Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
The Bryant Law Firm and Deborah E. Bryant v. Robert Walker
SCOTX
In a fee-dispute case with family-law implications, the Texas Supreme Court held that a client’s claims against his former lawyer were barred by accord and satisfaction under Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 3.311. After the client demanded a refund and complained that the lawyer’s alleged mishandling of his child-support-termination matter caused additional losses, the lawyer sent a $3,300 refund check and a release. The check conspicuously stated that cashing it would be a full and final settlement and release of all claims. The Court concluded the statutory elements were satisfied because the refund was tendered in good faith, there was a bona fide dispute over the amount and scope of the client’s claims, and the client deposited the check with actual knowledge of the settlement condition. The client’s attempt to cross out the release language and refusal to sign a separate release did not matter because negotiating the check itself completed the accord and satisfaction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat any check marked as full settlement like a binding settlement offer, not routine payment. In family-law disputes over fees, reimbursements, equalization payments, or support-related expenses, depositing a conspicuously conditioned check can wipe out larger claims—even if you write "under protest," strike the language, or decline to sign a separate release."
Fair v. Powell
COA03
In Fair v. Powell, the Austin Court of Appeals rejected a claimed implied easement by necessity across neighboring property in a family land dispute. Fair argued her guesthouse and event-center tract needed access over the Powells’ driveway, but the court focused on Texas’s strict-necessity standard and the time-of-severance requirement. Relying on deed history, recorded instruments, and affidavit testimony showing Fair’s property already had access to Keeneland Drive by a road on her own land, the court held the tract was not landlocked. Because an easement by necessity cannot arise from convenience, lower cost, or longstanding permissive family use, and because alternate access existed, no implied easement by necessity was established.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your client claims a right to keep using a family roadway, driveway, or gate after divorce, partition, or sale, historical practice alone is not enough. Courts will demand objective proof—deeds, surveys, severance history, and actual access to a public road—and any alternate route, even if unpaved or less desirable, can defeat an implied-easement-by-necessity claim."
In the Interest of L.D.M.W.
COA09
The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights to his child after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient on multiple predicate grounds and on best interest. The court emphasized Father’s prior termination order containing endangerment findings, his decision to continue a relationship with Mother despite prior CPS history and similar risks, his incarceration before the child’s birth and throughout the case, and his resulting inability to care for the child or meaningfully complete services. The court also held that an approved relative home study did not outweigh evidence of parental unfitness and the child’s successful, stable foster placement with a family ready to adopt.
Litigation Takeaway
"Past endangerment findings, repeated exposure of a child to known risky relationships, and incarceration-related inability to parent can strongly support termination—especially when the child is thriving in a stable adoptive placement. An approved relative placement is helpful but does not, by itself, defeat termination or overcome a strong best-interest record."
In the Interest of H.P. Jr. and H.P. III, Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (b)(2). The court viewed the evidence cumulatively, not incident by incident, and held that the parents’ repeated domestic violence, incarceration, criminal conduct, instability, missed medical care for the children, substance-abuse and mental-health concerns, failure to complete services, and inability to provide safe care showed a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children. The same evidence, along with the children’s improvement in foster care, supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts can infer endangerment and best interest from a parent’s overall pattern of violence, criminality, instability, untreated substance-abuse or mental-health issues, missed medical care, and service-plan noncompliance. In family cases, a party who wants to prove or defeat risk-based restrictions should build or attack the full course-of-conduct narrative, not just isolated events."
In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child
COA13
In *In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child*, the mother challenged only one part of the termination judgment: whether the trial court used the correct version of Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The suit was filed in 2023, but the Legislature amended § 161.001 effective September 1, 2025, repealing the old service-plan ground in subsection (O) and renumbering the substance-abuse ground into subsection (O). The Thirteenth Court focused on the amendment’s express transition clause, which made the new law apply to SAPCRs pending in the trial court on the effective date. Because this case was still pending on September 1, 2025 and was tried afterward, the amended statute controlled. The court held the trial court correctly applied amended subsection (O) and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family case stays pending across a legislative change, do not assume the filing date controls. Always check the session law’s effective-date and transition provisions, because amended Family Code sections can apply to pending SAPCRs and change pleadings, proof, jury charge, judgment language, and appellate strategy."
