Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
David Rojas Sanchez v. The State of Texas
COA05
In David Rojas Sanchez v. The State of Texas, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Sanchez waived his complaint about the admission of Article 38.37 extraneous-offense testimony because he did not preserve error. Although defense counsel objected at the pretrial hearing when the witness could not identify Sanchez in the courtroom, the trial judge responded that she would 'wait and see,' which the appellate court treated as a deferral rather than an express or implicit ruling. Counsel did not press for a definitive ruling, did not object to the court’s failure to rule, and did not renew the objection when the testimony came in before the jury. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and preservation authorities including Dobbs and Darty, the court held that an objection alone is not enough without an adverse ruling or an objection to the refusal to rule. Because no preserved ruling existed, the court did not reach the merits of the Article 38.37 challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the court says 'wait and see,' you do not yet have a ruling. In family-law trials and hearings, lawyers must press objections to a clear ruling, renew them when the evidence is offered, and object on the record if the court refuses or fails to rule. Otherwise, even strong evidentiary complaints may be lost on appeal."
Thompson v. State
COA05
In Thompson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a police officer’s testimony that she found the complainant credible required reversal of an assault-family-violence conviction. The court assumed, without deciding, that admitting the credibility-vouching testimony was error, then applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b)’s nonconstitutional harmless-error standard. Looking at the full record, the court emphasized that the testimony was brief, not repeated, and not featured in closing argument, while other evidence independently supported the verdict, including visible injuries, expert strangulation testimony, and jail-call evidence suggesting an admission. The court held that any error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Improper credibility-vouching is not automatic reversible error. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, the appellate fight will usually turn on harm: whether the opinion testimony was emphasized, whether the case lacked corroboration, and whether the challenged statement likely affected the outcome. Build your record with objective evidence, and if you are preserving error, also preserve prejudice."
In the Interest of S.W.R. and H.G.R., Children
COA05
In this Dallas child-support modification case, the parents’ 2020 agreed divorce decree set support at an amount that differed from the Chapter 154 guidelines. Father sought modification in February 2023, arguing both that circumstances had materially and substantially changed and that the agreed amount did not substantially comply with the guidelines. Mother moved for summary judgment on the ground that no material and substantial change had occurred. The court held that because the original support order was an agreed order that deviated from the guidelines, Texas Family Code section 156.401(a-1) controlled and required proof of a material and substantial change in the circumstances of the child or a person affected by the order. Father could not rely on section 156.401(a)(2)’s 20%/$100 guideline-difference test because three years had not yet elapsed, and he conceded that point. Because Father did not respond to the summary-judgment motion with evidence creating a fact issue and did not effectively challenge the no-material-change ground on appeal, the court affirmed summary judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"If an agreed child-support order departs from guideline support, a parent seeking modification before three years have passed must prove a material and substantial change in circumstances. A simple argument that the agreed amount is above or below the guidelines is not enough, and failing to directly attack a no-change summary-judgment ground can end the case on appeal."
In the Interest of J.D.H., a Child
SCOTX
In this parental-rights termination case, the mother’s notice of appeal was filed after the 20-day deadline for accelerated appeals because counsel apparently believed a motion for new trial extended the deadline. The Texas Supreme Court agreed the notice was untimely under Rule 26.1(b) and existing precedent, but held that termination cases are different from ordinary civil cases because the statutory right to counsel includes effective assistance, including counsel’s duty to timely perfect an appeal. Applying Strickland principles and drawing on criminal lost-appeal cases, the Court held that a parent may seek an out-of-time appeal when ineffective assistance caused the missed deadline. Rather than automatically accepting the late notice or dismissing outright, the proper remedy is to reverse the dismissal and remand so the court of appeals can abate the case for an evidentiary hearing in the trial court on deficient performance and prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination cases, a missed accelerated appellate deadline is not always the end of the case if counsel’s ineffective assistance caused it. Lawyers must separately calendar the 20-day notice-of-appeal deadline and should seek abatement and remand for a Strickland hearing—not equitable forgiveness of the deadline—when a lost appeal stems from attorney error."
Perricone v. Perricone
COA11
In Perricone v. Perricone, the Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed a family-law-related appeal for lack of jurisdiction because none of the challenged trial-court orders was appealable. The appellant tried to appeal an order denying leave to file a late nonsuit and related relief, and later a Rule 91a dismissal order. The court analyzed finality under Lehmann, Sealy Emergency Room, and In re C.K.M., explaining that appellate jurisdiction exists only over a final judgment or a statutorily authorized interlocutory order. Here, the orders did not dispose of all parties and all claims, one Rule 91a order expressly left Chapter 42 Family Code claims pending, there was no severance, and there was no unequivocal finality language. Because Rule 27's premature-notice framework does not create appellate jurisdiction by itself, the court declined to retain or abate the appeal and dismissed it without prejudice to refiling after an appealable order is signed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing a notice of appeal in a Texas family-law case, confirm there is a true final judgment or a statute authorizing interlocutory review. Partial dismissals, nonsuit-related orders, and orders resolving fewer than all claims or parties are usually not appealable unless the case is severed or the order clearly and unequivocally disposes of everything."
