Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
In the Interest of E.M.M. Jr., N.M.M., N.J.M., I.A.M., M.S.R., A.L.M., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b). Mother challenged only best interest, so the court accepted the unchallenged predicate grounds as true and evaluated the record under the Holley factors and Family Code section 263.307. The court relied on evidence that Mother and a newborn tested positive for marijuana, the children reported domestic violence, the family lived in unsafe housing without electricity, Mother refused or failed to engage in services, and she went about 175 days without contacting the Department or visiting the children. Considering that pattern of conduct, the court held a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief that termination was in the children’s best interest and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, courts can infer future risk from a parent’s pattern of past conduct—especially when drug use, domestic violence, unsafe housing, and noncompliance all appear together. On appeal, leaving predicate findings unchallenged can be outcome-determinative because those findings will reinforce the best-interest analysis."
Curtis Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Curtis Johnson v. State, the Amarillo court held that a defendant complaining the State’s article 38.37 notice of extraneous sexual-offense evidence was too vague did not preserve error by objecting alone. The defense argued the notice lacked specifics about the number of incidents, precise conduct, and locations, but never requested a continuance, postponement, or other curative relief to address the claimed surprise. The court treated the complaint as a surprise-based notice issue, applied preservation rules requiring a request for time to prepare, and concluded the issue was waived. The court also found no harm because the defense had long-range notice of the general allegations, heard and cross-examined the witness at the pretrial hearing, and failed to show how more detail would have changed trial preparation or strategy.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your real complaint is trial surprise from vague or late notice of prejudicial conduct evidence, an objection is not enough—you must ask for a continuance, postponement, or other specific curative relief. In family-law cases, this preservation rule matters whenever abuse, bad acts, or misconduct evidence surfaces without enough detail to prepare."
Bryant Pearl v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Bryant Pearl v. State of Texas, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child where the child testified the abuse happened multiple times over more than thirty days, even though she could not give precise dates and the record included evidence that another person had also abused her. The court applied the usual sufficiency standard, deferred to the jury on credibility, and emphasized that exact dates are not required under Penal Code section 21.02 and that a child victim’s testimony alone can sustain the finding. The child’s account was further reinforced by SANE-history testimony describing repeated abuse and explaining why the absence of physical trauma did not negate abuse. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving abuse allegations, Pearl underscores that a factfinder may still credit a child’s core abuse narrative despite memory gaps, imprecise timing, no physical findings, and evidence of another possible abuser. The practical lesson is to build or attack the case around repetition, duration, attribution, and consistency of the core allegations—not around the expectation of date-perfect testimony."
In the Matter of J.T., a Juvenile
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile adjudication for sexual assault, rejecting a legal-sufficiency challenge focused solely on identity. The complainant testified that he fell asleep next to J.T. during a sleepover, awoke to the assault, and identified J.T. based on the sleeping arrangements, prior familiarity, and surrounding circumstances, even though he could not make a complete facial identification in the dark. Applying the criminal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt sufficiency standard used in juvenile cases, the court held that the trial court, as factfinder, could credit the complainant’s testimony, disbelieve J.T.’s denial, and find identity proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The adjudication and disposition were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A single credible witness can be enough. In abuse-driven family cases, trial courts may rely on one witness’s testimony—especially when it is specific, internally consistent, and supported by contextual facts like sleeping arrangements, familiarity, immediate confrontation, or behavioral changes—and appellate courts will rarely reweigh those credibility calls."
In the Interest of K.R.N.S., a Child
COA14
In a privately filed SAPCR between two parents, the father appealed the final order and, construed liberally, argued that his retained trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena witnesses, respond to arguments, cite favorable authority, and better present the child’s best-interest case. The Fourteenth Court did not reach whether counsel performed deficiently because it treated the right-to-counsel question as dispositive. Relying on Family Code section 107.013 and cases such as In re D.T., the court explained that ineffective-assistance claims in Texas family cases are cognizable only when a constitutional or statutory right to counsel exists, such as in certain governmental Subtitle E proceedings. Because this was a private SAPCR, not a suit filed by a governmental entity, and the father identified no other source of a right to counsel, the court held his ineffective-assistance complaint was unavailable and affirmed the final SAPCR order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In private SAPCRs and other non-governmental family cases, appellate courts generally will not reverse based on complaints that a party’s own retained lawyer performed poorly. Unless a statute or the constitution creates a right to counsel, the proper appellate focus is trial-court error, preservation, sufficiency, or abuse of discretion—not ineffective assistance."
