Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Williams v. Nunnally-Williams
COA04
In Williams v. Nunnally-Williams, the former wife sought to enforce a divorce decree awarding her part of the husband’s thrift savings plan after she discovered most of the funds had been withdrawn before transfer. The husband argued the suit was barred by Family Code section 9.003(a)’s two-year deadline and filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The court rejected that approach, holding section 9.003(a) is not jurisdictional because the statute contains no clear statement tying timely filing to the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, it is a limitations defense that must be pleaded and proved as an affirmative defense. Even treating the husband’s plea as a summary-judgment motion under Rule 71, the court held he failed to conclusively prove that section 9.003(a) applied to the wife’s constructive-trust and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims or that the property fit the statute’s scope. The court affirmed the judgment for the wife.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use Family Code section 9.003 as a plea-to-the-jurisdiction shortcut in post-divorce property enforcement cases. If you want to rely on it, plead limitations, use the correct procedural vehicle, and bring evidence proving the statute applies to each claim and each type of property at issue."
M.B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In M.B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order terminating a father’s parental rights to two children after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no meritorious issues for appeal. The court independently reviewed the entire record, as required in Anders cases, and specifically examined the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) because those findings carry collateral consequences in future parent-child litigation. Finding no nonfrivolous issue as to the predicate grounds, best-interest finding, or any other aspect of the decree, the court affirmed. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding under In re P.M. that appointed counsel’s duties continue through any proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas, including filing an Anders-compliant petition for review if requested by the client.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even when an appeal appears hopeless, Texas termination cases require careful record review and special attention to endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E), because those findings can affect future family-law cases. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to fully develop and preserve the record on child-endangerment allegations; for appointed appellate counsel, filing an Anders brief does not end the representation."
In the Interest of B.R.M. and M.M.M., Children
COA07
In this SAPCR modification appeal after a jury trial, the mother challenged the evidence supporting an order naming the father sole managing conservator and awarding attorney’s fees against her. The Amarillo Court of Appeals focused first on preservation, explaining that after a jury trial a legal-sufficiency complaint must be preserved through a recognized vehicle such as a directed-verdict motion, JNOV, charge objection, motion to disregard, or a motion for new trial specifically raising no-evidence grounds. Although the mother filed a post-judgment motion for reconsideration, the court held that even if treated as a motion for new trial, it was too general and did not specifically assert legal insufficiency, so the complaint was not preserved. The court also held she failed to show harmful error regarding juror questions and alleged inattentiveness, and that her factual-sufficiency and attorney’s-fee complaints were inadequately briefed. The modification order and fee award were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-law case is tried to a jury, do not assume you can raise a no-evidence complaint for the first time on appeal. Preserve legal sufficiency with a specific directed-verdict motion, charge objection, JNOV, motion to disregard, or motion for new trial that clearly identifies the challenged finding and says why the evidence is legally insufficient; a generic motion to reconsider will not do the job."
Ronald White v. The State of Texas
COA07
In White v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a defendant who had preserved hearsay objections to a child’s recorded outcry lost those complaints by later telling the trial court “no objection” when the recording was formally offered before the jury. The court applied Texas preservation rules, especially Dean v. State and Thomas v. State, and concluded the record did not plainly show that counsel’s statement was merely procedural or not intended as abandonment. The court also held that a vague reference to “unfair prejudice” did not preserve a Rule 403 complaint and that an appellate challenge to outcry testimony failed because it did not match the objections made at trial. The court therefore rejected the evidentiary complaints on preservation grounds rather than reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Preservation can be lost at the moment evidence is admitted. In family law trials, if you object pretrial or outside the factfinder’s presence, do not later say “no objection” when the exhibit is offered unless you intend to waive the issue. Renew the objection, obtain a running objection, or clearly state the exhibit is admitted subject to your prior objection. Also, state Rule 403 specifically and make sure your appellate argument matches your trial objection."
Yakovlev v. Yakovleva
COA01
In Yakovlev v. Yakovleva, the spouses signed a valid postnuptial partition agreement stating that each spouse’s earnings, retirement benefits, stock, and other employment-related benefits would remain that spouse’s separate property. In the divorce, the trial court nevertheless treated portions of Sergey’s IRAs, 401(k), and pension earned before August 1, 2022 as community property, awarded Maria a share of those assets, and entered a money judgment as part of the overall division. The court of appeals analyzed the agreement under Texas Family Code sections 4.102 and 4.104, applied ordinary contract-construction principles, and held that the agreement’s text controlled characterization of the disputed assets. Because a divorce court may divide only community property and may not indirectly invade separate property through an offset or money judgment, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed the property division, vacated the money judgment, remanded for a new just-and-right division consistent with the agreement, and affirmed the child-abduction-prevention provisions.
Litigation Takeaway
"A valid postnuptial or partition agreement is not just an equitable factor—it controls characterization. In any divorce involving a marital property agreement, lawyers must resolve characterization first, draft the decree to track the agreement’s actual language, and object to any attempt to use offsets or money judgments to reallocate separate property."
