Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Dorsett v. State
COA05
In Dorsett v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld convictions for injury to a disabled individual and injury to a child under Penal Code § 22.04, rejecting arguments that conflicting and uncertain witness testimony made the evidence legally insufficient. The court applied Jackson v. Virginia and deferred to the trial court’s role as factfinder, holding that direct testimony from the victims and another child witness, combined with corroborating physical evidence, officer observations, and medical-style testimony about the injuries, allowed a rational factfinder to find bodily injury and identity beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the existence of a custody dispute and inconsistencies in details did not negate otherwise probative abuse evidence when the record was viewed cumulatively and in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-related family-law cases, inconsistency alone rarely defeats a claim. Trial courts may credit imperfect testimony when it is supported by photos, injuries, third-party observations, physical conditions in the home, timelines, or other corroborating evidence, and a custody-dispute motive defense will not overcome a well-built cumulative record by itself."
Rogers v. State
COA14
In Rogers v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed admission of extensive prior abuse evidence in an injury-to-a-child prosecution against a mother. The court held that repeated prior acts against the same children were highly probative of intent, state of mind, credibility, and the nature of the parent-child relationship under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 38.37 and 38.371, and that Rule 403 did not require exclusion because the probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or cumulativeness. The court also held that after the mother blurted out in front of the jury that her daughter was lying, the State could introduce the daughter’s earlier forensic-interview statement as a prior consistent statement to rebut the accusation of fabrication.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, prior incidents within the same family relationship can be powerful context evidence when tied to endangerment, intent, credibility, or the parent-child dynamic, and generic Rule 403 objections usually will not be enough to keep them out. Lawyers should also be careful when accusing a child or other witness of fabrication, because that attack may open the door to otherwise inadmissible prior consistent statements."
Hoisington v. State
COA11
In Hoisington v. State, the Eastland Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by exposure. The defendant argued the proof failed because there was no DNA evidence, no recovered pornography, and no conclusive forensic findings. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferred to the jury’s credibility determinations. The child complainant gave age-appropriate, internally consistent testimony describing exposure, sexual contact, oral contact, and digital penetration that tracked the statutory elements. Her account was reinforced by consistent disclosures to a SANE nurse and forensic interviewer, medical findings consistent with her description, and corroboration of a specific detail about a pink sex toy. The court held that a child complainant’s testimony alone can sustain the findings if believed, and the absence of DNA or other definitive forensic proof did not render the evidence insufficient.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, do not let the case rise or fall on DNA or conclusive physical proof. A child’s specific, developmentally appropriate, and consistent disclosures—especially when supported by outcry, forensic interview, medical evidence, or corroborating details—can be enough to justify protective relief, while credibility attacks must focus on real inconsistencies or contamination concerns rather than generic claims of “no forensic evidence.”"
In Re Edward Scott Rubin
COA05
In In re Rubin, the relator sought habeas relief from contempt and incarceration orders entered in a Dallas County family-law case. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the contempt challenge because the relator failed to provide competent proof of present confinement, which is a threshold requirement for habeas relief from a contempt commitment. Relying on prior cases distinguishing inadequate indirect proof from reliable evidence such as a sheriff’s affidavit, the court held the filing did not establish current restraint on liberty. The court also struck the petition and appendix because they contained unredacted sensitive information about minor children in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9, and it denied habeas relief, rendering the emergency request for release moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a family-law contempt habeas, the merits do not matter unless you first prove the client is actually in custody with competent evidence such as jail records or a sheriff’s affidavit. And even in emergency filings, scrub every appendix for minors’ identifying information or risk having the filing struck."
Mulford v. 1st Service Solutions
COA06
In Mulford v. 1st Service Solutions, a former executive sued for more than $800,000 in unpaid commissions, but he never served mandatory initial disclosures, filed witness and exhibit lists less than 30 days before trial, and produced nearly 180 pages of documents only days before trial. The defendants moved to strike under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The Texarkana Court of Appeals treated the issue as a mandatory-exclusion question rather than a discretionary sanctions dispute, holding that once the record showed the evidence and witnesses were not timely disclosed, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. Because he did not establish either exception, the trial court properly excluded the exhibits and witness testimony, and that exclusion left him unable to prove his claim. The court affirmed the take-nothing judgment and held any continuance complaint was waived.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 193.6 can win or lose a case before the merits are ever tried: if your documents, witnesses, or trial exhibits were not timely disclosed, the court must exclude them unless you prove good cause or no unfair surprise/prejudice. In family law, that can wipe out tracing claims, custody witnesses, valuation evidence, or fee proof, so build trial evidence through timely Rule 194 disclosures and prompt supplementation from the start."