Armstrong v. Thomas
COA03
In Armstrong v. Thomas, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a same-day handwritten post-divorce side agreement allegedly giving one ex-spouse the right to buy the other’s house could not be enforced against the parties’ divorce paperwork. The agreement incident to divorce and final decree confirmed the property as the husband’s property, included present-tense conveyancing and quitclaim language, and the AID contained a merger clause stating it was the parties’ entire agreement. The court analyzed the dispute primarily through quiet-title and statute-of-frauds principles, concluding that the handwritten note lacked the essential terms required for an enforceable real-estate sale and that oral testimony and later conduct could not supply those missing terms. The court also held that findings of fact and conclusions of law are improper after summary judgment and that the wife’s nonsuit did not eliminate the husband’s pending counterclaims for affirmative relief. The summary judgment declaring the side agreement unenforceable and quieting title in the husband was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce-related real estate deal matters, put every material term in the decree package or referenced closing documents. A vague side agreement, even one signed the same day as the divorce papers, may be wiped out by merger language, quitclaim language, and the statute of frauds. For litigators, Armstrong is a strong early-summary-judgment case for attacking post-divorce property claims based on informal side deals."
In the Interest of M.T., a Child
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous issues to raise. The court reviewed whether Anders procedures apply in termination cases, whether counsel’s brief provided the required professional evaluation of the record, and whether the court’s own independent review revealed any arguable appellate issue. After confirming counsel addressed potential jurisdictional and evidentiary-sufficiency issues, including predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2), and after finding the mother’s pro se response identified no legal error, the court held the appeal was frivolous, affirmed the termination order, and dismissed the mother’s emergency motion for temporary relief as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family appeals, especially termination cases, appellate success depends on a preserved and legally developed trial record. If no concrete, non-frivolous issue was preserved below, appointed counsel may proceed under Anders, and a general plea for reversal will not substitute for an actual legal complaint."
Adejokun v. Obosi
COA14
In this divorce SAPCR, the mother sought to block the father’s access based on the child’s alleged abuse outcry and also asked the court to interview the 10-year-old child in chambers. The court of appeals held that the mother did not preserve any complaint about exclusion of the child’s hearsay statements because, when hearsay objections were made, she never invoked Texas Family Code section 104.006 or requested the statute’s required reliability hearing. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request to interview the child regarding possession and access, so the final judgment appointing the mother sole managing conservator and the father possessory conservator with supervised visitation was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to admit a child’s abuse outcry under Family Code section 104.006, you must expressly say so at trial, request the reliability hearing, and make a clear record. Serious allegations alone will not preserve error, and a motion for new trial cannot fix the omission later. Likewise, a request for an in-chambers child interview is not automatic and should be tied carefully to the governing statute and the specific issue before the court."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sini Ann Mathews and Wesley Mon Mathews
COA13
In this divorce case, the appellant tried to use a restricted appeal to challenge the final divorce decree after already filing a timely motion for new trial. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a restricted appeal is available only if the appellant did not timely file any post-judgment motion, and that requirement is jurisdictional under the appellate rules and Ex parte E.H. Because the motion for new trial was filed within thirty days of the decree, the appellant could not satisfy a required element of restricted appeal. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and held that later efforts to obtain the appellate record could not cure the defect.
Litigation Takeaway
"Choose your post-judgment remedy carefully. In Texas family cases, a timely motion for new trial and a restricted appeal are not interchangeable fallback options—filing the motion for new trial destroys restricted-appeal jurisdiction."
Juan Morales a/k/a Juan Manuel Morales v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Juan Morales a/k/a Juan Manuel Morales v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the defendant’s fourth and fifth motions for continuance in a retrial for continuous sexual abuse of a child. The defense argued it needed more time because its proposed expert was unavailable, first citing medical issues and later scheduling conflicts. The court applied Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 29.03, 29.06, 29.07, and 29.08 and held that the trial court acted within its discretion because the continuance motions did not meet the strict statutory requirements for an absent-witness continuance. The fourth motion lacked required specifics about diligence, the expected testimony, and other mandatory elements, and the fifth motion was unverified, which preserved nothing for appellate review. The court also noted the case had already been continued multiple times and the record did not show the expert was medically unavailable on the actual trial date. The conviction was therefore affirmed on the continuance issue.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a continuance because an expert cannot appear, do not rely on general fairness arguments. File a sworn motion, show specific diligence, explain exactly why the expert matters, prove the absence was not self-created, and give the court a concrete timeline for availability. In family cases, Morales is a strong tool for defeating vague last-minute reset requests and a warning that repeated continuances seriously weaken any appellate complaint."