Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Price v. Clayborn
COA01
In Price v. Clayborn, a former husband filed a pleading labeled as a bill of review to attack post-divorce enforcement and receivership orders involving the former marital residence. The court looked past the title of the filing and analyzed its substance, concluding it was not a true bill of review because it did not seek to set aside the final divorce decree; instead, it sought only to undo later post-judgment orders allegedly inconsistent with the decree and MSA. Once characterized as a motion to set aside post-judgment orders, the appeal failed because denial of that type of motion is not independently appealable, and any direct appeal from the June 4, 2024 receiver and enforcement orders was untimely. The First Court of Appeals dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-divorce property cases, the label on your pleading does not control—the relief you actually seek does. If you are challenging an enforcement or receivership order rather than the divorce decree itself, use the correct procedural vehicle and meet the appellate deadline tied to that order, or you may lose the case on jurisdiction before the court ever reaches the merits."
Ex parte C.M.
COA05
In Ex parte C.M., the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile habeas application could be dismissed as an impermissible successive writ under Chapter 11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. C.M., who had previously filed multiple habeas applications challenging a 1998 juvenile delinquency adjudication, filed another application in 2022. The trial court dismissed it as successive and also denied relief on the merits. On appeal, the court analyzed the civil nature of juvenile delinquency proceedings, Family Code section 56.01(o), Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution, and precedent holding that criminal-procedure rules do not apply to juvenile matters unless the Legislature clearly says so. Because Chapter 11 governs criminal habeas practice and the Legislature did not incorporate its successive-writ bar into juvenile habeas proceedings, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the application on that basis. But because the trial court also denied relief on the merits, the court of appeals affirmed the ultimate denial of habeas relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume criminal procedural rules automatically apply in juvenile or Family Code proceedings. When an opponent tries to import a criminal limitation like Chapter 11’s successive-writ bar, start with the statutory classification question and require clear legislative authority. Even so, always build the merits record, because winning the procedural issue may not change the outcome."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Michelle DeJean and Robert Dean DeJean, Jr.
COA05
In this Dallas divorce appeal, the husband challenged several parts of the decree, including an award of contingent appellate attorney’s fees to the wife. The court affirmed the trial court’s property division, waste findings, and treatment of trial-level fees, but it separately analyzed whether the evidence supported conditional appellate fees. Applying Rohrmoos and Yowell, the court held that testimony giving only bottom-line amounts for an unsuccessful appeal and Supreme Court review was conclusory because it did not explain the expected appellate work, hours, rates, or other Arthur Andersen reasonableness factors. Because the evidence was legally insufficient, the court reversed the contingent appellate fee award and rendered a take-nothing judgment on those fees while otherwise affirming the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want contingent appellate fees in a family-law judgment, do not offer only a lump-sum number. Build a record with opinion testimony showing the anticipated appellate tasks, projected hours, rates, and why each stage-specific fee is reasonable and necessary under Arthur Andersen, or the fee award is vulnerable to reversal and rendition."
Williams v. State
COA05
In Williams v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a mother’s conviction for injury to a child after she challenged the sufficiency of the evidence identifying her as the abuser and complained about relevance and hearsay rulings tied to abuse-related testimony. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient because the record included the mother’s recorded admissions, sibling testimony describing repeated abuse, and medical evidence consistent with acute blunt-force trauma; under the deferential sufficiency standard, the jury was entitled to resolve conflicts and disbelieve her trial recantation and blame-shifting. The court also rejected her evidentiary complaints and modified the judgment to correct clerical errors in the Penal Code citation and lead counsel designation because the appellate record clearly supplied the correct information.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, appeals usually turn on the record: specific evidentiary objections must be carefully preserved, and a factfinder’s credibility calls will rarely be disturbed when admissions, child testimony, and medical proof line up. The case also underscores that clerical mistakes in final orders can often be corrected on appeal when the record clearly shows the right information, without undoing the merits."
In the Interest of A.Z.Q., a Child
COA08
The Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the child. The court relied on the child’s positive cocaine and THC test, the mother’s admitted cocaine use in the child’s presence, her failure to tell medical providers about likely marijuana-gummy ingestion, her continued drug use after removal, and her failure to engage honestly in substance-abuse services despite signing a service plan. Applying clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards, the court treated the case as one about ongoing endangerment rather than a single ingestion incident and concluded the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that subsection (E) was satisfied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug-use cases are won or lost on pattern evidence, not isolated events. A parent’s minimization of risk, continued use after intervention, refusal to test, denial during treatment assessments, and association with unsafe drug users can support endangerment findings and, in private custody cases, justify supervised access, restrictions, and modified conservatorship."
