Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1576 opinions found
In the Interest of K.M.N., P.N. III, E.J.N., I.A.N., B.L.N., C.A.N., S.V.N., L.F.N., and S.N., Children
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. The court relied on extensive evidence of danger and instability, including Mother’s cocaine use at the birth of the youngest child, unsafe and unsanitary housing, educational neglect, parentification of older siblings, Father’s sexual-abuse conviction and history of physical abuse, and Mother’s prolonged failure to protect the children despite knowing of Father’s violence and alleged killing of one child. Applying the Family Code best-interest framework and Holley factors, the court held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief that termination was in the children’s best interest, and it separately affirmed Father’s termination after independent Anders review revealed no non-frivolous appellate issue.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, failure to protect can be just as powerful as direct abuse. A parent who continues to align with a known abuser, minimizes danger, or cannot show a real safety plan risks losing conservatorship or parental rights even if that parent was not the primary perpetrator."
Bouvier v. Thompson
COA02
In Bouvier v. Thompson, the plaintiff sued family members in 2024 claiming they concealed inheritance information, committed fraud, breached fiduciary duties, and conspired to deprive her of assets she said she should have inherited. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment because the defendant used the plaintiff’s own prior filings to show she knew the key facts no later than 2014: she believed Ezelle was her biological mother, believed an inheritance was owed to her, and believed family members were concealing it. Applying Texas’s four-year limitations periods for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and the derivative limitations rule for conspiracy, the court held the claims accrued by 2014 and were therefore time-barred when filed in 2024. The court also emphasized that arguments about delayed discovery or concealment do not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"Labels do not save stale claims. If a client’s earlier pleadings, letters, or filings show they already knew the essential facts, Texas limitations likely starts running then—even if they later say they lacked full proof. In family-related property, probate-overlap, and fraud cases, lawyers should audit prior statements carefully, plead only recognized causes of action, and support any tolling theory with actual summary-judgment evidence."
In the Interest of A.W., N.W., N.W., P.W., Children
COA13
After a jury terminated Mother’s parental rights to four children, she appealed claiming the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support constructive abandonment and best interest, and also complained the order lacked required statutory findings. The court did not reach the merits because Texas preservation rules apply in termination jury trials just as in other civil jury cases. Mother filed none of the recognized preservation vehicles for legal sufficiency and no motion for new trial, which is required to preserve factual-sufficiency complaints. The court also noted that Mother challenged only subsection (N) while the jury also found unchallenged predicate grounds under subsections (D), (E), and (O), any one of which could support termination with a best-interest finding. The court held all complained-of issues were waived or would not afford relief and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any jury-tried family case, appellate sufficiency complaints must be preserved in the trial court or they are likely gone forever. If you may challenge a jury finding on appeal, use a recognized preservation motion, and for factual sufficiency always file a motion for new trial. In termination cases especially, challenge every predicate ground necessary for meaningful relief and promptly object to missing statutory findings in the final order."
Loria v. Loria
COA03
In Loria v. Loria, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s order modifying conservatorship rights after a bench trial. The father sought to change the prior joint-managing-conservatorship structure by obtaining the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence and greater medical and tie-breaking authority, arguing that circumstances had materially and substantially changed and that the existing arrangement had become unworkable. The appellate court, applying the abuse-of-discretion standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, held that evidence of persistent coparenting conflict, interference with communication, disputes over vaccinations and therapy, lack of follow-through on the children’s developmental needs, and the father’s more stable household was sufficient to support findings of material and substantial change and best interest. The court therefore upheld the reallocation of primary-residence and decision-making rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Modification cases are rarely won by one dramatic fact; they are won by proving a pattern of specific, child-centered problems showing the current order no longer works. If you want to modify conservatorship, build a record with concrete evidence of communication breakdowns, medical and educational conflict, parenting instability, and why a clearer allocation of rights will better serve the child."
Spragins v. Lunn 34 Cattle
COA02
In Spragins v. Lunn 34 Cattle, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals looked past the trial court’s label of a “restraining order” and held that the order was actually a temporary injunction because it was entered after a contested evidentiary hearing and remained in effect “until further order” during the pendency of the case. Applying Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 683 and 684, the court held the order was void because it did not affirmatively set the case for trial on the merits and did not fix a bond. The court rejected the idea that an “until further order” clause could satisfy Rule 683 and dissolved the injunction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, the label on an order does not control—its function does. If an order entered after notice and hearing operates like a temporary injunction, it must strictly comply with Rules 683 and 684 by including a merits trial setting and a bond amount. Otherwise, the order may be void and vulnerable to immediate interlocutory attack."
