Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
In the Interest of J.S.C. and J.M.C., Children
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show Father engaged in his own endangering course of conduct. Father argued the case turned on whether he knew about Mother’s drug use and neglect, but the court rejected that framing because subsection (E) was supported by Father’s independent conduct: repeated incarceration, methamphetamine use and related criminal charges, avoidance of the Department due to active warrants, refusal to begin services, and prolonged absence from the children’s lives. The court also rejected Father’s argument that conduct before formal paternity adjudication could not count, concluding that knowledge of paternity is not required when the parent had reason to believe he was the father and avoided involvement. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In endangerment cases, courts look at the parent’s overall pattern of instability—not just one bad act and not just the other parent’s misconduct. Repeated jail exposure, drug use, avoidance of CPS, failure to pursue paternity, and staying absent from the child’s life can together support termination and, by analogy, strong conservatorship and possession restrictions in other family-law cases."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Michael Adam Nelson and Jhoelayne Paixao Nelson and in the Interest of M.P.N. and M.A.P.N., Children
COA13
After the parties’ divorce decree was signed, one side sought sanctions and the other later filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship. The trial court ruled on the sanctions dispute, but the modification case remained pending. Applying Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held the sanctions order was not final because it did not dispose of all pending claims and parties, and it lacked clear and unequivocal finality language. Because no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal from the sanctions order, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a post-divorce sanctions order can be appealed by itself. In family-law cases, appellate finality depends on whether all live claims in the case have been resolved, including later-filed modification proceedings. Before filing a notice of appeal, check the full docket and consider severance if you need a stand-alone final judgment."
Rodriguez v. State
COA11
In Rodriguez v. State, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that Article 38.37, section 2(b) permits evidence of an extraneous child-sex offense even when the extraneous victim is a different child from the complainant in the charged case. The defendant, charged with indecency with a child involving G.T., challenged the admission of testimony from K.N. about an earlier alleged sexual assault, arguing the evidence was too dissimilar, unfairly prejudicial, and unconstitutional under Article 38.37. The court relied on prior authority, especially Wishert, to reject any same-victim limitation in the statute, held that the statute survived both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges because of its procedural safeguards, and concluded the trial court acted within its discretion after conducting the required hearing and Rule 403 balancing. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, Rodriguez is a strong crossover authority for the proposition that alleged sexual misconduct toward one child can be relevant to assessing risk to another child. In custody, modification, and protective-order cases, do not assume allegations lose force just because the child in suit is different; instead, expect courts to consider cross-child conduct as part of a broader safety and protective-capacity analysis, while still litigating reliability, corroboration, and proportionality."
Gustavo Gonzalez, Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA03
In Gustavo Gonzalez, Jr. v. State of Texas, the Third Court of Appeals held that legally sufficient evidence supported aggravated sexual assault findings even though the child complainant used age-appropriate, nontechnical terms like “private” and “butt” instead of anatomical language. Reviewing the full record in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court relied on the child’s outcry, written SANE statement, body-diagram markings, and descriptions of pressure, stretching, and pain to conclude the jury could reasonably infer penetration of both the sexual organ and anus. The court also rejected the argument that the jury charge needed a special definition of “penetration,” holding the term carries its ordinary meaning and requires no additional instruction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, do not discount a child’s disclosure just because the child lacks anatomical precision. Texas courts will evaluate the child’s words in context, and age-appropriate terminology can carry major evidentiary weight when supported by diagrams, outcry testimony, medical or forensic witnesses, and sensory details like pain, pressure, or stretching. For family-law litigators, this is strong crossover authority for supervised possession, protective orders, emergency relief, and endangerment-based conservatorship restrictions."
Ryan Tolle v. Perth Tolle
COA14
In this pre-September 1, 2023 Texas SAPCR modification case, the father sought to modify conservatorship but his Rule 194 disclosures merely repeated the statutory standards of material and substantial change and best interest without identifying any underlying facts. The court held that former Rule 194.2(b)(3) required a general factual narrative supporting the claim, not just boilerplate legal conclusions. Because the suit was filed in 2022, the old disclosure rules applied despite a later amended petition. After the father failed to show good cause or lack of unfair surprise under Rule 193.6, the trial court properly excluded his modification evidence, and with no evidence left on essential elements, properly granted a directed verdict against him.
Litigation Takeaway
"In legacy family cases filed before September 1, 2023, disclosures must tell the factual story behind a modification claim. If you only recite statutory buzzwords like material and substantial change or best interest, the court can exclude your evidence and your case may be over before it reaches the factfinder."
