Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
760 opinions found
Castillo v. State
COA07
In a case involving aggravated assault of a child, the defendant challenged the reliability of a burn expert's testimony regarding the timing of the injury. The trial court admitted the testimony over an objection that the State 'failed to lay a proper predicate.' The Seventh Court of Appeals held that a 'predicate' objection is too general to preserve a Rule 702 reliability complaint for appeal, as it fails to specify whether the challenge concerns the expert's qualifications, the methodology, or the application of facts. Analyzing the merits in the alternative, the court found no abuse of discretion, ruling that the expert's extensive clinical experience provided a sufficient basis for his opinions and that gaps in scientific literature were matters for cross-examination rather than exclusion.
Litigation Takeaway
"A general 'lack of predicate' or 'foundation' objection will not preserve a Daubert/Robinson challenge to an expert's reliability; you must explicitly object under Rule 702 and identify the specific methodological gap or analytical defect to avoid waiving the issue for appeal."
Williams-James v. James
COA03
In Williams-James v. James, the appellant challenged the accuracy of the reporter’s record, claiming it was incomplete and that certain exhibits were improperly included or omitted. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the dispute under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6, which requires a trial court to resolve record inaccuracies that the parties cannot agree upon. The court held that it could not adjudicate these factual disputes in the first instance and ordered the appeal abated and remanded to the trial court for a formal hearing to settle the record.
Litigation Takeaway
"The integrity of the trial record is the foundation of any appeal; if you discover the reporter's record is inaccurate or incomplete after it has been filed, you must file a formal motion to abate the appeal so the trial court can settle the dispute through a hearing."
In re Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield
COA06
Relators moved a child to Smith County in violation of a geographic restriction issued in a Panola County SAPCR order. After six months, they moved for a mandatory venue transfer to Smith County under Texas Family Code Section 155.201. The court analyzed whether a county where residency is established via a violation of a court order constitutes a 'proper county' for transfer. The court held that the mandatory transfer provision is not triggered by unauthorized residency, and the trial court of continuing exclusive jurisdiction retains authority to deny the transfer and enforce its orders through contempt.
Litigation Takeaway
"Violating a geographic restriction to establish residency in a new county will not trigger a mandatory venue transfer; a court will not reward 'venue shopping' or 'self-help' that occurs in direct defiance of a standing court order."
In re the Commitment of Rufino Coronado
COA05
The State sought the civil commitment of Rufino Coronado as a sexually violent predator. At trial, the State's expert psychologist testified that Coronado had a behavioral abnormality, basing her opinion in part on a prior evaluation conducted by a non-testifying psychologist. Coronado objected, arguing the prior evaluator's findings were inadmissible hearsay. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, which permit experts to rely on and disclose inadmissible facts or data if they are of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the specific field. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony because the expert performed her own independent evaluation and used the prior report as a standard clinical "building block" rather than offering the report itself as substantive evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"To introduce influential third-party data or prior evaluations without calling the original source, have your testifying expert integrate those materials into their own independent assessment. By establishing that such records are 'reasonably relied upon' in the expert's field under TRE 703, you can disclose the basis of the opinion to the factfinder, though you should be prepared for a Rule 705(d) limiting instruction to prevent the hearsay from being treated as substantive truth."
In Re Gregory Lynn Allison
COA06
In In re Gregory Lynn Allison, a relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to rule on motions filed less than three weeks earlier. The relator failed to provide a certified or sworn record, submitting only handwritten copies of his motions. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed whether a nineteen-day delay constituted an "unreasonable" period of time for a court to rule and whether the relator's pro se status excused procedural deficiencies under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that a delay of less than three weeks is insufficient to establish a failure to perform a ministerial duty and denied the petition, noting that strict compliance with record requirements (TRAP 52.3 and 52.7) is mandatory regardless of a party's indigency.
Litigation Takeaway
"Patience and procedural precision are mandatory for mandamus relief; a three-week delay in a trial court's ruling is legally insufficient to justify appellate intervention, and failure to provide a certified or sworn record will result in summary denial."
