Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Scholler v. State
COA09
In Scholler v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for assault by impeding breath against a dating partner. The complainant testified Scholler squeezed her throat, covered her mouth, and made it difficult for her to breathe. The court analyzed the record under Jackson v. Virginia, deferring to the jury’s role in resolving credibility disputes and considering the cumulative force of the evidence, including corroborating neck marks, petechiae, tenderness, and pain with swallowing observed by law enforcement. The court rejected arguments that the complainant’s ability to breathe somewhat, Scholler’s denial, or alleged shortcomings in the police investigation defeated sufficiency, and it affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence, custody, and protective-order cases, strangulation does not require proof of total airway blockage or unconsciousness. A detailed victim account plus modest corroboration—photos, officer observations, petechiae, swallowing pain, and contemporaneous symptom testimony—can be enough to support a finding of family violence, while a bare denial and attacks on investigative quality usually will not carry the day."
Estate of John Anthony Gonzales
COA12
In Estate of Gonzales, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a woman claiming to be a decedent’s surviving spouse had standing to participate in a contested heirship proceeding because she proved a post-divorce informal marriage at a threshold in limine hearing. After the parties’ 2014 divorce, the claimant presented evidence of a new agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others as married under Texas Family Code section 2.401(a)(2). The court treated standing as an early proof issue under Estates Code section 22.018, deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and concluded the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support surviving-spouse status. The court affirmed that once spouse status was established, the claimant was an interested person entitled to participate in the estate case.
Litigation Takeaway
"If marital status is the gateway to standing or property rights, expect Texas courts to decide it early and treat that hearing like the main event. In alleged common-law remarriage cases after divorce, be ready at the threshold hearing to fully prove or disprove a new present agreement to marry, cohabitation as spouses, and consistent holding out—because you may not get a second chance later."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Jimmie Wayne Wilson and Amy Elaine Bradshaw
COA12
In this divorce appeal, the Tyler Court of Appeals found that the final decree incorrectly listed the parties’ marriage date as March 24, 2025, even though the petition and both parties’ testimony showed they married on August 25, 2018. The court treated the mistake as a clerical error in a statutorily required recital under Texas Family Code Section 6.712, not a judicial error, and held that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) allowed it to reform the decree on its own because the appellate record conclusively established the correct date. The court modified the decree to reflect the true marriage date and otherwise affirmed. It also held that the husband waived his complaints about the property division, including issues tied to the Toyota Corolla and alleged inequity, because his appellate briefing was conclusory and lacked supporting authority and record citations.
Litigation Takeaway
"Small decree mistakes can often be fixed on appeal without a remand if the error is purely clerical and the record clearly shows the correct fact. But substantive property-division complaints will go nowhere unless they are thoroughly briefed with legal authority, record citations, and a clear abuse-of-discretion argument."
Marco Castro v. Monica Silva Castro
COA08
In Castro v. Castro, the husband challenged a divorce attorney’s-fees award on appeal, arguing the trial court improperly based the award in part on a temporary spousal-support issue. The El Paso Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the record showed he never preserved the complaint in the trial court. He did not object when wife’s counsel requested to prove fees by affidavit, did not object to the affidavit after it was filed, did not challenge the interim fee ruling, and did not object to the fee provisions in the final decree or later payment-related filings. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a), and relying on authorities treating fee complaints as ordinary preservable error, the court held that any challenge to the legal basis or evidentiary support for the fee award was waived. The court therefore overruled the issue without addressing whether the $15,000 fee award was substantively proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge attorney’s fees in a family-law case, you must object in the trial court—early, specifically, and repeatedly if necessary. Silence to affidavit proof, interim rulings, or decree language will likely waive appellate review, even if the fee award may have been vulnerable on the merits."
In the Interest of I.L.Y. aka I.L.Y.H. and M.R.M., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The court analyzed Mother’s conduct as a continuing course of endangerment, relying on drug use during pregnancy, the infant’s positive amphetamine test at birth, criminal activity, repeated incarceration, apparent intoxication while caring for the infant, and Mother’s ongoing failure to achieve stable housing, employment, and completion of key services. Because a single predicate ground plus best interest is enough to affirm, and subsection (E) has collateral consequences under In re N.G., the court addressed and upheld subsection (E), affirmed best interest, and declined to reach Mother’s challenges to subsections (N) and (Q).
Litigation Takeaway
"Pattern evidence wins endangerment cases. Courts look past isolated incidents and focus on whether drug use, criminal conduct, incarceration, untreated issues, and instability together show a voluntary course of conduct that jeopardizes a child’s well-being. For litigators, the lesson is to build or rebut the chronology with concrete proof of either continuing danger or verified rehabilitation."