Wood v. Wood
COA14
In Wood v. Wood, the parties’ premarital agreement and later MSA treated certain Schedule F retirement accounts as separate property to be divided equally, and their MSA required binding arbitration of disputes over drafting a decree that conformed to the agreement. When a dispute arose over decree language and use of a QDRO service to implement the retirement-account division, the wife argued the arbitrator exceeded his authority and substantively redivided property. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the MSA’s drafting-arbitration clause because the dispute submitted was how to implement the agreed division in the decree. The court further held that directing QDRO-related procedures was a permissible implementation mechanism, not an unlawful recharacterization or divestiture of separate property, and affirmed denial of vacatur under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 171.088(a)(3)(A).
Litigation Takeaway
"If an MSA sends decree-drafting disputes to binding arbitration, that authority can extend beyond mere wording disputes to the practical mechanics needed to carry out an agreed property division—especially with retirement assets. Lawyers should draft arbitration clauses carefully, spell out whether implementation issues like QDROs are included, and preserve any vacatur complaints precisely in the motion to vacate."
In re David J. Alarid
COA06
In In re Alarid, the Texarkana Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief without reaching the merits because the relator failed to provide a proper Rule 52 mandamus record. The court found that some attached documents were neither certified nor sworn, some materials appeared not to have been filed in the trial court, and the Rule 52.3(k) certification did not properly state that the petition’s factual assertions were supported by competent evidence in the appendix or record. Strictly enforcing Rules 52.7 and 52.3(k), the court held that these record defects were fatal and denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus can be lost on procedure alone. In family-law emergency and contempt matters, lawyers must ensure every material document filed below is included as a certified or sworn copy, exclude convenience exhibits that were not filed in the trial court, and use Rule 52.3(k) certification language that tracks the rule exactly. A strong merits argument will not save a defective mandamus record."
Victor Hugo Prado v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this injury-to-a-child appeal, the court rejected challenges to Prado’s convictions based on jury unanimity, legal sufficiency, and accomplice-witness corroboration, holding that commission and omission were alternative manner-and-means, that the evidence of prolonged malnourishment, visible injuries, deprivation, and Prado’s control over the children’s environment was sufficient to prove knowing or intentional injury by omission, and that independent testimony and documentary evidence adequately corroborated the mother’s testimony. The court did, however, agree that because both convictions arose from a single criminal action, duplicative court costs could not be imposed in both judgments under article 102.073, so it modified one judgment to delete those costs and affirmed as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"For Texas family-law cases, this opinion is a strong roadmap for proving endangerment through omission, not just direct abuse. A parent or paramour who controls the home and knowingly fails to feed, protect, or obtain care for a child can be framed as dangerous based on pattern evidence from daycare workers, relatives, photos, records, and other third parties. It also reminds lawyers to build corroboration beyond one compromised household witness and to audit multiple orders for duplicative cost or fee assessments."
In the Interest of Z.S., Z.S., M.S. III, Children
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence clearly and convincingly showed endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The court relied on severe unsanitary living conditions, untreated medical issues, exposure to sexual-abuse risk, domestic violence, and ongoing parental drug use during the case. It analyzed endangerment cumulatively, holding that the parents knowingly allowed the children to remain in dangerous surroundings and engaged in a continuing course of conduct that jeopardized the children’s physical and emotional well-being. The children’s improvement in their maternal grandmother’s placement further supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on the full pattern of danger, not one isolated event. Evidence of filthy home conditions, unsafe caregivers, domestic violence, drug use, poor visitation conditions, and lack of meaningful change after services can support termination—and in non-termination family cases, the same facts can justify supervised possession, sole conservatorship, or other protective restrictions."
In re Gentri Renee McLean
COA11
In In re McLean, the Eleventh Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court could temporarily transfer the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence from the mother to the father in a pending modification suit. The father relied on evidence that the mother had denied visitation, the children had school absences, and the mother tested positive for cocaine. The court held that Family Code section 156.006(b)(1) requires more than proof of parental misconduct or decree violations; the movant must show that the children’s present circumstances would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development. Because the record lacked child-focused evidence tying the complained-of conduct to present significant impairment, the temporary modification was legally insufficient. The trial court therefore abused its discretion, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want temporary orders changing primary custody in Texas, you need proof of present, child-specific significant impairment—not just evidence that the other parent is obstructive, irresponsible, or tested positive for drugs. Denied visitation may support enforcement, but it does not automatically justify a temporary change of primary residence."