Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
In the Interest of N. L. S. and E. J. C., Children
COA01
After Mother’s parental rights were terminated, she filed a petition to reinstate them under Texas Family Code section 161.302 while the children had not yet been adopted and were not yet subject to adoption placement agreements. Before the reinstatement hearing, however, DFPS executed adoption placement agreements for the children. The First Court of Appeals applied a strict plain-language reading of sections 161.302 and 161.303, holding that section 161.302 governs only filing eligibility, while section 161.303 governs the merits at the hearing. Because section 161.303 requires proof that the child is not subject to an adoption placement agreement at the time relief is granted, and the children were subject to such agreements at the hearing, Mother could not obtain reinstatement. The court also rejected the argument that filing a reinstatement petition creates an implied stay barring DFPS from moving forward with adoptive placement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Filing eligibility is not the same as winning on the merits. In reinstatement and other family-law cases involving timing-sensitive statutes, lawyers must confirm whether the controlling facts are measured at filing or at the hearing. A petition that is valid when filed can still fail if key facts change before the court rules, and courts will not read an implied stay into the Family Code without express statutory language."
In re Matthiew Adrian Alirol
COA13
After a trial court granted a new trial and set aside an agreed divorce decree, the relator sought mandamus relief, arguing the ruling was improper. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals focused on the procedural posture: this was a nonjury divorce matter, not a case involving a jury verdict. Applying Texas mandamus standards, the court explained that mandamus generally requires both a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal, and that immediate mandamus review of new-trial orders is far more limited in bench or agreed-decree cases than in jury-verdict cases. Because the relator did not show the new-trial order was void or that extraordinary circumstances made ordinary appellate review inadequate, the court denied mandamus and allowed the case to proceed in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a trial court grants a new trial after an agreed or bench-tried divorce decree, mandamus is usually not the answer. Unless you can show the order is void or that truly exceptional circumstances make appeal inadequate, the practical path is to preserve error, retry the case, and challenge the ruling in a regular appeal after final judgment."
Cedillo v. State
COA01
In Cedillo v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve an Article 38.072 reliability complaint by arguing only about who qualifies as the proper outcry witness. Cedillo challenged witness identity at the outcry hearing, but on appeal reframed the issue as whether the children’s statements to the mother, grandmother, and counselor were unreliable. The court applied Texas preservation rules and concluded that a generic or differently framed objection did not alert the trial court to a specific reliability challenge based on the statutory factors of time, content, and circumstances. The court also held that any assumed error was harmless because the complainants and CAC records provided substantially similar evidence without objection. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate review of a child-disclosure reliability issue, say so specifically and build the record around reliability—not just hearsay, process, or who the proper witness is. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, separate each evidentiary objection, get a clear ruling, and object consistently to repeated similar evidence or harmless-error will likely defeat any appeal."
Cedillo v. State
COA01
In Cedillo v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that a party does not preserve an appellate complaint that a child’s outcry statements were unreliable under Article 38.072 by arguing only about which adult was the proper outcry witness. The trial dispute focused on witness designation—whether the mother, grandmother, counselor, or another adult was the first qualifying recipient of the child’s disclosure—not on the separate statutory reliability inquiry requiring analysis of the statement’s time, content, and circumstances. Because Cedillo did not specifically raise that reliability objection in the trial court, the court found the complaint waived. The court also held that any error would have been harmless because substantially similar abuse evidence came in through the children’s own testimony and unobjected-to medical records.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, do not lump together distinct evidentiary objections. If you want to challenge a child’s statement as unreliable, say so clearly and tie the objection to the governing reliability standard; arguing only that the wrong adult is serving as the messenger will not preserve the issue for appeal. And if similar testimony or records come in elsewhere without objection, any evidentiary complaint may still fail on harmless-error grounds."
In the Interest of S.V.H.F., A Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after a three-month-old infant suffered severe non-accidental head trauma while in the father’s exclusive care. The court relied on medical records showing intracranial bleeding and retinal hemorrhages consistent with abusive acceleration/deceleration injury, and held the trial court was entitled to reject the father’s innocent explanation that the child merely choked or asphyxiated on milk. Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), and because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough, it did not need to reach subsection (D).
Litigation Takeaway
"When a very young child suffers serious unexplained injuries during one parent’s exclusive care, Texas courts may infer endangerment from circumstantial medical evidence alone—even without pinpoint testimony about the exact timing or mechanism of injury. For family-law litigators, the case highlights the importance of building or attacking the exclusivity timeline, medical-record causation, and witness credibility, because a factfinder may simply disbelieve a parent’s benign account and that can be enough to sustain major protective relief."
