Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
In the Matter of the Marriage of Albert Ray Garcia and Patricia Murguia Garcia
COA07
In this Texas divorce appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld a decree awarding the husband all of a premarital house titled in both parties’ names and a disproportionate share of a joint bank account. The court held that because the house was acquired before marriage, each party’s interest was separate property under the inception-of-title rule, and the deed’s presumption of equal ownership was rebutted by evidence that the husband alone paid the purchase price and did not intend a gift to the wife. Framed as a partition issue rather than a just-and-right division of community property, the trial court permissibly determined the parties’ true ownership interests and awarded the entire property to the husband. The court also rejected the wife’s challenge to the bank-account award because she attacked only one asset instead of showing that the overall community division was unjust.
Litigation Takeaway
"Joint title on premarital real estate does not guarantee a 50/50 result in divorce. If the property was acquired before marriage, lawyers should plead partition, trace the acquisition funds, and build evidence on ownership percentages and gift intent; on appeal, challenges to property division must address the overall estate, not just one account or asset."
Darwin Deason v. Barbara D'Amato
COA05
In Deason v. D'Amato, the former wife filed a post-divorce suit seeking ownership or the value of five pieces of jewelry, claiming the divorce papers had not actually resolved rights to those items. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that res judicata barred the claim because the jewelry had already been specifically identified as the husband’s separate property in both the premarital agreement and the Agreement Incident to Divorce, which was approved in the divorce decree. The court rejected the argument that a general reservation of a potential future claim preserved later litigation over the jewelry, explaining that property expressly allocated in the divorce documents is not “undivided property” under Family Code chapter 9. The court also clarified that chapter 9 is not jurisdictional, but reversed and vacated the $2.73 million jewelry award and reversed related fees and interest because the later suit was an impermissible relitigation of property already awarded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree or incorporated agreements specifically identify and award property, a later suit cannot repackage that dispute as an omitted-property or chapter 9 claim. Generic reservation language will not override a detailed property allocation, so lawyers must draft any true carve-out with precision and make sure the asset is not otherwise awarded elsewhere in the decree package."
Venson v. State
COA06
In Venson v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child by contact after the defendant argued that inconsistencies between the child’s trial testimony and prior forensic-interview statements made the evidence legally insufficient. The court applied the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard, measured the evidence against a hypothetically correct jury charge, and held that credibility conflicts and evolving details in a child’s disclosures are matters for the jury, not grounds for appellate reversal. The court also upheld the trial court’s designation of the forensic interviewer as the outcry witness because the mother received only a brief, nonspecific disclosure, while the interviewer obtained the first detailed account of the abuse. The conviction was affirmed in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, do not assume that inconsistencies alone destroy a child’s credibility or the legal force of the disclosure. Venson is strong crossover authority for the point that incremental or imperfectly consistent disclosures may still support protective relief, and that the key outcry question is who first received a sufficiently detailed description of the alleged conduct."
In the Interest of A.F., a child; In the Interest of M.M. and M.M., children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that Mother sold fentanyl while the children were present, left them with an apparently intoxicated boyfriend, had an existing neglectful-supervision case, admitted using fentanyl and methadone while caring for the children, and was incarcerated on drug-related sentences that prevented her from caring for or visiting them. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest factors, the court emphasized present and future danger, parental incapacity, and the children’s stable placement with a paternal aunt. Because the record supported a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest, the judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won by connecting misconduct to concrete parenting danger. Evidence of drug trafficking, active substance abuse, impaired supervision, incarceration, and prior Department involvement becomes especially powerful when paired with proof of a stable alternative placement. On appeal, unchallenged predicate findings can strongly reinforce a best-interest affirmance."
In the Interest of H.J.L. a/k/a H.J.H., a Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights after evidence showed he repeatedly sexually abused his child over several years. The court focused on Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), holding that the multi-year abuse constituted a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the child’s physical and emotional well-being. The court relied on the child’s outcry, therapist testimony about grooming, coercion, escalation, and trauma, and evidence of PTSD, depression, self-harm, and a suicide attempt. The same evidence, along with the child’s wish for no contact, progress in foster care, lack of safe family placement, and the ad litem’s recommendation, also supported the best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2).
Litigation Takeaway
"Sexual abuse evidence is powerful endangerment evidence in Texas family cases, not just CPS cases. When the record shows a sustained pattern of abuse, grooming, coercion, and resulting trauma, courts will support strong protective rulings—including termination, no-contact orders, supervised access, and sole conservatorship—even without a criminal conviction. Build the record through outcry, therapist, placement, and trauma evidence; noncooperation by the accused parent can further strengthen the endangerment and best-interest case."
