts heavily weigh a parent's history of drug use and failure to comply with service plans as indicators of future risk. Specifically, if a child tests positive for controlled substances while in a parent's care or a placement the parent sanctioned, it creates an incredibly high hurdle for the parent to overcome in a best-interest analysis.”
In the Interest of A.M., L.M., and M.M.
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of a mother’s and father’s parental rights following their convictions for child endangerment and federal drug conspiracy. The legal conflict focused on whether termination was in the children's best interest given the parents' history of fentanyl use—including an incident where the mother blew smoke into an infant's face—and their subsequent long-term incarceration. The court analyzed the evidence using the Holley factors, concluding that the parents' inability to provide a stable, drug-free environment outweighed any arguments for maintaining the parent-child bond. The court held that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding that termination was in the children's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“Severe criminal conduct involving narcotics and significant prison sentences create a high evidentiary bar that is difficult for parents to overcome in best-interest analyses. In termination cases involving fentanyl and child endangerment, courts will heavily prioritize the immediate safety and long-term stability of the children over parental rights.”
In the Interest of H.C.U., a Child
COA08
In this El Paso family law case, an appeal was initiated concerning child-related litigation, but the appellant’s counsel soon notified the court that the appeal had been filed in error. The Eighth Court of Appeals treated this notification as a motion for voluntary dismissal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a). The court analyzed the request as a unilateral intent to abandon the litigation and, finding the request appropriate under the rules, granted the dismissal. The court held that while the appeal could be terminated without reaching the merits, the appellant must be taxed with the costs of the appeal pursuant to the default provisions of Rule 42.1(d).
Litigation Takeaway
“Even a mistaken or premature appellate filing has financial consequences; while you can voluntarily dismiss an erroneous appeal, the appellant will generally be responsible for the court costs unless a different arrangement is negotiated with the opposing party.”
In re North Houston Pole Line, L.P. and Erik Garza Pena
COA01
This case centers on a dispute over whether a court-ordered medical examination under Rule 204.1 can be recorded or attended by an attorney. After a trial court ordered that four medical exams be audio and video recorded and attended by the plaintiff's counsel, the defendants sought mandamus relief. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the "special circumstances" test, which requires the party seeking a recording to provide a specific factual basis showing a "particularized need"—such as a client's inability to recount the exam due to cognitive deficits. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to meet this burden, relying instead on the general adversarial nature of the exams. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing these conditions without a factual basis, conditionally granting the writ of mandamus to vacate the recording and attendance requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
“To record a court-ordered medical or mental health evaluation, you must prove "special circumstances" with specific evidence of a client's vulnerability; general arguments about fairness or the adversarial nature of the exam are legally insufficient to allow cameras or lawyers in the room.”
In re Alpha Sonii
COA12
In the case of In re Alpha Sonii, a Relator sought mandamus relief to compel a trial court to rule on pending applications. The Twelfth Court of Appeals denied the petition, finding that the Relator failed to provide a properly authenticated record as required by Rule 52.7. Substantively, the court analyzed whether the act of filing a motion with a district clerk is sufficient to trigger a judge's ministerial duty to rule. The court held that it is not; rather, a party must demonstrate 'presentment'—evidence that the motion was actually brought to the judge's personal attention. Because the clerk's knowledge is not legally imputed to the trial judge, the Relator's failure to request a ruling or a hearing meant the appellate court could not intervene.
Litigation Takeaway
“E-filing a motion is only the first step; it does not legally force a judge to rule. To successfully challenge a trial court's delay through mandamus, you must create a documented 'paper trail of presentment' proving that you specifically asked the judge to rule and were ignored. Without evidence that the judge was personally aware of the request, the 'reasonable time' clock for a ruling never begins to run.”
In Re Reginal Eugene Hall AKA Michael Carter
COA05
In this original proceeding, the Relator sought a writ of mandamus from the Dallas Court of Appeals to compel the Dallas Police Department to release records under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA). The court analyzed its jurisdiction under Texas Government Code § 22.221, which limits an appellate court's mandamus power to actions against specific judges or instances where it is necessary to protect the court's own jurisdiction. The court also reviewed Texas Government Code § 552.321, which requires that suits to enforce the PIA be filed in a district court. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the police department is an executive body, not a judge, and the PIA explicitly mandates that enforcement actions must begin in a district court rather than an appellate tribunal.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a police department or government agency refuses to comply with a Public Information Act request for evidence like bodycam footage or incident reports, you cannot seek immediate relief from an appellate court. You must instead file a separate petition for writ of mandamus in a district court to enforce compliance.”
In re Jay W. Colvin III
COA01
In a dispute involving an arbitrator's subpoena for 'accountings' of real property transactions, the First Court of Appeals addressed whether such a request could force a party to create new financial records. The Relator argued that the order improperly required him to perform a forensic accounting service rather than simply produce documents. The court analyzed the language of the enforcement order, determining that 'accounting' was used as a noun referring to existing records already in the party’s possession and control. Ultimately, the court denied mandamus relief, holding that because discovery is limited to items already in existence, the order did not compel the creation of new work product, but rather the turnover of existing financial data.
Litigation Takeaway
“You cannot use a subpoena to force an opposing party to perform forensic work or create new financial reports for you. An 'accounting' request only compels the production of existing records; if you need a complex summary or tracing of assets for your divorce, you must obtain the raw data and have your own expert perform the analysis.”
In the Matter of D. L. A.
COA01
In this juvenile delinquency matter, D.L.A. challenged a robbery adjudication, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to identify him as the perpetrator due to inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the case under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required by the Texas Family Code and Jackson v. Virginia, noting that the testimony of even a single eyewitness is legally sufficient to support a conviction. The court held that because the victims provided positive identifications and were corroborated by circumstantial evidence—specifically, D.L.A. being apprehended in a stolen vehicle containing the distinctive clothing and weapon described by the victims—the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court's finding of delinquent conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas juvenile proceedings, the testimony of a single credible eyewitness is legally sufficient to sustain an adjudication; practitioners must focus on undermining identification reliability at the trial level because appellate courts will not re-weigh witness credibility or resolve evidentiary conflicts on appeal.”
In re Eandre Juwon Mott
COA09
In this parentage action, an incarcerated relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Jefferson County trial court to hold a hearing on a petition filed five years earlier. The Ninth Court of Appeals denied the petition, finding that the relator failed to provide a proper record or proof of service on the child's mother. The court analyzed the case under the high standards for mandamus relief, concluding that because the relator could not prove the case was "at issue" or that he had diligently pursued a setting, the trial court had no ministerial duty to act.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that requires more than just showing a case has been pending for a long time; you must provide a complete record proving that all parties have been served and that you have made recent, diligent efforts to secure a hearing.”
In re Theresa Velez
COA01
In a long-running divorce proceeding, Theresa Velez filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate or modify temporary orders issued by the 507th District Court of Harris County. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a), which requires the relator to prove the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal. The court held that Velez failed to meet this high evidentiary and legal burden, concluding that the trial court acted within its broad discretion in managing the marital estate and the parties' conduct during the litigation. Consequently, the court denied the request for extraordinary relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Challenging temporary orders through mandamus is an uphill battle that requires more than just showing a trial judge "got it wrong." To succeed, you must demonstrate a total absence of evidence or a clear misapplication of the law, supported by a perfect appellate record including all transcripts and exhibits.”
In the Matter of A.W.
COA02
In this juvenile delinquency case, the appellant challenged a court order transferring him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department to the adult prison system to serve the remainder of a twenty-year sentence. While the Second Court of Appeals found no merit to the appeal regarding the transfer itself, it identified a legal error in the assessment of $146 in court costs. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145 and the Texas Supreme Court's precedent in Campbell v. Wilder, concluding that because the appellant's affidavit of indigency was uncontested, it was conclusive as a matter of law. Consequently, the court affirmed the transfer but modified the judgment to vacate the assessment of court costs.
Litigation Takeaway
“An uncontested affidavit of indigency creates a categorical prohibition against the assessment of court costs; trial clerks cannot "bill" an indigent party, and appellate courts will strike these fees even if the underlying appeal is otherwise unsuccessful.”
In the Interest of N.L.
COA09
After a trial court terminated a mother's parental rights based on findings of endangerment and failure to complete a service plan, her court-appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating the appeal lacked merit. The Ninth Court of Appeals conducted an independent, de novo review of the record to ensure the trial court's findings under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b) were supported by clear and convincing evidence. The court concluded that the evidence regarding the statutory predicates and the child's best interest was sufficient and affirmed the termination order, finding no arguable grounds for appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Building a trial record with 'clean' evidence—particularly regarding statutory endangerment grounds—makes a termination order significantly more difficult to overturn. The Anders protocol provides a mechanism for the finality of these orders when a thorough appellate review confirms that no reversible error occurred at the trial level.”
In re P.W.
COA02
A seventeen-year-old mother signed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights that included an express waiver of service under Texas Family Code § 161.103. After her rights were terminated, she appealed, arguing the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because, as a minor, she lacked the legal capacity to waive service of process. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict between the general common law rule prohibiting minors from waiving service and the specific provisions of the Texas Family Code. The court held that § 161.103 creates a specific statutory exception to the general disability of minority, meaning a minor parent's voluntary relinquishment affidavit containing a waiver of citation is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction without formal service.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas Family Code § 161.103 serves as a statutory override to the common law rule that minors cannot waive service; a properly executed relinquishment affidavit from a minor parent is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction and protect a termination judgment from collateral attacks based on lack of service.”
