Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
Strategy Category
358 opinions found
In Re Constance Benavides a/k/a Constance Chamberlain
COA13
After an eviction judgment was entered following a property dispute, the Relator, Constance Benavides, attempted to stay her removal by filing a supersedeas bond. However, the trial court did not set the bond amount until over a month after the judgment, and Benavides filed the bond shortly thereafter. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Property Code § 24.007, which mandates that a bond must be filed within ten days of a judgment to stay an eviction 'under any circumstances.' The court held that the statutory deadline is absolute and contains no exceptions for judicial or administrative delays, ultimately denying mandamus relief and allowing the eviction to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In property crossover evictions, the ten-day deadline to post a supersedeas bond is a 'trap' that admits no excuses; you must aggressively move to set and file the bond within 240 hours of the judgment signature or face immediate removal from the premises, regardless of a pending appeal."
In the Matter of B.T.
COA02
In In the Matter of B.T., the Second Court of Appeals reviewed a juvenile court's order transferring a young man to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to finish an eighteen-year murder sentence. While the court found that the transfer was required by law because the respondent could not complete his minimum confinement before turning nineteen, it identified an error regarding court costs. The appellate court held that because the respondent had been declared indigent, that status was presumed to continue through the appeal. Consequently, the court affirmed the prison transfer but modified the judgment to strike all assessed court costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once a party's indigent status is established under the Family Code, it is legally presumed to continue throughout the litigation; attorneys should always audit final judgments and bills of costs to ensure clerks do not improperly assess fees against indigent clients."
Curtis Lilly v. Kimberly Thompson
COA02
In Lilly v. Thompson, appellant Curtis Lilly sought to appeal a judgment from the 360th District Court, but the Tarrant County District Clerk notified the appellate court that payment for the clerk’s record had not been made. The Second Court of Appeals issued a warning and granted an extension of time for the appellant to comply. After the appellant failed to meet the extended deadline or provide proof of payment arrangements, the court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 37.3(b) and 42.3(b). The court held that the appellant's persistent failure to manage the administrative costs of the appeal required dismissal for want of prosecution, effectively terminating the appeal before it could be heard on its merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Filing a notice of appeal is only the first step; an appeal will be dismissed regardless of its merits if the appellant fails to pay the administrative fees for the trial court record. Diligent management of court costs and deadlines is a non-negotiable requirement for seeking appellate review in family law cases."
Brandon Keith Anderson v. The State of Texas
COA12
In this case, a witness provided surprise testimony during a hearing involving prejudicial information that had not been disclosed during discovery. Although the defendant successfully moved the trial court to disregard the testimony, he did not specifically move for a mistrial. On appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and the 'preservation ladder,' which generally requires a party to object, request an instruction to disregard, and move for a mistrial to preserve error. The court held that because the appellant received the exact relief he requested (disregarding the testimony) and failed to seek a mistrial or obtain an adverse ruling, the complaint was waived.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning a motion to strike or disregard surprise testimony is a 'trap' if the evidence is truly 'incurable.' In Texas courts, if a witness drops a 'bombshell' that poisons the well, you must move for a mistrial and secure an adverse ruling to preserve the issue for appeal. Merely asking the judge to disregard the statement is considered a 'win' at trial that results in a procedural default on appeal, leaving you with no recourse if the judge is ultimately influenced by the excluded evidence."
In the Interest of M.L.L., A.M.L., and B.F.L., Children
COA07
In a parental termination proceeding, a mother sought to introduce evidence of events occurring prior to a 2018 divorce decree. The trial court excluded this evidence, citing res judicata. On appeal, the mother argued this exclusion was improper. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a), which require a party to preserve error by making an "offer of proof" when evidence is excluded. The court held that because the mother failed to make an offer of proof regarding what the excluded testimony would have shown, the appellate court could not conduct a harm analysis. Consequently, the mother waived her right to challenge the exclusion, and the termination of her parental rights was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a trial court excludes evidence, simply objecting is not enough; you must make a formal or informal 'offer of proof' for the record to show the appellate court exactly what that evidence would have been and why its exclusion was harmful."
