Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Hernandez v. State
COA04
In Hernandez v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support aggravated sexual assault of a child despite some inconsistencies in the child’s statements and a largely nonspecific SANE exam. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Texas authority on penetration, the court concluded the jury could credit the child’s reports that Hernandez touched “inside” her vagina, that it hurt, and that the contact occurred inside her underwear, which was enough to support the penetration element. The court also held any Confrontation Clause complaint about limits on cross-examination of the mother was not preserved because counsel did not make a clear constitutional objection or offer of proof. Finally, the court reversed and remanded Count II for a new punishment hearing because the 35-year sentence for indecency with a child by contact exceeded the lawful second-degree felony range of 2 to 20 years.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-abuse-driven custody or protective-order litigation, imperfect child outcry testimony and a normal or equivocal SANE exam do not automatically defeat the allegation; those issues usually go to weight and credibility. But if you want to challenge alternative-causation limits or other evidentiary restrictions on appeal, preserve error precisely with specific objections and an offer of proof."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Samantha RaeJon Downs and Ethan Sahen Downs and in the Interest of P.A.D. and Q.P.D., Children
COA06
In Downs, the Texarkana court of appeals held that when a December 11, 2025 final merits hearing functioned as the first trial setting in a contested divorce and child-custody case, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 required at least forty-five days’ notice. The record did not establish that an earlier June setting was actually received or remained operative, and Mother had objected in writing to the shortened setting. Relying on In re K.M.L. and Highsmith, the court treated Rule 245’s first-setting notice requirement as a constitutional due-process protection, not merely a procedural scheduling rule, and concluded that Mother did not waive the complaint by failing to file or properly present a continuance motion or by not appearing at trial. The court affirmed the divorce itself, but reversed the remaining challenged portions of the final decree and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a final hearing is the first real trial setting in a contested family-law case, forty-five days’ notice under Rule 245 is a due-process requirement. Actual notice, nonappearance, or defects in a continuance motion will not necessarily save the judgment; lawyers should make a clear Rule 245 record or risk reversal."
American Zurich Insurance Company v. Mark Carrera
COA04
In American Zurich Insurance Company v. Carrera, the claimant tried to expand an accepted workplace injury from a wrist and lumbar fracture to include a hip fracture, closed head injury, traumatic brain injury, hallucinations, and lifetime benefits based on alleged incurable insanity. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that these were medically complex conditions requiring competent expert medical testimony on diagnosis, causation, and disability. The claimant’s proof—family-member observations, temporal proximity, and two unsupported doctor letters—was legally insufficient, and the letters were also treated as hearsay. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and rendered judgment affirming the agency decision denying the expanded injury findings and lifetime income benefits.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party wants a Texas court to make findings about complex medical or psychiatric conditions, lay testimony and generic doctor letters are not enough. In family cases involving TBI, PTSD, psychosis, abuse-related diagnoses, incapacity, or inability to work, Carrera is a strong gatekeeping case for requiring qualified expert testimony that actually connects diagnosis, causation, and functional impact."
In re José Garza
COA03
In In re José Garza, the Austin Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 264.408(d-1) required the trial court to deny a criminal defendant’s request to have CAC forensic interview videos transcribed once the State had already made the recordings reasonably available for review under Code of Criminal Procedure article 39.15(d). Relying on its prior decision in Tharp, the court concluded that a verbatim transcript is a prohibited copy or reproduction of the recording, regardless of protective-order limits or neutral court-reporter procedures. Because the statute left the trial court with no discretion, the order authorizing transcription exceeded the court’s authority, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a statute tightly limits access to CAC forensic interviews, lawyers cannot get around that limit by asking for a transcript or other derivative version of the recording. In family cases involving abuse allegations, build your strategy around lawful review access, note-taking, and expert inspection protocols—not reproduction requests that invite statutory objections and possible mandamus."
Gonzalez v. State
COA01
In Gonzalez v. State, the First Court of Appeals affirmed admission of a friend’s testimony recounting the complainants’ earlier disclosures of abuse. The defense argued hearsay, but the State invoked Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(1)(B), contending that the defense had implied through voir dire, cross-examination, and closing that the complainants had recently embellished or fabricated their allegations for trial. The court held the complaint was not preserved because the defense did not specifically challenge the rule’s elements after the State identified the basis for admission. On the merits, the court concluded that, under Hammons, the trial court could consider the totality of the defense presentation and reasonably find an implied charge of recent fabrication. Because the prior statements to the friend were made years before the alleged motive to falsify arose, the premotive requirement was satisfied, and the testimony was properly admitted as prior consistent statements.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases involving abuse allegations or litigation-driven credibility fights, be careful when implying that a witness recently tailored testimony for custody, possession, or divorce advantage. That strategy can open the door to earlier consistent statements that would otherwise stay out. If you want to admit such statements, identify the exact motive alleged by the opponent and prove the statement predates it; if you want to exclude them, preserve element-specific objections and avoid turning a reliability attack into an accusation of calculated fabrication."
