Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Wilson v. State
COA05
In Wilson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support aggravated assault by threat against a child who was inside an apartment when the defendant intentionally set it on fire. The court analyzed the case under the legal-sufficiency standard and emphasized that a threat of imminent bodily injury can be proven through circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s conduct, knowledge that the child was home, the spread of the fire, and the child’s reaction in escaping through a second-story window. The court held that even without an express verbal threat aimed at the child, a rational factfinder could infer that intentionally starting a fire in an occupied home knowingly threatened the child with imminent bodily injury and involved a deadly weapon.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, you do not need an express verbal threat to prove danger to a child or household member. If a parent or partner knowingly creates an immediately dangerous condition in the home, the court can infer a threat from the conduct, the living arrangement, the child’s presence, and the surrounding circumstances—making this case especially useful in custody, protective-order, and family-violence disputes."
In the Interest of J.J.C., a Child
COA05
In In re J.J.C., the Dallas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from an order denying post-judgment motions filed more than twelve years after a 2013 child-support order. The appellant argued the earlier order was void for jurisdictional reasons, but the court focused on procedure rather than the underlying voidness claim. It held that motions filed in the original family-law case under the same cause number were not a true collateral attack; under Texas law, a collateral attack on an allegedly void judgment must be brought as a new proceeding under a different cause number. Because the 2025 motions were merely untimely post-judgment motions in the old case, the denial order was neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, and any effort to challenge the 2013 order directly was untimely. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Calling an old family-law order “void” does not make a later denial order appealable. If deadlines for a direct attack have expired, a party seeking to challenge a judgment as void must use the correct procedural vehicle—typically a new collateral proceeding under a new cause number—or risk having the case dismissed before any court reaches the merits."
Shaikh v. Rodriguez
COA01
In Shaikh v. Rodriguez, a diabetic patient sued her rheumatologist, alleging negligent prednisone treatment because the doctor failed to ensure glucose monitoring, warn about steroid-related risks, and coordinate diabetic care, which allegedly contributed to serious vision complications. On interlocutory appeal from the denial of dismissal under Chapter 74, the defendant argued the plaintiff’s experts were unqualified because they were not rheumatologists. The First Court of Appeals rejected that specialty-matching argument and held the qualification inquiry is issue-specific: whether the expert has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the precise medical questions at issue. Because the ophthalmologist and the internal-medicine/critical-care physician tied their experience to prednisone use in diabetic patients, glucose monitoring, risk disclosure, and coordinated care, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the reports sufficient and denying dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
"When defending or attacking an expert, focus on the exact issue in dispute—not job titles or subspecialty labels. An expert need not share the opposing party’s specialty if the expert can show real, issue-specific experience with the standard of care, risk, monitoring duty, or methodology actually at issue."
Willie Silliman v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Silliman v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could exclude late-produced April 2024 police and recording materials as a discovery sanction under article 39.14 yet still admit testimony about that same prior family-violence incident under article 38.371. The complainant recanted at trial, and the court treated the discovery-sanction issue and the admissibility of relationship evidence as separate questions, concluding that independently admissible testimony was not automatically tainted by exclusion of related exhibits. The court also held that using the excluded materials outside the jury’s presence to refresh recollection did not make the testimony inadmissible because the excluded items themselves were never shown to the jury, and that a timely disclosed May body-camera video referencing the April incident was admissible because its probative value in evaluating recantation and relationship context was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403.
Litigation Takeaway
"Excluding a late-produced exhibit does not automatically exclude live testimony about the underlying conduct. In family-law cases involving violence, recantation, or coercive control, lawyers should separate excluded documents from admissible personal-knowledge testimony and focus objections or responses on relevance, Rule 403, and whether the other side is using testimony as a backdoor way to publish excluded material."
Christopher Matthew Vickers v. Lena Cherie Chaisson-Munoz
COA13
In Vickers v. Chaisson-Munoz, the father tried to immediately appeal protective orders entered after the mother filed two protective-order applications while a SAPCR modification between the same parents was pending. Although the protective-order cases began under separate cause numbers, they were transferred to the SAPCR court and heard together with the modification case. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals focused on the functional reality of that consolidation, not the separate filings, and applied Texas Family Code § 81.009(c), which delays appeal of a protective order rendered against a party in a SAPCR until there is a final, appealable order on support, possession, or access. Because the modification case remained pending and no final SAPCR order existed, the court held the protective orders were interlocutory and dismissed the appeals for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A separate protective-order cause number does not guarantee an immediate appeal. If a protective-order case is transferred into, coordinated with, or jointly tried alongside a SAPCR, the order may become interlocutory under Family Code § 81.009(c). Family lawyers should be deliberate about consolidation language, joint hearings, transfer strategy, and preservation of alternative remedies like mandamus when immediate review matters."
