Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
Boswell v. State
COA02
In Boswell v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the State’s proof of an aggravated assault on a date different from the indictment’s “on or about” date did not make the evidence legally insufficient because, under Texas law, the State need only prove a date before indictment and within limitations unless time is a material element. The court rejected the defendant’s attempt to treat the date mismatch as a fatal variance or sufficiency defect. But the court agreed that double jeopardy barred punishing Boswell for both aggravated assault and continuous family violence when the aggravated assault was one of the predicate acts supporting the continuous-family-violence count. The court affirmed the aggravated-assault and assault/family-violence convictions, reversed the continuous-family-violence conviction, and rendered an acquittal on that count.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, a mismatch between a pleaded date and the proved date of a family-violence incident is usually better used as a credibility attack than as a dispositive legal argument. The bigger lesson is to carefully track how each abuse incident is being used across claims and requested relief so the same event is not carelessly double-counted as both a standalone act and part of a broader pattern."
In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a post-remand order confirming $63,508.86 in child-support arrearages against Father. Father argued Mother had not pleaded for arrearages, that a prior 2020 modification order terminating his support obligation barred any arrearage finding, and that the evidence was insufficient. The court rejected those arguments, explaining that on remand the support accounting issue was part of the live controversy because both parties presented competing support calculations, payment records, and requested relief concerning what Father should have paid from 2016 forward. The court also held the earlier modification order could not shield Father because that order had already been reversed on appeal, leaving the trial court free to recalculate support consequences consistent with the decree, the evidence, and the appellate mandate. Finally, the court found the evidence sufficient because the record included the operative divorce decree, the Attorney General payment history, Father’s records, and Mother’s arrearage summary, which supported the trial court’s arithmetic and arrearage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"A reversed modification order does not keep protecting a client on remand. If you open the door by asking for retroactive support reductions, credits, offsets, or termination, the court can just as easily determine the opposite and confirm arrearages if the decree, mandate, and payment records support that result. In support cases, lawyers should treat historical payment calculations as a two-way street and build a precise evidentiary record around the operative order and actual payments."
In the Interest of D.J., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to D.J. As to Mother, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), a prior endangerment-based termination finding under subsection (M), and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on a pattern of evidence, including Mother’s prior endangerment termination history, the child’s positive drug test, Mother’s own positive hair-follicle test, missed testing, instability in housing and supervision, failure to know the child’s whereabouts, and inconsistent visitation. The court also rejected Mother’s argument that an earlier letter ruling controlled over the final judgment, reiterating that the signed order governs. As to Father, the court accepted appointed counsel’s Anders brief, conducted an independent review, found no nonfrivolous appellate issue, and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family courts decide endangerment and best-interest disputes by looking at the whole pattern, not isolated recent improvements. Positive drug tests, missed tests, instability, prior CPS history, and inconsistent contact can combine to support severe relief, while informal letter rulings or oral pronouncements do not override the signed order."
In the Interest of A.M., a Child
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to A.M. after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support Father’s predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (N) and the best-interest findings as to both parents. The court analyzed Father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal conduct, long-term absence, and inability to provide a stable home holistically rather than in isolation, holding that this pattern constituted endangering conduct and constructive abandonment. It also held that A.M.’s history of instability, trauma, failed placements, both parents’ continued incarceration, and evidence that she was moving toward acceptance of adoption supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in her best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and other family-law cases, incarceration rarely stands alone—the winning record ties repeated criminal conduct and absence to a larger pattern of instability, lack of caregiving, and the child’s need for permanence. Trial lawyers should build a child-specific chronology showing how parental unavailability affected this child, because appellate courts will review endangerment holistically and defer heavily to credibility-based best-interest findings."
In the Interest of M.H.E., a Child
COA02
In a pending SAPCR, Mother tried to appeal a trial court order requiring mediation and dispute resolution. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order was appealable under Texas jurisdictional rules, explaining that direct appeals generally lie only from final judgments or from interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. Because the mediation order did not dispose of all parties and claims, the SAPCR remained pending, and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal from this type of case-management order, the court held it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don’t assume an unfavorable family-law procedure order can be appealed right away. Mediation and other case-management orders are usually not appealable unless they are part of a final judgment or a statute expressly allows interlocutory review; if immediate relief is necessary, mandamus—not direct appeal—is often the proper vehicle."
