Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Tremayne Edward Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Johnson v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether admitting a child complainant’s CAC forensic interview required reversal after the defendant was convicted of sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. The court held that although defense counsel initially said “no objection,” a later objection made before the video was published to the jury was timely enough to preserve some complaint because the trial court could still stop the jury from seeing it. But the court limited preservation to the specific trial objections actually made—bolstering and prejudice—not broader hearsay or Rule 403 theories raised on appeal. Assuming without deciding that admitting the CAC video was error, the court found the error harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) because the same abuse allegations had already come in through the forensic interviewer’s testimony and through the child’s own live testimony in greater detail. Since the video was cumulative and there was no showing it substantially influenced the verdict, the convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, preserving an objection is only half the battle—counsel must also build a record showing why a CAC interview or child recording is uniquely harmful and not just cumulative of other testimony. If the same allegations are already before the factfinder through the child, an outcry witness, or a counselor, an appellate court may treat any error in admitting an additional recording as harmless."
A. M. and J. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this DFPS parental-rights appeal, the parent argued the trial court improperly revisited indigence on its own and orally discharged appointed appellate counsel under Family Code § 107.013(e) without any authorized motion. The Third Court did not decide whether the discharge was unlawful because the appellate record lacked both a signed discharge order and the reporter’s record from the hearing. Instead, relying on the parent’s continuing right to counsel through appeal and ordinary record-preservation requirements, the court held that merits relief was premature and abated the appeal so the trial court could sign an order, include any supporting findings or conclusions, and supplement the record.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even strong statutory error arguments can fail temporarily if the record is incomplete. If a trial court orally changes indigence status, discharges appointed counsel, or enters any ruling affecting appellate rights, family lawyers should immediately secure a signed written order, obtain the hearing transcript, and seek abatement and record supplementation before asking the appellate court for substantive relief."
Mary G. Mauldin and Carl Adams v. James C. Nix, III, as Co-Trustee and on Behalf of the Nix Family Trust
COA05
In Mauldin v. Nix, a trust beneficiary sued his sister over alleged mismanagement of a family trust after years of discovery disputes that began in a Rule 202 presuit proceeding and continued after merits claims were filed. The trial court repeatedly ordered discovery, found ongoing noncompliance and delayed disclosure that financial records had been shredded, and ultimately struck the sister’s pleadings as a sanction. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s procedural handling of the Rule 202-to-merits transition and sustained the severe discovery sanctions, concluding the record showed persistent discovery abuse rather than a mere scope dispute. But the court reversed the $125,000 breach-of-fiduciary-duty damages award because legally sufficient evidence did not connect the alleged fiduciary breach to a compensable loss. The court rendered a take-nothing judgment on that damages claim, remanded attorney’s fees tied to that recovery, and otherwise left the conversion and sanctions-related rulings intact.
Litigation Takeaway
"Bad conduct and bad optics are not enough to win money damages. In family-law crossover cases involving hidden assets, waste, reimbursement, or fiduciary-duty theories, you still need proof that the alleged misconduct caused a measurable loss. At the same time, parties who keep resisting discovery after repeated court orders risk pleadings-striking sanctions, and Rule 202 is not a shield once full merits litigation is underway."
In the Interest of D.A., A.A., K.A., & G.A., Children
COA12
In In re D.A., the Tyler Court of Appeals considered whether the Department’s endangerment proof was sufficient to terminate a father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) when the evidence was largely circumstantial rather than direct. Father argued the absence of medical testimony, expert testimony, photographs, and eyewitnesses made the evidence legally and factually insufficient. The court rejected that argument, explaining that Texas law does not require direct evidence of endangerment and that circumstantial evidence may support a firm belief or conviction if the total record reasonably shows the parent knowingly allowed endangering conditions or engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct. Applying the J.F.C./C.H. sufficiency standards and relying on In re Lipsky, the court deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations and held the cumulative force of the record was sufficient to support termination under subsections (D) and (E), affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"You do not need a “smoking gun” witness or expert to prove or defeat endangerment. In Texas family cases, a well-developed pattern of indirect evidence can be enough—so the key fight is usually over the strength of the inferences, not the mere lack of direct proof."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Danielle Lauren Henry & Johnathon Hall
COA12
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued that her due-process rights were violated because she was not admitted into a January 3, 2025 Zoom hearing where the court granted a continuance and the parties agreed that the husband would not pay February spousal support. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of that constitutional complaint because the wife waited until the May 7, 2025 judgment hearing—after the final trial had already occurred—to raise it. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, the court held that even constitutional due-process complaints must be raised through a timely, specific objection, motion, or request at a point when the trial court can still cure the problem. Because the complaint was raised months too late, the issue was not preserved for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume calling something a due-process violation preserves it automatically. In family-law cases—especially Zoom hearings, temporary-orders settings, and continuance hearings—counsel must object immediately, request a concrete cure, and make a record while the trial court can still fix the problem, or the complaint will likely be waived on appeal."