Jaka Janaka v. Rina Sefrin Hutagaol
COA01
In Janaka v. Hutagaol, the father sought to modify the mother’s possession terms only months after a divorce decree based on a mediated settlement agreement, alleging a false CPS report, possession-schedule violations, and interference with the children’s activities. The First Court of Appeals held that Family Code section 156.101(a)(1) requires proof of a threshold material and substantial change in circumstances since the earlier of the prior order or the underlying MSA, and that disputed evidence of post-decree conflict did not require the trial court to find such a change. Because the trial court was entitled to credit the mother’s explanation for contacting CPS and to treat the parties’ disputes as ordinary continuing conflict rather than a new substantial development, the appellate court affirmed the denial of modification and the attorney’s-fees award based on a finding that the suit was frivolous or designed to harass.
Litigation Takeaway
"A possession modification is not a do-over for co-parenting conflict. If you file soon after an agreed decree, you need concrete, corroborated proof of a genuinely new and material change tied to the statutory baseline date—not just allegations of interference, CPS involvement, or bad motives—or you risk losing and paying the other side’s fees."
Sam Alam v. Randy Reimer, CPA and RMH CPA, PLLC
COA14
In Alam v. Reimer, the plaintiff amended his petition before the Rule 91a hearing to add several new causes of action after the defendants had already filed a Rule 91a motion attacking only the original claims. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Rule 91a is claim-specific: a motion may dismiss only the causes of action it actually identifies and challenges. Applying Rules 91a.1, 91a.2, and 91a.5, the court concluded that the original motion still reached the claims first pleaded in the original petition and re-alleged in the amended petition, but it did not automatically expand to newly added claims simply because the defendants chose to stand on it. The trial court therefore erred by dismissing the new, unchallenged claims, requiring reversal and remand as to those claims, while affirming dismissal of the previously challenged claims against Reimer individually.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a live amended petition adds new claims, an earlier Rule 91a motion does not automatically knock them out. In family-law cases where pleadings change quickly, the movant must amend the Rule 91a motion to specifically identify each new cause of action, and the non-movant should object to any blanket dismissal that goes beyond the claims actually challenged."
Tremayne Edward Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Johnson v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether admitting a child complainant’s CAC forensic interview required reversal after the defendant was convicted of sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. The court held that although defense counsel initially said “no objection,” a later objection made before the video was published to the jury was timely enough to preserve some complaint because the trial court could still stop the jury from seeing it. But the court limited preservation to the specific trial objections actually made—bolstering and prejudice—not broader hearsay or Rule 403 theories raised on appeal. Assuming without deciding that admitting the CAC video was error, the court found the error harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) because the same abuse allegations had already come in through the forensic interviewer’s testimony and through the child’s own live testimony in greater detail. Since the video was cumulative and there was no showing it substantially influenced the verdict, the convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, preserving an objection is only half the battle—counsel must also build a record showing why a CAC interview or child recording is uniquely harmful and not just cumulative of other testimony. If the same allegations are already before the factfinder through the child, an outcry witness, or a counselor, an appellate court may treat any error in admitting an additional recording as harmless."
Payne v. Cocoroiu
COA14
In Payne v. Cocoroiu, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification order after the father challenged personal jurisdiction, service, venue, and the evidentiary basis for the judgment. The court held that by filing a pro se answer before filing a Rule 120a special appearance, the father made a general appearance and waived any objection to personal jurisdiction; that same appearance also cured any service defects under Rules 120 and 124. The court further held that Harris County had continuing exclusive jurisdiction because of the earlier final parentage order, defeating the venue challenge. Finally, because the father failed to provide the reporter’s record, the appellate court presumed the missing evidence supported the modification findings and rejected unpreserved complaints.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, a respondent who files an answer before a special appearance likely waives personal-jurisdiction and service complaints. Family litigators should assess jurisdiction immediately, carefully sequence pleadings, and make sure the appellate record is complete—especially in modification cases where most complaints depend on the hearing evidence."
In the Interest of D.A., A.A., K.A., & G.A., Children
COA12
In In re D.A., the Tyler Court of Appeals considered whether the Department’s endangerment proof was sufficient to terminate a father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) when the evidence was largely circumstantial rather than direct. Father argued the absence of medical testimony, expert testimony, photographs, and eyewitnesses made the evidence legally and factually insufficient. The court rejected that argument, explaining that Texas law does not require direct evidence of endangerment and that circumstantial evidence may support a firm belief or conviction if the total record reasonably shows the parent knowingly allowed endangering conditions or engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct. Applying the J.F.C./C.H. sufficiency standards and relying on In re Lipsky, the court deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations and held the cumulative force of the record was sufficient to support termination under subsections (D) and (E), affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"You do not need a “smoking gun” witness or expert to prove or defeat endangerment. In Texas family cases, a well-developed pattern of indirect evidence can be enough—so the key fight is usually over the strength of the inferences, not the mere lack of direct proof."