Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
Coleman v. State
COA05
In Coleman v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old murder defendant for adult prosecution under Family Code § 54.02. The appellant argued the transfer was improper because the investigation was not “full” and the written transfer order did not spell out every factor-specific finding or item of evidence. The court applied a two-step review: first testing the transfer findings for legal and factual sufficiency, then reviewing the ultimate waiver decision for abuse of discretion. It held that § 54.02 requires a full investigation, probable-cause finding, and specific reasons for waiver, but does not require an exhaustive recitation of every evidentiary detail or every statutory factor. Because the record included the ordered psychological, diagnostic, and social evaluations, testimony about the juvenile’s background and risk factors, and evidence supporting probable cause and community-welfare concerns, the findings were sufficient and the transfer order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, Coleman is a strong appellate-record case: when a statute requires findings or reasons, the trial court must be specific enough to satisfy the statute, but it does not have to write an encyclopedic order summarizing every exhibit, witness, or factor. On appeal, broad complaints that the court did not investigate enough or did not say enough usually fail unless tied to a true statutory prerequisite, a preserved objection, and a materially deficient record."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Craige Kevin Howlett and Corrine Howlett
COA07
In this Texas divorce appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the trial court could not support three $250,000 compensatory awards to the wife for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud on the community, and fraudulent inducement merely by pointing to the husband’s serious misconduct, including hidden accounts, altered bank statements, and unexplained transfers. The appellate court explained that damages must track the character of the property injured: if the alleged harm was to the wife’s separate estate, the record had to show a distinct separate-property injury; if the harm was to the community estate, the remedy had to proceed under Family Code section 7.009(b) through a reconstituted-estate and just-and-right division analysis. Because the findings did not tie each award to a specific legally recognized injury, did not show how the amounts were calculated, and did not determine the value of the community estate absent the fraud, the court reversed the compensatory awards, rendered that the wife take nothing on separate-estate claims, and remanded for further proceedings on any community-estate injury. The exemplary-damages award remained undisturbed because it was not challenged on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"In fraud-heavy divorce cases, proof of concealment or dissipation is not enough by itself. Lawyers must identify whether the alleged injury is to a spouse personally, to separate property, or to the community estate, then prove the correct remedy with tracing and valuation evidence. If the claim is really fraud on the community, the court needs findings showing the reconstituted estate and the math under Family Code section 7.009(b), not just a large round-number damages award."
In the Interest of E.A., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of E.A., a Child, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a bill of review seeking to set aside a default divorce decree. The former wife argued she was never served, which would excuse her from proving the usual bill-of-review elements, but the court held the record did not conclusively prove nonservice. The court relied on the substituted-service order and return, her admission that she lived at the service address, and contemporaneous evidence suggesting she knew about the divorce papers. Because nonservice was not established, she had to satisfy the traditional bill-of-review requirements, including showing that the judgment remained in place due to official mistake and without any fault or negligence on her part. The court held the failure to obtain a signed written order granting new trial within plenary power did not justify relief on this record, especially where counsel did not secure the signature and no direct appeal was pursued.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to overturn a default family-law judgment years later, a bare claim of nonservice is not enough when the service record and surrounding evidence point the other way. And if a judge orally grants a new trial, do not assume that saves the case—a written signed order must be entered before plenary power expires, or the original judgment stands."
In the Interest of W.L.G., a Child
COA14
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals did not address the underlying parent-child dispute or review the merits; it simply applied Rule 42.1(a)(1), found no reason to deny the request, granted the motion, and dismissed the appeal. Because the appeal was dismissed rather than decided on the merits, the trial court’s August 29, 2025 judgment remained in effect and undisturbed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you voluntarily dismiss a family-law appeal, you usually end appellate review and leave the trial court’s order fully in place. In custody and other SAPCR cases, that means conservatorship, possession, support, and related rulings continue to control unless changed through some separate procedural vehicle."
In the Interest of P.S.R.F., D.M.R.F., D.A.R., P.R.R., B.I.R., B.E.R., B.L.R., and Y.R.R., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to eight children after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief and the court independently reviewed the record for any nonfrivolous appellate issue. The court emphasized that the evidence supported endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), relying on proof of the mother’s continuing pattern of drug abuse and the resulting danger and instability for the children, which showed a substantial risk of harm and parental incapacity. Because no arguable challenge existed to the predicate grounds or best-interest finding, the court affirmed, but it denied appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M. because appointed counsel’s duties continue through exhaustion of appeals.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and custody-related litigation, substance-abuse evidence is most powerful when developed as an ongoing pattern tied directly to child danger, instability, and impaired parenting—not as isolated bad acts. Appellate lawyers should also remember that Anders review in parental-rights cases requires meaningful attention to § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) findings, and appointed counsel usually must stay on the case through the petition-for-review stage."
