Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Skidmore v. Skidmore
COA14
In Skidmore v. Skidmore, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a final divorce decree because the husband failed to preserve most of his appellate complaints and inadequately briefed others. He challenged witness exclusion, admission of allegedly unconstitutional evidence, property characterization, child-support calculations, credibility determinations, and cumulative error. The court analyzed the appeal primarily under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and 38.1, emphasizing that appellate complaints must be timely and specifically raised in the trial court, must match the complaint made on appeal, and must be supported by record citations and legal authority. Because the record did not show preserved objections or developed briefing—and one no-evidence issue attacked a finding not contained in the decree—the court declined to reach most merits issues and affirmed the decree in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family-law appeals are usually won or lost in the trial court record. If you want to complain on appeal about excluded witnesses, admitted evidence, property characterization, or child-support calculations, you must make a timely, specific objection, obtain a ruling, make an offer of proof when needed, and then brief the issue with precise record citations and authority. Otherwise, even potentially strong complaints will be waived."
In the Interest of A.V. and B.L., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights because the judgment was based on an unrevoked affidavit of voluntary relinquishment that complied with Texas Family Code section 161.103. Applying section 161.211(c), the court held appellate review was limited to whether the affidavit was procured by fraud, duress, or coercion. The affidavit was prima facie valid, and the mother’s pro se claims of fear, pressure, and false hope were unsupported by any developed evidentiary record, including the absence of a motion for new trial. Because she failed to prove fraud, duress, or coercion by a preponderance of the evidence, the court found no nonfrivolous appellate issue, affirmed the termination order, and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a termination order rests on a section 161.103-compliant, unrevoked relinquishment affidavit, appellate options narrow dramatically. If a party wants to undo the affidavit, counsel must build a trial-court record with specific evidence of fraud, duress, or coercion; regret, generalized pressure, or unsupported allegations will not suffice on appeal."
In the Interest of G.H., a Child
COA02
In In re G.H., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of parental rights after the Department proved both predicate grounds and the additional Family Code section 161.001(f)(1) requirement that, despite reasonable reunification efforts, a continuing danger in the home prevented the child’s return. The court focused on present, unresolved risk—not just past misconduct—and held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient where the parents continued using marijuana, missed drug tests, refused substance-abuse services, visited inconsistently, failed to remedy unsafe housing that included a convicted child sex offender, and showed ongoing instability. The court also held the same evidence, along with the child’s stability and bonding in foster placement, supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts want proof that danger has actually been fixed, not merely explained away. In termination and other custody-related cases, partial compliance, a few clean tests, or promises to improve will not overcome evidence of ongoing substance use, missed testing, unsafe household members, unstable living conditions, and inconsistent contact with the child."
Robert v. State
COA10
In Robert v. State, the Tenth Court of Appeals held that a defendant accused of continuous sexual abuse of a child could not cross-examine the child complainant about an earlier accusation against her grandfather without first proving that earlier accusation was false. The defendant argued the prior allegation supported his theory that the child fabricated abuse claims when she got in trouble over cell-phone use, but the court applied Lopez v. State and concluded that suspicion, timing arguments, delayed reporting, omissions, and a good-faith belief in falsity do not satisfy the threshold requirement of proof of falsity. Because the prior accusation was not shown to be false, it was not probative impeachment evidence, and the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding it. The court also held that the defendant failed to preserve a separate Rule 613(b) complaint because that theory was not presented to the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to use a prior abuse allegation to show bias, fabrication, or motive in a family-law case, you need actual proof that the earlier allegation was false—not just inconsistencies, delay, or suspicion. Preserve every admissibility theory separately and be prepared to build the foundation outside the factfinder’s presence."
In the Matter of B.F.P.
COA11
In In the Matter of B.F.P., the Eastland Court of Appeals dismissed a juvenile appeal for want of jurisdiction because Texas Family Code section 56.01 allows an appeal from a disposition-modification order only if it is filed by or on behalf of the child. After the juvenile court modified B.F.P.’s disposition and placed her with her paternal grandfather, two adults filed a pro se notice of appeal alleging notice and due-process defects. But B.F.P.’s attorney informed the court that B.F.P. did not want to appeal and that the adults’ objectives conflicted with hers. Relying on the text of section 56.01 and prior juvenile cases, the court held that a parent or other adult cannot create appellate jurisdiction when the child, through counsel, does not desire an appeal. The adults’ later amended notice purporting to proceed on the child’s behalf was also ineffective, so the appeal was dismissed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Identify who actually owns the right to appeal before filing. When a statute makes appellate rights personal to the child, parents or other relatives cannot invoke appellate jurisdiction in their own names or override the child’s contrary position through counsel, even by framing the complaint as a due-process or voidness challenge."
