Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Beenish Khurram v. Yasir Ahmed
COA01
In Khurram v. Ahmed, a wife in a contested Harris County divorce argued that her notices of interlocutory appeal from multiple pretrial rulings and her motion to stay in the court of appeals prevented the trial court from going forward with the scheduled bench trial and final decree. The First Court of Appeals rejected that argument, relying primarily on Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(b), which provides that in Family Code cases an interlocutory appeal does not stay the commencement of trial. The court also held that a motion to stay is not self-executing and does not suspend proceedings unless the appellate court actually grants relief. It further found the wife had actual notice of trial, that the written decree controlled over any conflicting oral pronouncement, that missing reporter’s records required presumptions in favor of the judgment, and that her failure to appear waived complaints about limits on her affirmative claims. The final divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, a notice of interlocutory appeal or a filed motion to stay does not automatically stop trial. Unless the appellate court signs a stay order, parties should assume the case will proceed and must still appear, prepare, and make their record."
In Re The State of Texas ex rel. Sean Teare, Harris County District Attorney
COA01
In this criminal mandamus opinion with family-law crossover significance, the First Court of Appeals held that a trial court had no statutory authority to grant early termination of felony community supervision where each judgment contained an express deadly-weapon finding. The defendant received community supervision in two aggravated-assault cases, later obtained same-day early discharge orders, and the State sought mandamus after the trial court refused to reconsider. The court analyzed articles 42A.701 and 42A.054 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and concluded that felony cases with deadly-weapon findings are excluded from early-termination eligibility. Because the discharge orders were unauthorized by statute, rescission was a ministerial duty, and mandamus was the proper remedy. For family-law crossover cases, the opinion underscores that lawyers must verify the actual legal status of criminal supervision before relying on an early discharge order in disputes involving safety, possession, conservatorship, firearms, or protective relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"In crossover family-violence cases, do not assume a signed criminal early-discharge order is valid. If the underlying felony judgment includes a deadly-weapon finding, early termination of supervision may be statutorily barred, and family-court strategy should be built on the actual judgment and supervision status, not a potentially voidable discharge order."
In Re Johnny Joseph Chavez III
COA07
In In re Chavez, the Amarillo Court of Appeals denied habeas relief from a child-support contempt order because the relator’s petition was inadequately briefed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3, especially Rule 52.3(i). Chavez raised multiple complaints, including lack of notice, denial of counsel, inability-to-pay findings, and other due-process defects, but the court did not reach the merits because he offered only conclusory assertions without developed legal analysis, controlling authority, or record citations. The court held that an original habeas petition may be denied outright when the relator fails to clearly explain why the alleged defects render the contempt order void or otherwise entitle him to relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law contempt habeas practice, even potentially strong due-process complaints can be lost if the petition is not built like a true appellate brief. Lead with the voidness theory, support each issue with controlling authority and precise record citations, and explain exactly why the defect justifies habeas relief—courts will not develop the argument for you."
Mejia v. Bernal
COA01
In Mejia v. Bernal, the appellant tried to directly appeal a family-court order enforcing temporary orders and property division by contempt. The First Court of Appeals looked past the order’s title to its substance, noting the trial court expressly found Mejia in criminal contempt for violating prior orders. Applying settled Texas law that contempt adjudications are not reviewable by ordinary appeal, the court held it lacked appellate jurisdiction. Because contempt must be challenged through habeas corpus or mandamus, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume an enforcement order is appealable just because it concerns divorce, temporary orders, or property division. If the order actually adjudicates contempt, the proper review vehicle is usually habeas or mandamus—not a notice of appeal. In mixed enforcement orders, parse the contempt and non-contempt portions separately and act fast to preserve the right procedural remedy."
Wonisha Tatum v. Destiny Sallie
COA01
In Tatum v. Sallie, the appellant tried to challenge both a contempt order and a later order dismissing her protective-order application. The court first held it had no jurisdiction over a direct appeal from the contempt order. As to the dismissal, the notice of appeal was untimely under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 because it was filed well after the 30-day deadline and no deadline-extending motion or timely extension request was filed. The appellant then attempted to recast the case as a restricted appeal under Rule 30, but the court rejected that strategy because her trial counsel appeared at the dismissal hearing and made statements about the client’s lack of communication and lack of interest in pursuing the case. The court treated those statements as participation in the decision-making event that produced the dismissal, which barred restricted-appeal jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your lawyer appears and speaks at the hearing that leads to dismissal or another final order, you likely cannot rely on a restricted appeal later—even if you personally were absent. Family-law litigators should treat dismissal, withdrawal, status, and prove-up settings as potentially dispositive events, preserve ordinary appellate deadlines immediately, and not assume Rule 30 can rescue a late notice of appeal."