In re James Robert Lawson, IV
COA03
In In re James Robert Lawson, IV, the Third Court of Appeals held that a Bell County trial court lost jurisdiction to act on a child-support enforcement matter once the obligor filed a notice of removal in federal court and filed that notice in state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). Even though the enforcement hearing proceeded and the trial court later signed a capias for the father’s arrest, the court of appeals concluded the state court was barred from proceeding at all during the period between removal and remand. Relying on federal removal law and Texas precedent treating post-removal state-court orders as void, the court held the capias and related orders were legal nullities, not merely erroneous rulings. Because the challenged order was void and involved confinement-related process in a child-support enforcement case, habeas relief was proper, and the court conditionally granted relief directing the trial court to vacate the capias and related orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a notice of removal is filed in state court, the family court must stop immediately. Any contempt, capias, enforcement, or temporary order signed before remand is vulnerable as void, so practitioners should shift their efforts to federal remand practice rather than asking the state court to proceed anyway."
Jose Luis Espinoza v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Jose Luis Espinoza v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a young child and two indecency-with-a-child counts. The key dispute was whether the State proved the continuous-abuse statute’s thirty-or-more-day duration element when one child could not give precise dates and the defense argued the allegations were too vague and fabricated amid a family feud over the grandmother’s estate and residence. The court applied standard legal-sufficiency review under Jackson v. Virginia and held that exact dates were unnecessary. It focused on whether a rational factfinder could infer repeated abuse over the required span from the testimony. B.H.’s testimony that Espinoza touched her genitals over clothing twenty to thirty times over about a year was enough by itself to satisfy the duration requirement, even though P.P.’s timeline was less precise. The court also rejected Espinoza’s double-jeopardy, outcry, extraneous-act, medical-records, expert-testimony, and cumulative-error complaints, treating the defense’s fabrication and credibility themes as issues for the jury rather than grounds for reversal.
Litigation Takeaway
"For Texas family litigators, Espinoza is a strong crossover case on abuse-proof sufficiency: a child’s inability to give calendar-specific dates does not defeat abuse allegations if the testimony describes repeated conduct over an identifiable span. It is especially useful in custody, modification, protective-order, and termination litigation to counter the argument that abuse claims are too vague to credit. The case also shows that outcry and SANE-related evidence can survive appellate attack when properly framed, and that motive-to-fabricate theories tied to property or inheritance disputes usually create fact issues, not automatic legal wins."
In re Brittany Hilbert
COA05
In In re Brittany Hilbert, a pro se relator sought mandamus relief in a conservatorship-related case, asking the Dallas Court of Appeals to undo post-hearing orders affecting due process, attorney’s fees, and interim conservatorship or possession. The court did not reach those substantive complaints because the petition failed to comply with multiple mandatory requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52, including required sections, a proper certification, an appendix, and a sworn or certified mandamus record. The court also found that the petition and appendix contained unredacted sensitive data in violation of Rule 9.9. Because these procedural defects were dispositive, the court denied mandamus relief and struck the filing without addressing the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"In emergency family-law appellate practice, procedure can decide the case before the merits ever matter. A mandamus petition must strictly comply with Rule 52, include a proper certified or sworn record, and be fully redacted under Rule 9.9; otherwise even strong due-process or custody arguments may never be heard."
Brian Alex Bermudez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Bermudez v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a family-violence assault conviction and the denial of a motion for new trial. The defendant argued his lawyer had an actual conflict because counsel had pending criminal charges of his own, that counsel was ineffective for not securing an additional witness to testify the complainant was intoxicated, and that the trial court wrongly excluded the complainant’s testimony after a sequestration violation. The court held the conflict claim failed because the record did not show counsel’s personal charges adversely affected any specific trial decision; in fact, counsel affirmatively pursued intoxication as a central defense theme. The omitted-witness claim also failed because the proposed testimony was cumulative of other evidence showing intoxication and did not address the assault itself. Finally, the court held the trial court acted within its discretion under Rule 614 by excluding the complainant after the defendant discussed another witness’s testimony with her during a jail call, creating a concrete risk of tailored testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, Bermudez is a strong crossover case on three recurring themes: sequestration matters, speculative conflict claims usually fail, and cumulative omitted-witness testimony rarely justifies post-judgment relief. If a witness has been exposed to trial testimony through calls, texts, or hallway updates, the court has broad discretion to exclude that witness to protect the integrity of the proceeding. And if a party attacks counsel based on personal legal troubles, the attack must be tied to a specific adverse effect on representation—not just optics or suspicion."
In the Interest of G.L.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no nonfrivolous issues. The Eleventh Court independently reviewed the record and held the evidence was legally sufficient to support termination under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), based on the mother’s pattern of drug and alcohol abuse and the resulting danger to the child, as well as the best-interest finding. The court also held that the trial court improperly relied on former section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because that predicate ground had been repealed by the 2025 amendments and the case was still pending after the amendment’s effective date. Rather than reverse, the court modified the termination order to delete the void subsection (O) finding, affirmed the order as modified, and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two practical lessons stand out: first, family-law lawyers must update pleadings and proposed orders for statutory changes because a repealed predicate ground can become void in a pending case; second, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) remain critically important on appeal because they can sustain termination and carry collateral consequences in future custody litigation. The case also reminds appointed counsel that an Anders affirmance does not automatically end representation in a termination appeal."