Rogers v. State
COA14
In Rogers v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld admission of extensive prior-abuse evidence in a child-injury prosecution arising from a mother’s alleged physical abuse of her son and daughter. The defendant argued the many prior incidents were overly prejudicial and cumulative under Rule 403, and also challenged admission of the daughter’s prior forensic-interview statement after accusing her in court of lying. The court held the prior incidents were admissible under Code of Criminal Procedure articles 38.37 and 38.371 because they involved the same child complainants and were probative of intent, state of mind, and the nature of the parent-child relationship, not just propensity. Applying the Rule 403 balancing test, the court concluded the evidence’s substantial contextual and credibility value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or cumulativeness. The court also held that the defendant’s in-court accusation of lying opened the door to admission of the daughter’s prior consistent statement to rebut fabrication and rehabilitate credibility.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, repeated abuse or coercive incidents are most persuasive when framed as relationship-context evidence showing intent, state of mind, credibility, and household dynamics—not merely bad-character proof. And before accusing a child or parent of fabrication, counsel should consider whether that attack will open the door to prior consistent statements such as forensic interviews, school reports, or counselor disclosures."
Miller v. Boyd
COA14
In Miller v. Boyd, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment because the trial court effectively denied a verified continuance after the defendant’s attorney withdrew under Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.08 as a necessary witness. Applying Villegas v. Carter, the court held that when withdrawal is ethically required, the resulting gap in representation is generally not the client’s fault or negligence. The court reviewed the full procedural history, including substitute counsel’s appearance only one week before the summary-judgment hearing, the client’s documented health issues, the first-request status of the continuance, the finite sixty-day delay requested, and the lack of material prejudice to the opposing party. On that record, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by forcing the hearing forward without giving replacement counsel meaningful time to prepare, reversed the final summary judgment, and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"If counsel must withdraw because Rule 3.08 makes the lawyer a necessary witness, treat the continuance as a due-process issue, not a mere scheduling request. Build a verified record showing the withdrawal was ethically compelled, the client was not at fault, substitute counsel needs real preparation time, and a short delay will not materially prejudice the other side."
In the Interest of K.H. and D.H., Children
COA02
In this SAPCR appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court could not deny Mother all possession and access to her children because no live pleading sought that relief at the time of trial. Although the Department’s earlier petition had included more severe allegations and requests, it expressly abandoned termination and instead asked that both parents be named possessory conservators, with Mother receiving supervised access. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301 and cases holding that judgments must conform to live pleadings, the court concluded that a request to restrict or supervise access under Family Code section 153.193 is not the same as a request to eliminate access altogether, and abandoned claims could not support the final order. The court reversed and remanded the portions of the orders denying Mother access, but affirmed the conservatorship rulings because Mother did not show an abuse of discretion as to the trial court’s refusal to appoint her as a conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a Texas court to deny a parent all possession and access, you must plead that relief expressly and keep it live through trial. Requests for supervised, restricted, or limited visitation do not authorize a no-access order, and oral abandonment of broader relief can create reversible Rule 301 error if the final judgment goes beyond the live pleadings."
Rodriguez v. Torres
COA13
After a divorce decree awarded Alma Rodriguez a $115,000 money judgment against Levi Medina, Rodriguez alleged Medina fraudulently transferred two Brownsville parcels to his daughter after Rodriguez recorded an abstract of judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Medina and the daughter, but the court of appeals reversed. Applying Texas Business and Commerce Code § 24.005(a)(1), the court held Rodriguez produced more than a scintilla of evidence of actual intent through multiple badges of fraud: transfer to an insider, transfer after the debt and judgment lien arose, transfer of substantially all reachable Texas assets, and a later no-compensation transfer to a church in Mexico. The court also held res judicata did not bar the suit because the fraudulent-transfer claims were based on post-decree conduct, not the divorce court’s original property adjudication.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-divorce collection cases, direct proof of fraudulent intent is not required to defeat summary judgment. If a debtor spouse moves property to a relative after judgment or after an abstract is recorded, build the case around UFTA badges of fraud—timing, insider status, lack of consideration, and depletion of reachable assets—because those facts alone can create a triable issue."
In the Interest of P.J., a Child
COA14
In In the Interest of P.J., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order appointing the Department as sole managing conservator after concluding the parental presumption in Texas Family Code section 153.131 was rebutted. The court analyzed the evidence cumulatively and held it was legally and factually sufficient to show that appointing Mother as managing conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. Key facts included Mother’s failure to protect the child from her boyfriend’s physical abuse, the child’s expressed fear of the boyfriend, Mother’s refusal of a safety plan, housing instability, inadequate supervision, food insecurity, and broader concerns about unmet medical and basic needs. The court also rejected Mother’s complaints about charge error, evidentiary rulings, child support, and possession restrictions.
Litigation Takeaway
"To overcome the parental presumption, build a cumulative significant-impairment record tied to concrete danger: tolerated third-party abuse, refusal to protect, instability, and unmet basic needs. For parents defending these claims, denial is not enough—document separation from unsafe partners, current stability, and a credible protective plan."