In the Matter of B.F.
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring a 15-year-old charged with capital murder to criminal district court. The court rejected the argument that Family Code § 54.02(a)(3) required findings on both the seriousness of the offense and the child’s background because the statute is disjunctive: transfer may be based on either ground. It also held that the State’s conjunctive pleading did not increase its burden, and that the evidence on the § 54.02(f) factors—including the double homicide, evidence of planning and concealment, B.F.’s sophistication and maturity, and expert testimony that rehabilitation within the juvenile system was unlikely before age nineteen—supported the transfer decision.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a Family Code statute is written in the disjunctive, proving one statutory ground may be enough even if the pleading alleges multiple grounds. For family lawyers, this case is a reminder to track statutory text closely, frame appeals around required statutory elements rather than pleading form, and build a record supporting at least one independently sufficient basis for a discretionary ruling—especially in expert-driven cases where appellate courts defer heavily to the trial court’s credibility calls."
Patricia Faith Dickinson v. Joshua Thomas Dickinson
COA03
In this SAPCR appeal, the mother argued that the appellate record filed in the court of appeals was incomplete and potentially misleading because important materials had been omitted despite her repeated efforts to obtain them. The Third Court of Appeals did not decide for itself whether the materials existed or belonged in the record. Instead, applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(e)(3), it held that once a post-filing dispute arises over the accuracy or completeness of the record, the proper course is to abate the appeal and remand to the trial court to determine whether the disputed materials exist, are relevant to the appeal, and should be included through supplementation. The court therefore abated and remanded for those factual determinations.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the appellate record in a family-law case is missing key hearings, exhibits, filings, or rulings, do not just complain around the problem. Build a paper trail, file a verified motion, and ask for a TRAP 34.6(e)(3) abatement so the trial court can decide whether the missing items exist, matter, and must be added to the record."
Payne v. Cocoroiu
COA14
In Payne v. Cocoroiu, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification order after the father challenged personal jurisdiction, service, venue, and the evidentiary basis for the judgment. The court held that by filing a pro se answer before filing a Rule 120a special appearance, the father made a general appearance and waived any objection to personal jurisdiction; that same appearance also cured any service defects under Rules 120 and 124. The court further held that Harris County had continuing exclusive jurisdiction because of the earlier final parentage order, defeating the venue challenge. Finally, because the father failed to provide the reporter’s record, the appellate court presumed the missing evidence supported the modification findings and rejected unpreserved complaints.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, a respondent who files an answer before a special appearance likely waives personal-jurisdiction and service complaints. Family litigators should assess jurisdiction immediately, carefully sequence pleadings, and make sure the appellate record is complete—especially in modification cases where most complaints depend on the hearing evidence."
In the Interest of A.F., a child; In the Interest of M.M. and M.M., children
COA07
The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on Mother’s fentanyl trafficking while the children were present, her leaving them with an impaired boyfriend, her admissions that she used fentanyl and methadone while caring for them and was high during the incident, her ongoing incarceration and delayed parole eligibility, prior Department involvement for neglectful supervision, and the children’s stable placement with a paternal aunt. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and Holley best-interest factors, the court concluded the record allowed the factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that termination served the children’s need for safety, stability, and permanence.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases get much stronger when misconduct is tied to concrete danger to the child, parental unavailability, and a stable alternative placement. In custody and modification disputes, this case is a strong reminder that substance abuse, criminal conduct, unsafe third-party caregivers, and incarceration can heavily influence child-centered rulings even outside termination cases."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Albert Ray Garcia and Patricia Murguia Garcia
COA07
In this Texas divorce appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld a decree awarding the husband all of a premarital house titled in both parties’ names and a disproportionate share of a joint bank account. The court held that because the house was acquired before marriage, each party’s interest was separate property under the inception-of-title rule, and the deed’s presumption of equal ownership was rebutted by evidence that the husband alone paid the purchase price and did not intend a gift to the wife. Framed as a partition issue rather than a just-and-right division of community property, the trial court permissibly determined the parties’ true ownership interests and awarded the entire property to the husband. The court also rejected the wife’s challenge to the bank-account award because she attacked only one asset instead of showing that the overall community division was unjust.
Litigation Takeaway
"Joint title on premarital real estate does not guarantee a 50/50 result in divorce. If the property was acquired before marriage, lawyers should plead partition, trace the acquisition funds, and build evidence on ownership percentages and gift intent; on appeal, challenges to property division must address the overall estate, not just one account or asset."