What is the litigation takeaway from Rolling Dough, Ltd. d/b/a Panera Bread v. Anyadike?

Reporting suspected criminal activity to law enforcement is a protected matter of public concern under the TCPA; consequently, the TCPA serves as a powerful defensive shield to quickly dismiss retaliatory IIED claims and recover attorney’s fees in high-conflict disputes where the police are called.

What is the summary of Rolling Dough, Ltd. d/b/a Panera Bread v. Anyadike?

A customer sued Panera Bread for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) after a manager accused her of theft and summoned the police during a dispute over a pre-paid order. Panera moved to dismiss the claim under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA), arguing the report was a matter of public concern. The Court of Appeals analyzed whether reporting criminal activity falls under the TCPA and whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for IIED. The court held that reporting a crime is an exercise of free speech on a matter of public concern and that the plaintiff failed to provide clear and specific evidence of "extreme and outrageous" conduct, as false accusations of theft and summoning police do not meet the high legal threshold for IIED. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded for the assessment of attorney's fees.

Does reporting a suspected crime to the police constitute an exercise of the right of free speech under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA)?

Reporting a purported crime to the police qualifies as a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 27.001. Texas courts, including the Supreme Court of Texas in Walgreens v. McKenzie (2025), have held that such communications fall within the exercise of free speech protected by the TCPA. Actionable claims based on these reports generally trigger the TCPA's dismissal framework.

What is required to invoke the commercial-speech exemption under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 27.010(a)(2)?

To invoke the commercial-speech exemption under Section 27.010(a)(2), a party must show that the challenged conduct arose out of a commercial transaction involving the specific goods or services the defendant provides. Texas courts construe this exemption narrowly, holding that accusations of theft or the detention of a customer by a retailer do not typically fall within the scope of 'commercial speech' for TCPA purposes.

Does a claim for emotional distress, including symptoms like anxiety and sleeplessness, qualify for the bodily-injury exemption under the Texas Citizens Participation Act?

No. For the purposes of the TCPA exemption under Section 27.010(a)(3), 'bodily injury' is defined as physical damage to a person's body. Texas appellate courts have determined that symptoms such as anxiety, sleeplessness, headaches, and depression do not constitute physical damage and therefore do not trigger the bodily-injury exemption.

How do Texas courts define a 'matter of public concern' for purposes of the Texas Citizens Participation Act following the 2019 amendments?

The 2019 amendments to the Texas Citizens Participation Act narrowed the definition of 'matter of public concern' to include statements regarding public officials, matters of political or social interest to the community, or subjects of concern to the public. Under Section 27.001(7), the statement must have more than a purely private significance to qualify for protection under the Act's free speech provisions.

What is the evidentiary standard for a plaintiff to survive a TCPA motion to dismiss regarding an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim?

To survive a motion to dismiss under the TCPA, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for IIED by showing the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, the conduct was 'extreme and outrageous,' and it caused severe emotional distress. In the context of retail disputes, Texas courts generally hold that accusations of theft or verbal confrontations do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required by law.

Is the denial of a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act subject to an interlocutory appeal?

Yes. Under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 51.014(a)(12), a person may appeal an interlocutory order that denies a motion to dismiss filed under Section 27.003 of the Texas Citizens Participation Act. This allows for an expedited appellate review of whether the TCPA applies to the claims at issue.

Rolling Dough, Ltd. d/b/a Panera Bread v. Anyadike

Rolling Dough, Ltd. d/b/a Panera Bread v. Anyadike, 14-25-00012-CV, February 24, 2026.

On appeal from the 268th District Court of Fort Bend County

Synopsis

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA) applies to Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) claims arising from reports of suspected criminal activity to police. Because the plaintiff failed to establish by clear and specific evidence that the defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law, the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motion to dismiss was reversed and remanded for the assessment of attorney's fees.

Relevance to Family Law

For the Texas family law litigator, this case is a vital defensive precedent. High-conflict domestic litigation frequently involves "police-involved" incidents—whether during a volatile custody exchange or a dispute over the possession of community property. When a party reports the other to law enforcement, the reported party often retaliates by filing IIED or defamation counterclaims. Rolling Dough reinforces the standard that reporting a crime is a matter of public concern, triggering the TCPA's dismissal framework and providing a high-speed lane to dismiss retaliatory tort claims and recover attorney’s fees.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The dispute originated at a Panera Bread location where the appellee, Uju Anyadike, attempted to pick up a pre-paid order. A dispute arose when store employees and a manager could not locate her order and refused to review records or video. According to Anyadike’s pleadings, the manager engaged in racially discriminatory rhetoric, accusing her of being "like people" who frequently claim they paid for items when they had not. The manager threatened to have Anyadike arrested for theft if she did not vacate the premises. Both the manager and Anyadike contacted the police. Upon arrival, an officer reviewed Anyadike’s electronic proof of payment and declined to make an arrest. Anyadike subsequently sued Panera Bread for IIED, alleging the manager’s conduct—specifically the public accusation of theft and the summoning of police—caused her severe emotional distress, including anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation. Panera Bread moved to dismiss the IIED claim under the TCPA, asserting the claim was based on its exercise of free speech regarding a matter of public concern.

