Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Krueger v. Krueger
COA02
In Krueger v. Krueger, the wife tried to amend her divorce counterpetition ten days before trial to add new fault-based theories—including cruelty, family violence, adultery, and waste—and to seek a disproportionate share of the community estate. The trial court struck the late amendments and excluded related business records, affidavits, and supplemental discovery because those theories had not been timely pleaded or disclosed and would unfairly surprise the husband after discovery had already proceeded on different claims. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Rule 63 allowed the trial court to deny the late amendments as prejudicial and that Rule 193.6 supported exclusion of the late-produced supporting evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to pursue fault-based property arguments in a Texas divorce, plead them early and disclose the supporting evidence on time. Waiting until the eve of trial to add disproportionate-division theories can get both the claims and the evidence thrown out as unfair surprise."
Waleski v. State
COA11
In Waleski v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that a revocation judgment may be reformed when the written judgment incorrectly states the pleas made in open court. Waleski pleaded true to only one alleged supervision violation and not true to the other two, but the written revocation judgments recited that he pleaded true to all three. The court concluded revocation was still proper because one proven violation is enough to support revocation, and Waleski’s plea of true plus supporting evidence established at least one violation. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) and Bigley v. State, the court modified the judgments to accurately reflect the actual pleas and affirmed them as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not ignore inaccurate recitals in a signed order just because the judgment itself is likely to stand. If the written order does not match what happened in court, ask the trial or appellate court to correct it so the record “speaks the truth,” especially where those inaccuracies could affect future enforcement, modification, protective-order, or credibility disputes."
McFarland v. Bouyer
COA11
In McFarland v. Bouyer, the husband appealed a divorce decree awarding the wife the marital residence and argued he was not given a meaningful chance to present evidence. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code section 7.001 and emphasized that a property division is reversible only if it is manifestly unjust and unfair. Because the husband failed to provide the reporter’s record from the final hearing, the appellate court presumed the missing evidence supported the trial court’s decree. The court also rejected his due-process complaint, concluding the record showed he had opportunities to cross-examine, object, testify, and offer evidence, and that his failure to understand how to present electronic evidence was a preparation problem, not trial-court error. The court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge a divorce property division on appeal, you need a full record and proof that the overall division—not just one asset award—was manifestly unfair. This case also shows that courts will not reverse simply because a pro se party failed to prepare or did not understand how to admit evidence when the record shows the party was given a fair opportunity to participate."
Ryan Keith Markowski v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Markowski v. State, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for violating a family-violence bond condition under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A). The court rejected his attempt to treat the case like a protective-order prosecution, explaining that the charging instrument alleged violation of a bond condition, not a protective order, so the State did not need to prove the statutory pedigree of a protective order. Applying the legal-sufficiency standard, the court held the evidence was enough because the bond-condition order was admitted, it prohibited the defendant from coming within 200 yards of the protected person’s residence, officers testified the underlying criminal case was still pending, and officers observed him within the prohibited zone. The court further held that the lack of an express expiration date did not make the bond condition unenforceable while the underlying criminal case remained unresolved.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a family-violence bond condition expires just because the order omits an end date. In parallel family and criminal cases, lawyers should obtain the actual bond paperwork, confirm whether the criminal case is still pending, and make sure temporary orders, residence access, and exchange plans do not require conduct that would violate a still-active criminal stay-away condition."
Waleski v. State
COA11
In Waleski v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed revocation of community supervision after Michael Waleski admitted he drank alcohol in violation of a supervision condition in cases involving continuous family violence and protective-order violations. The court applied settled Texas revocation law: the State need prove only one supervision violation by a preponderance of the evidence, and a plea of true alone can support revocation. Because Waleski pleaded true to the alcohol-use allegation, disputes about the other alleged violations did not matter. The court also held that he could not use the revocation appeal to challenge the reasonableness of conditions imposed in the original community-supervision order. It modified the judgments only to correct clerical errors misstating his pleas and otherwise affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A single admitted supervision violation can decide the whole case. For family-law litigators, if a party is on supervision tied to family violence or protective-order conduct, even a 'technical' violation like alcohol use may become powerful evidence on credibility, safety, conservatorship, and possession restrictions. Get the revocation records early, identify any plea of true, and do not assume disputed allegations matter once one violation is proven."
