Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Romero v. State
COA14
In Romero v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove continuous sexual abuse of a child under Penal Code section 21.02 when the child could not give exact dates for each incident. The court applied the standard legal-sufficiency framework and held that exact dates were not required so long as a rational factfinder could infer that at least two acts of sexual abuse occurred over 30 or more days. The child’s testimony that the abuse happened about every other weekend, together with her description of three memorable incidents occurring more than a month apart, was enough to satisfy the statute’s duration element. The court also reaffirmed that a child complainant’s testimony alone can support the conviction and affirmed Romero’s conviction and sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
"When exact dates are unavailable, lawyers can still prove repeated child abuse by building a pattern-based record anchored to routines, recurring opportunities, and a few memorable incidents separated in time. In family-law cases, that approach can support findings about endangerment, possession restrictions, supervised access, and best interest without requiring false calendar precision."
Rodriguez v. State
COA03
In Rodriguez v. State, the defendant was convicted of violating a protective order, and the trial court enhanced his punishment under Texas Penal Code section 12.42 based on two prior felony convictions. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodriguez was the same person convicted in the prior cases. The court explained that similar identifiers and investigative testimony, without a reliable evidentiary link such as fingerprints, certified penitentiary records, stipulations, or other competent identity evidence, were legally insufficient to support the habitual-offender findings. The court left the underlying conviction intact, reversed the punishment portion of the judgment, and remanded for a new punishment hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"If prior convictions matter, do not assume identity from a shared name or partial identifiers. In family-law cases involving protective orders, conservatorship, possession restrictions, or family-violence allegations, lawyers should be prepared to prove that the opposing party is the person actually convicted through certified records and a clean identity link—or attack that link if the proof is weak."
In the Interest of S.S.W., a Child
COA05
In *In re S.S.W.*, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed that Texas retained continuing exclusive jurisdiction over a custody-modification dispute under Family Code section 152.202, even though the child had long lived in California with Mother. Mother argued Texas lacked jurisdiction or should decline it as an inconvenient forum, but the court separated those issues and held that Father’s Texas residence and the ongoing Texas-based parent-child order supported continuing exclusive jurisdiction. The court further held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the inconvenient-forum challenge because the record did not show the chapter 152 factors required Texas to defer to California. The court also affirmed the modification naming Father as the conservator with the right to designate the child’s primary residence.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child’s out-of-state residence does not automatically strip Texas of modification jurisdiction once a Texas court has continuing exclusive jurisdiction. Family-law litigators should analyze UCCJEA cases in two steps: first, whether Texas still has continuing exclusive jurisdiction; second, whether Texas should nevertheless decline jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum. To move a case out of Texas, build a full statutory record on both issues rather than relying only on the child’s residence, school, or medical care in another state."
In the Interest of M.B., a Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to M.B. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) because the mother engaged in a voluntary course of conduct that endangered the child, including drug use, leaving the children with unsafe caregivers, chronic school neglect, and disappearing for weeks without communication. The court also held the mother failed to preserve any complaint about the specificity of the trial court’s statutory findings, upheld the best-interest finding, and declined to address alternative predicate grounds because one supported ground plus best interest was enough to affirm.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on pattern evidence, not isolated incidents. Proof of drug use, unsafe caregiver choices, prolonged absence, school neglect, and failure to engage with services can collectively support termination under subsection (E), and the same themes can strongly influence conservatorship and possession disputes short of termination. On appeal, complaints about insufficiently specific statutory findings must be preserved in the trial court."
John Tomaszewski and Heather Bryan v. K. Hovnanian of Houston II, LLC d/b/a Brighton Homes
COA01
In Tomaszewski v. K. Hovnanian of Houston II, LLC, the First Court of Appeals held that although a trial court may impose monetary discovery sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.2(b), the amount of those sanctions must be supported by competent evidence showing a direct nexus between the discovery abuse and the reasonable fees, costs, and expenses awarded. The trial court imposed more than $50,000 in sanctions for third-party depositions, sanctions-motion practice, and later discovery work after finding discovery misconduct, but the appellate court concluded the record lacked sufficient evidence of reasonable hours, rates, expenses, and causation under Nath and Rohrmoos. The court reversed the sanctions orders as to amount and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, while also declining to reinstate the plaintiffs’ nonsuited claims and recognizing that the related contempt order tied to nonpayment could not stand once the sanctions were reversed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even when discovery sanctions are justified, a fee-based sanctions award will not survive appeal unless the movant proves the amount with real evidence. In family-law cases, lawyers seeking Rule 215 sanctions should prove hours, rates, expenses, and causation with the same rigor as any fee claim; lawyers opposing sanctions should attack lump-sum requests that are not tied to work actually caused by the discovery violation."