In the Interest of V.I.P.M., a Child
COA05
In *In the Interest of V.I.P.M., a Child*, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a father could immediately appeal an order denying his motion to unseal records from an earlier divorce case. The court held he could not. Its analysis focused on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a: although Rule 76a(8) allows immediate appeal of certain sealing orders, Rule 76a’s definition of “court records” expressly excludes documents filed in actions originally arising under the Family Code. Because the records at issue were filed in a divorce case, the order denying unsealing was not transformed into a final, appealable order. The court also rejected an equal-protection challenge to the Family Code exclusion under rational-basis review and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume Rule 76a creates an interlocutory appeal in family-law cases involving sealed records. If the documents were filed in a case originally arising under the Family Code, a sealing or unsealing order is usually still interlocutory, so lawyers must instead evaluate finality, preservation, and whether mandamus is the proper path for immediate review."
Webb v. Ramirez
COA03
In Webb v. Ramirez, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a bill of review attacking a default parentage order. Webb argued he lacked notice of the final hearing, but at the bill-of-review hearing he offered no testimony, affidavit, or documents to explain his failure to appear or to rebut the court file. The trial court judicially noticed its file, which showed personal service and a signed February 2023 order setting the April final hearing and bearing Webb’s signature. Relying on Valdez, Katy Venture, and Drewery, the court held that even when a petitioner frames the challenge as a due-process notice defect, he is excused only from proving the first two traditional bill-of-review elements—not from proving that his own fault or negligence did not contribute to the default. Because Webb presented no competent evidence negating negligence and the file affirmatively showed notice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review based on alleged lack of notice is an evidence problem, not just a legal argument. If the court file shows service or a signed setting order, the petitioner must come forward with real evidence explaining the missed hearing and negating his own negligence; otherwise, the file itself may defeat the attack."
Steven Benedict and Rayma Benedict v. Tonya Hill and Charles Edward Hill, Jr.
COA03
In Benedict v. Hill, grandparents filed a SAPCR modification seeking conservatorship of their granddaughter, and the trial court dismissed for lack of standing under Texas Family Code section 102.003(a)(9). The Austin Court of Appeals held that, under the pre-September 2025 version of the statute, a nonparent grandparent did not have to prove exclusive care, exclusive possession, or total parental abandonment to establish standing. Instead, the court analyzed whether Rayma Benedict had actually exercised care, control, and possession in a parent-like role during the required six-month period ending within 90 days before filing. Because the evidence showed shared residence on the family property, substantial day-to-day caregiving, transportation, schooling support, financial support, and involvement in the child’s routine and welfare, the court concluded the trial court applied too restrictive a standard and reversed the dismissal as to Rayma. The court affirmed dismissal as to Steven Benedict, holding that a step-grandparent not related within the third degree of consanguinity did not qualify for standing under this theory, and it also rejected the argument that a grandparent-access affidavit defect defeated the separate section 102.003(a)(9) claim.
Litigation Takeaway
"For grandparent-standing cases, the key question is functional parenting during the statutory window—not whether the parent disappeared from the child’s life. Build or attack standing with specific proof about the child’s residence, daily care, decision-making, and continuity during the six-month period, and make sure each petitioner independently fits the statute."
In the Interest of G.H., a Child
COA11
In In re G.H., the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(2). The court examined a record showing both parents’ ongoing substance abuse, criminal history, prior endangering conduct, instability, and continued problems even after Department involvement and safety measures were put in place. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest framework, the court emphasized that the same evidence supporting endangerment can also support best interest, and that a factfinder may infer future danger from a parent’s past conduct. The parents’ service-plan compliance and supervised visitation did not outweigh the broader evidence of recurring risk, so the termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won or lost on patterns, not box-checking. Evidence of repeated drug use, criminal instability, and unsafe conduct—especially after CPS or court intervention—can outweigh service-plan completion and recent improvement because courts may infer future risk from past behavior."
In re Laci Kay Johnson s/k/a Laci Kay Bode
COA05
In this mandamus proceeding, the relator challenged two family-law-related oral rulings: the trial court’s denial of a habeas petition and denial of a motion to dismiss. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the relator failed to provide a sufficient mandamus record. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3(l)(1)(B) and 52.7(a), along with settled mandamus law, the court explained that mandamus relief requires either a signed written order or a reporter’s record showing that an oral ruling was clear, specific, and enforceable. Because the relator provided neither a written order nor hearing transcripts, the court could not determine what the trial court actually ordered and denied mandamus and the related emergency motions.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you may need mandamus review of a bench ruling, build the record immediately: get a court reporter, obtain the transcript, and push for a signed written order. In family-law emergency practice, an oral ruling without a transcript is usually a dead end on mandamus."