Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
In the Interest of B.E.S.D. and T.D.G., Children
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the children under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and applied the nonexclusive Holley factors, emphasizing that the same evidence supporting predicate endangerment grounds can also support best interest. The court focused on the mother’s repeated marijuana use during multiple pregnancies, repeated positive drug tests at childbirth, long CPS history, prior removals, domestic violence, instability, and failure to make lasting changes despite services. As to the father of B.E.S.D., the court likewise held that his refusal to cooperate, role in the unsafe environment, and conduct supporting the predicate findings also supported best interest. The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pattern matters. Texas courts may infer future danger from a parent’s past conduct, and a best-interest finding does not fail just because every Holley factor was not proved. In family-law cases involving conservatorship, modification, or supervised possession, lawyers should build the record chronologically around recurring substance abuse, domestic violence, instability, noncompliance, and failure to benefit from services—not isolated incidents."
In the Interest of A.K.B., a Child
COA04
In In re A.K.B., maternal grandparents sought court-ordered access to their grandchild after the father cut off contact. They alleged they had been deeply involved in the child’s upbringing and raised concerns about the father’s parenting, household, and the child’s emotional distress from losing the relationship. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that Family Code §§ 153.432 and 153.433 work together, so at the standing stage a grandparent’s affidavit must allege specific facts that, if true, could overcome the fit-parent presumption and show that denial of access would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional well-being. Because the affidavits showed only a close, beneficial relationship, parenting disagreements, and generalized claims of emotional harm—not concrete facts tying denial of access itself to significant impairment—the trial court properly dismissed the suit for lack of standing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Grandparent-access cases in Texas live or die on the affidavit. A close bond, past caregiving, and criticism of a parent’s choices are not enough; the pleading must allege specific, nonconclusory facts showing that denial of access itself will significantly impair the child and that the claim can overcome the fit-parent presumption. For parents, this is a strong early-dismissal case; for grandparents, it is a warning to plead extraordinary facts with precision before filing."
In re LOH Elkhart, LLC d/b/a Elkhart Oaks Care Center, Live Oak Healthcare, LLC, Senior Living Properties, LLC, SLP Management Holdings, LLC, and LOH Management, LLC
COA12
In this mandamus proceeding, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a party cannot revive a case dismissed for want of prosecution by filing an unverified motion to reinstate and later trying to supply Rule 306a proof after the trial court’s plenary power has expired. The plaintiff’s case was dismissed, and her later motion to reinstate alleged lack of notice but was not verified and did not state the date she first received notice or actual knowledge of the dismissal order. The court strictly applied Rules 165a and 306a, explaining that a verified motion is required to extend plenary power and that delayed-notice relief requires a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion proving the date of first notice or actual knowledge. Because those requirements were not timely met, the trial court’s plenary power expired before it signed the reinstatement order, making that order void. Mandamus relief was therefore proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your family-law case gets DWOP’d, lack of notice alone does not save you. To extend deadlines, you must promptly file a verified motion and, if relying on delayed notice, strictly comply with Rule 306a(5) with sworn proof of the exact date notice or actual knowledge was first received. If the other side gets a reinstatement order without a verified Rule 165a motion or proper Rule 306a proof, that order may be void and vulnerable to mandamus."
In the Interest of S.M.S., a Child
COA12
In this SAPCR conservatorship appeal, a pro se appellant challenged a trial court order naming multiple nonparents as joint managing conservators and raised twenty-three appellate issues, including standing and jurisdiction complaints. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the appellant’s brief failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1: it listed issues but provided no meaningful record citations, no supporting authority, and no developed legal analysis. Applying settled law that pro se litigants are held to the same briefing standards as attorneys, the court held that inadequately briefed complaints are waived and affirmed the conservatorship order in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"On appeal, even potentially strong family-law issues are lost if they are not tied to the record, legal authority, and a developed argument. For appellants, Rule 38.1 compliance is essential; for appellees, inadequate briefing can be a powerful path to affirmance without reaching the merits."
