Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
In Re Jim S. Adler & Associates, Frank W. Robertson, Michael Gomez, David J. Sacks, Jr., and Marco Antonio Rodriguez
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus and vacated a trial court’s order disqualifying one law firm from jointly representing a client and a second law firm sued in the same case. The plaintiff argued joint representation created a Rule 1.06 conflict because it sued one defendant for breach of an alleged fee contract and the other for tortious interference with that contract. The appellate court held disqualification was improper because both represented parties took the same present position: the alleged contract never existed or was invalid and unenforceable. The court emphasized that Rule 1.06 does not mandate disqualification based on a theoretical conflict created by an opponent’s pleadings; the movant must show a real, current, material adversity and resulting prejudice. Because no actual present conflict was shown, the trial court abused its discretion, and mandamus was the proper remedy.
Litigation Takeaway
"A disqualification motion cannot succeed just because opposing pleadings imagine a future conflict between jointly represented parties. In Texas litigation—including family cases—the movant must prove a real, present, material conflict and prejudice, not merely speculative adversity. If aligned clients are advancing the same defense, Rule 1.06 alone does not force separate counsel."
Israel Villalobos v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Villalobos v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to sentencing without a presentence investigation report and without a separate punishment hearing after adjudication, and whether the written judgment accurately reflected the trial court’s oral true findings on the motion to adjudicate. The court held the ineffective-assistance claims failed because Villalobos had already waived a PSI and Texas law permits a unitary adjudication-and-punishment proceeding, so counsel’s conduct was not shown to be deficient on this record. But because the written judgment misstated which allegations were found true, and the State conceded the errors, the court reformed the judgment under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) to match the actual oral findings and affirmed the judgment as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a written judgment is accurate just because the court’s oral ruling was clear. If a judgment overstates or misstates the findings actually made, that error can distort later family-law litigation involving custody, protective orders, enforcement, or credibility. Verify the criminal record against the oral pronouncement and seek correction or appellate reformation before the judgment is used as shorthand proof in family court."
In the Interest of A.M.K., A Child
COA14
In In re A.M.K., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held Texas lacked initial child-custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because the child had not lived in Texas for six consecutive months immediately before Father filed his SAPCR. The court measured residence from the commencement date, assumed in Father’s favor that the child’s departure to Georgia was only a temporary absence, and still found the child’s maximum Texas residence was only 5 months and 20 days. Because the six-month home-state requirement in Texas Family Code §§ 152.102(7) and 152.201(a)(1) was not met, Texas could not exercise home-state jurisdiction. The court also upheld the trial court’s decision that, even aside from Father’s significant-connection argument, Georgia was the more appropriate forum under § 152.207.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not file a Texas custody case on a rough six-month estimate. Under the UCCJEA, the home-state clock is exact, temporary absence cannot cure a mathematical shortfall, and even a possible significant-connection argument may fail if another state is the more appropriate forum."
In the Interest of A.T.G., A.G.G., A.G.G. II, A.G.G., and A.G.G., Children
COA07
In In re A.T.G., the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s rights to two children after the record showed a long-running pattern of domestic violence against the mother, excessive corporal punishment of the children, and a home environment dominated by fear and aggression. Although sexual-abuse allegations that triggered the case became uncertain by trial, the court held that the remaining evidence independently satisfied Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court analyzed subsection (D) as addressing the children’s endangering conditions and surroundings and subsection (E) as addressing the father’s endangering conduct, concluding that repeated assaults, abusive discipline with objects, intimidation, and the children’s persistent fear were legally and factually sufficient under both grounds. The court therefore upheld termination and the related no-contact relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domestic violence is not collateral to custody or termination litigation—it is direct evidence of child endangerment. Even if one major allegation weakens, a well-developed record showing a pattern of violence, abusive discipline, intimidation, and child fear can still support severe restrictions or termination."
Michael Eugene Dreelan v. Martha Estupian Dreelan
COA05
In Dreelan v. Dreelan, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree finding that the husband committed both actual and constructive fraud on the community estate. The evidence showed he used his superior control over marital finances, along with a power of attorney signed by the wife, to sell the parties’ Forney home, divert the proceeds, and position the Terrell house as his separate property without the wife’s informed consent. The record also included evidence of transfers to a paramour, gifts to third parties, unaccounted cash withdrawals, and diverted business distributions. Applying Texas Family Code section 7.009 and established fraud-on-the-community principles, the court held that a spouse’s formal participation in a transaction does not defeat a fraud claim when that spouse did not knowingly consent to the ultimate disposition of community assets, and that fiduciary duties between spouses—and under a power of attorney—support relief. The court upheld reconstitution of the community estate and the $133,979.16 money judgment as part of a just-and-right division, rejecting the husband’s one-satisfaction challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informed consent matters more than signatures. If one spouse uses control over finances, title, or a power of attorney to redirect community assets without full disclosure, Texas courts can find fraud on the community, reconstitute the estate, and award a money judgment. For trial lawyers, detailed tracing, fiduciary-duty evidence, and findings of fact can make or break these claims."