Gray v. Beck
COA03
In Gray v. Beck, an heirship dispute turned on whether Jane Gray was Robert Beck’s informal spouse under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2). Gray offered evidence that they lived together in Texas and may have privately considered themselves married, but Matthew Beck moved for no-evidence summary judgment arguing there was insufficient proof of the required elements. The Third Court of Appeals held that an informal-marriage claim requires legally sufficient evidence of agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others in Texas as married. The court concluded the record lacked more than a scintilla of evidence on the key holding-out element, and it also rejected Gray’s notice complaint because the amended summary-judgment motion merely clarified existing grounds rather than adding new ones. The court affirmed summary judgment and the heirship judgment declaring Robert unmarried at death.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your case depends on proving an informal marriage, evidence of living together and a private commitment is not enough. You need concrete proof that the couple publicly represented themselves in Texas as married—through witnesses, documents, or consistent public conduct—or the claim may be defeated on no-evidence summary judgment."
Crane v. Crane
SCOTX
In Crane v. Crane, the Texas Supreme Court held that a no-evidence summary-judgment motion under Rule 166a is sufficiently specific when it identifies the factual predicates of the pleaded claims in enough detail to put the nonmovant on notice of what evidence is required. Sasha Crane sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging Robert Crane’s fence interfered with her easement and blocked access to her property. Robert moved for no-evidence summary judgment, asserting there was no evidence Sasha owned an easement crossing his property or that his fence crossed any such easement. The Court looked to the actual claims pleaded and concluded that fence interference was the sole factual basis for both the declaratory and injunctive claims, so the motion adequately challenged the essential elements even without using the precise phrase “interference with an easement.” Because Sasha produced evidence aimed mainly at proving the easement still existed, but no evidence that the fence actually crossed or interfered with the easement, the Court held take-nothing summary judgment was proper and reinstated the trial court’s judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law property and injunction disputes, courts will focus on the specific factual event that gives the claim life. A no-evidence motion does not need magic words if it clearly targets that operative fact. If you plead lockout, blocked access, gate changes, or interference with awarded property, you must have summary-judgment evidence proving the actual interference—not just the underlying right."
Arthur v. Williams
COA06
In Arthur v. Williams, the defendant tried to use a Rule 120a special appearance to argue that substituted service was defective because the process server allegedly failed to comply with the trial court’s substituted-service order and Rules 106 and 107. The Texarkana Court of Appeals focused on the substance of the complaint and held that these arguments challenged only the manner of service, not whether the defendant was amenable to Texas process. Relying on Kawasaki Steel and GFTA Trendanalysen, the court explained that service defects must be raised by motion to quash, not by special appearance, and that using a special appearance for that purpose constitutes a general appearance. The court therefore affirmed the denial of the special appearance.
Litigation Takeaway
"Use the right procedural tool. In Texas family cases, a special appearance is for true personal-jurisdiction or non-amenability challenges, not complaints that substituted service was carried out incorrectly. If the issue is noncompliance with a substituted-service order or Rules 106 and 107, raise it by motion to quash or risk turning the filing into a general appearance."
In re Coby Todd Bausch
COA08
In re Coby Todd Bausch arose from a trust-administration dispute after a trial court entered an order clarifying a successor trustee’s powers to wind up a family trust under Texas Property Code § 115.001. The relator sought mandamus, arguing the order was void because it was entered without notice and a hearing and because it impermissibly expanded the trustee’s authority beyond the trust instrument. The El Paso Court of Appeals denied relief, focusing on the threshold mandamus requirement that the relator show no adequate appellate remedy. The court explained that even if the relator disputed the merits of the trustee-powers order, those complaints were the kind ordinarily reviewed on direct appeal, and the relator never developed any argument showing why appeal after final judgment would be inadequate. The court also rejected the due-process theory as a basis for extraordinary relief because the trial court later held a reconsideration hearing, considered the parties’ positions, and reaffirmed its ruling. The petition for writ of mandamus and motion to stay were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus is not a shortcut for challenging an aggressive interlocutory order. Even if a trial court acts without an initial hearing or grants broad fiduciary powers, the petition will likely fail unless you specifically show why a normal appeal cannot fix the harm. Preserve error, build a record, seek reconsideration, and separately prove irreparable harm before choosing mandamus."
In the Interest of J.Z.A., a Child
SCOTX
In In re J.Z.A., the Supreme Court of Texas held that former Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O) allowed termination only for violating a court order that specifically stated the actions required for reunification. The Department relied on service-plan language requiring Mother to “follow through with all recommendations” from providers and to “actively participate” and “utilize learned skills” during visits. The Court concluded those directives were too vague and open-ended to satisfy the statute, especially where the later recommendation to take antipsychotic medication was never incorporated into an amended court order. Because the evidence showed, at most, noncompliance with generalized expectations rather than a specific court-ordered act, the Court reversed and vacated the termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party’s rights depend on compliance with an order, the order must say exactly what must be done. Vague directives like “follow recommendations” or “actively participate” are poor enforcement language and may not support termination, sanctions, or other serious consequences without specific, court-ordered terms."