Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
Ralston v. Ralston
COA07
Two family members, James and Anthony Ralston, were involved in a dispute over the ownership and possession of a residence. After a district court issued a partial summary judgment quieting title in Anthony’s favor and voiding James’s claims, Anthony initiated a forcible detainer (eviction) action in the county court at law. James argued that the county court lacked jurisdiction because the title dispute was still 'active' since the district court's judgment was only partial and not yet final. The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the eviction, holding that once a district court adjudicates title—even through an interlocutory or partial summary judgment—the jurisdictional bar for forcible detainer actions is removed. The court also held that a notice to vacate is not required to be signed to be valid under Texas Property Code § 24.005.
Litigation Takeaway
"In intra-family property disputes, you do not need a final, appealable judgment to begin eviction proceedings; an interlocutory or partial summary judgment from a district court quieting title is sufficient to establish jurisdiction for a forcible detainer action in a lower court."
In re Brandon Charles Cole
COA05
In this original proceeding, Relator Brandon Charles Cole challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to recuse via a petition for writ of mandamus. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition, focusing on two primary issues: procedural non-compliance and the availability of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court found that Cole failed to provide a sworn or certified record as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7. Substantively, the court held that under Texas Supreme Court precedent, the erroneous denial of a recusal motion does not satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief because the issue can be fully addressed through a direct appeal following a final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas civil and family law litigation, mandamus is generally unavailable to challenge a trial court's refusal to recuse. Practitioners must focus on meticulously perfecting the appellate record and preserving the bias issue for a post-judgment appeal rather than seeking mid-stream intervention."
Calvin Dorsey Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA12
After a trial commenced, it became apparent that a juror lacked sufficient English proficiency to understand the proceedings. The defendant moved for a mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion because the issue was not raised during jury selection. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed, analyzing the distinction between absolute disqualifications and waivable challenges for cause. The court held that a juror's inability to comprehend English is a waivable challenge that must be exercised during voir dire; failure to do so precludes a mistrial or a later challenge to the jury's composition.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely solely on a juror's self-certification of English proficiency on their questionnaire; you must actively vet their comprehension through open-ended questions during voir dire or risk waiving any future objection to their fitness to serve."
Gary D. Pickens v. City of Greenville, Texas
COA05
In Pickens v. City of Greenville, a plaintiff filed a mandamus action under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA) after a city failed to respond to multiple record requests. After the suit was filed, the parties entered into a Rule 11 settlement agreement where the City 'voluntarily' produced the records. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiff's request for mandatory attorney's fees and dismissed the case as moot. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that to 'substantially prevail' under Texas Government Code § 552.323(a), a plaintiff must obtain judicially sanctioned relief—such as a court order or judgment—that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties. Because the production was secured via a contract (Rule 11) rather than a judicial mandate, the plaintiff did not meet the prevailing party standard.
Litigation Takeaway
"To recover attorney's fees in a Public Information Act mandamus action, do not accept a 'voluntary' production via a Rule 11 agreement. You must secure a signed court order or an agreed final judgment that explicitly compels the production of documents to ensure your client qualifies as a 'prevailing party.'"
In the Interest of K.B., a Child
COA12
In the Interest of K.B., the Twelfth Court of Appeals reviewed the termination of parental rights where the parents challenged the sufficiency of evidence for endangerment and the admission of hearsay statements from the child’s siblings. The court analyzed the 'excited utterance' exception, determining that the siblings' visible distress—including crying and fearful demeanor—was a sufficient foundation for admitting their statements regarding the parents' intoxication. Furthermore, the court found that driving while intoxicated with a child in the vehicle, combined with neglectful physical conditions, provided legally and factually sufficient evidence of endangerment under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1). The court held that the termination was in the child's best interest and affirmed the trial court's decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Simply 'checking the boxes' of a service plan is insufficient for parents to avoid termination if they fail to acknowledge the underlying issues, such as substance abuse; additionally, visible physical manifestations of a child's stress can provide the necessary predicate to admit hearsay under the excited utterance exception."