Pullen v. Pullen
COA02
In Pullen v. Pullen, the parties reached a partial settlement regarding their property division while an appeal of their divorce decree was pending. They filed an unopposed motion under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(B) requesting that the appellate court set aside only the property division and remand it for a new division consistent with their agreement. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed its authority to perform a 'surgical remand,' noting that while trial courts cannot sever a divorce from the property division, appellate courts have the discretion to affirm the divorce and SAPCR (child-related) orders while remanding the marital estate if the divorce itself is not challenged. The court held that the property division was set aside without regard to the merits and remanded to the trial court, while the portions of the decree granting the divorce and establishing custody and support were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Parties who reach a property settlement during an appeal can utilize Rule 42.1(a)(2)(B) to remand only the financial disputes to the trial court. This 'surgical remand' allows you to finalize a settlement agreement without risking the finality of the divorce itself or disturbing favorable custody and support orders.”
Cotton v. Smith
COA13
In Cotton v. Smith, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals addressed the jurisdictional requirements for a permissive interlocutory appeal. The Appellants sought to challenge rulings on corporate standing and notice requirements before the final judgment. Although the trial court signed an order intended to allow the appeal, the order merely recited statutory boilerplate language without identifying the specific 'controlling question of law' or explaining how an immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation. The appellate court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168 and Section 51.014(d) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, concluding that these procedural requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional. Because the trial court's order failed to define the legal issues or provide a substantive ruling on them, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“When seeking a permissive interlocutory appeal, you cannot rely on 'boilerplate' language in a trial court's order. To avoid a jurisdictional dismissal, the order must explicitly state the specific legal question at issue, provide a substantive ruling on that question, and detail exactly how an early appeal will save time or litigation costs. A poorly drafted order is a 'death warrant' for your appeal.”
In the Matter of D.L.A.
COA01
In this juvenile delinquency case, a sixteen-year-old was found to have committed robbery based on the testimony and in-court identification of two victims. The appellant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence, pointing to inconsistencies in the description of his clothing and the tentative nature of some witness statements. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the case under the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard, concluding that the testimony of a single eyewitness is legally sufficient to support a finding of delinquency. The court held that the trial judge, as the factfinder, has the sole authority to determine witness credibility, and any discrepancies in the evidence go to its weight rather than its legal sufficiency.
Litigation Takeaway
“In 'quasi-criminal' family law proceedings, such as juvenile delinquency or family violence cases, the credible testimony of a single witness can be enough to meet the highest burden of proof. Because appellate courts will not re-weigh witness credibility, legal strategy must focus on impeaching witness reliability and descriptions during the initial trial.”
In re Grayson Mill Operating, LLC
COA14
In a mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a plaintiff could invoke the Texas residency exception to avoid a forum non conveniens dismissal by moving to the state after a claim accrued or a lawsuit was filed. The trial court had denied the motion to dismiss, viewing the residency determination as a flexible matter of first impression. However, the appellate court analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 71.051(e) and concluded that allowing post-incident relocation to satisfy the residency requirement would encourage "mischief" and blatant forum shopping. The court held that residency for the purpose of this statutory exception must be fixed at the time the cause of action accrued or when the suit was filed. Because the trial court misapplied the law, the appellate court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party cannot "manufacture" Texas residency to subvert a forum non conveniens claim by moving to the state after a dispute has already begun. This ruling provides family law practitioners with a critical defense against "migratory spouses" who relocate to Texas mid-dispute to seek a more favorable jurisdictional or legal environment.”
Camden Design Group, Inc. v. Dialyspa Management Services, Inc.
COA01
In this case, a plaintiff sued for breach of a settlement agreement because the defendant paid via a standard check rather than 'good funds' and missed a technical waiver deadline. Although the plaintiff eventually received all the money owed, they continued the lawsuit to seek additional damages and attorney's fees. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas contract law, concluding that a 'technical breach' is not actionable unless the plaintiff can prove actual financial loss (pecuniary damage). Additionally, because the plaintiff’s initial demand for payment asked for a significantly higher 'new settlement' rather than the specific amount owed, the court applied the 'excessive demand doctrine' to deny the plaintiff's request for attorney's fees. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant, essentially ruling 'no harm, no foul.'
Litigation Takeaway
“You cannot successfully sue for a technical breach of a settlement agreement (like a late payment or the wrong form of payment) if you eventually receive the money and suffer no actual financial harm. Moreover, be precise in your demand letters: asking for more than what is strictly owed under the agreement can 'weaponize' the excessive demand doctrine against you, causing you to lose your right to recover attorney's fees.”
Travis Park Apartments v. Perez
COA03
In Travis Park Apartments v. Perez, the Third Court of Appeals examined whether an attorney's general testimony regarding work performed was sufficient to support a fee award. After her detailed billing records were excluded due to a discovery error, the claimant’s attorney testified from memory, providing a total of 141.2 hours and describing broad categories of work like 'discovery' and 'trial prep.' The court analyzed this under the 'lodestar' method, which requires specific evidence of which tasks were performed, by whom, and when. The court held that general testimony is legally insufficient to support a fee award and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for a new trial on the issue of fees.
Litigation Takeaway
“To win and keep an attorney’s fee award in Texas, 'generalities' are not enough. If you cannot produce detailed billing records, you must be prepared to testify with granular precision about exactly how many hours were spent on specific individual tasks; providing aggregate totals for broad categories like 'litigation' or 'discovery' will likely lead to your fee award being overturned on appeal.”
Hickerson v. State
COA14
In Hickerson v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of a deceased victim's prior out-of-court statements. The court applied the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" doctrine, which provides an equitable exception to the Confrontation Clause when a defendant intentionally procures a witness's unavailability to prevent their testimony. Finding that Hickerson murdered his girlfriend to silence her regarding pending domestic violence charges, the court held that he waived his right to object to the admission of her prior statements, including her protective order application and police reports.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party who uses intimidation, threats, or violence to prevent a witness from testifying cannot later use the Confrontation Clause or hearsay rules to exclude that witness's prior statements. In family law cases involving domestic violence, this doctrine allows for the admission of critical evidence—such as prior affidavits, police reports, and protective order applications—even when the victim is too intimidated or otherwise unavailable to testify at trial.”
Howell Sand Company, Inc. v. Triple L Utilities, Inc.
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit for want of prosecution (DWOP) following two distinct six-year periods of inactivity. The plaintiff attempted to avoid dismissal by announcing 'ready' for trial after receiving a notice of intent to dismiss and offered excuses of financial hardship and a mistaken belief that a defendant was in bankruptcy. The court analyzed the case using the 'entire history' test, determining that a trial court’s inherent power to dismiss is not curtailed by a last-minute announcement of readiness if the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence throughout the life of the suit. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case or denying reinstatement, as the plaintiff's excuses were insufficient to prove the delay was not the result of conscious indifference.
Litigation Takeaway
“A last-minute 'announcement of ready' or a request for a trial setting will not save a stale case from dismissal for want of prosecution if there is a historical lack of diligence; furthermore, 'lack of funds' is not a legal justification for letting a family law modification or enforcement action languish for years.”
El Paso V Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Reyes
COA08
In El Paso V Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Reyes, a healthcare facility challenged the qualifications of a nurse and a family physician who provided expert reports regarding a patient's pressure wounds. The defendants argued the experts lacked specific nursing home experience. The court analyzed the requirements under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74, applying a 'lenient standard' that prioritizes the 'type of care' (wound management) over the specific title or facility setting. The court held that the experts' general experience in long-term care and medicine was sufficient to satisfy the threshold requirements, affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
“Don't assume you need a hyper-specialized expert to survive a Chapter 74 challenge; focus on qualifying general practitioners or nurses by linking their experience to the specific 'type of care' or medical protocols at issue rather than the specific facility type.”
Conover v. Conover
COA01
Two daughters sued their grandfather’s estate for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, alleging he failed to properly fund testamentary trusts created by their father's will, resulting in a $3.4 million discrepancy. The First Court of Appeals analyzed whether the fiduciary relationship between the trustee and beneficiaries tolled the four-year statute of limitations under the discovery rule. The court held that while a fiduciary relationship relaxes the duty to inquire, it does not eliminate the requirement of reasonable diligence; because the daughters had reached the age of majority and had access to financial advisors and account statements years before filing suit, their claims were barred by limitations. Furthermore, the court held that an exculpatory clause in the will protected the executor because the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of willful misconduct or gross negligence.
Litigation Takeaway
“A fiduciary relationship is not a license to ignore financial red flags. Beneficiaries of family trusts must exercise reasonable diligence once they reach adulthood and gain access to financial records; failure to investigate discrepancies in a timely manner will result in the statute of limitations barring recovery, even if self-dealing or mismanagement occurred.”
Burns v. Standard Casualty Company
COA14
In Burns v. Standard Casualty Company, a group of homeowners and their law firm faced significant financial sanctions after filing a lawsuit that a court deemed 'groundless.' The dispute began when the homeowners claimed that a frozen pipe burst during a winter storm should be classified as an 'explosion' under their insurance policy to secure higher coverage. The trial court found no evidence to support this claim and ruled that the lawsuit was brought in bad faith. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld the sanctions against the clients and their attorneys, largely because the lawyers failed to bring a court reporter to the hearing. Without a record of the evidence, the appellate court was forced to presume the trial judge's decision was correct.