Susan Mack Cooper v. Thomas Christian Cooper
COA05
In Cooper v. Cooper, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a jury-based divorce decree because the wife’s appellate complaints were inadequately briefed. Although she alleged serious problems—including discovery abuse, concealment of assets, improper transfers, restrictions on character evidence, and an unfair property division—her brief did not identify specific reversible rulings or jury findings, apply the correct standards of review, cite the record, or support her arguments with relevant authority as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. The court treated the appeal as a briefing-waiver case rather than reaching the merits, holding that broad accusations of unfairness and generalized sufficiency attacks were not enough to overturn a decree implementing a unanimous jury verdict and equal division of the estate.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appeals are won with precise legal briefing, not broad complaints that the trial was unfair. In a divorce appeal, each complaint must be tied to a specific ruling or jury finding, preserved in the record, supported by authority, and accompanied by a harm analysis—or the issue is likely waived."
J.L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In J.L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Third Court of Appeals upheld an order denying the father both managing and possessory conservatorship of his infant child. The record showed repeated domestic violence between the parents, the father’s methamphetamine use, the child’s positive methamphetamine hair test, untreated mental-health issues, threats to the caregiver, and the father’s failure to complete key court-ordered services. Applying Family Code sections 153.002 and 153.191 under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held that the usual presumption favoring appointment of a non-managing parent as possessory conservator was rebutted because appointment was not in the child’s best interest and the father’s possession or access would endanger the child’s physical or emotional welfare. The court also rejected the father’s complaint about discretionary visitation because he was not entitled to possessory-conservator status in the first place.
Litigation Takeaway
"The Section 153.191 possessory-conservator presumption is real, but it can be overcome with a strong danger record. Repeated family violence, substance abuse, direct child drug exposure, untreated mental-health instability, threats, and failure to complete services can justify denying a parent any conservatorship role at all—not just restricting visitation."
In the Interest of V.C., a Child
COA13
In this private termination-and-adoption appeal, the court reversed a trial court order terminating the mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(C) and (F). The father and stepmother relied mainly on the mother’s incarceration, nonpayment of child support, and absence from the child’s life. The court strictly scrutinized the evidence under the clear-and-convincing standard and held it was insufficient on both predicate grounds. As to subsection (C), the evidence showed the child was adequately supported in the father’s home, so the record did not establish that the mother voluntarily left the child without adequate support. As to subsection (F), the petitioners proved nonpayment but did not prove the mother had the ability to pay during the relevant statutory period, especially while incarcerated and in a halfway house. The mother’s post-release efforts to contact the child, along with evidence that the father controlled or blocked access, also undermined any abandonment theory. The court reversed and rendered judgment without reaching best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination cases rise or fall on exact statutory proof, not sympathy or bad optics. Incarceration, missed support, and a weak relationship with the child do not by themselves prove abandonment or failure to support under § 161.001(b)(1)(C) or (F). Petitioners must prove each element—especially adequate-support facts under subsection (C) and actual ability to pay during the statutory window under subsection (F). For respondents, evidence of attempted contact, blocked access, and inability to pay can be decisive."
In the Interest of A.W., a Child
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating that, after reviewing the record, no nonfrivolous issue could be raised. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals independently reviewed the clerk’s and reporter’s records under Anders and In re K.M., including the trial court’s findings under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (Q) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). Given the record of drug use during pregnancy, the child’s positive test at birth, incarceration, noncompliance, instability, and the absence of any pro se response, the court found no arguable ground for appeal and affirmed the termination order. The court separately denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding under In re P.M. that a no-merit appeal alone is not good cause for withdrawal and that appointed counsel’s duties continue through Texas Supreme Court proceedings unless relieved on some independent basis.
Litigation Takeaway
"An Anders affirmance in a termination case does not end appointed counsel’s job. For family-law litigators, the case highlights two practical lessons: build and preserve appellate issues at trial because a bad record is hard to overcome on accelerated review, and if appointed on appeal, comply fully with Anders procedures while expecting to remain counsel through possible Texas Supreme Court review unless the court grants withdrawal for a reason beyond frivolousness."
Olivares v. Sanchez
COA08
In Olivares v. Sanchez, the appellant tried to appeal a July 1, 2025 final judgment by filing a notice of appeal on November 10, 2025, after the trial court denied her timely motion for new trial on October 9, 2025. The court explained that a timely motion for new trial extends the deadline to file a notice of appeal to 90 days after the final judgment is signed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a)(1), making the deadline September 29, 2025. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the later order denying new trial created a separate 30-day deadline, because an order denying a motion for new trial is not independently appealable. Since the notice of appeal was filed after the extended deadline measured from the final judgment, and outside the Rule 26.3 grace period calculated from that same date, the court held it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, the appellate clock runs from the signed final judgment or final appealable order—not from the order denying a motion for new trial. A timely new-trial motion can extend the notice-of-appeal deadline to 90 days, but it does not restart the clock. Calendar the final-order date, the Rule 26.1 extended deadline, and the Rule 26.3 grace period immediately, or the appeal may be lost entirely."