Michael Damone Jones v. The State of Texas
COA12
In Jones v. State, the Twelfth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could legally assess attorney's fees as court costs against a defendant who had already been declared indigent. The court analyzed Texas statutes requiring that once indigency is established, it is presumed to continue unless the record shows a 'material change' in the individual's financial circumstances. Finding that the record contained no evidence of financial improvement, the appellate court held the fee assessment was improper and modified the judgment to strike the $300 in attorney's fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you have been declared indigent by the court (such as through a Rule 145 Statement), you are protected from being ordered to pay attorney's fees or court costs unless the opposing party can prove a significant improvement in your financial situation."
IN THE INTEREST OF D.J., A CHILD, Appellant
COA05
After losing his job, a father sought to terminate his child support obligation but refused to produce discovery documents regarding his retirement accounts and foreign property interests. The trial court granted a directed verdict against him, denying the modification and imposing a $4,800 discovery sanction. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the modification, holding that a party seeking to change support must provide full financial transparency to allow the court to calculate "net resources." However, the court reversed the monetary sanction because the trial record lacked specific evidence, such as attorney fee invoices or testimony, to justify the $4,800 amount.
Litigation Takeaway
"Transparency is mandatory in support modification cases; losing your primary income does not excuse you from disclosing your broader financial estate. Additionally, any party seeking discovery sanctions must ensure the record contains specific evidentiary proof linking the amount of the sanction to the actual costs or fees incurred."
Morrison v. Morrison
Supreme Court of Texas
In Morrison v. Morrison, a former wife sought to enforce a divorce decree after her ex-husband allegedly damaged their marital home and failed to return various items of personal property. Although the original decree split the home sale proceeds 50/50, the trial court awarded the wife 100% of the proceeds as damages without making specific findings regarding the fair market value (FMV) of the losses. The Supreme Court of Texas analyzed the distinction between the power to 'enforce' a decree under Family Code Chapter 9 and the prohibition against 'modifying' a substantive property division. The Court held that while trial courts can award money judgments for breaches, they impermissibly modify a decree when they reallocate community assets without a direct evidentiary link to the proven fair market value of the damaged or missing property.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully recover damages for damaged or missing assets after a divorce, you must provide specific evidence of fair market value; a court cannot simply reallocate property interests as a penalty for bad behavior without a dollar-for-dollar evidentiary accounting."
In the Interest of K.K. and K.K., Children
COA12
In this parental termination case, the appellant (J.K.) filed a notice of appeal six days after the mandatory 20-day deadline for accelerated appeals. Although the notice was filed within the 15-day 'grace period' allowed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3, the Twelfth Court of Appeals notified J.K. that a 'reasonable explanation' for the delay was required to maintain jurisdiction. Because the appellant failed to respond to the court’s inquiry or provide any explanation for the late filing, the court held it was powerless to grant an extension. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, emphasizing that procedural rules apply equally to pro se litigants and licensed attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines in parental termination cases are extremely strict and accelerated; missing the 20-day filing window—and failing to provide a prompt, reasonable explanation for the delay—will result in the permanent loss of your right to appeal."
John C. Campbell v. Medical Imaging Consultants, LLP
COA12
John Campbell, a radiologist, sued his former employer for breaching a non-disparagement clause in their separation agreement after he was passed over for a job at a different medical group. Campbell alleged that a negative comment regarding his "personality issues" from a former partner caused him to lose the position. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed a no-evidence summary judgment against Campbell, ruling that he failed to prove causation. The court found that Campbell's theory relied on "inference stacking"—the speculative assumption that he would have successfully completed a multi-step interview process and received a unanimous hiring vote but for the alleged disparagement.
Litigation Takeaway
"To recover damages for the breach of a non-disparagement clause, it is not enough to prove a negative comment was made; you must provide direct evidence that the disparagement was the 'but-for' cause of a lost job or contract, rather than relying on a chain of speculative inferences about a third party's hiring process."