Opinion Library

In the Interest of M.R.L.

COA04

In a contested SAPCR, the trial court entered a default final order after the mother failed to appear, even though no reporter’s record was made and the order recited that the parties waived the record. The court of appeals held that Family Code § 105.003(c) imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to ensure a record is made in any contested SAPCR final hearing unless all parties validly waive it with the court’s consent. Because the pleadings showed an active dispute over conservatorship and residence restrictions, the case remained contested despite the mother’s absence. And because the mother was absent and unrepresented at trial, she could not waive the reporter’s record. The absence of a record was error apparent on the face of the record and harmful because it prevented meaningful appellate review, so the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Litigation Takeaway

"Do not treat a default prove-up on parent-child issues like an ordinary civil default. If the pleadings make the SAPCR contested, get a court reporter and make a record; an absent, unrepresented party cannot waive it, and skipping the record can make the default order easy to reverse on appeal."

July 29, 2026

David Cortez v. Alicia Cortez

COA04

In a default-divorce appeal, the parties settled during the appeal and asked the court of appeals to render an agreed judgment adopting their mediated parenting plan and child-support terms. The court held it could not do so because Texas Family Code § 153.007 requires the trial court to approve any agreed parenting plan involving conservatorship, possession, or support based on a best-interest finding, and appellate courts cannot make that factual determination in the first instance. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(B), the court set aside the judgment and remanded the case so the trial court could consider the agreement and, if appropriate, render judgment consistent with it after making the required best-interest finding.

Litigation Takeaway

"If a family-law appeal settles on child-related issues, do not ask the court of appeals to simply render the agreement. Structure the disposition as vacatur and remand, because only the trial court can approve a parenting plan under § 153.007 after finding it is in the child’s best interest."

Evidence

Jose Agosto v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Jose Agosto v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether testimony from a forensic interviewer and a police sergeant improperly vouched for a child complainant’s credibility in a child-sex-offense trial. The interviewer testified she had no concerns during the interview that required referral to a detective, and the sergeant testified the child’s forensic interview was consistent with the earlier outcry. The court analyzed the objections as turning not on the label 'bolstering' alone, but on whether the testimony actually expressed an opinion that the complainant was truthful. Relying on Texas cases distinguishing factual consistency and process-based observations from direct credibility endorsements, the court held that testimony about an absence of concerns and consistency across disclosures was admissible because neither witness expressly stated the child was truthful, credible, or believable. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by overruling the objections.

Litigation Takeaway

"In abuse-allegation cases, professionals can usually testify that a child’s statements were consistent or that they observed no concerns requiring further action, so long as they do not cross the line into saying they believed the child or that the child was truthful. For family-law litigators, the key is careful question framing: descriptive and process-based testimony is more likely admissible, while explicit credibility-vouching remains vulnerable to objection."

In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile

COA01

The State sought to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer A.M. to criminal district court on three aggravated-assault allegations and a murder allegation arising from multiple shootings. Applying Texas Family Code §§ 54.02(a) and (f), the First Court of Appeals concluded that surveillance footage, witness testimony, and officer identifications supplied probable cause and supported the finding that the seriousness of the person-directed offenses and the need to protect the community required criminal proceedings. For the murder allegation, the State did not have to identify whose bullet killed the victim at the transfer stage; evidence that A.M. fired repeatedly into the occupied vehicle during the fatal shooting supported probable cause under felony-murder or party-liability principles. Although A.M. presented evidence of cognitive limitations, low intellectual functioning, impulsivity, and mental-health concerns, the juvenile court could reasonably give greater weight to the repeated firearm violence, post-release conduct, and public-safety risks. The appellate court therefore held that the transfer findings were supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence and affirmed the waiver orders as within the juvenile court’s discretion.

Litigation Takeaway

"At a juvenile-transfer hearing, probable cause is a preliminary screening standard, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence of coordinated violent conduct may support transfer under felony-murder or party-liability theories even when the State cannot identify who fired the fatal shot. Cognitive or mental-health mitigation will not necessarily overcome repeated, person-directed violence; counsel seeking rehabilitation-focused relief should present a concrete, credible plan for treatment, supervision, placement, and public safety rather than relying on diagnoses alone."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

In the Matter of A.M.

COA01

The First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring A.M. to criminal district court under Texas Family Code section 54.02(a). The State alleged three aggravated assaults with a deadly weapon and one murder arising from multiple shootings, including one incident in which A.M. allegedly fired nine rounds into an occupied vehicle and a passenger was killed. On appeal, A.M. argued the evidence was insufficient on probable cause and the welfare-of-the-community finding, and emphasized his extremely low intellectual functioning and mental-health history. The court applied the section 54.02(a) transfer requirements and the nonexclusive section 54.02(f) factors, held the violent, repeated offenses against persons and the failure of prior interventions supported transfer, and concluded the juvenile court was entitled to weigh public-safety concerns more heavily than the evidence favoring treatment in juvenile court. The court also held probable cause existed on the murder allegation even though the investigator could not identify which shooter fired the fatal bullet, and it affirmed the denial of a fitness-to-proceed evidentiary hearing.