Litigation Takeaway
“Baseless 'kitchen sink' legal claims can lead to expensive sanctions against both the client and the law firm. To protect your rights, always ensure a court reporter is present at hearings to record the evidence; otherwise, you lose your ability to challenge an unfair ruling on appeal.”
Quest Trust Company, for the benefit of Caroline Allison IRA #2593721 v. Karpova
COA03
In this case, Quest Trust Company, acting as trustee for a self-directed IRA (SDIRA), sought to evict a holdover occupant from a property purchased at a foreclosure sale. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that an IRA is merely an 'inanimate object' or bank account that lacks the legal standing to sue. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals reversed this decision. The court analyzed federal tax law and Texas trust statutes to determine that an IRA functions as a trust. Because the IRA was the actual purchaser of the property, it suffered a 'concrete injury' sufficient for standing. Furthermore, the court clarified that any challenge to the IRA's legal 'personality' is a matter of procedural capacity, which allows for a correction of the lawsuit's styling rather than a total dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
“When litigating over real estate held within a self-directed IRA—a common scenario in high-net-worth property divisions—ensure the plaintiff is styled as the 'Trustee for the benefit of the IRA.' If the opposing party challenges the IRA's ability to sue, this case confirms that such an error is a fixable 'capacity' issue, not a jurisdictional 'standing' defect that would end the case.”
Carlos v. State
COA07
In Carlos v. State, a defendant on community supervision for family violence and injury to a child had his probation conditions administratively modified (requiring time in an Intermediate Sanction Facility) after violating his terms. Later, the State filed a formal motion to revoke his probation based on the exact same violations. The defendant argued that this violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had already been "punished" for that conduct. The Seventh Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that probation modifications are not constitutional "punishment" and that administrative adjustments without a formal hearing do not constitute a final adjudication. The court held that the State is not barred from later seeking formal revocation or adjudication based on conduct that was previously addressed through administrative means.
Litigation Takeaway
“An opposing party’s "administrative" probation modification—such as being sent to a treatment or sanction facility—does not legally resolve their underlying misconduct. In family law litigation, this means a party who has committed domestic violence remains at risk of imminent incarceration for those acts even if they were already "dealt with" by a probation officer, providing powerful evidence of instability in custody and access disputes.”
Pugh v. Winfield-Pugh
COA14
In a divorce proceeding, Barbara Winfield-Pugh sought to confirm a residence and a vehicle as her separate property. Although property possessed at the time of divorce is presumed to be community property, Barbara provided a 2005 deed and a 2013 title application showing she acquired the assets years before her 2021 marriage. The husband challenged this characterization but failed to appear at the evidentiary hearing to offer rebuttal evidence. The court analyzed the case under the 'Inception of Title' doctrine, which dictates that the character of property is determined at the moment a party first has a right to it. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that Barbara's uncontradicted testimony combined with pre-marital documentary evidence met the 'clear and convincing' standard required to prove separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
“To successfully protect separate property in a Texas divorce, 'Inception of Title' is the gold standard; maintaining original deeds, titles, or purchase agreements dated prior to the marriage provides the necessary documentary evidence to overcome the community property presumption, especially when the other spouse fails to provide contradictory evidence.”
In Re Catherine Goodman
COA02
After the death of an individual with outstanding debts, a claimant filed a lawsuit in a Texas district court to recover funds after the estate administrator rejected their claim. However, Texas Estates Code Section 355.064(a) mandates that a claimant must file suit in the specific court of original probate jurisdiction where the estate is pending within 90 days of a rejection. The Second Court of Appeals held that filing in a court of general jurisdiction (like a district court) rather than the specific probate court failed to satisfy the statute. Because the 90-day window had closed, the claim was legally barred. The court granted mandamus relief, ordering the district court to dismiss the case because it had no basis in law.
Litigation Takeaway
“When pursuing an estate for unpaid child support, alimony, or property division, you must strictly adhere to the Texas Estates Code. If an estate administrator rejects your claim, you have exactly 90 days to file suit in the specific court handling the probate. Filing in the family court that issued your decree is a fatal error that will result in your claim being permanently barred once the 90-day deadline passes.”
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile
COA10
In this juvenile law case, a minor (C.C.) challenged a court's jurisdiction to transfer his case to criminal court. He argued that his summons was not served at least two days before the hearing date listed on the document, violating Texas Family Code § 53.07(a). The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory language and determined that the 'two-day' requirement refers to the date the hearing actually occurs, rather than the date originally printed on the summons. Because C.C. was served in June and the hearing did not take place until August, the court held the service was timely. The court also ruled that once jurisdiction is established through initial service, subsequent postponements do not require new summons and that appearing for a hearing without objection waives minor clerical errors.
Litigation Takeaway
“Service of process defects regarding hearing dates are often cured by time. If you are served late for an initial date but the hearing is postponed, the statutory window is measured against the actual hearing date. Critically, if you appear and announce 'ready' at a hearing, you waive the right to challenge these types of clerical or timing defects in the summons.”
In the Interest of J.S.J. and J.S., Children
COA10
The appellant challenged a trial court's dismissal of a SAPCR case for lack of prosecution. However, after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant failed to pay the required filing fee or submit a mandatory docketing statement, despite receiving multiple warnings and extensions from the appellate clerk. The appellant attempted to "cancel" the appeal by filing an unsigned document in the trial court, but never filed a proper motion for voluntary dismissal in the Court of Appeals. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 5, 32.1, and 42.3(c), concluding that the appellant's failure to comply with administrative requirements and clerk notices warranted involuntary dismissal. The court held that administrative compliance is mandatory and informal filings in a trial court cannot substitute for proper appellate procedure.
Litigation Takeaway
“Procedural precision is just as important as substantive advocacy; failing to manage ministerial tasks like filing fees and docketing statements can result in the forfeiture of a client's right to an appeal. Furthermore, if a party decides to abandon an appeal, they must file a formal, signed motion in the appellate court rather than relying on informal or improperly filed documents in the trial court.”
Cunningham v. Smith
COA02
In Cunningham v. Smith, an incarcerated litigant challenged the dismissal of his lawsuit for want of prosecution (DWOP) after he failed to appear at a scheduled dismissal hearing. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a, noting that while the litigant claimed he mailed a motion to retain, he failed to file a verified motion to reinstate after the case was dismissed. The court held that incarceration does not excuse a party from procedural requirements. Because the plaintiff bypassed the trial court and filed a notice of appeal instead of a motion to reinstate, he waived his due process complaints. The court affirmed the dismissal, finding no abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“Incarceration is not a "get out of jail free" card for legal deadlines. If your case is dismissed while you are incarcerated, you must file a verified motion to reinstate in the trial court to preserve your right to appeal; filing a notice of appeal alone is insufficient to save your claims.”
In the Interest of A.C., a Child
COA02
In this case, a mother attempted to appeal an order terminating her parental rights while the claims against the child's presumed father remained pending and unadjudicated. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the order under the finality standard established in Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., determining that because the trial court explicitly recessed the father's portion of the case, the litigation had not concluded as to all parties. Despite the trial court's inclusion of "Mother Hubbard" language and statutory warnings regarding accelerated appeals, the court held that the order remained interlocutory and unappealable without a severance, resulting in a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never rely on boilerplate 'finality' language or Mother Hubbard clauses to create an appealable order in multi-party litigation. If any party's rights—such as an alleged or presumed father—remain unadjudicated, you must affirmatively move for a severance to trigger the appellate clock for a terminated parent, or your appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”
S. T. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
After a child was injured by a mother's partner, the Department of Family and Protective Services initially sought to terminate the mother's parental rights. However, following the mother’s successful completion of most of her service plan, the Department recommended a monitored return of the child. When the mother later tested positive for marijuana and allowed an unauthorized visitor, the trial court terminated her rights. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals reversed the termination, analyzing the 'best interest' of the child through the Holley factors. The court held that because the Department had previously deemed the home safe for a return and the subsequent violations did not involve physical harm, the evidence was factually insufficient to support the permanent 'death penalty' of civil litigation: the termination of the parent-child bond.
Litigation Takeaway
“Progress in a service plan and Department concessions—like a recommended monitored return—create a powerful defense; if the State later pivots back to termination, they must prove that new, technical violations outweigh your demonstrated ability to provide a safe and stable home.”
Hawkins v. State
COA14
In Hawkins v. State, a defendant out on bond for a prior murder was charged with a second murder after GPS data from his court-ordered ankle monitor placed him at the scene. Hawkins sought to suppress the location data, claiming the search warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that individuals wearing court-ordered monitors as a condition of their release have no reasonable expectation of privacy in that data. The court also clarified that the State can challenge a defendant's standing to contest a search for the first time on appeal because standing is a threshold legal requirement.
Litigation Takeaway
“GPS tracking data from a court-ordered ankle monitor is a powerful and admissible tool in family law "crossover" cases. Because individuals under court-mandated monitoring have no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their movement data, that information is discoverable and generally exempt from Fourth Amendment-style privacy objections. This is particularly useful in custody or protective order litigation to prove violations of stay-away zones or unauthorized contact.”
