Opinion Library

In the Interest of E.K.L., a Child

COA10

In In re E.K.L., the appellant tried to directly appeal a temporary order entered in a SAPCR. The Tenth Court of Appeals focused on the order’s character—not its specific terms—and held that because it was a temporary child-related order governed by Texas Family Code § 105.001, § 105.001(e) barred an interlocutory appeal. Relying on the statute, Little v. Daggett, and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a), the court concluded it lacked appellate jurisdiction, dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and dismissed the pending emergency-relief motion as moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"Do not assume a harsh temporary custody or child-related order can be directly appealed. If the order is a temporary SAPCR order, Texas Family Code § 105.001(e) likely bars interlocutory appeal, so lawyers should instead preserve error, evaluate mandamus, and push the underlying case toward prompt merits resolution."

May 28, 2026

In the Interest of J.A.E., III, J.R.E, J.A.E., J.E.E., and J.E.W.E., Children

COA14

In this Department conservatorship appeal, the mother argued the final order was void because the trial court signed it more than 90 days after trial allegedly commenced under Texas Family Code § 263.4011. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that argument. It held the trial court properly extended the Chapter 263 dismissal deadline based on extraordinary circumstances, and trial truly commenced before that deadline when the parties appeared, the court addressed preliminary matters, admitted an exhibit, and heard testimony from a sworn witness. The court then analyzed the statutory text and the Supreme Court’s guidance in In re G.X.H., emphasizing that § 263.401 expressly makes failure to timely commence trial jurisdictional, while § 263.4011 does not impose dismissal or loss of jurisdiction for failing to render a final order within 90 days. Because the Legislature provided mandamus as the remedy for a missed 90-day rendition deadline, the late final order was mandatory-error territory, not a jurisdictional defect. The court affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"Not every mandatory deadline makes a judgment void. If trial timely commences under Chapter 263, a later failure to render a final order within 90 days under § 263.4011 should be challenged promptly by mandamus, not saved for a post-judgment argument that the court lost subject-matter jurisdiction. And if you are relying on a "commence and recess" setting, make a real trial record with appearances, rulings, admitted evidence, and sworn testimony."

Evidence

Kyron Henderson v. The State of Texas

COA05

In *Kyron Henderson v. The State of Texas*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Instagram evidence was properly authenticated under Texas Rule of Evidence 901 through circumstantial evidence rather than direct testimony from someone who personally saw the defendant use the account. The court relied on the account’s self-identifying posts, photos and videos depicting Henderson, direct messages discussing his bond and incarceration, jail-call references to the same account, and Instagram business records. Applying the liberal Rule 901 standard from *Butler*, *Fowler*, and *Tienda*, the court concluded the State only needed to present enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find the account was Henderson’s, not conclusive proof of ownership or exclusive control. Because the surrounding circumstances sufficiently tied the account and its contents to Henderson, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits, and the judgment was affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"Social-media evidence can be authenticated with a circumstantial mosaic; you do not need an eyewitness who saw the other party type the post. In family cases, lawyers should connect screenshots, DMs, and videos to the party through self-identifiers, images, case-specific references, platform records, and outside corroboration, while challengers must attack the specific gaps in that linkage rather than relying on a generic 'anyone could have made the account' objection."

Evidence

Sells v. State

COA09

In Sells v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child and held that testimony from another alleged victim was admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was offered for a noncharacter purpose, including showing a pattern of access-based abuse, relationship dynamics, and rebutting fabrication rather than merely proving propensity. The court also held that the defendant could not obtain reversal based on the absence of a limiting instruction in the jury charge because he failed to request the instruction or object to its omission, and any unpreserved error did not amount to egregious harm under Almanza. Finally, the court found the evidence legally sufficient, relying on the complainant’s testimony and corroborating context from other witnesses.

Litigation Takeaway

"For family-law abuse cases, Sells is a strong roadmap for admitting other-victim evidence when you can tie it to a specific noncharacter theory like grooming pattern, opportunity, plan, credibility, or rebuttal of fabrication. It is also a preservation warning: if you want the factfinder instructed on the limited use of that evidence, you must request the instruction clearly and timely or appellate review becomes much harder."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Recarido Antonio Terrell v. The State of Texas

COA09

In Terrell v. State, the Beaumont court affirmed an aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction arising from a dating-violence shooting. The defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence, but the court held that the record—combining the complainant’s on-scene identifications, a 911 call, body-camera footage, prior testimony from an unavailable officer, medical evidence of a gunshot wound and road-rash-type abrasions, and circumstantial evidence tying the defendant and his red vehicle to the timeline—was enough for a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under Jackson v. Virginia. The court emphasized that appellate review does not reweigh credibility disputes or inconsistencies where the jury could reasonably credit the State’s corroborated version of events. The court also upheld the admission of punishment-phase extraneous-offense evidence.

Litigation Takeaway

"For family-law litigators, the case is a strong reminder that violence allegations do not rise or fall on perfect eyewitness testimony. Courts can credit a cumulative record built from emergency statements, responder observations, medical proof, recordings, and digital or physical corroboration—even when later testimony is incomplete or inconsistent. If you are proving family violence, build a layered evidentiary mosaic; if you are defending, attack foundation, attribution, and chronology rather than relying only on generalized credibility complaints."

