Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Deola T. Ali v. Discover Bank
COA14
After Discover Bank obtained a money judgment, it sought a post-judgment receiver based largely on alleged deemed admissions from unanswered requests for admissions. The court held that Ali’s filed Rule 21a certificate of service created a presumption that his discovery responses were timely served, and Discover’s unsworn motion claiming nonreceipt was not competent evidence to rebut that presumption. Because the requests were not deemed admitted and Discover offered no other competent evidence that the judgment remained unpaid or that Ali owned non-exempt property subject to turnover, the trial court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver. The receivership order was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-judgment enforcement, especially turnover or receivership proceedings, do not rely on unsworn assertions to establish discovery default or statutory elements. A Rule 21a certificate of service can defeat deemed admissions unless rebutted with competent evidence, so family-law litigators must build the record with affidavits, testimony, payment proof, and evidence of non-exempt property."
The State of Texas v. Frankie Lee Hines
COA08
In Hines, the State repeatedly dismissed and reindicted child-sexual-abuse charges arising from the same underlying allegations while the defendant remained incarcerated for more than two years. The Eighth Court of Appeals applied the Barker v. Wingo speedy-trial factors across the entire prosecution timeline, holding the clock did not restart with each new indictment because all charges stemmed from the same factual nucleus. The court found the extraordinary delay, the State’s trial-readiness and charging-theory problems, Hines’s repeated assertion of his speedy-trial right, and resulting prejudice from prolonged incarceration and evidentiary drift supported dismissal with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"Changing pleadings or legal theories does not erase delay when the case is still built on the same core facts. In family-law cases involving evolving abuse allegations, lawyers should preserve a unified chronology, force clarification of what actually changed, and show concrete prejudice from repeated resets, fading witness memories, and ongoing temporary restrictions."
In the Interest of T.L.F.
COA09
In In the Interest of T.L.F., the Beaumont Court of Appeals reviewed a mother’s appeal from an order terminating her parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (L), along with a best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). Appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal and moved to withdraw. The court independently reviewed the entire record, confirmed counsel’s no-merit assessment, and found no arguable ground for reversal. The court therefore affirmed the termination order. But relying on Texas Family Code §§ 107.013 and 107.016 and In re P.M., the court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding that appointed counsel in termination appeals generally must continue representation through further appellate proceedings unless additional good cause for withdrawal is shown.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas parental-termination appeals, a strong trial record can leave little room for reversal, and an Anders affirmance will stand if the appellate court finds no arguable issue after its own review. Just as important, appointed counsel cannot assume that filing an Anders brief ends the representation; absent good cause, counsel must stay on through the completion or waiver of further appellate review."
Khaled Mohammad Ikhlas v. Farzana Rasooli
COA14
In Ikhlas v. Rasooli, the appellant tried to appeal an order denying his Texas Family Code section 85.025(b) motion to review, modify, or dissolve an existing protective order. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed section 81.009(a), which allows appeals from a protective order rendered under Subtitle B, and held that a denial of post-judgment review under section 85.025(b) is not a new protective order and does not independently create appellate jurisdiction. The court also refused to treat the attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding because the appellant’s complaints were fact-bound and challenged evidentiary sufficiency rather than presenting a pure legal issue. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat a section 85.025(b) review hearing as a second chance to appeal a protective order. If you may need appellate review, build the record and calendar deadlines from the original protective order; later denials of review or dissolution are likely not appealable, and mandamus will usually require a clear legal error rather than a fact-based attack on the evidence."
WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio
COA11
In WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio, a limited partner sought access to partnership books and records after seeing apparent disparities in distributions and unexplained accounting related to partnership assets. The partnership refused, arguing Fenoglio may have transferred his interest in an earlier divorce, that the records could be used in collateral litigation, and that he had to sign a unilateral confidentiality agreement before inspection. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Fenoglio’s stated purpose—determining whether partnership assets were properly managed and whether revenues and expenses were properly accounted for and allocated—was a proper purpose under Texas Business Organizations Code section 153.552. The court further held that speculation about other litigation, an unresolved allegation that his interest had been transferred in the divorce, and reliance on a general prudence clause in the partnership agreement did not defeat his contractual and statutory inspection rights. It affirmed summary judgment enforcing inspection and the award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law dispute involves an entity interest, frame any records demand around valuation, accounting, distributions, tracing, and management review. This case shows that a proper-purpose inspection right cannot be defeated by speculation about divorce-related litigation, unsupported claims that the ownership interest changed hands in the divorce, or extra-contractual confidentiality conditions."
