Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
667 opinions found
Lalita R. Morey v. Oaks of Devonshire Homeowners Association, Inc.
COA01
After a July 14, 2025 final judgment, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 23, 2025—outside the 30-day deadline in TRAP 26.1 and also outside the 15-day grace period in TRAP 26.3—and filed no post-judgment motions that would have extended the timetable to 90 days. The First Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over a standard appeal because an untimely notice of appeal does not invoke appellate jurisdiction under TRAP 25.1(c). The appellant then asked the court to treat the late notice as a restricted appeal, but the court refused because a restricted appeal has its own jurisdictional prerequisites and the notice must strictly include the statements required by TRAP 25.1(d)(7) (including non-participation in the hearing and no timely post-judgment filings). Because the notice did not contain those mandatory declarations, the court could not construe it as a restricted appeal and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if you miss the 30-day notice-of-appeal deadline (and the 15-day extension window), you’re out—unless you properly perfect a restricted appeal. If you need a restricted appeal, your notice must expressly track TRAP 25.1(d)(7)’s required statements; a generic notice of appeal cannot be “converted” later by briefing or argument."
Shelton v. Flores
COA14
In Shelton v. Flores, a government employee (Shelton) attempted to dismiss claims against himself by filing a Rule 91a motion under the Texas Tort Claims Act's (TTCA) election-of-remedies provision after both he and his employer, the City of Houston, were sued. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(e), which states that an employee shall be dismissed 'on the motion of the governmental unit.' The court held that because the City did not join or file the motion to dismiss Shelton, the statutory condition precedent was not met. The court concluded that individual employees lack standing to 'self-dismiss' under this provision without the employer’s active participation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Government employees, such as CPS caseworkers or law enforcement officers, cannot unilaterally exit a lawsuit under the TTCA election-of-remedies provision unless the government agency they work for formally moves for their dismissal. This provides family law litigants with strategic leverage to keep individual defendants in a case for discovery purposes, especially when an agency is reluctant to admit the employee was acting within the scope of their employment."
Cove Funding, LP and its Subsidiary HPS Admin, LLC v. Marcy Barba and Jorge Barba
COA03
In a post-judgment enforcement proceeding, a third-party lender intervened in a receivership, asserting a priority security interest and requesting the turnover of assets. The trial court denied the turnover motion but did not issue specific findings regarding the validity of the lender's lien. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order met the 'discrete issue' finality standard for receiverships or qualified as a mandatory injunction. The court held that because the order was a simple denial that did not conclusively adjudicate the underlying ownership rights or substantial interests of the third party, it was an interlocutory order over which the appellate court lacked jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"To prevent third-party claimants from disrupting a receivership through interlocutory appeals, practitioners should seek a simple denial of turnover requests rather than a formal adjudication of the claim's merits. Conversely, third parties seeking to appeal a denial must ensure the order contains specific findings that finally adjudicate their substantial rights or act as a mandatory injunction."
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company v. Payne & Keller Company, By and Through Its Duly-Appointed Receiver, Peter D. Protopapas
COA14
In this case, a receiver attempted to domesticate a South Carolina order in Texas under Chapter 35 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Texas version of the UEFJA). Third-party insurers intervened and filed motions to vacate, then attempted to appeal the filing as a final judgment. The Court of Appeals analyzed whether domesticating a non-final foreign order "upgrades" its status to a final Texas judgment. The court held that because the underlying South Carolina order was interlocutory on its face, its domestication in Texas resulted only in an interlocutory order, not a final appealable judgment. Consequently, because the trial court had not ruled on the motions to vacate and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal for such a filing, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domesticating a foreign order in Texas under Chapter 35 only creates an appealable judgment if the original foreign order was final; if the out-of-state order is temporary or interlocutory, it remains unappealable in Texas, potentially freezing enforcement if a motion to vacate is pending."
Brown v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Brown v. State, police returned to an apartment for a second search after an initial search warrant had expired. Rather than seek a new warrant, officers relied on consent from the apartment manager and the victim’s family (who were clearing out the unit) and on the defendant’s own statement during an interview that he did not live there and had not lived there for 18 months. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the suppression issue under Fourth Amendment standing principles, applying Texas’s abandonment doctrine (disclaimer of a possessory/privacy interest defeats a reasonable expectation of privacy) and the apparent-authority consent doctrine (a warrantless search is valid if officers reasonably believe the consenting third party has authority). Under the totality of circumstances—primary tenant deceased, unit being vacated by the family, manager’s consent, and Brown’s explicit disavowal of residency—the court held Brown lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search; the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The court also rejected claims of judicial bias, charge error, and ineffective assistance, and affirmed the murder conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Move-out disclaimers can become legal waivers: if a party tells police, a landlord, or a court “I don’t live there,” that statement can be used to establish abandonment and defeat privacy/standing arguments—making warrantless entry/search more defensible based on third-party consent. In family-law crossovers (protective orders, divorce/custody disputes), counsel should carefully manage residency/possession statements and build evidence of continuing ties (keys, utilities, mail, property left behind) if privacy or possessory rights will matter."
Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez
COA08
In Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez, a state employee sued for retaliation, alleging she was fired for filing internal complaints and requesting FMLA leave. The HHSC argued she was terminated for chronic training delinquency and unauthorized cell phone use. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether Lopez's firing was a 'pretext' for retaliation. The court found that because Lopez admitted to the policy violations and failed to provide evidence of 'similarly situated' employees being treated differently, she could not overcome the agency's legitimate reasons. The court held that the agency retained its sovereign immunity and dismissed the case, emphasizing that subjective belief and timing are not enough to prove a retaliatory motive.
Litigation Takeaway
"To defeat a 'neutral' excuse in court—whether it is an employer's policy or a parent's justification for denying visitation—you must provide objective evidence that the reason is factually false or applied inconsistently. Suspicious timing or personal feelings of unfairness are legally insufficient to prove that an opponent’s stated reason is a mere pretext for retaliation."
In Re Alejandra Suarez Jaramillo
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, Alejandra Suarez Jaramillo challenged a trial court's scheduling order that set a discovery supplementation deadline five weeks before the order was even signed. Jaramillo argued that this retroactive and "impossible" deadline effectively barred her from presenting a defense. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the claim under established mandamus standards, which require both a clear abuse of discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court held that while the retroactive deadline was procedurally unusual, the relator failed to provide a record showing that her defense was 'severely compromised.' Specifically, because she did not identify which vital witnesses or documents were excluded or how they went to the 'very heart' of the litigation, she failed to demonstrate that the error could not be corrected through a normal appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court's procedural error—even one as logically absurd as a retroactive deadline—does not guarantee emergency relief unless you build a specific record proving that the error 'severely compromised' your ability to present your case."
E-VOLVE ENERGY HOLDINGS, LLC v. MP2 ENERGY, LLC
COA05
In a dispute sent to AAA arbitration, E‑Volve sought to vacate/modify an award confirmed by the Collin County trial court, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her authority and made erroneous offset/damages determinations. The Dallas Court of Appeals first held the confirmation order was a final, appealable judgment because it contained clear, unequivocal Lehmann finality language (“disposes of all claims and all parties and is final and appealable”), even if the order lacked detailed recovery terms. On the merits, applying the FAA/TAA’s narrow vacatur/modification standards, the court held the party challenging an award bears the burden to provide a complete, authenticated arbitration record. Because no transcript of the final arbitration hearing existed (and appellant provided only unauthenticated materials), the appellate court was required to presume the missing evidence supported the award, making review of the alleged errors impossible. The court affirmed confirmation of the arbitration award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want any meaningful chance to overturn or modify a private arbitration result—especially in high-stakes divorce/custody arbitrations—secure a court reporter and preserve an authenticated record. Without a transcript, appellate courts will presume the evidence supported the arbitrator, and challenges that the arbitrator exceeded their powers or got the facts wrong will usually be dead on arrival."
Curtis Lilly v. Kimberly Thompson
COA02
In Lilly v. Thompson, appellant Curtis Lilly sought to appeal a judgment from the 360th District Court, but the Tarrant County District Clerk notified the appellate court that payment for the clerk’s record had not been made. The Second Court of Appeals issued a warning and granted an extension of time for the appellant to comply. After the appellant failed to meet the extended deadline or provide proof of payment arrangements, the court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 37.3(b) and 42.3(b). The court held that the appellant's persistent failure to manage the administrative costs of the appeal required dismissal for want of prosecution, effectively terminating the appeal before it could be heard on its merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Filing a notice of appeal is only the first step; an appeal will be dismissed regardless of its merits if the appellant fails to pay the administrative fees for the trial court record. Diligent management of court costs and deadlines is a non-negotiable requirement for seeking appellate review in family law cases."
Michael Damone Jones v. The State of Texas
COA12
In Jones v. State, the Twelfth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could legally assess attorney's fees as court costs against a defendant who had already been declared indigent. The court analyzed Texas statutes requiring that once indigency is established, it is presumed to continue unless the record shows a 'material change' in the individual's financial circumstances. Finding that the record contained no evidence of financial improvement, the appellate court held the fee assessment was improper and modified the judgment to strike the $300 in attorney's fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you have been declared indigent by the court (such as through a Rule 145 Statement), you are protected from being ordered to pay attorney's fees or court costs unless the opposing party can prove a significant improvement in your financial situation."