Issues Decided

The court addressed three primary issues: (1) whether a report of suspected criminal activity to police constitutes an "exercise of the right of free speech" on a "matter of public concern" under the TCPA; (2) whether the TCPA’s commercial speech or bodily injury exemptions apply to such a claim; and (3) whether the plaintiff presented clear and specific evidence of "extreme and outrageous" conduct sufficient to establish a prima facie case for IIED.

Rules Applied

The court applied the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001 et seq.), specifically the 2019 narrowed definition of "matter of public concern." It relied heavily on the Texas Supreme Court’s recent precedent in Walgreens v. McKenzie, 713 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. 2025), which clarified that reporting a crime to police falls within the TCPA’s parameters. For the IIED claim, the court applied the "extreme and outrageous" standard established in Twyman v. Twyman and its progeny, noting that the conduct must go "beyond all possible bounds of decency." The court also applied the rule of narrow construction for TCPA exemptions, as dictated by State ex rel. Best v. Harper.

Application

The court first determined that Panera Bread met its initial burden because the IIED claim was "in response to" the manager's report of a suspected crime to the police. Citing Walgreens, the court noted that such communications are inherently matters of public concern. The court then rejected Anyadike’s attempts to invoke TCPA exemptions. The "commercial speech" exemption did not apply because the tortious conduct (the theft accusation) did not arise out of a commercial transaction for the sale of goods, but rather a report of criminal activity. Similarly, the "bodily injury" exemption failed because Anyadike’s alleged symptoms—anxiety, headaches, and suicidal ideation—do not constitute "physical damage to a person’s body" under the required narrow interpretation of the statute. Once the burden shifted to Anyadike to establish a prima facie case, the court analyzed the "extreme and outrageous" element of IIED. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Anyadike, the court found that being wrongly accused of theft and having the police called—while certainly distressing and potentially rude or insensitive—does not rise to the level of "outrageous" conduct required by Texas law. The court emphasized that the tort of IIED is a "gap-filler" and is not intended to provide redress for mere insults, indignities, or even false accusations that do not meet the legal threshold of being "utterly intolerable in a civilized community."

Holding

The Court held that the TCPA applies to IIED claims based on reports of suspected criminal activity to law enforcement because such reports constitute a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern. The Court further held that the commercial speech and bodily injury exemptions to the TCPA must be construed narrowly; thus, allegations of emotional distress and accusations of theft do not trigger these exemptions to bypass the TCPA’s dismissal framework. Finally, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of IIED because an accusation of theft and the summoning of police, even if done in a rude or discriminatory manner, does not constitute "extreme and outrageous" conduct as a matter of law. Consequently, the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss.

Practical Application

This case provides a strategic roadmap for defense counsel in family law matters. If a client is sued for IIED after calling the police during a "he-said/she-said" dispute (e.g., a dispute over whether a spouse is "stealing" property from the marital residence), a TCPA motion should be the first line of defense. It effectively shifts the burden to the plaintiff to prove their case with "clear and specific evidence" before discovery even begins. If the plaintiff cannot prove that the client's report was "extreme and outrageous"—a notoriously high bar—the case is dismissed, and the client is entitled to mandatory attorney's fees.

Checklists

Asserting the TCPA Defense in "Police-Report" Tort Claims

Identify Protected Conduct: Confirm the lawsuit is "based on or in response to" a report made to law enforcement or a public official.
Establish Public Concern: Categorize the report as a "matter of public concern" (reporting a crime) to satisfy the first TCPA hurdle.
Preempt Exemptions: Prepare to argue that "emotional distress" is not "bodily injury" and that the dispute is not a "commercial speech" transaction.
Draft the Fee Affidavit: Ensure contemporaneous billing records are ready to support a request for attorney's fees upon dismissal.

Attacking the IIED "Prima Facie" Case

Analyze "Outrageousness": Compare the facts to the Twyman standard; argue that even false or rude accusations do not meet the "gap-filler" tort's requirements.
Check for Physical Harm: If the plaintiff only alleges anxiety or sleeplessness, argue the lack of physical bodily injury both for the exemption and the damages element.
Leverage the "Gap-Filler" Rule: If the conduct could be addressed through a defamation claim (even if time-barred), argue IIED is unavailable.

Citation

Rolling Dough, Ltd. d/b/a Panera Bread v. Anyadike, 14-25-00012-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 24, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

View Full Opinion Here

Family Law Crossover

The "Retaliatory IIED" claim is a common fixture in the Texas family law landscape. Parties often use tort claims to gain leverage in property divisions or to color a judge’s perception of a parent in a SAPCR. The Rolling Dough opinion is a powerful "shield" against these tactics. By categorizing the report of a crime—even a disputed one—as protected speech, the court has made it significantly more difficult for a disgruntled spouse to use a police report as the basis for a secondary lawsuit. Family law practitioners should use this case to remind the court that the TCPA’s purpose is to stifle "legal actions" intended to "intimidate or silence" citizens who are exercising their right to contact the authorities. In short: calling the police during a divorce is a matter of public concern, and unless the caller’s conduct is "utterly intolerable," the TCPA demands dismissal. ~~f4f48216-6df8-4556-908b-18e5f891ab61~~