Opinion Library

EX PARTE BESSIE TEKILA MARTIN

COA02

After Bessie Tekila Martin's deferred adjudication in Tarrant County was adjudicated, she faced new charges in Parker County for the same conduct. She filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Parker County prosecution was barred by double jeopardy because those offenses had been 'taken into account' during her Tarrant County sentencing under Texas Penal Code Section 12.45. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the 'paper trail' and found significant record gaps, including missing motions and inconsistent cause numbers. Consequently, the court held that it could not determine which specific offenses were actually admitted and considered, remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute.

Christopher Michael Green v. The State of Texas

COA05

In Green v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals examined whether a trial court erred by admitting SANE (Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner) records of an unavailable victim during a criminal punishment phase. The defendant argued that admitting graphic forensic evidence without the victim's testimony was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 because he could not cross-examine the witness. The court analyzed the records' high probative value regarding the defendant's character and pattern of behavior, especially since the forensic evidence was linked to the defendant via DNA. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, ruling that forensic medical records are admissible to show a pattern of conduct even without live testimony from the victim.

Mangawe v. The State of Texas

COA02

Bengamiah Mangawe appealed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse, arguing that vague testimony regarding dates (like 'November-ish') failed to meet the 30-day statutory duration requirement. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the evidence under a deferential standard, noting that a detective's testimony about Mangawe’s non-verbal 'nod' or confirmation of the timeline during an interview was substantive evidence. The court held that the jury is the sole arbiter of credibility and can resolve chronological conflicts in favor of the verdict, even when dates are approximate or admissions are not captured on audio.

EarnhartBuilt, LLC v. Preferred Materials, LLC, Procore Technologies, Inc., Express Lien, Inc. d/b/a Levelset, Michael Mann, and J. Earnhart, Inc.

COA05

In EarnhartBuilt, LLC v. Preferred Materials, LLC, a materials supplier filed a lien to collect $17,000 for concrete delivered to a construction project. The property owner sued, claiming the lien was "fraudulent" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 12.002 because it was filed after the statutory deadline. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the "knowledge" and "intent" requirements of the statute, distinguishing between a lien that is merely legally invalid and one that is fraudulent. The court held that because the underlying debt for the materials was legitimate, the supplier did not have the requisite "actual knowledge" of fraudulence at the time of filing, even if the lien was procedurally defective. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the supplier.

CB Sanders v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Sanders v. State, the Seventh Court of Appeals addressed whether an appeal has merit after a defendant enters a 'plea of true' to violating community supervision. The appellant, who was originally on deferred adjudication for promoting prostitution, admitted to ten violations. The court analyzed the case under the Anders framework, which requires an independent review of the record for nonfrivolous issues. The court held that because a 'plea of true' constitutes sufficient evidence standing alone to support an adjudication of guilt, the appeal was meritless. This ruling confirms that such admissions are legally conclusive, leaving no room for a defendant to challenge the evidentiary basis of the trial court's judgment.

In re Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield

COA06

Relators sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Panola County court to grant a mandatory transfer of a SAPCR proceeding to Smith County, where an adoption was pending, pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 155.201(a-1). The child's mother had filed a controverting affidavit, and the trial court had scheduled a hearing on the matter. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory framework, noting that while Section 155.201(a-1) is mandatory, Section 155.204(e) requires a hearing when a transfer is contested. The court held that mandamus relief was inappropriate because the Relators failed to show that the trial court had refused to rule or that an unreasonable amount of time had passed, especially since a hearing was already on the docket.

C. Q. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

COA03

The Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate a mother’s parental rights following allegations of drug use and child neglect. While the mother demonstrated significant recent progress, including stable housing and numerous negative urinalyses, she continued to test positive for cocaine in hair follicle tests. Additionally, her live-in fiancé refused to submit to drug testing. The Court of Appeals analyzed the conflicting forensic evidence and the mother's choice of partners under the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard. The court held that the trial court was entitled to credit the hair follicle results over other tests and that the presence of an untested partner constituted endangering conduct. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the termination of her parental rights.

Kist v. Kist

COA14

Kathryn Kist sought to lift a geographic residency restriction to relocate her four children from Texas to Indiana, presenting evidence of a $70,000 job offer, free housing from her parents, and access to private schooling. She argued that the father, Jonathan, was largely uninvolved and that staying in Texas was a financial hardship. Jonathan contested the move, presenting evidence of his involvement and the children's stability in their current environment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict using the Lenz factors and Texas public policy favoring 'frequent and continuing contact' with both parents. The court held that because the trial court faced conflicting testimony regarding the father’s involvement and the children's best interests, it did not abuse its discretion in maintaining the residency restriction or in characterizing Jonathan's post-petition home purchase as his separate property.

COA10

In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, S.W. appealed an order committing her to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. Her court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous and a motion to withdraw. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code § 51.101(a), which requires counsel appointed at the initial detention stage to represent the child 'until the case is terminated.' Drawing a parallel to the Texas Supreme Court’s 'continuing duty' doctrine in parental rights termination cases (In re P.M.), the court interpreted 'termination' to mean the exhaustion of all appeals through the Texas Supreme Court. Consequently, while the court affirmed the commitment order, it denied the attorney's motion to withdraw.

Bravo v. Bravo

COA02

In Bravo v. Bravo, a Husband challenged a final divorce decree that appointed the Wife as sole managing conservator, denied him all access to his children, and ordered child support. He argued he received only four days' notice of the trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support the findings. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that because the Husband's attorney appeared and announced 'ready' at trial, any objection to the 45-day notice requirement was waived. Furthermore, because the Husband failed to provide a reporter’s record (the transcript of the trial), the court applied an irrebuttable presumption that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the judge's rulings. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decree in its entirety.