McKeand v. Lansdown
COA14
In this procedural dispute, attorney David McKeand challenged a $10,000 sanctions order and a 2021 disqualification order stemming from ongoing litigation between Renee Sizemore and Daniel Lansdown. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the sanctions challenge under the mootness doctrine, finding that because the court had already granted mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate those sanctions, there was no longer a live controversy to resolve. Regarding the disqualification order, the court determined it lacked jurisdiction because the order was issued during a prior modification phase that ended in a final judgment in 2022. The court held that McKeand's failure to challenge the disqualification at that time—either through mandamus or a timely appeal of the 2022 judgment—precluded him from raising it years later during an enforcement proceeding. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Family law litigation is often divided into distinct phases—such as modification and enforcement—each ending in its own final judgment. To preserve your rights, you must challenge interlocutory orders (like the removal of an attorney) immediately or directly after the final judgment of that specific phase; you cannot wait until a subsequent proceeding years later to raise old grievances. Additionally, obtaining relief via a writ of mandamus will effectively end any parallel direct appeal on the same issue.”
Ellis v. State
COA14
Timothy Ray Ellis was convicted of felony murder following the death of his girlfriend’s intellectually disabled son, who was subjected to extreme isolation, malnutrition, and unauthorized physical restraint. On appeal, the court analyzed whether Ellis’s actions—including padlocking the refrigerator and performing makeshift surgery—constituted 'acts clearly dangerous to human life' during the commission of the felony of injury to a disabled individual. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the systematic neglect and physical dominion Ellis exercised were legally sufficient to support the murder charge and that technical errors in the jury instructions did not constitute egregious harm.
Litigation Takeaway
“'Coercive control'—evidenced by isolation, food restriction, and psychological dominance—is a recognized pattern of family violence that can be used to rebut custody presumptions and secure protective orders, even when physical assault is not the primary factor.”
Anderson v. Altom
COA02
After a dispute at a Little League game, a board member called the police on a parent, suggesting the parent 'may' become a threat. The parent sued for defamation, but the defendants moved to dismiss the case under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, ruling that reporting potential criminal activity to law enforcement is a matter of public concern protected by the TCPA. The court held that speculating about future behavior—using language such as 'may' or 'might'—constitutes a non-actionable opinion or 'allusion' rather than a verifiable false statement of fact, which is a necessary element of a defamation claim.
Litigation Takeaway
“Reporting 'concerning behavior' or 'potential threats' to the police is generally protected from defamation lawsuits under the TCPA. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must identify specific, verifiable false statements regarding past or present facts; mere speculation about future danger or 'allusions' to potential crimes are insufficient to support a defamation claim and can result in the plaintiff paying the defendant’s attorney’s fees.”
Morrison v. State
COA14
In Morrison v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant "possessed" a firearm found in a vehicle he occupied but did not own. Despite the presence of another person's identification and a lack of fingerprint evidence, the court applied the "affirmative links" doctrine—analyzing factors such as the weapon's proximity to the defendant, its visibility in plain view, the defendant's flight from officers, and his recorded jailhouse admissions. The court held that the cumulative force of these links was legally sufficient to prove the defendant exercised care, custody, and control over the contraband.
Litigation Takeaway
“Physical ownership is not required to prove possession; legal "control" can be established through proximity and behavior. Family law litigants can use the "affirmative links" doctrine to hold a parent accountable for drugs or weapons in their environment, even if they claim the items belong to a third party.”
Akiyode v. McGee
COA14
In Akiyode v. McGee, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a party could use Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.2 to "pause" (abate) a premature appeal while waiting for a jury trial on remaining claims to conclude. The appellant attempted to appeal an order that explicitly left counterclaims open for a future jury trial, arguing that the appellate court should abate the case until a final judgment could be entered. The Court rejected this argument, clarifying that TRAP 27.2 is a tool for ministerial corrections or minor clarifications of an order’s finality—not a jurisdictional "waiting room" for pending trials. Because substantive claims remained to be adjudicated, the Court held the order was interlocutory and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never file a notice of appeal on a partial or "interlocutory" order with the expectation that the appellate court will hold the case until your trial is finished. Rule 27.2 only allows for the correction of ministerial errors or technical finality issues; it cannot be used to keep a premature appeal alive while the trial court conducts substantive proceedings like a jury trial on remaining claims.”
In the Interest of E.J., a Child
COA02
In this case, a mother’s parental rights were terminated by a trial court based on specific conduct-based grounds and the child's best interest. Her appointed appellate attorney filed an Anders brief, stating that after a thorough review, there were no valid legal grounds to overturn the decision. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals conducted its own independent review of the record and the mother's personal responses, concluding that the evidence supported the termination. While the court affirmed the termination order, it denied the attorney's motion to withdraw, holding that appointed counsel in termination cases must continue representation through potential Texas Supreme Court proceedings unless specific 'good cause' is shown.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas parental termination cases, an appointed attorney's duty doesn't end just because an appeal is considered 'frivolous.' Under the 'P.M. Mandate,' counsel must generally remain on the case through the Texas Supreme Court stage, providing parents with continuous legal representation throughout the entire appeals process.”
MedCare EMS v. Flores
COA13
In MedCare EMS v. Flores, a plaintiff filed a medical negligence claim after being injured when an emergency stretcher tipped over. The plaintiff timely served an expert report by a paramedic; however, Texas law requires a physician to provide opinions on medical causation. The defendant sought a mandatory dismissal, arguing the report was a legal nullity. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) under the "Scoresby" standard, which favors a lenient interpretation of expert reports. The court held that if a report is served timely and addresses the required elements—even if the expert lacks the specific statutory qualifications—it is considered a 'deficient report' rather than 'no report.' Consequently, the trial court has the discretion to grant a 30-day extension to cure the deficiency, preventing a 'gotcha' dismissal of potentially meritorious claims.
Litigation Takeaway
“A technical error in an expert's qualifications is not a terminal failure; as long as your initial report addresses standard of care, breach, and causation in good faith, you can secure a 30-day extension to fix qualification issues, such as replacing a paramedic's causation opinion with one from a licensed physician.”
Sanchez v. Gonzales
COA13
In Sanchez v. Gonzales, the appellant attempted to proceed with an appeal without paying filing fees by claiming indigency. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals abated the case multiple times to ensure the trial court complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f), which requires a specific written order to deny a claim of indigency. After the trial court conducted a hearing and issued a compliant order finding that the appellant was not indigent, the appellant still failed to remit the required fees. The appellate court analyzed the interplay between indigency protections and mandatory filing requirements, ultimately holding that the appeal must be dismissed for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to comply with the court's fee notices once his indigency claim was formally denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“To stop a stalled or tactical appeal, family law litigants should aggressively challenge false claims of indigency by requesting a Rule 145(f) hearing; once a trial court issues a formal written order finding the opponent can afford costs, their failure to pay filing fees provides a direct path to dismissing the appeal.”
Carlos v. State
COA07
After Jayden Louis Carlos violated the terms of his community supervision for family violence offenses, his conditions were administratively modified to include a stay at an Intermediate Sanction Facility. Later, the State filed a formal motion to revoke his supervision based on the same conduct. Carlos argued that this violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and Due Process, claiming he was being punished twice for the same act. The Seventh Court of Appeals held that Double Jeopardy does not apply to revocation proceedings because they are meant to determine compliance with court orders rather than punish criminal conduct. Furthermore, because the initial modification was administrative and did not involve a formal hearing, the trial court maintained the authority to later revoke his supervision for the original violation.
Litigation Takeaway
“Administrative 'slaps on the wrist' by a probation department do not protect an abuser from future incarceration for the same conduct. In family law cases involving domestic violence, an administrative modification to an offender's probation is not a final settlement, and the threat of full revocation remains a significant factor for custody and safety considerations.”
Valdez v. State
COA14
In Valdez v. State, a defendant challenged his conviction by arguing the trial court should not have included jury instructions on 'party' and 'conspirator' liability when the State's primary theory was that he acted alone as the principal. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the 'some evidence' threshold for jury instructions, noting that a jury, as the sole judge of witness credibility, is free to disbelieve portions of testimony—especially from biased 'insider' witnesses like a mother or lover. The court held that if a rational jury could find the defendant assisted in the offense even while doubting they were the primary actor, the court does not err by submitting multiple theories of liability.
Litigation Takeaway
“When litigating fraud on the community or the waste of assets, ensure your jury charge includes instructions on conspiracy and vicarious liability. By leveraging the legal standards for witness bias, you can prevent a spouse’s 'insider' witnesses from narrowing your legal theories, allowing the jury to find liability for a joint enterprise even if they disbelieve the witness's specific account of who performed the act.”
Pentcheva v. Mundt
COA03
In this case, a biological mother sought to challenge a court order terminating her parental rights through a "bill of review." The trial court denied her request, treating the original termination order as a final, unchangeable judgment. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order was truly final given that it arose from a combined "Petition for Termination and Adoption" but failed to address the adoption claim or the co-petitioner (the stepmother). Applying established legal standards for finality, the court determined that because the adoption remained pending and the order did not dispose of all parties and claims, the termination order was merely "interlocutory" (non-final). The court held that the trial court's denial of the mother's challenge was premature and reversed the ruling, remanding the case for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a legal action combines both termination of parental rights and adoption, the case is not legally final until both claims are officially resolved or dismissed by the court. If the adoption piece is left "hanging," the termination order remains open to legal challenges indefinitely, as the standard appellate deadlines never begin to run.”
In the Interest of B.H.