In the Interest of K.L.M., a Child
COA05
In this default SAPCR appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court exceeded the record in two respects. First, it reversed and rendered the child-surname change because Mother’s testimony—that the parents were unmarried and she wanted the child to bear her surname—did not establish the required good cause or show that the child’s substantial welfare and best interest required the change. Second, it reversed and remanded the retroactive child-support award because the record lacked sufficient evidence of Father’s net resources during the relevant period and the statutory factors required by Family Code sections 154.009 and 154.131. The court affirmed the remainder of the order, including the finding that Father had a history or pattern of family violence, concluding the evidence was sufficient on that issue.
Litigation Takeaway
"A default prove-up is not a shortcut around pleadings and proof. Even in uncontested SAPCRs, name changes and retroactive support require evidence tied to the governing statutes and factors; if the record is thin, the judgment is vulnerable on appeal. By contrast, targeted testimony that directly addresses the family-violence standard can be enough to sustain that finding."
In the Interest of D.D.D.-H. a/k/a D.D.D.H., A.R.M., and O.N.H. a/k/a O.H., Children
COA01
The First Court of Appeals held that termination could not rest on former Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because the Legislature repealed that predicate ground before the termination decree was signed and made the change applicable to pending cases. The court treated that as a statutory-validity issue rather than a sufficiency issue. Even so, it affirmed because legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under subsections (D) and (E), based on evidence of Mother’s physical abuse of one child, indifference to his welfare, unstable and unsafe living conditions, inability to meet basic needs, and ongoing mental-health and possible substance-abuse concerns. The court also held the same pattern of abuse, instability, and unmet needs was sufficient to support the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Check the statute in effect on the date judgment is signed, not just the date of pleading or trial. A repealed ground can invalidate part of a judgment, but reversal may still be avoided if another independently supported ground and the best-interest finding survive—especially in termination cases involving subsections (D) and (E), which carry lasting collateral consequences."
In re Costco Wholesale Corporation
COA14
In In re Costco Wholesale Corporation, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by granting Rule 202 pre-suit discovery based only on a verified petition and attorney declarations. The petitioner sought broad deposition and document discovery before filing a personal-injury suit, arguing she needed the information to identify additional parties and avoid delay from a possible federal removal. The court emphasized that Rule 202 requires proof, not pleading, and that verified pleadings are not competent evidence. Because no admissible evidence was offered at the hearing, and because the petitioner failed to prove either that the discovery would prevent a failure or delay of justice or that its likely benefit outweighed its burden, the Rule 202 order could not stand. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 202 is not a shortcut to merits discovery. If you want pre-suit discovery, you must present competent evidence from a witness with personal knowledge and prove a real Rule 202 necessity; if you are opposing it, attack the lack of evidence, the availability of ordinary post-filing discovery, and any speculative claim of urgency."
In re Lisa Marie Clontz
COA01
In In re Lisa Marie Clontz, the relator sought mandamus to force the family-law trial court to rule on a motion to transfer venue and a motion to reinstate. The First Court of Appeals held that filing motions with the clerk was not enough to prove the trial court had a ministerial duty to rule at that point. Applying settled mandamus law, the court distinguished between filing and presentment and required record proof that the motions were actually brought to the judge’s attention, that a ruling was requested, and that the court failed or refused to act within a reasonable time. Because the mandamus record showed only file-stamped motions and did not show presentment, a hearing or submission setting, or a filed demand for ruling, the court denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you may need mandamus based on a trial court’s failure to rule, do more than file the motion—create a record showing presentment, judicial awareness, and a clear request for a ruling. In family-law cases, preservation of the paper trail can determine whether appellate relief is available, regardless of the motion’s merits."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brendan Potyondy and Meredith Potyondy and in the Interest of D.P., C.P., and B.P., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision voiding the parties’ premarital agreement in their divorce. The trial court had found the agreement unconscionable based on the circumstances of signing—two days before the wedding, no separate counsel for the wife, and a perceived “double recovery” because the husband’s premarital assets were no longer traceable. The appellate court held that those reasons did not satisfy Texas Family Code section 4.006, emphasized that unconscionability in this context must be analyzed under the statute rather than general equitable concerns, and noted the absence of any finding that the wife signed involuntarily. Because the agreement’s equalization payment was part of the bargain the parties made, not an improper double recovery, the court reversed the property division and remanded for entry of a division consistent with the premarital agreement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts cannot set aside a premarital agreement just because it seems unfair in hindsight or because the signing circumstances look imperfect. To defeat enforcement, the resisting spouse must prove a statutory ground under Family Code section 4.006 and obtain findings that match that theory. For trial lawyers, this case is a strong reminder to build the record around voluntariness and statutory disclosure issues—not generalized fairness, tracing complaints, or lack-of-counsel themes standing alone."