In the Interest of S.P. and K.D.C.L., Children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). Father argued the case was based only on his incarceration, but the court analyzed the full Holley-factor record and emphasized that incarceration alone is not enough; here, the surrounding facts included domestic violence against pregnant Mother while Father was holding a child, instability, lack of contact with the children, failure to complete services, no viable interim or post-release care plan, and the children’s significant need for safety, medical care, and permanence. Because the children were thriving in a stable foster placement and the record showed ongoing danger and no realistic reunification plan, the court upheld termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat incarceration as the key fact in a best-interest case. What persuades courts is the conduct behind the incarceration, its effect on the child, the parent’s history of violence or instability, the absence of a workable caregiving plan, and the child’s concrete need for safety and permanence."
Tozee Construction, Inc. v. BNG Management Group, LLC
COA05
In a construction dispute, the plaintiff perfected the jury right by filing a timely jury demand and paying the jury fee, then later tried to withdraw that demand and obtain a bench trial. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 216 and 220, a perfected jury demand benefits the entire case, so the opposing party could rely on it without filing a separate demand. Because the defendant objected before trial and the trial court nevertheless conducted a bench trial, the court held the trial court abused its discretion, reversed the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once any party properly demands a jury and pays the fee, that jury setting becomes a shared procedural right. In family law cases, if the other side later tries to withdraw the jury demand, preserve the issue immediately with a clear written and oral objection; the court cannot force a bench trial over that objection."
Christopher Matthew Vickers v. Lena Cherie Chaisson-Munoz
COA13
In Vickers v. Chaisson-Munoz, the father tried to immediately appeal protective orders entered after the trial court heard two protective-order applications together with a pending SAPCR modification involving the parties’ child. The court of appeals focused on Texas Family Code § 81.009(c), which delays appeal of a protective order rendered against a party in a SAPCR until there is a final, appealable order addressing child support, possession, or access. Even though the protective-order applications had separate cause numbers, the court held they were procedurally intertwined with the SAPCR because they were transferred to the SAPCR court, heard together, and reflected in an order referencing all related cases. Because no final SAPCR order had yet been signed, the protective orders were interlocutory, and the appeals were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Separate cause numbers do not guarantee an immediate appeal of a protective order when the case is functionally merged with a SAPCR. Family-law litigators should think carefully before agreeing to combined hearings, transfers, or consolidation, because once protective-order issues are heard as part of a child-possession or access dispute, appellate review may be deferred until the final SAPCR order."
In the Interest of D.K.L., D.C.L., and R.R.M., Children
COA13
In this SAPCR-related appeal, the appellant tried to challenge a final order signed on October 14, 2025, by filing notices of appeal in July 2026. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and held that the notice of appeal was untimely under either the 30-day deadline or the 90-day deadline that would have applied even if a qualifying post-judgment motion had been filed. Relying on Mitschke v. Borromeo, the court explained that a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite. It also rejected the appellant’s argument that the final order was void and therefore could be attacked at any time, holding that an allegedly void order still cannot be reviewed through an untimely direct appeal. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if the notice of appeal is late, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction, and calling the order “void” will not save a direct appeal. Lawyers must calendar the Rule 26.1 deadline from the date the order is signed and quickly evaluate other remedies if that deadline is missed."
Mora v. Morales
COA13
In Mora v. Morales, the appellant tried to use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a to extend post-judgment and appellate deadlines after claiming late notice of a final judgment. The court held the Rule 306a(5) motion was defective because its sworn allegations referred only to one lawyer as “counsel” and failed to negate timely notice or actual knowledge as to the client and another attorney of record. Without a proper Rule 306a showing, plenary power expired 30 days after the original judgment, making the later amended judgment void. The court also held that even if Rule 306a had applied, the notice of appeal was still untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the alleged date of first actual knowledge. The amended judgment was vacated and the appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are relying on Rule 306a to revive deadlines in a family-law case, your sworn motion must specifically address the client and every attorney of record—not just one lawyer or “counsel” generally. And even with a valid Rule 306a motion, you must immediately recalculate and protect the new appellate deadlines."