COA04
In this interstate custody dispute, a Father filed a motion to modify the parent-child relationship in a Texas court that had previously issued orders regarding the child. Despite the Father's filing, the trial court initiated a conference with a Louisiana court and determined—on its own motion—that Texas was an 'inconvenient forum' because the child had lived in Louisiana for two years. The Father appealed, arguing the court lacked the authority to move the case without a formal request from a party or a full evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Texas law explicitly allows judges to relinquish jurisdiction 'sua sponte' (on their own) and that the law only requires parties be given an opportunity to submit information rather than requiring a formal hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never assume that jurisdiction is safe just because the other parent hasn't challenged it. In interstate cases, Texas judges act as 'gatekeepers' and can move your case to another state on their own initiative if the child has a stronger connection elsewhere. If your child lives out of state, you must be prepared to immediately provide evidence regarding their school, healthcare, and support network to defend your choice of forum.”
In re Luke B. Berry, M.D.
COA04
In this case, a doctor sought to block discovery of records from business entities he controlled, arguing that because the entities were not parties to the lawsuit, he should not have to produce their records. He also challenged the trial court's authority to reverse its own previous rulings that had initially shielded this information. The Fourth Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief, holding that trial courts maintain 'absolute control' over interlocutory discovery orders and may revisit or overrule them at any time before final judgment. Crucially, the court clarified that under Texas discovery rules, an individual party can be compelled to produce records held by non-party entities if that individual has 'possession, custody, or control' over the documents.
Litigation Takeaway
“Business owners cannot hide behind an 'entity shield' to avoid discovery in divorce or property litigation; if a party has the legal right to access an entity's records, they can be compelled to produce them personally. Furthermore, practitioners should remain aware that discovery 'wins' are interlocutory and subject to being revisited or reversed by the trial court as the case develops.”
Pimentel v. Maverick Maintenance & Supply, LLC
COA04
In Pimentel v. Maverick Maintenance & Supply, LLC, the plaintiff filed suit in Harris County based on the defendant's principal office location. The defendants successfully moved to transfer the case to Karnes County by arguing that the claims were legally barred by an affirmative defense, effectively 'mini-trialing' the case at the venue stage. The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the transfer, holding that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 15.064(a) expressly prohibits courts from considering the ultimate merits of a claim when determining venue. The court concluded that if venue facts are established, a trial court must retain the case regardless of the claim's perceived weakness.
Litigation Takeaway
“Venue is fixed by facts—like where a business is located—not by whether your claims are likely to win. You can stop an opponent from transferring your case by showing that venue rules are satisfied, even if they argue your underlying lawsuit is meritless or barred by legal defenses.”
K. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In K. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Third Court of Appeals addressed whether a permanent injunction banning all contact between a mother and her child could be dismissed as a "frivolous" appeal. The mother's attorney filed an Anders brief, suggesting there were no valid legal arguments to challenge the trial court's order. However, the appellate court disagreed, citing recent Texas Supreme Court precedent that treats indefinite no-contact orders with the same constitutional weight as the termination of parental rights. The court held that such restrictive orders require "clear and convincing" evidence and a specific finding that a total ban is the least restrictive means to protect the child. Consequently, the court rejected the Anders brief and ordered the appointment of new counsel to argue the merits of the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“An indefinite or long-term "no-contact" order is effectively the "death penalty" of parental rights; it requires the highest evidentiary standard—clear and convincing evidence—and must be the least restrictive option available to the court.”
In the Interest of A.L.V., A.D.V., and A.C.V., Children
COA05
After a trial court issued temporary orders in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR), the appellant attempted to challenge those orders through an interlocutory appeal. The Fifth Court of Appeals identified a jurisdictional defect, noting that temporary orders are generally not final judgments and are not eligible for interlocutory appeal under Texas law. After the appellant failed to respond to a court order requiring a brief on the jurisdictional issue, the court applied Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b) and (c). The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Temporary orders in family law cases are generally not appealable; if a trial court abuses its discretion in a temporary order, the correct legal remedy is a petition for writ of mandamus, not a standard appeal. Additionally, failing to respond to an appellate court's jurisdictional inquiry is a fatal procedural error that will result in the immediate dismissal of your case.”
In the Interest of C.R., a Child
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's order terminating a mother's parental rights to her two-year-old child, who suffered from end-stage liver failure. The conflict centered on the mother's persistent failure to maintain a sterile environment and adhere to clinical protocols necessary for the child's survival before and after a life-saving transplant. The court analyzed the evidence under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), determining that the mother’s refusal to remediate horrific living conditions—including mold, maggots, and animal waste—despite receiving specialized education and free medical housing, constituted a conscious course of conduct that endangered the child. The court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under both environmental and conduct-based grounds and that termination was in the child's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“In cases involving medically fragile children, 'endangerment' is a relative standard; a parent's failure to maintain sterile conditions or follow clinical hygiene protocols can elevate ordinary housekeeping issues to a termination-level 'conscious course of conduct.'”
In Re Richard Haddad
COA04
After a father was awarded the right to designate his child’s primary residence and moved to Virginia, the mother filed for a modification within months of the final order. She alleged communication issues and presented photos of bruises (which were later linked to the child's martial arts activities). The trial court granted temporary orders moving the child back to Texas. On appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals found that the mother's affidavit failed to meet the strict requirements of Texas Family Code Section 156.102, which requires a showing of physical endangerment or significant emotional impairment for modifications sought within one year of a final order. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief, vacating the trial court's orders.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas, the law prioritizes custodial stability during the first year after a final order; to change a child's primary residence during this 'cooling-off period,' a parent must provide specific, factual evidence of endangerment or significant emotional harm, rather than just general complaints about co-parenting friction.”
Moore v. Moore
COA04
In Moore v. Moore, a husband challenged a final divorce decree that divided the marital estate and awarded his ex-wife spousal maintenance. However, the husband affirmatively chose not to file a reporter's record (the transcript of the trial), arguing that his issues were purely legal. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that because the trial court's decisions regarding property division and maintenance are based on evidentiary facts, it was impossible to review for errors without a record. Applying the 'Englander' doctrine, the court presumed that the evidence presented at trial supported the judgment and affirmed the trial court's ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
“An appeal is almost certainly doomed if you fail to provide the appellate court with a transcript of the trial; without a reporter's record, Texas courts will legally presume that the trial judge's decision was supported by the evidence.”
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, a defendant sought to suppress drug evidence discovered in his bag following a warrantless arrest, arguing that the police lacked probable cause because they could not establish an 'affirmative link' between him and drug paraphernalia found nearby on the ground. The San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed the procedural role of the 'affirmative link' doctrine, determining it is a standard used to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence for a conviction at trial, rather than a basis for pretrial suppression. The court held that the presence of drug paraphernalia in plain view and within arm’s reach provides sufficient probable cause for a warrantless arrest under the totality of the circumstances, making the subsequent search of the defendant's personal effects a valid search incident to arrest.
Litigation Takeaway
“The 'affirmative link' doctrine is a trial defense regarding the sufficiency of evidence, not a pretrial tool to suppress contraband; therefore, evidence of drugs found in proximity to a party remains admissible and relevant in family law proceedings regardless of whether the party 'owned' the substances.”
Taylor-White v. State
COA04
In Taylor-White v. State, the Fourth Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant could be convicted of murder for giving verbal commands to a shooter without personally pulling the trigger. The defendant argued his directives to 'light him up' and 'empty a clip' were mere threats intended to scare the victims rather than a specific intent to kill. The court analyzed the 'law of parties' under the Texas Penal Code, which holds individuals responsible for the conduct of others if they direct or encourage the offense. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances—including the defendant's leadership role during the confrontation and his flight with the shooter—the court held that verbal commands are legally sufficient evidence of intent, affirming the murder conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“'Violence by proxy' is legally actionable; if a party directs or encourages a third party (such as a relative or new partner) to harass or assault an ex-spouse, they can be held legally responsible for those acts in family court just as if they committed the violence themselves.”
Groesbeck v. Fry Construction Company, Inc.
COA05
In Groesbeck v. Fry Construction Company, Inc., a construction firm sued both an LLC and its individual manager for unpaid contract debts, successfully obtaining a personal judgment against the manager for over $645,000. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed this decision, focusing on Texas Business Organizations Code § 101.114, which shields LLC members and managers from the entity's liabilities. The court found that the plaintiff’s own pleadings—which identified the business as an LLC and the defendant as its manager—constituted binding "judicial admissions." Because the plaintiff admitted the defendant was acting in a representative capacity and failed to plead a "veil-piercing" theory like alter ego or fraud, the court held the manager could not be held personally liable for the company’s debts.
Litigation Takeaway
“Your opponent’s pleadings can be their own undoing; if they identify your client as a manager of an LLC but fail to allege "veil-piercing" facts, they have effectively admitted that your client is shielded from personal liability. This "entity shield" is a powerful tool in divorce litigation to prevent business creditors—or an opposing spouse—from reaching a client’s separate property or the community estate to satisfy corporate debts.”
Rolling Oaks Mall LLC v. Bexar Appraisal District
COA04
A property owner challenged a tax appraisal in state court before filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and requesting a federal valuation under 11 U.S.C. § 505. The bankruptcy court dismissed the federal claim 'with prejudice' to abstain in favor of the state court proceeding, leading the taxing authority to argue that res judicata barred the state court suit. The Court of Appeals analyzed the nature of discretionary abstention, concluding that because the federal court declined to exercise jurisdiction for administrative reasons rather than deciding the property's value, there was no final adjudication on the merits. The court held that the federal dismissal did not trigger res judicata or collateral estoppel, allowing the state court valuation to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
“A bankruptcy court's 'dismissal with prejudice' based on discretionary abstention is a jurisdictional hand-off, not a merits-based win; family law practitioners can use this to defeat a spouse's attempt to use federal bankruptcy filings to block state court property valuations.”