In the Interest of J.M.V.V., a Child
COA10
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous grounds for appeal after the trial court terminated the father’s rights under Family Code section 161.001 and appointed DFPS as managing conservator. The Waco Court of Appeals reviewed whether counsel’s Anders filing was adequate, confirmed counsel had summarized the facts, procedural history, and governing law, and then independently examined the full record, the father’s pro se response, and the State’s response. Finding no arguable basis for reversal, the court affirmed the termination order. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature, holding that appointed counsel remains obligated through potential Texas Supreme Court proceedings unless formally relieved.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination appeals, an Anders brief is not a shortcut out of the case: counsel must fully review the record, explain why no arguable issue exists, and continue representing the client through the petition-for-review stage unless relieved. For trial lawyers, the case is another reminder that appellate outcomes usually turn on preservation and a well-developed record."
In re Claudia Jacobs
COA05
In this post-divorce enforcement dispute, the relator sought mandamus relief and an emergency stay to block an order to appear and an upcoming enforcement hearing. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the mandamus filing was procedurally defective: the petition lacked the certification required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52, the record did not contain sworn or certified copies of material documents, and the appendix included unredacted sensitive information in violation of Rule 9.9. The court held that these threshold defects defeated mandamus relief, denied the stay as moot, and struck the petition and appendix for the redaction violation.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law mandamus practice, procedure is substance. If your petition lacks a Rule 52 certification, your record is not sworn or certified, or your filing contains unredacted sensitive data, the court may deny relief without ever reaching the underlying enforcement issue."
In re Rebel Hayz Breaux
COA09
After completing his sentence for misdemeanor assault family violence, Breaux filed an article 11.09 habeas application alleging ongoing restraints from the conviction, including the lifetime federal firearm ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and a final protective order. The trial court denied relief solely because his sentence had expired and it concluded he was no longer restrained. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the pleaded federal firearm disability is a sufficient present restraint to support article 11.09 habeas jurisdiction, so the trial court erred in denying the application on that categorical ground. But the court also held that this did not automatically require issuance of the writ, an evidentiary hearing, merits rulings, or appointment of counsel, because the applicant still had to satisfy article 11.14’s procedural and verification requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-violence conviction does not become legally irrelevant once the sentence ends: the federal firearm ban can be enough continuing restraint to keep post-conviction habeas relief alive. For family-law litigators, that means old assault-family-violence convictions can still carry real leverage in custody, safety, and firearm-related disputes—but any collateral attack on the conviction must be pleaded and verified with precision."
Hutton v. Alfrido
COA14
In Hutton v. Alfrido, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from a final protective order for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was filed too late. Although the appellant filed a timely post-judgment motion that functioned like a motion for new trial and extended the deadline to 90 days after the order was signed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), the notice of appeal still had to be filed by February 3, 2026, or within the additional 15-day Verburgt grace period by February 18, 2026. Filing on February 27 was outside both deadlines. The court also rejected the appellant’s apparent attempt to rely on a later denial of a motion to set aside or reconsider the protective order, explaining that such a denial is not independently appealable and does not create a new appellate deadline. And because the record showed only a docket-sheet notation—not a signed order—there was no appealable later order in any event. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, calendar appellate deadlines from the original final order, not from a later ruling on a motion to reconsider or set aside. A post-judgment motion may extend the deadline, but it does not restart it indefinitely, and docket-sheet entries are not appealable orders. If there is any doubt, get a signed order, calculate the Rule 26.1 and Verburgt deadlines immediately, and file the notice of appeal early."
Griffith v. Barrett
COA14
In Griffith v. Barrett, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a temporary injunction was void because the order did not set the case for trial on the merits as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. The injunction stated only that it would remain in effect until final judgment or further order, which the court found was not a substitute for an affirmative merits trial setting. Applying the strict-compliance rule from InterFirst Bank and Qwest, the court treated the omission as a facial defect that rendered the injunction void, reversed the order, dissolved the injunction, and remanded without reaching other issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want temporary injunctive relief in a family-law-adjacent case, draft the order like a real Rule 683 injunction. An order that says it lasts until final judgment is not enough; the injunction itself must set the case for trial on the merits. For the responding party, this is a strong procedural attack point that can dissolve an overbroad injunction before litigating the underlying facts."