Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Ruben Gonzalez v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Ruben Gonzalez v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed Gonzalez’s injury-to-a-child conviction under a party-liability theory. The State did not need direct proof that Gonzalez personally inflicted every injury; instead, the court held circumstantial evidence was enough to show he intended to promote or assist the offense. The evidence showed Gonzalez lived in the home, exercised disciplinary authority over the child, used harsh punishment including food restriction, was aware of the child’s obvious physical decline, and failed to obtain medical care. Applying Texas Penal Code sections 7.01 and 7.02, the court concluded a rational jury could infer culpable participation from his authority in the household, proximity to the child, awareness of the worsening condition, omission in the face of obvious need, and minimizing statements after the fact. The court also rejected his Confrontation Clause complaint and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases, Gonzalez is a strong crossover authority for the idea that a live-in nonparent can be treated as a de facto caregiver based on actual household power, not formal legal status. If a parent’s partner or other resident adult disciplines the child, controls food, observes injuries or decline, and does nothing, that evidence can support endangerment, restrictions, supervised possession, or no-contact provisions even without formal caregiving records."
Roland Joseph Seymour v. Sharee Walker
COA14
In Seymour v. Walker, the father appealed the denial of his Chapter 157 enforcement motion seeking contempt, make-up possession, sanctions, and fees for alleged violations of a possession order. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over the contempt portion because contempt rulings are not reviewable by direct appeal. It further held that the request for additional possession under Family Code section 157.168 became moot when the child turned eighteen during the appeal, leaving no live controversy over possession or access. The court also rejected the argument that a fee request under section 157.167 preserved jurisdiction, explaining that the statute mandates fees only after a finding of noncompliance, which Seymour never obtained before mootness attached. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a possession-enforcement case is approaching a child’s eighteenth birthday, move fast: make-up possession claims can become moot on appeal once the child turns eighteen. And a bare request for fees under Family Code section 157.167 will not keep the case alive unless the movant already obtained a finding of noncompliance. Also, denial of contempt relief generally cannot be challenged by direct appeal."
In the Interest of B.H. and L.H.
COA09
In this Beaumont divorce appeal, the wife challenged a final decree requiring sale of the marital residence and setting guideline child support. The court held the property complaint was not preserved because the decree tracked the parties’ mediated agreement, the trial court found the division just and right, and the wife made no objection or developed any record of coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation at the prove-up or in a post-judgment motion. The child-support complaint likewise failed because the trial court based support on testimony and admitted financial information about the husband’s self-employment income, disallowed some claimed deductions, and the wife did not object or offer contrary evidence in the trial court. The court also refused to consider documents attached only to the appellate brief because matters outside the appellate record are not evidence. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge a mediated divorce decree or a child-support calculation, do it in the trial court and make a record. Silence at prove-up, especially when the decree follows a mediated agreement, usually waives appellate complaints, and you cannot fix a bad record by attaching new documents to an appellate brief."
In re Guardianship of Stewart
COA10
In In re Guardianship of Stewart, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a guardianship order appointing Father as permanent guardian of the parties’ adult son was void because the proposed ward was never personally served with Father’s guardianship application as required by Texas Estates Code § 1051.103(a)(1). Although the son was later personally served with Mother’s separate competing application and an attorney ad litem answered and appeared, the court treated the problem as a complete lack of service—not a mere technical defect. Relying on the Estates Code and In re Guardianship of Fairley, the court explained that personal service must correspond to the specific pleading on which the court grants relief, and neither actual notice nor ad litem participation can waive or cure the absence of service on the proposed ward. Because Father’s application was never personally served on the proposed ward, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to appoint Father, so the appellate court vacated the order and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a statute makes personal service jurisdictional, each pleading seeking affirmative relief must stand on its own. Service of one party’s petition does not authorize judgment on another party’s competing petition, and actual notice, attorney participation, or ad litem involvement will not save an order entered on an unserved pleading."
In the Interest of P.H.S. and E.K.S., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally insufficient to support endangerment findings against Father under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The Department proved serious concerns in Mother’s home, including unsanitary conditions, domestic violence concerns, a violated safety plan involving Mother’s paramour, and an unexplained injury to one child, but the court emphasized that subsections (D) and (E) require parent-specific proof. Applying the clear-and-convincing and legal-sufficiency standards, the court concluded the record did not show Father knowingly placed the children in endangering conditions, knowingly allowed them to remain there, personally engaged in a course of endangering conduct, or knowingly placed them with someone who did. The court therefore reversed and rendered the (D) and (E) findings as to Father, while affirming the termination order on other grounds.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings cannot rest on guilt by association. If you want a Family Code 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) finding against a particular parent, you need evidence tying that parent to knowledge, control, placement, permission, or a conscious course of dangerous conduct—not just proof that the child was in a bad situation with someone else."