Russo v. State
COA04
In Russo v. State, the defendant argued that only the district court that originally placed him on deferred adjudication could later revoke supervision and adjudicate guilt unless the case was formally transferred under Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42A.151 and 42A.754. The Fourth Court of Appeals rejected that argument, explaining that no statutory transfer occurred at all; instead, another district judge in the same county, sitting in a court with concurrent jurisdiction, heard the revocation proceeding. Relying on Texas Government Code section 24.003, article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution, and Mata v. State, the court held that same-county district judges may hear and determine matters pending in another district court without a written transfer or bench-exchange order unless a contrary statute or rule requires one. The court therefore affirmed the revocation, adjudication, and sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before attacking an order because a different same-county district judge heard the case, distinguish a true jurisdictional or mandatory-transfer defect from mere internal court assignment. If the courts share concurrent jurisdiction and no statute or local rule requires transfer, the absence of a written transfer or bench-exchange order likely will not make the order void."
Estate of Lavon Matrick Frisby
COA12
In Estate of Frisby, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a petitioner could not use a bill of review to attack an adverse summary judgment when she had an ordinary appellate remedy and failed to pursue it. The petitioner tried to revive fraud, notice, heirship, and probate-defect allegations through a bill of review after losing a 2025 state-court suit and not appealing that judgment. Relying on longstanding Texas bill-of-review doctrine, including Wembley and Caldwell, the court treated exhaustion of legal remedies as a threshold requirement and concluded that the missed direct appeal barred equitable relief as a matter of law. The court also concluded that complaints about the lack of an evidentiary hearing and dismissal before service were waived for inadequate briefing, while noting that a separate hearing is not always required at the prima facie stage.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review is a last-resort remedy, not a backup plan for a missed appeal. In family-law cases involving divorce decrees, custody orders, property divisions, or enforcement judgments, the first question is whether the complaining party exhausted available post-judgment and appellate remedies; if not, the case may be defeated on that threshold ground before the court ever reaches allegations of fraud, lack of notice, or concealment."
Beenish Khurram v. Yasir Ahmed
COA01
In Khurram v. Ahmed, a wife in a contested Harris County divorce argued that her notices of interlocutory appeal from multiple pretrial rulings and her motion to stay in the court of appeals prevented the trial court from going forward with the scheduled bench trial and final decree. The First Court of Appeals rejected that argument, relying primarily on Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(b), which provides that in Family Code cases an interlocutory appeal does not stay the commencement of trial. The court also held that a motion to stay is not self-executing and does not suspend proceedings unless the appellate court actually grants relief. It further found the wife had actual notice of trial, that the written decree controlled over any conflicting oral pronouncement, that missing reporter’s records required presumptions in favor of the judgment, and that her failure to appear waived complaints about limits on her affirmative claims. The final divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, a notice of interlocutory appeal or a filed motion to stay does not automatically stop trial. Unless the appellate court signs a stay order, parties should assume the case will proceed and must still appear, prepare, and make their record."
In Re The State of Texas ex rel. Sean Teare, Harris County District Attorney
COA01
In this mandamus proceeding, the State challenged trial-court orders that discharged a defendant from felony community supervision before his supervision terms expired, even though both criminal judgments contained affirmative deadly-weapon findings involving a firearm. The First Court of Appeals analyzed Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42A.701 and 42A.054 together and held the statutory text is clear: early termination is unavailable for a defendant convicted of a felony covered by article 42A.054, including a case with a deadly-weapon finding. Because the trial court lacked statutory authority to grant early discharge, its orders were unauthorized, and rescission was a ministerial duty rather than a discretionary call. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to rescind the early-termination orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a criminal judgment includes an affirmative deadly-weapon finding, do not assume community supervision can end early based on good performance, agreement, or equitable arguments. For family-law crossover cases, treat that supervision end date as fixed and verify the signed judgment before building custody, safety, possession, relocation, or settlement strategy around any claimed early discharge."
In Re Johnny Joseph Chavez III
COA07
In In re Chavez, the Amarillo Court of Appeals denied habeas relief from a child-support contempt order because the relator’s petition was inadequately briefed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3, especially Rule 52.3(i). Chavez raised multiple complaints, including lack of notice, denial of counsel, inability-to-pay findings, and other due-process defects, but the court did not reach the merits because he offered only conclusory assertions without developed legal analysis, controlling authority, or record citations. The court held that an original habeas petition may be denied outright when the relator fails to clearly explain why the alleged defects render the contempt order void or otherwise entitle him to relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law contempt habeas practice, even potentially strong due-process complaints can be lost if the petition is not built like a true appellate brief. Lead with the voidness theory, support each issue with controlling authority and precise record citations, and explain exactly why the defect justifies habeas relief—courts will not develop the argument for you."