Brys v. Cobb
COA01
In Brys v. Cobb, the First Court of Appeals held that when a properly authenticated California judgment was filed in Texas under the UEFJA on July 21, 2023, it immediately became a Texas judgment. The judgment debtor waited more than a year to file a motion for new trial and later asked the Texas court to declare the foreign judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court did not reach the underlying jurisdictional challenge to the California judgment because the dispositive issue was timing: under Chapter 35 and Texas Rules 306a and 329b, any attack on a domesticated foreign judgment must be brought through the same procedures and within the same deadlines that apply to Texas judgments. Because the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after domestication and no timely post-judgment motion was filed, the later orders granting a new trial and declaring the judgment void were themselves void. The court vacated those post-deadline orders and left the domesticated California judgment fully enforceable in Texas.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat the UEFJA filing date like the signing date of a Texas final judgment. If you want to attack a domesticated foreign judgment, move immediately—waiting can forfeit even a personal-jurisdiction or voidness challenge. If you represent the creditor, a proper UEFJA filing can quickly become a powerful enforcement and settlement tool once the deadline passes."
In re Cristina Gallegos Ortega
COA13
In this original proceeding, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a Hidalgo County trial court improperly used temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to order a child returned from Texas to Mexico. The father alleged the child had always lived in Mexico, that Mexican custody proceedings were already pending, and that concerns existed about the child’s tourist-visa status, school enrollment, the mother’s immigration status, and criminal allegations tied to the child’s removal from Mexico. The appellate court concluded those facts did not show abandonment, mistreatment, abuse, or an immediate threat to the child as required by Texas Family Code § 152.204. Because emergency jurisdiction cannot be used as a substitute for home-state jurisdiction or to accomplish a merits-based transfer of possession, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its emergency order and writ of attachment.
Litigation Takeaway
"UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction is narrow and requires evidence of a real, immediate danger to the child—not wrongful removal allegations, immigration concerns, or a desire to return the child to the home-state forum. In cross-border custody cases, Texas courts cannot use § 152.204 as a shortcut to decide possession when another country is the child’s home state and no actual emergency is proven."
Raymond Matthew Thibault v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this criminal appeal, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child by contact and upheld the admission of extraneous-act evidence that the defendant sought or took breast photographs of women, including a prior incident involving another thirteen-year-old girl. The court held the evidence was admissible for noncharacter purposes under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), especially to show intent and to rebut any claim that the touching or photographing was accidental or mistaken. The court also concluded under Rule 403 that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, particularly given the similarity of the prior conduct and the limiting instruction. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prior sexualized conduct may be admissible when it is tied to a specific disputed issue like intent, grooming, or absence of accident—not just bad character. In family-law cases, lawyers should frame or attack this kind of evidence with precision under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403, because those rulings can heavily affect custody, possession, and protective-order outcomes."
In re Genevience Alexandrie Anthony
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus after a Bexar County trial court denied the mother’s jurisdictional challenge to the father’s SAPCR. The child was born in Mississippi and had lived there continuously with the mother since birth, while Texas had previously entered only a UIFSA support order establishing paternity and support. Applying the UCCJEA, the court held that Mississippi was the child’s home state under Family Code section 152.201(a)(1), so Texas lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination. The court rejected the father’s reliance on significant-connection jurisdiction because that basis applies only when no home state exists or the home state declines jurisdiction, and it also rejected use of the inconvenient-forum statute as an independent source of jurisdiction. The court further made clear that a prior Texas UIFSA support case does not create or support UCCJEA custody jurisdiction. Because improper assertion of custody jurisdiction is reviewable by mandamus, the court conditionally granted relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"In interstate custody cases, start with the child’s home state and keep UIFSA and UCCJEA analyses separate. A Texas support or paternity order does not give Texas power to decide conservatorship or possession if another state is the child’s home state. Before filing a Texas SAPCR, confirm that no other state has home-state jurisdiction or that the home state has expressly declined; otherwise the case is vulnerable to dismissal and mandamus."
Lorkovic v. Lorkovic
COA04
In Lorkovic v. Lorkovic, the Fourth Court of Appeals considered whether a final divorce decree improperly included permanent injunctions and a child-support amount that were not fully resolved at trial. The court held that most of the injunctions were valid because the wife had pleaded for harmful-contact relief and the trial evidence about abuse, safety concerns, communication problems, and interference with possession supported protective restrictions tied to the parent-child relationship. The court also concluded that the decree did not become reversible merely because its injunction language was more detailed than the trial court’s oral rendition. But the court reversed the child-support provision because the trial court never actually adjudicated the amount at trial; it only stated that the husband would owe support and later indicated the parties were expected to calculate the figure or return for a further hearing. Because the decree inserted $650 per month without a prior adjudication of that amount, the support award had to be reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Protective injunctions in a divorce decree can survive appeal if they are grounded in the pleadings, the evidence, and conservatorship-related concerns, even when the written decree is more detailed than the oral rendition. Child support is different: the exact amount must be actually decided by evidence, stipulation, or later hearing before it can appear in the final decree. Do not treat support numbers as decree-drafting details."