In the Interest of K.D.S., a Child
COA05
In In re K.D.S., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a father’s SAPCR modification suit, a $5,000 attorney’s-fee award, and an order requiring him to post a $5,000 bond before filing future modification pleadings in the case. The father tried to use the modification proceeding to collaterally attack the underlying 2021 SAPCR order based on alleged service defects and other jurisdictional theories, but the court held those complaints were waived by his prior appearance and answer and could not support a collateral attack on a non-void final order. The court also held that any complaint about the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law was waived because none were requested. Most significantly, the court approved the prefiling bond as a sanctions measure for repeated frivolous filings, discovery abuse, failure to appear, and refusal to litigate within the rules, explaining that such relief may be imposed without a formal vexatious-litigant finding when supported by the record and tailored to secure costs and attorney’s fees. The father’s due-process, equal-protection, and access-to-courts objections were not preserved, so the sanctions and dismissal were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas family courts can use their sanctions power—not just the vexatious-litigant statute—to require a bond before future SAPCR modification filings when a party shows a pattern of frivolous pleadings, discovery abuse, and rule-defying conduct. For practitioners, the key is to build a detailed record, tie the bond to anticipated costs and fees, and preserve any constitutional objections with specificity in the trial court."
In the Interest of N.P., a Child
COA12
In In re N.P., the Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court analyzed whether the child’s environment and the father’s course of conduct endangered the child, focusing on the mother’s methamphetamine use during pregnancy, the newborn’s positive drug test, the parents’ homelessness, the father’s repeated domestic violence against the mother during pregnancy, and his resulting incarceration. The court held this evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show both endangering conditions or surroundings under subsection (D) and a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious endangering course of conduct under subsection (E), so it affirmed the termination judgment without reaching subsection (P).
Litigation Takeaway
"Prenatal violence, drug exposure at birth, homelessness, and criminal instability can combine to prove endangerment under both Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a unified safety narrative tying domestic violence, substance abuse, and instability directly to risk to the child."
In re Ganga Thapa
COA03
In In re Ganga Thapa, the Third Court of Appeals held that a grandmother had standing under Texas Family Code section 102.004(a)(2) to seek managing conservatorship because the Department, which had been appointed managing conservator after termination of the parents’ rights, expressly consented to her suit. The trial court had sua sponte found she lacked standing and struck her intervention in the pending SAPCR. The appellate court treated the issue as a pure standing question, applied the rule that an intervenor in a SAPCR generally needs only the same standing required to file the claim as an original suit, and concluded that Thapa’s original-suit standing carried over to intervention. Because the trial court’s contrary legal conclusion was an abuse of discretion and denial of intervention in a SAPCR lacks an adequate appellate remedy, the court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its standing ruling and order striking the intervention.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a grandparent’s standing depends on Family Code section 102.004(a)(2), get the managing conservator’s consent clearly into the record—preferably in a filed written consent tied expressly to the statute. Once that statutory gateway is satisfied, a trial court cannot deny intervention based on generalized discretion; the fight shifts from standing to the merits."
Michael Ray Guajardo v. The State of Texas
COA09
In Michael Ray Guajardo v. The State of Texas, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that Article 38.37 allows the State to admit prior sexual acts against children even when the defendant committed those acts as a juvenile, so long as the statute’s notice and relevance requirements are met. The defendant argued the statute should be limited to adult conduct and that Rule 403 required exclusion because the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. The court rejected both arguments, reasoning that the statute contains no adulthood limitation and courts may not add one. It further held the extraneous-act evidence was highly probative of sexual interest in children, state of mind, and the propensity inference Article 38.37 expressly permits in child-sex-offense cases, and that this probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-related litigation, historical sexual misconduct involving children is not automatically irrelevant or inadmissible just because it occurred when the accused was a juvenile. For family-law cases involving conservatorship, possession, protective orders, or modification, Guajardo is a strong analogy for arguing that older or juvenile-age conduct can still be powerful evidence of present child-safety risk—while opponents should focus on relevance, reliability, remoteness, and Rule 403 fairness rather than a categorical age-based objection."
Jackson v. Slack
COA12
In Jackson v. Slack, the Tyler Court of Appeals reversed a no-answer default judgment because substituted service did not strictly comply with the Rule 106(b) order authorizing it. The trial court’s order allowed service only at Jackson’s specified apartment unit by either leaving the papers with someone over sixteen at that unit or posting them on that unit’s front door. But the return showed service was made instead on a leasing-office employee in the complex office. Applying Texas’s strict-compliance rules for default judgments, the court held that substituted service must match the order exactly, that actual notice cannot cure defective service, and that the deviation deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction. The default judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any Texas family-law default, substitute service is only as good as the Rule 106 order. If the order authorizes service at a specific residence, unit, or by a specific method, the return must show exact compliance. Service on apartment staff, relatives, office personnel, or other practical substitutes will not support a default unless the order expressly allows it."