Flatt v. Tornow
COA01
In Flatt v. Tornow, a third party sued a wife involved in a divorce, alleging she accessed private communications and disclosed intimate photos and private information to others. The wife sought dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, arguing the suit was based on her petitioning activity in the divorce and her speech about the marriage and affair. The First Court of Appeals rejected that framing, focusing on the gravamen of the pleaded claims: private disclosure conduct, not protected litigation activity or speech on a matter of public concern. Because the wife failed to meet her threshold burden to show the TCPA applied, the court held the analysis ended at step one and affirmed denial of the TCPA motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
"A pending divorce does not automatically turn related misconduct into protected TCPA activity. In privacy-based tort cases involving alleged disclosure of intimate images or private communications, courts will look to the actual pleaded injury and conduct, not the broader litigation backdrop. Family-law litigators should not assume subpoenas, depositions, or affair-related communications create TCPA protection."
Grant Hanson v. Tara Louise Nugent
COA03
In this SAPCR appeal, the father challenged a final order appointing the mother sole managing conservator, restricting his possession through a tiered supervised schedule tied to negative drug tests, and excluding evidence he said showed a disability, medication-assisted recovery, and a lawful THC prescription. The court reiterated that conservatorship and possession rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with sufficiency complaints folded into that review. But the excerpted opinion expressly resolved only the evidentiary complaint, holding it was forfeited because the father’s briefing failed to clearly identify the excluded evidence, address the trial objections, or provide supporting legal authority and analysis. The court affirmed the final SAPCR order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody appeals, preservation and briefing matter as much as the merits. If you want to complain about excluded evidence, identify the exact testimony or exhibit, make sure it is in the record, address the objection and ruling, and explain with authority why it was admissible. More broadly, trial courts can support sole managing conservatorship and stepped possession restrictions when the record ties a parent’s substance use to the child’s specific best-interest needs."
In Re WhiteWater Midstream, LLC, WWM Operating, LLC, MXP Parent, LLC, and Matterhorn Express Pipeline, LLC
COA14
In In re WhiteWater Midstream, the relators sought mandamus relief from orders compelling discovery and denying reconsideration, arguing the requests were overbroad and unduly burdensome. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused first on preservation under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.2(e), not on the merits of those objections. Because the relators did not timely assert overbreadth and undue-burden objections in writing before their response deadline, those objections were waived unless the trial court excused the waiver for good cause. The appellate court held the record supported the trial court’s implied finding that no good cause was shown, so compelling discovery was not an abuse of discretion. Without a clear abuse of discretion, mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law discovery fights, timing can matter more than the substance of your objection: if you do not serve specific written overbreadth or undue-burden objections by the response deadline, you may lose them entirely. For requesting parties, this case is a strong waiver tool; for responding parties, it is a reminder to preserve objections early, specifically, and in writing."
Davis v. State
COA02
In Davis v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support deadly-weapon findings in a family-violence prosecution where the defendant used both his hands and a knife. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and Texas Penal Code section 1.07(a)(17), the court focused on whether the hands and knife, in the manner used or intended to be used, were capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The court held that repeated strangulation, choking until the complainant turned blue and nearly lost consciousness, resumed choking when she began breathing again, and the severe resulting medical injuries supported the jury’s finding that the defendant’s hands were used as deadly weapons. The court also held that the knife qualified as a deadly weapon because the defendant wielded it, threatened to hurt the complainant if she ran, and used it to force her movement and compliance, even though he did not stab her. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving family violence, Davis shows that courts will treat strangulation, coercive control, and threats with a household knife as highly serious evidence even when the assailant used only hands or never actually stabbed the victim. Build the record around the manner of assault, the victim’s inability to breathe or escape, threats tied to a weapon, and the medical consequences, because those facts can strongly support protective orders, custody restrictions, supervised possession, and other safety-based relief."
Perry v. Perry
COA09
In Perry v. Perry, the husband tried to use a bill of review to set aside a final divorce decree, arguing he was denied a fair chance to seek a larger share of the marital estate, a jury trial, and relief from allegedly unfair binding arbitration. The court affirmed summary judgment against him because a bill of review is an equitable remedy that is unavailable when an adequate legal remedy existed. Here, the record showed he had already filed a direct appeal from the same final decree and then voluntarily dismissed it. Because those complaints could have been raised on direct appeal, and in fact were pursued through that route, the bill of review could not be used to relitigate the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review is not a fallback option for issues that could have been raised on direct appeal. In family-law cases, if a party challenges a divorce decree on matters like property division, arbitration, or jury-trial complaints, counsel must treat the direct appeal as the primary vehicle. Once that appellate remedy exists—and especially if it is actually invoked—a later bill of review is likely barred."