Gagnon v. Gagnon
COA12
In Gagnon v. Gagnon, the Tyler Court of Appeals addressed post-divorce enforcement of a domesticated California judgment and whether a Texas trial court could use a turnover order to authorize sale of the debtor spouse’s LLC membership and partnership interests. The court first held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the debtor’s renewed attack on enforcement of the foreign judgment because any challenge to the earlier enforcement order had to be raised in a timely appeal, and the prior appeal was untimely. On the merits of the turnover order, the court applied Texas Business Organizations Code sections 101.112(d) and 153.256(d), which make a charging order the exclusive remedy for satisfying a judgment from an LLC membership interest or partnership interest. Because the trial court authorized the receiver to sell those entity interests through a turnover order without using the charging-order procedure, the court held the trial court abused its discretion and reversed that portion of the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"When collecting a divorce-related money judgment, do not assume a broad turnover order can reach every business asset the debtor owns. If the target is an LLC membership interest or partnership interest, Texas law requires a charging order, and a turnover sale of the ownership interest itself is reversible error. The case also underscores a separate appellate lesson: missing the deadline to appeal an earlier enforcement order usually cannot be fixed by appealing a later contempt or turnover order."
Lacy v. State
COA12
In Lacy v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals considered whether statements made during a domestic-violence investigation should have been suppressed because the defendant was handcuffed when he made them. The court analyzed the distinction between an investigative detention and custody under Miranda and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22, holding that temporary handcuffing for officer safety during an active on-scene investigation does not automatically amount to custody. The court also separately analyzed whether the statements resulted from interrogation, concluding that the body-camera statements were made during an investigative detention and that the patrol-car recording did not show questioning or its functional equivalent reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses. The court affirmed admission of the statements.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a recorded statement is vulnerable simply because the speaker was handcuffed. In family-violence-related divorce, SAPCR, and protective-order cases, the real questions are whether the person was actually in custody and whether police engaged in interrogation. If the recording arose during temporary scene control or contains volunteered statements, it may remain highly usable in parallel family-law litigation."
In the Interest of D.L.B., D.L.B., and D.L.B., Minor Children
COA04
In this SAPCR modification dispute, the trial court signed a final order that added a sentence making the mother solely responsible for the children’s insurance costs unless she provided documentation by a certain date, even though that condition was not in the parties’ mediated settlement agreement. After plenary power expired, the trial court tried to delete that sentence through a judgment nunc pro tunc. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that nunc pro tunc relief can correct only clerical error, not judicial error, and the controlling question is what judgment the court actually rendered—not what it intended or should have rendered. Because there was no prior oral pronouncement, memorandum, docket entry, or other competent evidence showing the court had rendered a different judgment before signing the February 16, 2024 order, the signed order itself was the rendition. Deleting the sentence was therefore a substantive change to the judgment actually rendered, making the nunc pro tunc order void. The court vacated the nunc pro tunc judgment and reinstated the original order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a mediated settlement agreement, mandate, or obvious drafting mistake can be fixed later by nunc pro tunc. Once plenary power expires, a family court can correct only clerical mistakes, and if the signed order is the only evidence of rendition, substantive cleanup is too late. Build a clear rendition record, compare orders line-by-line to the MSA before signing, and move quickly within plenary deadlines if the signed order varies from the agreement."
In the Interest of R.R., a Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR order naming both parents joint managing conservators of a medically fragile child, ordering a week-on/week-off schedule, allocating certain independent decision-making rights, and setting no child support. The mother argued the evidence required greater restrictions because of alleged domestic violence, abuse, intimidation, and medical neglect, and also complained about an asserted reporter’s-record error. Applying the child’s best-interest standard under Texas Family Code § 153.002 and highly deferential abuse-of-discretion review, the court held that the trial judge was entitled to resolve conflicting testimony in the father’s favor, especially where DFPS had ruled out abuse allegations and the medical-neglect proof was underdeveloped. Because no findings of fact were requested, the appellate court implied all findings necessary to support the judgment and concluded the record supported a reasonable best-interest determination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Serious allegations alone rarely win a custody appeal. To overturn a conservatorship ruling, counsel must build a detailed, child-centered record tying abuse, coercive conduct, or medical lapses to concrete harm or risk and must request findings of fact; otherwise, abuse-of-discretion review and implied findings will usually carry the judgment."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Steven O. Steele and Rachel L. Steele
COA06
In this Texas divorce appeal, the wife challenged the property division by arguing the trial court failed to implement disability-related accommodations, allowed disclosure and evidentiary unfairness, and ultimately made an unjust division of the community estate. The Texarkana Court of Appeals applied the abuse-of-discretion standard under Family Code Section 7.001 and focused on whether the appellate record showed preserved, harmful error that materially affected the just-and-right division. The court found the record showed the husband complied with the exhibit-production order, did not show the wife was denied any accommodation she actually requested, and did not establish unfair surprise or prejudice from any disclosure problems. It also held the property division had a reasonable basis because the wife failed to show the decree was manifestly unjust or unfair, especially where her own testimony undermined the feasibility of awarding her the marital home and the court still allowed her to testify about excluded documents. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Property-division appeals are won or lost on the record. To reverse a divorce decree, the complaining party must preserve specific objections, obtain rulings, and show how the alleged procedural or evidentiary error probably caused an unjust and right division; generalized fairness complaints are not enough."