Magdaleno-Garcia v. State
COA07
The Appellant challenged twenty-five convictions for sexual assault and prohibited sexual conduct, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient because the victims provided generalized testimony about a high volume of abuse—hundreds of instances over two years—rather than identifying specific dates for each individual count. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict by distinguishing between evidentiary sufficiency and jury unanimity requirements. The court applied a 'mathematical' approach, determining that if the described frequency (e.g., 'once or twice a week') within a specific timeframe establishes that the conduct occurred at least as many times as there are counts, the evidence is legally sufficient. The court held that the inability to distinguish which specific act supports which specific count is a jury charge issue, not a sufficiency issue, and affirmed the convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
"To establish a history of family violence or abuse, you do not need to prove the exact date of every incident; establishing a 'mathematical' pattern through a clear start date, end date, and consistent frequency is legally sufficient to support multiple findings of fact."
Riley v. State
COA13
In Riley v. State, an ex-husband was convicted of "interception" under the Texas wiretap statute for accessing his ex-wife's stored voicemails using a known passcode without her consent. On appeal, the defendant argued that an "interception" can only occur if the communication is captured contemporaneously during transmission, rather than after it has been stored. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals rejected this narrow construction, analyzing Texas Penal Code § 16.02 and concluding that the statute does not require contemporaneous acquisition. The court held that unauthorized access to stored electronic or wire communications, including voicemails, constitutes a criminal interception.
Litigation Takeaway
""Snooping" into an ex-spouse's digital life is more than a credibility issue—it is a potential felony. Accessing stored voicemails or accounts without permission constitutes criminal "interception" in Texas, providing family law litigants with powerful leverage to secure protective orders, exclusive use of devices, and evidence of coercive control."
Office of the Attorney General v. PFLAG, Inc.
SCOTX
In Office of the Attorney General v. PFLAG, Inc., the Supreme Court of Texas addressed whether a trial court could enjoin a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) based on the 'political sensitivity' of an investigation into gender-transition care providers. The Court analyzed the CID as a standard discovery tool governed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure rather than a matter for judicial second-guessing of executive branch motives. The Court held that the Attorney General has broad discretion to investigate potential statutory violations, and courts may only limit these demands based on established rules of relevance and privilege, not on the perceived wisdom or political nature of the investigation.
Litigation Takeaway
"The State’s power to investigate third-party records via Civil Investigative Demands is broad and treated like standard discovery; practitioners cannot rely on 'political harassment' defenses to shield sensitive client data. Instead, they must utilize rigorous discovery mechanics, such as privilege logs and redaction agreements, to protect information that could eventually be used as leverage in high-stakes custody or 'best interest' litigation."
Shamim v. Chaudhry
COA05
In Shamim v. Chaudhry, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed whether 'findings' included within the text of a final judgment are valid on appeal. The case involved a breach of contract claim over a promissory note and counterclaims regarding separate oral loans. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendant, including three specific findings in the order itself. The Court of Appeals analyzed the procedural requirements of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 296 and 297 and the 'Casino Magic' rule, holding that findings recited within a judgment are procedurally meaningless and cannot substitute for formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Because no formal findings were requested, the court applied the 'implied findings' standard. It found that the defendant's counterclaims lacked more than a 'mere scintilla' of evidence, while the plaintiff conclusively established his claim. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on findings or recitals written directly into a Final Decree or Order; if you prevail at a bench trial, you must timely request formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to ensure your evidentiary wins are preserved and protected from 'no-evidence' challenges on appeal."
Bunch v. Goen
COA03
In Bunch v. Goen, a non-attorney acting as a court-appointed conservator attempted to file a pro se appeal on behalf of a ward. The Third Court of Appeals faced two primary issues: a non-final judgment and a jurisdictional defect regarding the appellant's representative capacity. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 7 and the Texas Government Code, concluding that the privilege to appear pro se is strictly personal and does not extend to fiduciaries representing the interests of others. The court held that appellate documents filed by a non-lawyer in a representative capacity are a legal nullity and ineffective to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court held that while it has the discretion to abate an appeal to allow a trial court to cure a finality defect, it cannot overlook the unauthorized practice of law.
Litigation Takeaway
"A non-lawyer—even one with legal status as a conservator, 'next friend,' or power of attorney—cannot represent another person in court; any pro se notice of appeal filed in such a representative capacity is a nullity that fails to protect the party's right to appeal."