Navarro v. State
COA04
In Navarro v. State, Alan Navarro was convicted of sexual and felony assault. During his trial, Navarro attempted to use a 'reformed character' defense, calling his current girlfriend to testify that he was a religious, non-violent man who had changed over the last decade. In response, the State called Navarro’s ex-wife, who testified to a nine-year history of domestic violence. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that by affirmatively presenting evidence of his good character, Navarro 'opened the door' under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(a), allowing the State to introduce prior acts of violence to impeach his claims. The court also clarified that a running objection to evidence regarding one person does not automatically preserve errors for testimony regarding a different person.
Litigation Takeaway
“Claiming to be a 'changed' or 'non-violent' person in a custody or protective order hearing can backfire. Once you make your character an issue, the opposing side is legally allowed to bring in ex-spouses or former partners to testify about your past conduct, effectively bypassing usual protections against 'stale' or 'extraneous' evidence.”
Navarro v. State
COA04
In Navarro v. State, Alan Angelo Navarro appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from his ex-wife regarding his history of domestic violence. While Navarro had a 'running objection' to evidence regarding his relationship with the current complainant, the court analyzed the shift in the trial's legal context. Because Navarro presented witnesses to testify that he was a 'changed' and 'non-violent' man, he 'opened the door' to character rebuttal. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that the original running objection did not preserve the error for this new category of character evidence involving a third party, and therefore affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a party attempts to portray themselves as a 'changed person' or 'non-violent' in court, they effectively waive protections against their past history being introduced. Furthermore, litigators must remember that a 'running objection' to evidence about the current relationship will not protect the record if the other side introduces evidence about a former spouse; a new, specific objection is required to preserve the issue for appeal.”
May v. State
COA01
In May v. State, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault after accelerating his vehicle while police officers were partially inside the car attempting an arrest, causing them to be thrown to the ground. The defendant argued he lacked the requisite intent because his primary goal was to flee, not to threaten the officers. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the 'knowing' mental state under the Texas Penal Code, characterizing assault by threat as a 'conduct-oriented' offense. The court held that because the defendant chose to maneuver the vehicle while aware of the officers' immediate physical proximity to the car’s path, a rational juror could infer he acted with the necessary intent, regardless of his ultimate desire to escape.
Litigation Takeaway
“The 'I was just trying to leave' defense is insufficient to defeat a claim of assault or family violence if the actor is aware that their departure puts another person in the 'danger zone' of a vehicle. In family law disputes, evidence that a party accelerated or maneuvered a car while a spouse or child was near the doors or path of travel establishes the 'knowing' mental state required for a Family Violence Protective Order, even if the party’s stated goal was merely to de-escalate by driving away.”
Obadagbonyi v. State
COA14
In Obadagbonyi v. State, a defendant appealed his DWI conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his 'refusal' to provide a specimen when the officer failed to provide the mandatory statutory warnings. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals performed a harmless error analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), assuming the trial court erred but concluding that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. The court held that because the record contained 'overwhelming' evidence of intoxication—including a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.206 and clear physical impairment—the procedural misstep was immaterial to the final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Technical procedural errors or exclusionary rules in a criminal DWI case often provide a false sense of security in parallel family law litigation; if substantive evidence like a high BAC exists, the court will likely treat procedural mistakes as 'harmless' when determining the best interest of the child.”
In re Tereza Kacerova
COA03
In this case, a mother filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the return of her child after the father refused to allow her scheduled access. The father argued that the mother had violated "automatic suspension" clauses in their temporary order by discussing the ongoing litigation with the child and failing to speak English during supervised visits. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code § 157.372(a), which requires a child's return only if the person seeking it is currently entitled to possession. The court held that because there was evidence the mother violated the specific conduct requirements that triggered an automatic suspension of her rights, she was no longer "entitled to possession." Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the return of the child.
Litigation Takeaway
“Be aware that "self-executing" or "automatic suspension" clauses in a court order are powerful and enforceable. If your right to see your child is conditioned on specific behaviors—such as following language requirements or avoiding disparaging remarks—violating those terms can legally extinguish your right to possession before you even get to court, making it impossible to use emergency legal remedies like a writ of habeas corpus.”
In the Matter of B.S., a Child
COA14
In *In the Matter of B.S.*, a juvenile appellant challenged a trial court order transferring them from the juvenile system to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant filed an unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss the case. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the motion under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a), which allows for the voluntary dismissal of an appeal upon the appellant's request, provided no other party seeks affirmative relief. The court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, leaving the trial court's original transfer order in effect without a review of the substantive merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a) provides a strategic 'off-ramp' for litigants to voluntarily dismiss an appeal, which is a critical tool for finalizing settlements or avoiding unfavorable appellate precedents.”
Tiney v. Tiney
COA14
In Tiney v. Tiney, a wife obtained a default divorce after her husband failed to respond to the petition. The trial court divided the marital estate, including a home and retirement accounts, despite the wife providing virtually no evidence regarding the value of these assets during the hearing. The husband appealed, challenging both the validity of the service of process and the evidentiary basis for the property division. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the service of process, ruling that Texas law does not require a return of service to include a physical description of the defendant. However, the court reversed the property division, holding that under Texas Family Code § 6.701, a petitioner in a divorce must still prove their case with substantive evidence even if the other party defaults. Because the record lacked any information on asset values, the trial court's division was an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“A default judgment in a Texas divorce does not mean an automatic win; you must still 'prove up' the value and nature of all community assets with specific evidence to ensure the property division survives an appeal.”
Tatum v. Noble
COA14
In Tatum v. Noble, a respondent failed to appear for a protective order hearing in the 280th District Court. Following the presiding judge's sua sponte recusal, the case was immediately transferred to the 245th District Court within the same county, where the judge issued a default protective order. The respondent challenged the order, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction due to missing administrative forms and that her due process rights were violated because she was not served with new notice for the second courtroom. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the order, holding that administrative "Registry" forms are not jurisdictional requirements. Furthermore, under Texas 'exchange of benches' statutes, a respondent who has already defaulted by failing to appear at the originally noticed time and place is not entitled to new formal notice when the matter is moved to another district court in the same county.
Litigation Takeaway
“Failing to show up for a scheduled hearing is a major risk; a judge recusing themselves or a case being moved to a different courtroom in the same building does not require the other party to re-serve you with notice before a default order is signed.”
Mergel v. Bigby
COA14
In Mergel v. Bigby, a former city official attempted to appeal a judgment that found she had committed unauthorized (ultra vires) acts. Although she was sued only in her official capacity, she filed the appeal in her individual capacity after leaving her position. The Court of Appeals analyzed the 'legal persona' doctrine, which dictates that a person in their official capacity is a distinct legal entity from that same person as an individual. The court held that because she was never a party to the lawsuit in her individual capacity and no longer held the office to appeal in an official capacity, she was a 'legal stranger' to the judgment and lacked standing to appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“An official sued only in their official capacity cannot personally appeal a judgment after leaving office; to protect their individual interests or reputation, they must formally intervene in their individual capacity while the trial court still has jurisdiction.”
In re BD Trucking and Basil Odigie
COA14
In a negligence lawsuit arising from a workplace accident, the defendants moved to designate the plaintiff's employer as a Responsible Third Party (RTP). The plaintiff objected, arguing that the employer's worker's compensation immunity barred the designation and that the defendants failed to plead sufficient facts. The trial court denied the motion. On mandamus review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 33 and the 'fair notice' pleading standard. The court held that because the motion was timely filed (more than 60 days before trial) and provided sufficient notice of the allegations, the trial court had a ministerial duty to grant it. The court further clarified that statutory immunity does not prevent a party from being included in a proportionate responsibility jury charge.
Litigation Takeaway
“In litigation involving interspousal torts or fraud on the community, always look to designate responsible third parties (like paramours or financial advisors) to dilute your client's percentage of fault. Trial courts have almost no discretion to deny these motions if they are filed 60 days before trial and meet the minimal 'fair notice' pleading standard, even if the third party has a statutory immunity against being sued directly.”
In re A.T.
COA03
In this Hays County family law proceeding, the relator filed a second amended petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to overturn an interlocutory trial court ruling. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52 and the established standards for extraordinary relief, which require showing both a clear abuse of discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court held that the relator failed to meet this heavy burden despite multiple opportunities to amend the pleadings, resulting in the denial of the petition and the dismissal of all ancillary motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is an extraordinary "nuclear option" that requires more than just showing a trial court made an error; you must prove the judge had no legal choice but to rule in your favor and that a standard appeal cannot fix the harm. Success in the court of appeals depends on a meticulous record and a precise legal argument that meets a very high evidentiary threshold.”
Turner Specialty Services, L.L.C. v. Horn
COA01
After an employee's work-related death, his widow filed a wrongful death suit individually and on behalf of their minor children. The employer moved to compel arbitration based on a Dispute Resolution Agreement signed by the decedent at the time of hire. The plaintiffs argued that the minor children were not bound by the contract and that the employer waived its right to arbitrate by litigating personal jurisdiction for three years. The Court of Appeals held that because wrongful death claims are entirely derivative of the decedent's rights, the beneficiaries—including minor children—are bound by the decedent's agreement to arbitrate. Furthermore, the court found no waiver of arbitration, reasoning that challenging a court's jurisdiction through special appearances and appeals does not constitute a substantial invocation of the judicial process on the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“Non-signatory minor children are bound by a parent's arbitration agreement in derivative claims such as wrongful death. Additionally, a defendant can vigorously litigate jurisdictional challenges for years without waiving the right to arbitrate, provided they do not seek a judicial resolution on the merits of the case.”