Shereef Kamel v. Lindsay Zacharko
COA05
After Lindsay Zacharko obtained a protective order against Shereef Kamel, Kamel filed his own protective-order application just four days later. The trial court denied Kamel’s application after finding his testimony not credible and later sanctioned him $3,150 in attorney’s fees on findings that his application was groundless and filed in bad faith or for harassment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that both the denial of the standalone protective-order application and the sanctions order were final and appealable, rejected Kamel’s unpreserved due-process complaint, and held that the written sanctions order controlled over any imprecise oral comments from the bench. The court also held that a different district judge could rule on sanctions in a rotating docket system and that the trial court’s stern comments did not establish judicial bias. The court affirmed the denial of the protective order and the sanctions award.
Litigation Takeaway
"A failed protective-order application can become sanctionable when the record shows it was not just weak, but groundless and filed in bad faith or for harassment. In family-law cases, lawyers should carefully vet reactive family-violence filings, build a clear sanctions record when a protective order is being used as leverage, and remember that on appeal the signed written sanctions order usually controls over stray oral comments from the bench."
Ex parte C.M.
COA05
In Ex parte C.M., the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile habeas application could be dismissed as an impermissible successive writ under Chapter 11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. C.M., who had previously filed multiple habeas applications challenging a 1998 juvenile delinquency adjudication, filed another application in 2022. The trial court dismissed it as successive and also denied relief on the merits. On appeal, the court analyzed the civil nature of juvenile delinquency proceedings, Family Code section 56.01(o), Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution, and precedent holding that criminal-procedure rules do not apply to juvenile matters unless the Legislature clearly says so. Because Chapter 11 governs criminal habeas practice and the Legislature did not incorporate its successive-writ bar into juvenile habeas proceedings, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the application on that basis. But because the trial court also denied relief on the merits, the court of appeals affirmed the ultimate denial of habeas relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume criminal procedural rules automatically apply in juvenile or Family Code proceedings. When an opponent tries to import a criminal limitation like Chapter 11’s successive-writ bar, start with the statutory classification question and require clear legislative authority. Even so, always build the merits record, because winning the procedural issue may not change the outcome."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Michelle DeJean and Robert Dean DeJean, Jr.
COA05
In this Dallas divorce appeal, the husband challenged several parts of the decree, including an award of contingent appellate attorney’s fees to the wife. The court affirmed the trial court’s property division, waste findings, and treatment of trial-level fees, but it separately analyzed whether the evidence supported conditional appellate fees. Applying Rohrmoos and Yowell, the court held that testimony giving only bottom-line amounts for an unsuccessful appeal and Supreme Court review was conclusory because it did not explain the expected appellate work, hours, rates, or other Arthur Andersen reasonableness factors. Because the evidence was legally insufficient, the court reversed the contingent appellate fee award and rendered a take-nothing judgment on those fees while otherwise affirming the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want contingent appellate fees in a family-law judgment, do not offer only a lump-sum number. Build a record with opinion testimony showing the anticipated appellate tasks, projected hours, rates, and why each stage-specific fee is reasonable and necessary under Arthur Andersen, or the fee award is vulnerable to reversal and rendition."
Thomas McClendon v. The State of Texas
COA07
In McClendon v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s out-of-court statements to a friend during a police pursuit required reversal. The defendant argued the statements were admissible under the present-sense-impression or excited-utterance exceptions and supported his defense that he did not realize officers were trying to stop him. The appellate court assumed, without deciding, that excluding the statements was error, but held the error harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). In reaching that result, the court reviewed the entire record and concluded the same defensive theory reached the jury through other evidence, including the friend’s admissible observations that the defendant sounded confused and the defendant’s own detailed testimony about his state of mind. Because the excluded statements were cumulative and even partly double-edged, the court had fair assurance the ruling did not affect the verdict and affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even if a trial court wrongly excludes evidence, reversal is unlikely when the same point comes in elsewhere. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to both preserve the evidentiary complaint and build a harm record showing the excluded proof was unique, central, and not merely cumulative of other testimony or documents."
Christian Carmona v. The State of Texas
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed two indecency-with-a-child convictions arising from a teenage employee’s allegations that her adult supervisor touched her vagina over her jeans in one incident and her breast under her shirt and bra in another. The defendant argued the State failed to prove identity and challenged the reliability of the text-message evidence, while also complaining about the admission of a resignation email referencing other misconduct. Applying the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard, the court held the complainant’s specific testimony alone could support the verdicts under Texas law, and that the text messages, matched phone number, and surrounding circumstances further reinforced identity, sexual contact, and intent. The court also approved the limited use of the admitted extraneous-conduct evidence in the posture presented and emphasized that sufficiency review considers all evidence admitted at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Specific, credible testimony from a child or teen witness can be enough, and digital communications plus surrounding facts can significantly strengthen that proof even without perfect forensic recovery. For family-law litigators, allegations involving inappropriate touching or grooming should be built or challenged through layered authentication, contextual detail, and careful handling of extraneous-conduct evidence."