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed whether a juvenile-transfer order under Texas Family Code section 54.02 could be challenged through a later criminal appeal after conviction. The juvenile court had signed a November 1, 2024 order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring Gonzales for adult criminal prosecution, but Gonzales did not file a notice of appeal in the juvenile court within 20 days. Instead, he filed a notice of appeal in the criminal case after his April 2, 2026 conviction. The court analyzed sections 54.02 and 56.01 of the Family Code together with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and held that a transfer order is directly appealable, the appeal is accelerated, and the notice of appeal must be filed in the juvenile court within 20 days after the transfer order is signed. Because Gonzales filed only an untimely post-conviction notice in the criminal case, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a Family Code order is immediately appealable, lawyers must identify the correct order, file in the correct court, and meet the statute-driven deadline. A later judgment, trial-court certification, or notice filed in a related case will not revive a missed appeal deadline or create appellate jurisdiction."
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, the appellant tried to challenge a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring him for criminal prosecution as an adult only after he was later convicted in criminal court. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code sections 54.02 and 56.01 together with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and held that a juvenile transfer order is directly appealable as an accelerated appeal. That means the notice of appeal had to be filed in the juvenile court within 20 days after the transfer order was signed. Because the transfer order was signed on November 1, 2024, and the only notice of appeal was filed in the criminal case on April 6, 2026, the notice was both untimely and filed in the wrong court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and did not reach the merits of the transfer challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the Family Code creates a direct, accelerated appeal, lawyers must act immediately, file in the correct court, and not assume the issue can be preserved for review after a later final judgment in a related case. A trial-court certification or later criminal judgment cannot cure a missed statutory appellate deadline."
In the Interest of T.S.L., a Child
COA04
In In re T.S.L., the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of an alleged father’s rights because the trial court’s judgment rested on an independent ground under Texas Family Code § 161.002(b)(3): the child was under one year old when the case was filed, and the father neither registered with the paternity registry nor otherwise acknowledged or adjudicated paternity. On appeal, the father challenged only best interest and the denial of his oral continuance, but he did not attack the § 161.002(b)(3) finding. The court held that an unchallenged independent ground requires affirmance and reiterated that termination under § 161.002(b)(3) does not require a separate best-interest finding. The court also held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the father’s oral motion for continuance because it was not written or verified under Rule 251 and the case was near the statutory dismissal deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"For fathers and their counsel, paternity status is not a side issue—if a client remains only an alleged father and does not register, acknowledge, or adjudicate paternity, § 161.002(b)(3) can become a stand-alone path to termination. For appellate lawyers, the case is a blunt reminder that every independent ground in the judgment must be challenged or the appeal can be lost automatically."
In the Interest of J.W.H. and T.L.H., Children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the paternal grandparents lacked standing to bring an original SAPCR under Texas Family Code § 102.004(a)(1) because they did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence as of the filing date, that Mother’s specific conduct would probably cause significant impairment to the children’s physical health or emotional development. The court analyzed the grandparents’ allegations about marijuana use, leaving a child unattended, educational problems, and cohabitation through the required filing-date lens and concluded the evidence showed only generalized concerns, stale events, or post-filing developments—not present circumstances meeting the statute’s high threshold. Because standing is jurisdictional, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, so the court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the suit.
Litigation Takeaway
"In third-party custody cases, standing is a jurisdictional hurdle that must be proven with date-specific evidence at the time of filing. Nonparents cannot rely on sympathy, family conflict, lifestyle criticism, old incidents, or proof they could provide a better home; they must tie a parent’s identifiable conduct to probable significant impairment. For parents’ counsel, this case is a strong blueprint for an early plea to the jurisdiction."
In the Interest of C.S., a Child
COA04
In this private termination-and-stepfather-adoption case, the father appealed an order terminating his parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(L) based on his Georgia statutory-rape conviction. The key dispute was whether the Georgia offense qualified as a conviction under a foreign law with elements substantially similar to a listed Texas offense. The Fourth Court of Appeals compared the elements of Georgia Code section 16-6-3 to Texas Penal Code section 21.11 and held that sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen necessarily includes sexual contact with a child under seventeen, making the statutes substantially similar for subsection (L) purposes. The court also held the conviction itself, together with the statutory comparison, was legally and factually sufficient to support termination and affirmed the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Out-of-state sex-offense convictions can support termination in Texas even if the foreign crime has a different name. For family-law litigators, the winning approach is an element-by-element comparison backed by certified conviction records and the text of both statutes; for respondents, the best defense is to show the foreign statute is broader than the Texas comparator, not merely to argue the offense titles differ."