Martinez v. State
COA01
In Martinez v. State, a defendant appealed his 50-year sentence, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to appoint a Spanish-language interpreter despite a specific request for a "translation" during his adjudication hearing. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the "totality of the record," observing that the defendant had previously demonstrated functional English proficiency during his initial plea hearing, where he engaged in English colloquies and confirmed he could read and write the language "a little bit." Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held that a trial court is not required to provide the "best" interpretive services, but rather "constitutionally adequate" ones; because the record showed the defendant understood English "well enough" to participate in the proceedings and assist his counsel, no due process violation occurred.
Litigation Takeaway
“To defeat a tactical mid-trial request for an interpreter—or to preserve the right to one—practitioners must document a party's English proficiency early in the case through discovery of English-language texts, emails, and prior hearing transcripts, as Texas courts only require a litigant to understand English "well enough" to satisfy due process.”
Palmer Enterprises, Inc. v. Kaplan Higher Education, LLC
COA13
In this case, a landlord sought to recover unpaid rent from a commercial guarantor following a lease extension. The guarantor argued they were not liable because they had not signed the second lease amendment, pointing to a clause in the original lease stating that all amendments must be signed by 'all parties' to be valid. The court analyzed the documents as a single integrated contract and applied the rule of 'strictissimi juris,' which requires a guarantor's obligations to be strictly construed. The court held that because the guarantor was a party to the agreement and did not sign the extension, the amendment was void as to them, and the 'continuing' nature of the guaranty did not override the lease's specific procedural requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
“A 'continuing guaranty' may not be enough to bind an ex-spouse to future business debts if the underlying contract requires all parties to sign modifications. If your client is a guarantor on an ex-spouse's business lease, the 'all parties' signature requirement in the original lease can serve as a powerful shield to avoid liability for post-divorce extensions they did not personally sign.”
Davidson v. State
COA01
Annual Davidson, III appealed his murder conviction, arguing that the State’s closing remarks regarding his failure to claim self-defense to third parties constituted an unconstitutional comment on his right to remain silent. The First Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the State's argument was a permissible summary of the evidence and a rebuttal of the defense's theory. The court reasoned that the State was commenting on Davidson's voluntary pre-trial statements and omissions to medical personnel and witnesses, rather than his decision not to testify at the trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party's failure to mention a specific justification (like self-defense or child protection) to first responders or medical professionals at the time of an incident can be used to impeach a fabricated or coached narrative that only emerges later during litigation.”
Gallardo v. State
COA07
In Gallardo v. State, the Seventh Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant could be convicted of two counts of aggravated assault for a single, continuous encounter with one victim. The defendant drove a vehicle with the victim on the hood across several hundred yards before crashing into a house. The court analyzed the 'unit of prosecution' for assaultive offenses, determining that multiple punishments are permissible if the evidence shows discrete criminal acts separated by time or location. The court held that because the first assault ended before the second began—marked by the distance traveled and the change in residential locations—the convictions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Litigation Takeaway
“Domestic violence incidents that move from room to room or occur in stages should be pleaded as multiple discrete acts of family violence rather than a single event. By establishing that one act ended before another began (due to a change in location, weapon, or a brief pause), practitioners can 'stack' findings of violence to overcome conservatorship presumptions under Texas Family Code § 153.004 and argue for a disproportionate share of the community estate based on cruelty.”
In re Allied Trust Insurance Company
COA01
In an insurance dispute with significant implications for family law discovery, the First Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief after a trial court refused to abate a lawsuit for alleged failure to satisfy conditions precedent. While the insurer argued that an examination under oath (EUO) was a mandatory prerequisite to litigation, the respondent claimed her severe PTSD necessitated a remote (Zoom) format, which the insurer refused. The court analyzed whether a 'total failure' to comply had occurred and held that because there were unresolved factual disputes regarding the reasonableness of the insurer's demands and the format of the performance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the abatement.
Litigation Takeaway
“To successfully abate a case for non-compliance, you must first secure a court order defining the 'parameters of performance'; mere disagreement over the format of discovery (such as in-person vs. Zoom for a traumatized party) creates a factual dispute that prevents abatement from becoming mandatory.”
Rolling Dough, Ltd. d/b/a Panera Bread v. Anyadike
COA14
A customer sued Panera Bread for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) after a manager accused her of theft and summoned the police during a dispute over a pre-paid order. Panera moved to dismiss the claim under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA), arguing the report was a matter of public concern. The Court of Appeals analyzed whether reporting criminal activity falls under the TCPA and whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for IIED. The court held that reporting a crime is an exercise of free speech on a matter of public concern and that the plaintiff failed to provide clear and specific evidence of "extreme and outrageous" conduct, as false accusations of theft and summoning police do not meet the high legal threshold for IIED. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded for the assessment of attorney's fees.
Litigation Takeaway
“Reporting suspected criminal activity to law enforcement is a protected matter of public concern under the TCPA; consequently, the TCPA serves as a powerful defensive shield to quickly dismiss retaliatory IIED claims and recover attorney’s fees in high-conflict disputes where the police are called.”
Washington v. Young and Office of the Attorney General of Texas
COA08
After filing an appeal from a Travis County district court, the appellant failed to pay the required filing fee and neglected to make financial arrangements for the preparation of the clerk's record. The Eighth Court of Appeals issued multiple warnings and "show cause" notices, providing the appellant opportunities to remit payment or prove indigency. The Court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 5, 37.3(b), and 42.3, which authorize dismissal when an appellant fails to comply with administrative requirements or court notices. Because the appellant failed to respond to these warnings, the Court held that the appeal must be dismissed for want of prosecution without reaching the underlying merits of the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family law appeals, procedural discipline is just as important as the facts of your case; failing to pay administrative fees or secure the trial court record will result in a swift dismissal regardless of the merits of your custody or property claims.”
Dixson v. Marmolejo
COA08
Michael Dixson appealed a judgment from the 345th District Court of Travis County. Following a transfer to the Eighth Court of Appeals, the appellant failed to pay the required filing fee and failed to arrange for the preparation of the clerk's record. Despite the court providing multiple notices and explicit warnings that the appeal was in jeopardy, the appellant did not respond or rectify the deficiencies. The court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 5, 37.3(b), and 42.3, which authorize dismissal for failure to comply with procedural requirements or court orders. The court held that the appeal must be dismissed for want of prosecution, as the appellant failed to satisfy the mandatory administrative hurdles necessary to maintain the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate procedural requirements, such as paying filing fees and arranging for the clerk's record, are mandatory; failure to strictly adhere to these administrative deadlines will result in a summary dismissal of the appeal, forfeiting the client's right to a substantive review of the trial court's judgment.”
Brown v. State
COA03
In Brown v. State, the Third Court of Appeals addressed a situation where an appellant's counsel failed to file a brief despite receiving multiple extensions and a final warning. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.8(b), which protects appellants in criminal and quasi-criminal matters from losing their appeal due to attorney negligence. Because appellate courts cannot make factual findings regarding attorney-client communications, the court held that the appeal must be abated and remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the appellant still intends to prosecute the appeal or if counsel has abandoned the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“In parental termination or enforcement cases, do not expect an immediate 'default win' if the opposing party fails to file their brief; due process requirements will likely trigger a remand hearing that delays finality but offers a strategic chance to force a dilatory opponent to commit to the appeal or face dismissal.”
In re Jacob C. Luce and Lauren L. Gifford
COA05
Relators Jacob C. Luce and Lauren L. Gifford sought mandamus relief to compel a trial court to rule on a pending motion for default judgment. The Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas) did not address the merits of the case, focusing instead on a procedural defect in the petition's certification. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k), the court analyzed whether the Relators' certification precisely matched the mandated language. Reaffirming its precedent of 'exceptionally strict' compliance, the court held that any deviation from the verbatim text of the rule is a fatal error. Because the Relators' certification failed to use the exact phraseology required by the 2026 rules, the court denied the petition without reaching the underlying legal issues.
Litigation Takeaway
“In the Dallas Court of Appeals, there is no 'substantial compliance' for mandamus certifications; attorneys must use a strict 'copy-paste' approach to the verbatim language in TRAP 52.3(k). Failing to update templates to the 2026 rule changes can result in an immediate procedural denial, which is especially dangerous in emergency family law matters where stays or custody are at stake.”
In re Johnny Partain
COA13
Johnny Partain filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Thirteenth Court of Appeals seeking to challenge a Justice of the Peace's order regarding court costs in an eviction case. The Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Government Code § 22.221, which explicitly lists the judicial officers against whom an appellate court may issue a writ of mandamus (such as district and county judges) but notably excludes Justices of the Peace. The court held that because Justice Courts are not included in its general mandamus authority and because the relator failed to show that the writ was necessary to protect the court's jurisdiction over a pending appeal, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition. The case was dismissed, affirming that supervisory power over Justice Courts resides with District Courts.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never file a petition for writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals to challenge a Justice of the Peace's order. Because Justice Courts are not among the judicial officers listed in Texas Government Code § 22.221(b), the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to supervise them unless a writ is necessary to protect an existing appeal. Instead, you must seek mandamus relief in a District Court, which holds constitutional supervisory authority over inferior courts.”