In re The State of Texas, ex rel. Jennifer A. Tharp
COA03
In this original mandamus proceeding, the State challenged a trial court’s refusal to include an affirmative family-violence finding in a criminal judgment and its refusal to impose the mandatory $100 family-violence fine after placing the defendant on community supervision for assault causing bodily injury, family violence. The Austin Court of Appeals analyzed Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42.013 and 42A.504(b), emphasizing that both statutes use mandatory language: once the court determines a Title 5 offense involved family violence as defined by Family Code section 71.004, it must enter the finding in the judgment and must impose the fine if community supervision is granted. The court rejected the trial court’s attempt to hold those consequences in abeyance as a probation incentive, concluding the duties were ministerial rather than discretionary. Because the State lacked an adequate appellate remedy, mandamus was proper, and the court conditionally granted relief compelling entry of both the family-violence finding and the fine.
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-violence finding is not a negotiable probation detail. Once a criminal court determines family violence occurred in a qualifying Title 5 case, the finding must be entered immediately, and family-law litigators should expect that judgment to become a powerful exhibit in custody, possession, protective-order, and divorce-related disputes."
In the Interest of V.C., a Child
COA13
In this private termination-and-adoption appeal, the court reversed a trial court order terminating the mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(C) and (F). The father and stepmother relied mainly on the mother’s incarceration, nonpayment of child support, and absence from the child’s life. The court strictly scrutinized the evidence under the clear-and-convincing standard and held it was insufficient on both predicate grounds. As to subsection (C), the evidence showed the child was adequately supported in the father’s home, so the record did not establish that the mother voluntarily left the child without adequate support. As to subsection (F), the petitioners proved nonpayment but did not prove the mother had the ability to pay during the relevant statutory period, especially while incarcerated and in a halfway house. The mother’s post-release efforts to contact the child, along with evidence that the father controlled or blocked access, also undermined any abandonment theory. The court reversed and rendered judgment without reaching best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination cases rise or fall on exact statutory proof, not sympathy or bad optics. Incarceration, missed support, and a weak relationship with the child do not by themselves prove abandonment or failure to support under § 161.001(b)(1)(C) or (F). Petitioners must prove each element—especially adequate-support facts under subsection (C) and actual ability to pay during the statutory window under subsection (F). For respondents, evidence of attempted contact, blocked access, and inability to pay can be decisive."
In re M.M.
COA02
In this original proceeding arising from post-divorce enforcement litigation, the mother obtained a contempt order against the father for violating possession, medical, and property-division provisions of the divorce decree. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the order was void because the criminal-contempt portion contained inconsistent confinement terms, and the civil-contempt portion merely declared the father in civil contempt without imposing a coercive sanction or stating how he could purge the contempt. Applying settled Texas contempt law, the court emphasized that civil contempt must be coercive and must tell the contemnor exactly what act will secure compliance or release. Because the order lacked those essential features, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a Texas family-law contempt order to survive review, drafting matters as much as proof. A valid civil-contempt order must do more than list violations—it must specify the coercive sanction and the exact purge condition within the contemnor’s power. If the order blurs civil and criminal contempt, or leaves the respondent guessing how to comply, it is vulnerable to mandamus as void."
In the Interest of A.W., a Child
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating that, after reviewing the record, no nonfrivolous issue could be raised. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals independently reviewed the clerk’s and reporter’s records under Anders and In re K.M., including the trial court’s findings under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (Q) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). Given the record of drug use during pregnancy, the child’s positive test at birth, incarceration, noncompliance, instability, and the absence of any pro se response, the court found no arguable ground for appeal and affirmed the termination order. The court separately denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding under In re P.M. that a no-merit appeal alone is not good cause for withdrawal and that appointed counsel’s duties continue through Texas Supreme Court proceedings unless relieved on some independent basis.
Litigation Takeaway
"An Anders affirmance in a termination case does not end appointed counsel’s job. For family-law litigators, the case highlights two practical lessons: build and preserve appellate issues at trial because a bad record is hard to overcome on accelerated review, and if appointed on appeal, comply fully with Anders procedures while expecting to remain counsel through possible Texas Supreme Court review unless the court grants withdrawal for a reason beyond frivolousness."
In the Interest of J.C.L.L. and J.C.H.L., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that temporary SAPCR and enforcement findings that Father lived within the decree’s geographic area did not bar the trial court from reconsidering that issue at the final modification trial because res judicata applies to final judgments, not interlocutory temporary orders. On the merits, the court concluded the evidence showed material and substantial post-decree changes in the parties’ circumstances, including Father’s divided Texas-California living situation and Mother’s relocation-related support and financial considerations, and that the children’s best interest supported a tailored modification. The court therefore affirmed the order allowing Mother to designate the children’s primary residence in either Collin County, Texas, or Los Angeles County, California.
Litigation Takeaway
"Temporary-order wins do not prove your modification case at final trial. In relocation disputes, lawyers must build fresh, trial-ready evidence on actual residence, material and substantial change, and best interest rather than relying on temporary findings or enforcement language."