Litigation Takeaway

"When a case involves youth violence, courts tend to focus on structured statutory factors and will defer heavily to the trial judge’s weighing of conflicting evidence. In family-law litigation, repeated violent conduct, firearm use, surveillance evidence, and failed prior interventions can strongly support emergency relief, possession restrictions, and conservatorship limits; mental-health or cognitive-deficit evidence is most persuasive when tied to a concrete treatment, supervision, and safety plan."

In re U. L.

COA14

In re U. L. involved a party who sought emergency mandamus relief after a regional presiding judge denied her motion to recuse in a pending Harris County case. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(j) controls and makes a denial of recusal reviewable only for abuse of discretion on appeal from a final judgment, which forecloses interlocutory mandamus review of the denial itself. The court also analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and concluded it lacked authority to order the regional presiding judge to vacate the recusal denial or conduct further proceedings absent a specific statutory grant. The court therefore denied the mandamus petitions.

Litigation Takeaway

"If a recusal motion is denied in a family-law case, do not count on emergency mandamus to fix it. Build a complete Rule 18a record, preserve objections and harm, and prepare to challenge the denial only after final judgment."

Child Custody

In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile

COA01

In In the Matter of A.M., the First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer A.M. to criminal court under Texas Family Code section 54.02. The State alleged three aggravated assaults and one murder, and presented surveillance footage, officer testimony, and psychological and probation evidence showing A.M.’s involvement in multiple violent shootings, including a fatal shooting into an occupied vehicle. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support probable cause and the finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings, despite evidence of A.M.’s intellectual and mental-health limitations. It also held probable cause existed for felony murder under the law of parties even though the fatal bullet was not tied to A.M. specifically, and affirmed the denial of a fitness-to-proceed hearing.

Litigation Takeaway

"Courts do not treat diagnoses, low IQ, or mental-health history as automatic barriers to transfer or other protective rulings; they focus on functional evidence, prior interventions, public safety, and whether existing services can realistically prevent further harm. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a concrete record linking behavior, supervision history, treatment response, and objective evidence to the governing best-interest or safety standard."

In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile

COA01

In In the Matter of A.M., the First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring A.M. to criminal district court under Texas Family Code section 54.02. The State presented surveillance footage, witness testimony, and officer identification tying A.M. to three aggravated assaults and to a shooting in which Faridah Davis was killed. A.M. argued that his low IQ, cognitive limitations, mental-health history, and prior fitness concerns weighed against transfer, but the court held that the juvenile court could reasonably give greater weight to the seriousness and repeated nature of the violent offenses, the recency of the conduct after release from detention, and community-safety concerns. The court also held probable cause existed on the murder allegation even though the State could not yet prove which shooter fired the fatal bullet, because evidence showed A.M. fired multiple rounds into the occupied vehicle and acted in concert with another shooter. The transfer order was therefore supported by sufficient evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.

Litigation Takeaway

"When a record shows serious, repeated violence supported by objective evidence like video, witnesses, and law-enforcement testimony, Texas courts may prioritize safety over mitigating evidence of mental-health or cognitive impairment. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to connect impairment evidence to actual risk, parenting capacity, and workable safeguards—or expect the court to focus on dangerous conduct and public protection."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Wilson v. State

COA05

In Wilson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support aggravated assault by threat against a child who was inside an apartment when the defendant intentionally set it on fire. The court analyzed the case under the legal-sufficiency standard and emphasized that a threat of imminent bodily injury can be proven through circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s conduct, knowledge that the child was home, the spread of the fire, and the child’s reaction in escaping through a second-story window. The court held that even without an express verbal threat aimed at the child, a rational factfinder could infer that intentionally starting a fire in an occupied home knowingly threatened the child with imminent bodily injury and involved a deadly weapon.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases, you do not need an express verbal threat to prove danger to a child or household member. If a parent or partner knowingly creates an immediately dangerous condition in the home, the court can infer a threat from the conduct, the living arrangement, the child’s presence, and the surrounding circumstances—making this case especially useful in custody, protective-order, and family-violence disputes."

Divorce

In the Matter of the Marriage of Lenore Hernandez Mowafy and Mohamed Rizk Mowafy and in the Interest of R.M.M., a Child

COA07

In this Texas divorce appeal, the husband had answered and counterpetitioned, but later failed to appear for the final hearing. The trial court proceeded by post-answer default and signed a divorce decree after a hearing set only 42 days after the setting order was filed. The Seventh Court of Appeals held that because this was a post-answer default, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 required at least 45 days’ notice of the first trial setting. Relying on Highsmith, the court concluded that the record affirmatively showed inadequate notice, which amounted to a Rule 245 and due-process violation. The default divorce decree was therefore ineffectual, so the court reversed and remanded.

Litigation Takeaway

"If the other side has filed any answer, you cannot safely take a default final order on short notice. In an answered family-law case, Rule 245’s 45-day notice requirement is a hard appellate trap, and a decree entered on less notice is vulnerable to reversal even if the absent party does not appear at trial."