Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
In the Interest of N. L. S. and E. J. C., Children
COA01
After Mother’s parental rights were terminated, she filed a petition to reinstate them under Texas Family Code section 161.302 while the children had not yet been adopted and were not yet subject to adoption placement agreements. Before the reinstatement hearing, however, DFPS executed adoption placement agreements for the children. The First Court of Appeals applied a strict plain-language reading of sections 161.302 and 161.303, holding that section 161.302 governs only filing eligibility, while section 161.303 governs the merits at the hearing. Because section 161.303 requires proof that the child is not subject to an adoption placement agreement at the time relief is granted, and the children were subject to such agreements at the hearing, Mother could not obtain reinstatement. The court also rejected the argument that filing a reinstatement petition creates an implied stay barring DFPS from moving forward with adoptive placement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Filing eligibility is not the same as winning on the merits. In reinstatement and other family-law cases involving timing-sensitive statutes, lawyers must confirm whether the controlling facts are measured at filing or at the hearing. A petition that is valid when filed can still fail if key facts change before the court rules, and courts will not read an implied stay into the Family Code without express statutory language."
Cedillo v. State
COA01
In Cedillo v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve an appellate complaint that a child’s outcry statements were unreliable under Article 38.072 by arguing only about which adult was the proper outcry witness. The trial dispute focused on witness designation—whether the mother, grandmother, counselor, or another adult was the first qualifying recipient of the child’s disclosure—not on the separate statutory reliability inquiry requiring analysis of the statement’s time, content, and circumstances. Because Cedillo did not specifically raise that reliability objection in the trial court, the court found the complaint waived. The court also held that any error would have been harmless because substantially similar abuse evidence came in through the children’s own testimony and unobjected-to medical records.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, do not lump together distinct evidentiary objections. If you want to challenge a child’s statement as unreliable, say so clearly and tie the objection to the governing reliability standard; arguing only that the wrong adult is serving as the messenger will not preserve the issue for appeal. And if similar testimony or records come in elsewhere without objection, any evidentiary complaint may still fail on harmless-error grounds."
In the Interest of S.M.M. and R.M.M., Minor Children
COA05
In a child-support modification case, the trial court signed a 2022 order awarding Mother $22,953.40 in attorney’s fees after taking fees under advisement at the hearing. After plenary power expired, the court later signed a nunc pro tunc judgment deleting that award and requiring each party to pay their own fees. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that because the court had not orally rendered a fee ruling at the hearing, the signed 2022 order was itself the rendition of judgment on fees. Deleting the fee award and replacing it with a take-nothing fees provision was a substantive change to the judgment actually rendered, not a clerical correction permitted by Rule 316. The nunc pro tunc judgment was therefore void, and the original fee award remained in place.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once plenary power expires, a court can fix clerical mistakes in a family-law order, but it cannot use nunc pro tunc to rewrite who owes attorney’s fees or other substantive obligations. If a signed order is the first actual rendition on an issue, any challenge to that ruling must be made through timely post-judgment motions or appeal—not later by calling the change a mere clerical correction."
Fulton v. State
COA07
In Fulton v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not assess $787.50 in court-appointed attorney’s fees against a defendant who had repeatedly been found indigent when the record contained no evidence of a material change in her financial circumstances or any present ability to pay. The court relied on article 26.05(g) and Mayer v. State, emphasizing that boilerplate recitals and an administrative order entered without a hearing do not substitute for evidence. The court also struck a $500 fine that was never orally pronounced, deleted a $443 reparation award unsupported by the record, and removed a premature $15 time-payment fee. The judgment, bill of costs, and withdrawal order were modified accordingly.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a court is going to impose attorney’s fees or other monetary obligations on a party previously found indigent, the record must affirmatively show present ability to pay and any material change in circumstances. For family-law litigants, Fulton is a strong analogy for attacking unsupported fee awards, reimbursement orders, and cost assessments that rest on assumptions rather than evidence."
In the Interest of A.P.Z., a Child
COA05
In In re A.P.Z., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a custody-modification order after Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to give Father the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence. The court did not reach the merits of Mother’s evidentiary complaints because the appellate record was incomplete: it omitted the trial court’s in-camera interview of the 15-year-old child, a referenced child interview status report, and related proceedings. Applying settled Texas appellate rules, the court presumed the missing portions of the reporter’s record supported the judgment. Because Mother’s arguments depended on the state of the evidence, the court held those complaints were waived and treated the evidence as sufficient to support implied findings of material and substantial change and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you plan to challenge a custody or modification ruling on evidentiary grounds, you must bring up a complete appellate record—especially any in-camera child interview under Family Code § 153.009. In family cases, missing hearings, report-back settings, or child interviews will usually trigger a presumption that the omitted evidence supports the judgment, making sufficiency and abuse-of-discretion complaints effectively dead on arrival."