In the Interest of J.G.S., a Child
COA01
In In re J.G.S., the First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights and held that her complaint that the Department failed to provide ADA accommodations in her service plan was waived because she never raised it in the trial court. Mother argued the court should overlook preservation because termination implicates fundamental rights and because Family Code section 161.001(f) and (g) require the Department to prove reasonable efforts to return the child. The court rejected both arguments, reaffirmed In re C.M., and concluded that an ADA-based challenge to reunification services remains an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved below. The court also held that Mother’s request for more time, based only on scheduling and technical problems, did not preserve a disability-accommodation complaint, and it affirmed the termination order on the challenged predicate grounds and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"If disability affects a parent’s ability to complete services or participate in a family-law case, do not assume the court or opposing party’s awareness preserves the issue. Make a specific ADA or accommodation request on the record, tie it to the client’s actual limitations, seek a ruling, and connect any continuance or extension request to that accommodation need. In Texas family cases, even in termination appeals, unpreserved accommodation complaints are likely waived."
Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina
COA09
In Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina, the Beaumont Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the parties had an informal marriage under Texas Family Code section 2.401. Medina sought to prove a common-law marriage as part of her divorce and property-division case, while Lara argued the evidence was insufficient because the parties filed separate taxes, lacked joint financial accounts, and did not consistently use traditional marital markers. The court analyzed the totality of the evidence under the three statutory elements—agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others as married—and emphasized that, in a bench trial without findings of fact, implied findings favor the judgment if supported by the record. Crediting testimony that the parties lived together as husband and wife, introduced each other as spouses, celebrated their marriage, and were described in at least one property-related document as husband and wife, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the informal-marriage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informal-marriage cases are usually decided on credibility and record-building, not on whether the couple checked every traditional marriage box. If there is some evidence of agreement, cohabitation as spouses, and holding out, appellate courts will heavily defer to the trial judge—especially when no findings of fact are requested. For lawyers, that means the real battle is at trial: build corroboration if you are proving the marriage, and do more than point to separate finances or tax filings if you are trying to defeat it."
In the Interest of V.R., A.R., and M.R., Children
COA02
In In re V.R., the father appealed an order dismissing his child-support enforcement-related motions, arguing the Office of the Attorney General lacked authority to continue withholding and garnishing income and that various procedural defects required reversal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the dispositive associate-judge hearing was not included in the appellate reporter’s record. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and Christiansen v. Prezelski, the court presumed the missing hearing record supported the trial court’s ruling and held that, without that record, the father could not show reversible error. The court also rejected attempts to rely on materials not admitted below and noted that new complaints raised for the first time in a reply brief were not properly before the court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your appeal depends on what happened at the hearing, you must bring the reporter’s record. In Texas family-law cases, an incomplete appellate record usually means the court will presume the missing evidence supports the judgment, which can doom challenges to enforcement, modification, custody, and other post-judgment rulings before the merits are ever reached."
Foster v. Wise
COA01
In Foster v. Wise, the respondent challenged a default protective order by restricted appeal, arguing the record did not show the notice and service required by Family Code sections 82.041 and 82.043. The court examined only whether error was apparent on the face of the record and held the citation itself functioned as the required notice because it included the hearing setting and default warning. It further held that a citation bearing the court’s seal and a deputy clerk’s typed name satisfied the statutory signature requirement in a nonelectronic-service context, that the return sufficiently showed personal service, and that service of an amended application was unnecessary because the amendment did not seek a more onerous judgment. The court therefore affirmed the default lifetime protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Default orders in family cases usually survive restricted appeal when the clerk’s record and return facially show strict compliance with statutory notice and service requirements. Substance matters more than labels, a typed clerk signature on a sealed nonelectronic citation may be enough, and amended pleadings do not require re-service unless they seek more onerous relief."
In Re Jessica Coronado
COA11
In this mandamus proceeding arising from temporary orders in a divorce and SAPCR, the mother challenged the trial court’s appointment of both parents as temporary joint managing conservators and a travel-exchange provision after evidence showed the father physically abused her son from a prior relationship. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 153.004(b) is a mandatory bar to joint managing conservatorship when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse against a child, spouse, or the other parent. The court relied on the mother’s testimony about two bruising incidents, photographs, text messages, and permissible adverse inferences from the father’s repeated Fifth Amendment invocations to conclude the abuse evidence was credible. It also held the travel requirement was an abuse of discretion because the trial court expressly imposed it to burden the mother for moving, not to protect the child’s safety and welfare. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If credible abuse evidence is in the record, § 153.004(b) does more than weigh against joint conservatorship—it forbids it, even in temporary orders and even when the abuse was directed at a stepchild rather than the subject child. For litigators, the case underscores the importance of building a corroborated abuse record and preserving any punitive, child-untethered temporary-order rulings for mandamus."