In the Interest of B.J.M., a Child

COA04

In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant tried to challenge a default final order more than eight months after it was signed, making any ordinary appeal untimely. The Fourth Court of Appeals considered whether the late filing could proceed as a restricted appeal and repeatedly gave the appellant chances to amend his notice to satisfy Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(d)(7). But the appellant never alleged or verified the key jurisdictional fact that he did not participate, in person or through counsel, in the hearing that produced the challenged judgment. Relying on Rule 25.1 and Ex parte E.H., the court held that nonparticipation is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a restricted appeal, not a mere technicality. Because the notice was too late for a regular appeal and the appellant failed to establish restricted-appeal jurisdiction, the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Litigation Takeaway

"If the normal appellate deadline has passed, a family-law appellant cannot save the case by simply calling it a restricted appeal. You must expressly and properly show the jurisdictional prerequisites—especially that the appellant did not participate in the hearing resulting in the judgment. Courts may forgive defective paperwork, but they will not infer missing jurisdictional facts."

Xenia Pirogov v. Ilya Pirogov

COA04

In this divorce appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that a decree ordering the marital home sold and the net proceeds divided is a judgment for recovery of an interest in real property under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(2). The trial court set a $15,000 supersedeas bond by looking to the home’s market value, mortgage balance, and estimated equity, but the appellate court said that was the wrong legal measure. Because Rule 24.2(a)(2) applies, the amount of security had to be based on the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue, not projected equity or a discretionary figure under Rule 24.2(a)(3). With no evidence of rent or revenue in the record, the trial court abused its discretion, so the court remanded for a new evidentiary hearing and for consideration of reduced or alternate security.

Litigation Takeaway

"If a divorce decree orders real property sold and the proceeds divided, treat supersedeas as a real-property-interest issue under Rule 24.2(a)(2). Lawyers should build the record around rent, rental value, or revenue from the property—not market value, debt, or estimated equity—or risk reversal of the bond order."

In the Matter of W.M., A Juvenile

COA05

In In the Matter of W.M., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order transferring a juvenile to criminal district court for murder and three aggravated-assault charges arising from an apartment-complex shooting. W.M. argued the evidence was insufficient to support the probable-cause finding required by Family Code section 54.02. The court rejected that challenge, explaining that a transfer hearing requires only evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the juvenile committed the charged offenses, not trial-level proof of guilt. Applying that standard, the court relied on Ring-camera footage showing W.M. arrive in and drive a black Acura, approach the complex with another suspect, and flee immediately after gunshots; eyewitness testimony that two masked men with guns were present before and after the shooting; ballistics showing two firearms were used; and evidence tying the Acura and related conduct to W.M. The court held that this direct and circumstantial evidence, including a law-of-parties theory, was enough to support probable cause and affirmed the transfer order.

Litigation Takeaway

"When a court is making a threshold safety or responsibility finding under the Family Code, a connected circumstantial record can be enough. Video, timing, access to a vehicle, association with a co-actor, and flight may collectively support a serious adverse ruling even without definitive proof of who pulled the trigger. Family lawyers should build—or dismantle—the full narrative, not just one piece of evidence."

General trial issues

Juan Gasca v. Marcque Keller

COA05

In Gasca v. Keller, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 required exclusion of exhibits Keller failed to timely disclose in the county-court case, even though some materials may have been produced in related eviction litigation. Keller added a security-deposit claim shortly before a bench trial and relied on late-produced evidence to prove it. The court emphasized that Rule 193.6 is a mandatory exclusion rule, that the proponent bears the burden to prove good cause or lack of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice, and that bench trials are not exempt from the rule. Because Keller did not carry that burden and the undisclosed evidence supported a late-added claim, the trial court’s admission of the evidence probably caused an improper judgment. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Litigation Takeaway

"Late-disclosed evidence can blow up a judgment—even in a bench trial. If an opponent tries to prove a newly added claim with documents or other proof that were not timely disclosed in the actual case, object under Rule 193.6 and force them to prove good cause or no unfair surprise/prejudice on the record. For family-law cases, this is a powerful tool against late-produced tracing, reimbursement, valuation, fee, support, or custody evidence."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Joseph v. State

COA04

In Joseph v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed an aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction arising from a violent incident between unmarried dating partners who lived together. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient, challenged authentication of exhibits, and claimed ineffective assistance. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court held the complainant’s testimony alone was enough for a rational jury to find that he used or exhibited a firearm while intentionally or knowingly threatening her with imminent bodily injury, and the jury was entitled to believe her over his denial. The court also rejected the authentication and new-trial complaints, leaving the conviction intact. For family-law crossover purposes, the opinion reinforces that cohabiting dating partners fit comfortably within a household/family-violence context and that one credible witness, supported by domestic-scene evidence, can sustain consequential violence findings.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases, do not underestimate the power of one detailed, credible account of domestic violence—especially where the parties were dating and living together. Cohabitation can place the dispute squarely in a family-violence framework, and corroborating videos, property damage, officer observations, and firearm evidence can strongly influence protective orders, possession limits, and best-interest rulings even if some allegations are disputed or only partially proven."