In Re Kathryn Copeland
COA05
In In re Copeland, a pro se litigant already subject to a vexatious-litigant prefiling order sought mandamus after the local administrative judge denied her request under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 11.102(d). The Dallas Court of Appeals held that section 11.102(d) is only a gatekeeping mechanism for deciding whether a vexatious litigant may file new litigation; it does not authorize the local administrative judge to declare the underlying vexatious-litigant order void ab initio. Because Copeland’s motion primarily sought a collateral attack on the prior order rather than permission to file identified new litigation, and because she failed to show the judge had authority to grant the requested relief, mandamus was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use a Chapter 11 permission request as a backdoor attack on an existing vexatious-litigant order. In family-law cases, be precise about whether you are seeking permission to file new litigation, filing in an existing case, or challenging the validity of the prior prefiling order—because those are different procedural paths, and mixing them can sink the request and any mandamus challenge."
In Re Jose Gilberto Perez
COA05
In this original proceeding, a father sought mandamus relief after the trial court denied his request to modify SAPCR temporary orders that apparently left the child with a nonparent. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of his parental-presumption arguments because his mandamus record was fatally incomplete: he omitted the operative January 2025 temporary order, the relevant motions, and properly authenticated transcripts and exhibits from the hearings that led to the ruling. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7 and standard mandamus principles, the court held he failed to show a clear abuse of discretion. The court also struck the petition and record for including unredacted sensitive data, and denied relief without prejudice to refiling with a compliant record.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus rises or falls on the record. Even strong family-law arguments about parental rights or improper nonparent conservatorship will go nowhere if the petition does not include the actual order being challenged, the key motions, and authenticated transcripts and exhibits from every material hearing. Also, do a final Rule 9.9 redaction check before filing."
In the Interest of B.W., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of B.W., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a child could not appeal an order terminating his father’s parental rights when the child, through counsel, had only filed a general denial and opposed termination at trial but had not pleaded any affirmative claim for relief or identified any Family Code provision authorizing the appeal. The court analyzed the issue as a threshold question of appellate standing and subject-matter jurisdiction, explaining that participation in the trial court does not itself make someone an aggrieved party for appellate purposes. Because B.W. showed no legally recognized justiciable interest that was injuriously affected by the judgment, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the sufficiency challenge to the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume that trial participation preserves appellate rights in a family case. To appeal, the would-be appellant must have a statutory basis to do so and must be an aggrieved party whose own legally recognized interest was harmed by the judgment; a general denial and opposition at trial are not enough."
Dillon Austin Venson v. The State of Texas
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly designated a forensic interviewer as the Article 38.072 outcry witness even though the child first told her mother that the defendant had 'messed with' her and put his hands down her pants. The court explained that the outcry witness is not automatically the first adult who hears any allegation of abuse, but the first adult who receives a statement that describes the alleged offense in a discernible way. Because the mother described the initial conversation as brief and lacking detail, while the later CAC interview provided specific facts about the sexual touching, the trial court acted within its discretion in selecting the forensic interviewer. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to support the indecency-with-a-child conviction and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-abuse-related family litigation, do not assume the first adult listener controls the evidentiary story. Courts will focus on the first sufficiently descriptive disclosure, not merely the first mention of abuse. For practitioners, the key is to build a precise disclosure timeline, compare the exact content of each statement, and frame arguments around specificity rather than chronology."
In the Interest of Z.D., a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The court first analyzed whether counsel complied with Anders, In re Schulman, and Kelly by thoroughly reviewing the record, serving the mother with the brief and motion to withdraw, and advising her of her right to review the record and file a pro se response. After conducting its own independent review, the court found no arguable ground for reversal, including no viable challenge to the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), where the record showed a pattern of drug abuse creating substantial risk of harm to the child and impairing the mother’s ability to parent. The court also held that counsel’s motion to withdraw was premature because appointed counsel in termination appeals generally must continue representation through exhaustion of further appellate remedies under Family Code section 107.016(2) and In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination cases, Anders review will not save a weak record challenge where the evidence clearly ties a parent’s substance abuse to danger, instability, and inability to safely parent. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to build a record that specifically connects conduct to child endangerment and best interest; for appointed appellate counsel, the lesson is to strictly follow Anders procedures and expect representation to continue beyond the court of appeals unless properly relieved."