In re Richard Adame
COA05
In this mandamus proceeding, Relator Richard Adame sought to vacate a trial court order compelling the parties to arbitration. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition without reaching the merits of the arbitration dispute because the Relator failed to provide a properly authenticated record. The court analyzed Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7, which require a relator to provide sworn or certified copies of every document material to the claim. Following the precedent in Walker v. Packer, the court held that because the Relator submitted unauthenticated documents, he failed to meet the threshold burden of providing a sufficient record to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“Procedural compliance is a threshold barrier in mandamus proceedings; you must ensure every document in your appellate record is strictly authenticated via certification or affidavit, as even a valid legal argument will be summarily denied if the record fails to meet the technical requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.”
In re Michael Anthony Mayes
COA13
In In re Michael Anthony Mayes, a relator sought mandamus relief regarding jail time credit and trial court judgments but failed to provide any supporting record, transcripts, or substantive legal authority. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7, which require a relator to provide a sworn or certified record of all documents material to the claim. Because the relator failed to provide any documentation from the trial court proceedings or clear legal arguments, the court held that the relator failed to meet his burden of proof and denied the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy that requires strict adherence to procedural rules; a petition filed without a properly authenticated record or supporting legal citations is 'dead on arrival' and will be summarily denied before the court even considers the merits of the case.”
Vodicka v. Tobolowsky
COA05
In Vodicka v. Tobolowsky, a judgment creditor sought to satisfy a multi-million dollar judgment by garnishing the debtors' airline miles. The Dallas Court of Appeals addressed whether service was effective under Rule 21a, whether Texas retained jurisdiction after the judgment was domesticated in Florida, and whether the trial court was required to value the miles. The court analyzed Rule 21a, concluding that service is legally complete upon deposit in the mail, and affirmed that Texas courts retain jurisdiction to enforce their judgments through ancillary proceedings. However, the court held that while airline miles are garnishable assets, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to assign them a specific monetary value. The case was remanded to determine the market value of the miles to ensure proper credit against the judgment balance.
Litigation Takeaway
“When enforcing a judgment or dividing property involving intangible assets like airline miles or reward points, you must provide the court with a specific monetary valuation (a 'valuation bridge') to ensure the judgment is legally complete and enforceable.”
In re Elizabeth Cavazos
COA05
Relator Elizabeth Cavazos sought a writ of mandamus and an emergency stay after a Dallas trial court struck her trial exhibits and related testimony on the eve of trial. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under the newly amended Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k), which updated certification requirements in December 2025, and the established 'Prudential' standard for extraordinary relief. The court denied the petition, holding that the Relator's failure to include the mandatory certification language was a fatal procedural defect and, substantively, that the Relator failed to demonstrate that the evidentiary ruling lacked an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“In mandamus practice, technical compliance is just as critical as substantive merit; using outdated templates that fail to incorporate the December 2025 TRAP 52.3(k) certification language will result in summary denial, even in emergency circumstances. Furthermore, remember that striking evidence is rarely a 'mandamus-able' event unless it effectively terminates a party's ability to present their case entirely.”
In re Corey Martinez
COA02
In this original proceeding, Relator Corey Martinez sought a writ of mandamus from the 233rd District Court of Tarrant County. The Second Court of Appeals initially granted a stay of the trial court proceedings but subsequently determined that the underlying controversy had become moot. Applying the principle that Texas appellate courts lack jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions or decide cases that do not present a live controversy, the court analyzed the status of the litigation and found that the requested relief could no longer have a practical legal effect. Consequently, the court held that the petition must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the previously issued stay must be vacated.
Litigation Takeaway
“Beware the 'mootness trap' in family law mandamus practice. Even if you secure a stay from the appellate court, any subsequent trial court order or voluntary compliance that resolves the underlying dispute will immediately strip the appellate court of jurisdiction. Practitioners must move quickly and vigilantly monitor the trial court record to ensure their appellate remedy remains viable.”
In re Michael Anthony Mayes
COA13
Michael Anthony Mayes filed a pro se pleading seeking jail time credit and other relief, which the Thirteenth Court of Appeals construed as a petition for writ of mandamus. The relator failed to provide any supporting documentation, legal authority, or citations to a record. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7, the court emphasized that the relator bears the absolute burden of providing a record sufficient to establish a right to relief. Because the petition lacked the necessary certified documents and transcripts, the court held it could not reach the merits of the case and denied the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“A mandamus petition is "dead on arrival" without a meticulously prepared record; even an egregious trial court error will not be reviewed if the relator fails to include the certified orders, material exhibits, and authenticated transcripts required by the appellate rules.”
Humphrey v. State
COA05
In Humphrey v. State, the Fifth Court of Appeals addressed whether a jury's rejection of a self-defense claim was legally sufficient following a father's physical assault on a man he perceived as a threat to his daughter. The defendant argued his use of force was justified 'vigilante parenting.' The court analyzed the evidence under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, weighing conflicting testimony from the defendant's father against evidence of an ambush and third-party testimony regarding the defendant's retaliatory motives. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury is the sole arbiter of witness credibility and that a parent's subjective belief in 'protecting' a child does not override the legal requirement that force be immediately necessary and proportional.
Litigation Takeaway
“A criminal conviction resulting from 'vigilante parenting' can act as a 'silver bullet' in custody litigation, triggering presumptions against joint managing conservatorship and providing the evidence needed to restrict a parent's access under the Texas Family Code.”
Johnson v. State
COA05
A defendant convicted of possession with intent to deliver challenged his conviction, arguing that the State was required to prove he knew the specific chemical identity of the drugs (fentanyl) rather than just knowing he possessed a controlled substance (which he believed was oxycodone). The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Health & Safety Code and established precedent regarding culpable mental states, determining that the 'knowing' requirement applies to the illicit nature of the substance generally. The court held that the State must prove a defendant knew they possessed a controlled substance, but does not need to prove they knew its specific chemical name or potency. Additionally, the court ruled that trial courts are not required to define the 'floor' of the burden of proof by including 'clear and convincing' instructions in a criminal jury charge.
Litigation Takeaway
“In high-conflict custody or termination litigation, a parent cannot mitigate a 'knowing' endangerment finding by claiming they were mistaken about a drug's identity; knowledge that a substance is 'controlled' is sufficient to establish the mental state for endangerment regardless of the parent's subjective belief about its specific chemical composition or lethality.”
In re Aftab Mahmood
COA05
In this interstate custody dispute, Relator Aftab Mahmood sought a writ of mandamus to overturn a Collin County trial court's order asserting jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under the strict 'Prudential' standard, which requires a relator to prove both a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court and the lack of an adequate remedy through a standard appeal. The appellate court denied the petition, holding that the relator failed to provide a sufficient record or evidence to demonstrate that the trial court’s jurisdictional findings were arbitrary or a misapplication of the law.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, not a shortcut for an appeal; to successfully challenge a court's jurisdiction in a custody case, you must provide the appellate court with a robust record, including specific findings of fact and transcripts that clearly disprove the trial court's authority.”
In re Persian Marshall
COA13
In In re Persian Marshall, a successor judge vacated a predecessor judge's oral rendition of a final judgment and ordered a complete retrial. The relator challenged this decision via a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the court was required to use a less drastic "clarifying order" under Texas Family Code § 157.421 to resolve any ambiguities. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals denied the petition, reasoning that because the oral ruling had never been reduced to a signed written judgment, the trial court maintained broad discretion over its docket. The Court concluded that the relator failed to prove the trial court acted arbitrarily or that an appeal would be an inadequate remedy.
Litigation Takeaway
“An oral ruling from a judge is fragile; until a final written decree is signed, a successor judge has the power to vacate that ruling and force a total retrial. To protect your victory, you must move immediately to get a signed judgment or secure a Rule 11 agreement that binds the parties regardless of which judge is on the bench.”
Mitchell v. Mitchell
COA07
In *Mitchell v. Mitchell*, the appellant sought to suspend the enforcement of a judgment by filing a motion for a supersedeas bond. The trial court denied the request via an informal, handwritten notation on an unsigned order without conducting an evidentiary hearing or providing a legal rationale. Upon review, the Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, which generally entitles a judgment debtor to supersede a judgment to preserve the status quo. The court determined that without a developed record or specific findings of fact, it could not properly review the trial court's denial for an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the appellate court invoked Rule 24.4(d) and remanded the case, ordering the trial court to take evidence and enter formal findings regarding the bond.
Litigation Takeaway
“Trial courts cannot effectively 'pocket veto' an appellant's right to stay a judgment; if a court denies a supersedeas bond without a hearing or explanation, practitioners can use TRAP 24.4(d) to compel a remand for formal findings and an evidentiary record.”
In the Interest of M.P. Jr. and A.P., Children
COA13
In this parental termination case, a father attempted to appeal the trial court's decision before a formal written order had been signed by the judge. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed its jurisdictional limits, concluding that appellate review is generally predicated on a final, signed judgment rather than mere oral pronouncements or docket entries. Because the appellant failed to provide the necessary written order or respond to a clerk's notice regarding the defect, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“A judge's oral ruling is not enough to start an appeal; you must have a signed, written order. In high-stakes litigation like parental termination, failing to ensure the trial court signs the final decree—and failing to respond to appellate court notices about missing paperwork—will result in the permanent dismissal of your appeal regardless of the case's merits.”