In the Interest of J.E.F. and J.J.F., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court held that, even on a thin record, legally and factually sufficient evidence showed the father knowingly exposed the children to endangering conditions and engaged in an endangering course of conduct. Key facts included an incident where the children were left alone and the father returned intoxicated, his resulting abandonment and child-endangerment conviction, domestic-violence concerns, a protective-order violation, and instability caused by incarceration. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the deferential sufficiency review required in termination cases, the court concluded those facts supported both the environmental endangerment finding under subsection (D) and the conduct-based endangerment finding under subsection (E), and affirmed under In re N.G.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings are often built from a pattern, not a single event. In both termination and private custody litigation, facts like unsafe supervision, intoxication, family violence, protective-order violations, criminal conduct, and incarceration can support major restrictions on parental rights. Lawyers should build a detailed record tying each fact to either the child’s environment, the parent’s course of conduct, or both—because appellate courts will closely review subsection (D) and (E) findings and those findings can have lasting consequences."
Mack v. State
COA04
In Mack v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals rejected a legal-sufficiency challenge to child-sexual-assault convictions where the child did not visually observe the perpetrator during the assaults. The court applied Jackson v. Virginia and article 38.07, emphasizing that identity may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence and that a child complainant’s testimony alone can support conviction. Here, the child testified she recognized the defendant by his distinctive smell, cigarette odor, breath, bodily presence, and the surrounding household circumstances, and she later identified him in court. The court held that the cumulative force of that testimony, along with corroborating outcry context, was enough for a rational jury to find identity beyond a reasonable doubt despite the absence of physical evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child’s abuse allegation is not weak just because the child did not see the alleged abuser or there is no forensic proof. In family-law cases, courts may give significant weight to sensory-based identification, household context, and outcry testimony when assessing safety, credibility, and possession restrictions. If you are advancing the claim, build the full context carefully; if you are defending it, attack the reliability of the identification itself—not merely the lack of corroboration."
Brigham v. State
COA05
In Brigham v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant challenging an Article 38.072 outcry ruling must preserve the exact complaint made on appeal. The defense broadly objected to the forensic interviewer being designated as the outcry witness "in this case," but on appeal argued a narrower theory: that the interviewer may have been proper for some incidents, yet the child’s mother was the proper outcry witness for one specific alleged event. The court emphasized that outcry analysis is event-specific in multi-incident abuse cases, that the objecting party must distinctly identify the incident and the earlier qualifying disclosure, and that trial courts are not required to parse an undeveloped theory. Because the defense did not make that event-specific argument in the trial court, the complaint was not preserved under Rule 33.1(a), and the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your evidentiary objection is event-specific, your record must be event-specific too. In abuse-related family cases, broad objections to CAC, therapist, parent, or forensic-interviewer testimony will not preserve a narrower appellate complaint unless counsel clearly identifies the particular incident, the competing witness, and why that earlier disclosure legally qualifies."
Manka v. Acosta
COA04
In Manka v. Acosta, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a civil-assault verdict arising from a courthouse encounter during a family-law case. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because there was no bodily injury and the video did not clearly show the precise grabbing alleged. The court rejected that framing, holding that offensive-contact assault under Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(3) does not require bodily injury. Applying ordinary legal- and factual-sufficiency review, the court relied on the plaintiff’s testimony, corroborating witness testimony, security video showing escalating physical contact and invasion of personal space, the plaintiff’s immediate reaction and outcry, and surrounding circumstances to conclude the jury could infer both that the contact occurred and that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known it would be regarded as offensive or provocative. The court therefore held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support liability.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law-adjacent settings, intrusive touching does not become legally trivial just because it leaves no injury or is only partially captured on video. Lawyers should treat courthouse, mediation, and exchange-site conduct as potential tort and family-case evidence: immediate outcry, witness observations, partial surveillance footage, and contextual proof can be enough to prove offensive-contact assault and to shape credibility, protective-order, conservatorship, and trial-strategy issues."
In the Interest of S.M.M. and R.M.M., Minor Children
COA05
In a child-support modification case, the trial court signed a 2022 order awarding Mother $22,953.40 in attorney’s fees after taking fees under advisement at the hearing. After plenary power expired, the court later signed a nunc pro tunc judgment deleting that award and requiring each party to pay their own fees. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that because the court had not orally rendered a fee ruling at the hearing, the signed 2022 order was itself the rendition of judgment on fees. Deleting the fee award and replacing it with a take-nothing fees provision was a substantive change to the judgment actually rendered, not a clerical correction permitted by Rule 316. The nunc pro tunc judgment was therefore void, and the original fee award remained in place.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once plenary power expires, a court can fix clerical mistakes in a family-law order, but it cannot use nunc pro tunc to rewrite who owes attorney’s fees or other substantive obligations. If a signed order is the first actual rendition on an issue, any challenge to that ruling must be made through timely post-judgment motions or appeal—not later by calling the change a mere clerical correction."