Shamsa v. Reagan
COA05
In Shamsa v. Reagan, a homeowner who acquired her property via a divorce decree sued her neighbor for adverse possession over a disputed boundary strip. The neighbor argued the homeowner lacked standing because the divorce decree contained a scrivener's error in the legal description of her own lot. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed constitutional standing, concluding that the right to assert title via adverse possession depends on the claimant's actual appropriation of the disputed land, not the perfection of the record title to their adjacent property. The court held that Reagan had standing and title to the strip, but reversed the award of attorney’s fees because Texas law does not provide a statutory basis for fees in adverse possession suits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Clerical errors in a divorce decree's property description do not automatically strip a party of the right to sue third parties for land ownership; however, clients should be prepared to bear their own legal costs in adverse possession cases as attorney's fees are generally not recoverable."
Justin Eugene Howard v. The State of Texas
COA06
In Howard v. State, the Sixth Court of Appeals addressed the requirement for jury unanimity when the State proves multiple distinct criminal acts to support a single charged count. The defendant was convicted of three counts of child sex offenses, but argued on appeal that the jury charge failed to require the jurors to agree on which specific incident formed the basis of the conviction for two of those counts. The court affirmed Count I because the evidence described only one discrete act for that timeframe, making a general unanimity instruction sufficient. However, it reversed Counts II and III, holding that the State's reliance on a 'course of conduct' narrative without a specific-unanimity instruction created a risk of a non-unanimous 'patchwork' verdict, which constituted egregious harm under the Almanza standard.
Litigation Takeaway
"In cases involving 'multiple acts over time'—common in protective orders and SAPCR proceedings—litigators must force the opposing party to identify specific, discrete incidents rather than relying on a generalized course of conduct. Failure to demand this specificity allows a factfinder to reach a 'composite' finding based on different incidents, whereas requiring incident-level clarity creates a stronger record for appeal and prevents relief based on vague, aggregated allegations."
Paredes v. State
COA08
In a prosecution for indecency with a child, the defendant challenged the admission of an unindicted extraneous sexual offense involving the same complainant. The defendant argued the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed the evidence under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.37, which permits propensity evidence in specific child-sex cases, and the Gigliobianco factors for Rule 403 balancing. The court found the evidence was highly probative of intent and propensity and that the State had a significant "need" for the evidence because the defense's strategy centered on attacking the victim's credibility. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, as its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In cases involving family violence or sexual misconduct where credibility is the central issue, "pattern" evidence of other bad acts is often admissible to rebut claims of fabrication. To win the Rule 403 balancing test, practitioners should emphasize the factual similarities, temporal proximity, and the heightened "need" for such evidence when the opposing party's theme is that the victim is lying or coached."
Joseph Christopher Cole v. The State of Texas
COA12
In Joseph Christopher Cole v. The State of Texas, the Twelfth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court can assess court-appointed attorney’s fees against a defendant who had previously been found indigent. The court analyzed Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 26.04(p), which establishes a legal presumption that a party found indigent remains so for the remainder of the proceedings unless a "material change" in financial circumstances occurs. Because the record lacked any affirmative evidence that the defendant’s financial status had improved, the court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order reimbursement. Consequently, the appellate court modified the trial court's judgment to delete the assessment of attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"The "once indigent, always indigent" presumption is a powerful shield; if you seek to recover court-appointed fees or ad litem costs from a party previously declared indigent, you must proactively build an evidentiary record demonstrating a "material change" in their financial resources before the final judgment is entered."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Njipwo
COA07
In a Williamson County divorce case, the husband insisted that Cameroon law govern the property division. When the trial court rejected this, the husband explicitly requested on the record to discharge his attorney and signed a handwritten withdrawal order to proceed pro se. The trial court subsequently divided the marital estate based on unsworn property spreadsheets and attorney statements. On appeal, the husband challenged both the withdrawal of his counsel and the evidentiary basis of the property division. The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the decree, holding that the "invited error" doctrine precluded the husband from complaining about a withdrawal he specifically requested. Additionally, the court found that the husband waived any objection to unsworn evidence by failing to object at trial and proceeding on an agreed factual basis.
Litigation Takeaway
"Be cautious when making mid-trial demands; once you explicitly request a procedural change—such as discharging your lawyer—or fail to object to the use of unsworn property summaries, the "invited error" and waiver doctrines may permanently bar you from challenging those issues on appeal."