Austin G. Croom v. Casey L. Croom
COA05
In Croom v. Croom, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a divorce decree unambiguously awarded the wife a continuing one-half share of the parties’ present interest in AP Capital, separate from a separate $397,000 equalization judgment. Reading the decree as a whole, the court rejected the husband’s argument that the AP Capital award had been monetized and absorbed into the equalization payment merely because the asset’s value was used in the divorce balance-sheet calculations. The court concluded that “present interest” meant the community’s ownership stake at divorce, not just its then-current dollar value, and that the decree’s language awarding rights and privileges “past, present, or future” confirmed the wife’s entitlement to later sale proceeds attributable to that interest. Because the husband kept and spent those proceeds after AP Capital sold its asset, the evidence supported liability for civil theft, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The court affirmed the substantive judgment but reversed and remanded the attorney’s-fees award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree separately awards a spouse an ownership interest in a business asset, do not assume a separate equalization payment buys that interest out unless the decree expressly says so. Draft decrees with precision: say whether the spouse gets the asset itself or a cash buyout, and if future distributions are intended to follow ownership, say that clearly. In enforcement, a spouse who pockets post-divorce proceeds from property awarded to the other spouse may face not just enforcement remedies, but tort and civil-theft exposure."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Angela Zesiger and Bryan Zesiger
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a Texas trial court could enforce and clarify a divorce decree awarding a former spouse one-half of the military retirement benefits accrued during marriage. After Bryan retired, the trial court converted Angela’s formula-based share of disposable retired pay into a monthly dollar amount, included cost-of-living adjustments, entered an arrearage judgment, and ordered execution of payment paperwork. On appeal, Bryan argued federal law preempted the order, but the court rejected that argument because the USFSPA expressly allows state courts to divide and enforce disposable retired pay, and the order did not reach non-disposable pay or interfere with disability-waiver rights protected by Mansell and Howell. The court further held that expressing the already-awarded share in monthly terms was a permissible clarification under Texas Family Code Chapter 9, not an impermissible modification of the property division.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree validly awards a share of disposable military retired pay, Texas courts can later clarify the formula into a monthly amount, include COLAs, and award arrears without violating federal law—so long as the court is enforcing the original division rather than redividing property or reaching disability-waived/non-disposable pay."
In re Ahmed Ahmed
COA12
In a SAPCR-related mandamus proceeding, Ahmed challenged the trial court’s denial of his plea to the jurisdiction. The Tyler Court of Appeals denied relief because Ahmed failed to provide a Rule 52.7-compliant mandamus record. Although he claimed no testimony was taken at the hearing, that assertion was disputed and he admitted he was not present, so the court could not verify what occurred below. Without authenticated materials showing the nature of the hearing and any relevant testimony, the court could not evaluate whether he had established a clear abuse of discretion and entitlement to mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus can fail even when the underlying complaint may have merit if the relator does not bring a complete, authenticated Rule 52.7 record. In family-law cases, always secure and file the reporter’s record, material pleadings, orders, and proof of whether testimony was or was not taken before seeking emergency appellate relief."
In Re Richard Gonzales
COA13
In In re Richard Gonzales, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court exceeded the Texas Citizens Participation Act by allowing broad discovery based only on generalized claims that the information was relevant to responding to a TCPA motion. The court explained that Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 27.006(b) allows only limited discovery on a showing of good cause, which requires case-specific findings tying narrowly tailored requests to particular material facts necessary to meet the nonmovant’s TCPA burden. Because the discovery order allowed broader merits discovery without those findings, the court found an abuse of discretion and conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a TCPA motion is on file, you cannot use ordinary discovery standards to get wide-ranging documents or communications. The party seeking discovery must identify the exact material fact needed at the TCPA stage and request only narrowly tailored discovery; otherwise, an overbroad order is vulnerable to mandamus."
Dustin Lee Jones v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Jones v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not add post-adjudication court-appointed attorney’s fees without record evidence that the defendant had present financial resources and a present ability to pay under article 26.05(g). Jones had remained indigent, told the court he could not presently pay, and the record showed no material change in his finances. The court distinguished the original $1,000 fee assessed when deferred adjudication was imposed—which was left intact as untimely to challenge—from the later-added $2,090, which it deleted along with related collection language and withdrawal orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a court is asked to impose a money obligation tied to ability to pay, make the record about present resources—not possible future earnings. For family lawyers, Jones is a strong analogy for resisting unsupported fee awards, enforcement-related payment orders, or other monetary obligations based on speculation rather than current evidence."
Sorrells v. State
COA05
In Sorrells v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for indecency with a child by sexual contact, holding that the child complainant’s testimony alone was legally sufficient even though the defense presented substantial impeachment and contradictory evidence. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court explained that appellate review does not permit reweighing witness credibility and that the jury was free to believe the child’s account of the charged sexual contact. The court also rejected the change-of-venue complaint because the motion had been filed in a different cause number, so nothing was preserved for review in the appealed cases.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, do not assume a lack of corroboration defeats a child’s allegations. A factfinder may credit a child witness despite inconsistencies or impeachment, and appellate courts will usually defer to that credibility call. For the accused party, the real work is building objective contradictions and preserving every procedural and evidentiary issue in the correct cause number."