In the Matter of J.P., a Juvenile
COA05
In this juvenile appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed a written modification order that committed J.P. to TJJD but cited Family Code section 54.04(f), the original-disposition statute, instead of section 54.05(f), the statute governing modification proceedings. After conducting its Anders review, the court concluded the record clearly showed this was a modification case, that J.P. had pleaded true to the probation violation, and that the underlying felony adjudication made him eligible for TJJD commitment. Because the defect was a drafting error rather than a lack of authority or harmful substantive error, the court reformed the order to substitute section 54.05(f) for section 54.04(f) and affirmed the order as modified. The court also denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw because counsel’s duties continue through the petition-for-review stage absent good cause.
Litigation Takeaway
"Not every mistake in a written order justifies reversal. If the record clearly shows what the trial court intended and supports the relief granted, an appellate court may reform a mis-cited or internally inconsistent order rather than remand or reverse. For family-law litigators, that means two things: draft orders carefully, and on appeal focus on whether the defect is truly substantive and harmful or merely a correctable scrivener’s error."
Dillon Austin Venson v. The State of Texas
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly designated a forensic interviewer as the Article 38.072 outcry witness even though the child first told her mother that the defendant had 'messed with' her and put his hands down her pants. The court explained that the outcry witness is not automatically the first adult who hears any allegation of abuse, but the first adult who receives a statement that describes the alleged offense in a discernible way. Because the mother described the initial conversation as brief and lacking detail, while the later CAC interview provided specific facts about the sexual touching, the trial court acted within its discretion in selecting the forensic interviewer. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to support the indecency-with-a-child conviction and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-abuse-related family litigation, do not assume the first adult listener controls the evidentiary story. Courts will focus on the first sufficiently descriptive disclosure, not merely the first mention of abuse. For practitioners, the key is to build a precise disclosure timeline, compare the exact content of each statement, and frame arguments around specificity rather than chronology."
In the Interest of A.P.Z., a Child
COA05
In In re A.P.Z., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a custody-modification order after Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to give Father the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence. The court did not reach the merits of Mother’s evidentiary complaints because the appellate record was incomplete: it omitted the trial court’s in-camera interview of the 15-year-old child, a referenced child interview status report, and related proceedings. Applying settled Texas appellate rules, the court presumed the missing portions of the reporter’s record supported the judgment. Because Mother’s arguments depended on the state of the evidence, the court held those complaints were waived and treated the evidence as sufficient to support implied findings of material and substantial change and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you plan to challenge a custody or modification ruling on evidentiary grounds, you must bring up a complete appellate record—especially any in-camera child interview under Family Code § 153.009. In family cases, missing hearings, report-back settings, or child interviews will usually trigger a presumption that the omitted evidence supports the judgment, making sufficiency and abuse-of-discretion complaints effectively dead on arrival."
In the Interest of B.W., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of B.W., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a child could not appeal an order terminating his father’s parental rights when the child, through counsel, had only filed a general denial and opposed termination at trial but had not pleaded any affirmative claim for relief or identified any Family Code provision authorizing the appeal. The court analyzed the issue as a threshold question of appellate standing and subject-matter jurisdiction, explaining that participation in the trial court does not itself make someone an aggrieved party for appellate purposes. Because B.W. showed no legally recognized justiciable interest that was injuriously affected by the judgment, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the sufficiency challenge to the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume that trial participation preserves appellate rights in a family case. To appeal, the would-be appellant must have a statutory basis to do so and must be an aggrieved party whose own legally recognized interest was harmed by the judgment; a general denial and opposition at trial are not enough."
Fulton v. State
COA07
In Fulton v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not assess $787.50 in court-appointed attorney’s fees against a defendant who had repeatedly been found indigent when the record contained no evidence of a material change in her financial circumstances or any present ability to pay. The court relied on article 26.05(g) and Mayer v. State, emphasizing that boilerplate recitals and an administrative order entered without a hearing do not substitute for evidence. The court also struck a $500 fine that was never orally pronounced, deleted a $443 reparation award unsupported by the record, and removed a premature $15 time-payment fee. The judgment, bill of costs, and withdrawal order were modified accordingly.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a court is going to impose attorney’s fees or other monetary obligations on a party previously found indigent, the record must affirmatively show present ability to pay and any material change in circumstances. For family-law litigants, Fulton is a strong analogy for attacking unsupported fee awards, reimbursement orders, and cost assessments that rest on assumptions rather than evidence."