Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Wilma Reynolds and Carl Gordon v. Quantlab Financial, LLC; Quantlab Incentive Partners I, LLC; Quantlab Trading Partners US, LP; and David Reynolds
COA14
After years of post-divorce litigation, Wilma Reynolds filed yet another suit alleging David Reynolds and the Quantlab entities concealed bonus and compensation information during the divorce, causing the marital estate to be undervalued. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Texas’s transactional res judicata doctrine and held the new fraud, conspiracy, misrepresentation, conversion, and undivided-property claims all arose from the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior divorce-related cases. The court rejected Wilma’s argument that the facts had changed because in camera documents supposedly had not been reviewed for damages or property-division relevance, concluding that this was only a repackaging of previously rejected allegations. The court affirmed summary judgment, denial of further discovery and access to the in camera materials, and sanctions.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot relitigate an old divorce-property dispute by changing the label on the claim. If the alleged hidden-asset or compensation-concealment theory was or could have been litigated in the divorce or prior post-decree proceedings, res judicata will likely bar later fraud, tort, or undivided-property suits—and repetitive refilings may draw sanctions."
In the Interest of S.G.H. and W.C.H., Children
COA13
In In re S.G.H. and W.C.H., the trial court dismissed a modification case for want of prosecution, and after plenary power expired Father filed a separate bill of review. Although the trial court granted the bill of review and vacated the dismissal, it later signed a new modification order in the original cause number rather than retrying the merits in the bill-of-review proceeding. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that granting a bill of review does not restore plenary power in the original case; instead, any retrial must occur in the separate bill-of-review action. Because the 2024 modification order was signed in the original cause years after dismissal, it was void, so the court vacated the order and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review can wipe out an old judgment, but it does not reopen the original case for a new merits ruling. In family cases, lawyers must move all post-bill-of-review litigation into the bill-of-review cause number; if the court signs a modification or other merits order in the old dismissed case after plenary power expired, that order may be void and the entire effort wasted."
Cherry v. Williamson
COA02
In Cherry v. Williamson, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree after the pro se wife challenged rulings on conservatorship, child support, the child’s surname change, attorney withdrawal, and alleged judicial bias. The court did not reach the merits because her appellate briefing failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1: it lacked coherent legal argument, supporting authority, and citations to the appellate record, and it relied in part on documents attached to the brief that were not part of the record. Applying the rule that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys, the court held the complaints were inadequately briefed, unpreserved, or both, and affirmed the final decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even serious family-law complaints can be lost on appeal if they are not preserved in the trial court and presented with record citations, legal authority, and a clear connection to a specific ruling. Pro se status does not relax appellate briefing rules, and documents attached to a brief cannot replace the appellate record."
In the Interest of J.M.
COA02
In In re J.M., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a mediated settlement agreement in a SAPCR that satisfies Texas Family Code section 153.0071(d) is binding and must be reduced to judgment under section 153.0071(e). After Mother signed an MSA appointing the Department as managing conservator and giving her supervised possession largely by mutual agreement with Grandmother, she later sought a new trial to obtain more specific and enforceable visitation terms, arguing the agreed structure gave Grandmother too much discretion and was fraudulently induced. The court rejected that effort, explaining that Mother did not dispute the MSA’s statutory compliance, the final order tracked the parties’ agreement, and she offered no evidence proving any recognized exception such as fraud. Because a motion for new trial cannot be used to rewrite an irrevocable MSA simply because implementation later proves unsatisfactory, the trial court properly denied relief and the judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat every custody MSA as final drafting, not a rough outline. If the agreement complies with section 153.0071, the court will usually enforce it as written, so vague 'mutual agreement' possession terms and supervision details must be negotiated before signing. If the problem is fraud or coercion, build proof immediately; if the problem is later noncooperation or changed circumstances, use modification or enforcement—not a motion for new trial to get a better deal."
Nadia Muraira v. Wesley William Hall
COA03
In Muraira v. Hall, the Third Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 162.012 barred a biological father’s bill of review filed more than six months after a final adoption order. Hall argued the adoption should be undone because he was not served, was not joined despite being the biological father, and the adoptive mother and biological mother allegedly procured the judgment by fraud. The court rejected those theories, explaining that § 162.012 creates an unusually strict finality rule for adoption decrees: after six months, both direct and collateral attacks are barred unless the challenge is based on the rendering court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because complaints about lack of service, nonjoinder, and fraud do not amount to subject-matter-jurisdiction defects, Hall’s attack could not proceed. The court also noted that a bill of review must be filed in the court that rendered the original judgment, not a different district court. It reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the bill of review.
Litigation Takeaway
"Adoption orders get extraordinary finality in Texas. If more than six months have passed, lawyers cannot revive an attack by labeling service defects, omitted-parent claims, or fraud as “jurisdictional”; only a true subject-matter-jurisdiction challenge survives. Practitioners should do exhaustive notice, paternity, and joinder work before the adoption is signed, and any bill of review must be filed in the rendering court."
In the Interest of G.H.G. and H.R.G.
COA05
In In re G.H.G., the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a divorce decree improperly gave a parenting facilitator authority to decide when a father could advance through phases of a three-step possession schedule and whether the decree varied from the parties’ mediated settlement agreement. Reading the MSA as a whole, the court held the agreement authorized the facilitator to determine when Father could move to the next phase of the step-up schedule, not just from Phase One to Phase Two. The court also held the decree did not violate Family Code §§ 153.606 and 153.6061 because it expressly preserved the trial court’s exclusive jurisdiction over conservatorship, possession, access, and support, making the facilitator’s role one of implementation rather than adjudication. The decree’s clarifying language about the court retaining authority was treated as a permissible statutory clarification, not an improper alteration of the MSA.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a parenting facilitator to act as the gatekeeper for a step-up possession schedule, draft the decree so the phases and progression criteria are fixed by the court, the facilitator only determines compliance with those criteria, and the decree expressly states the court keeps exclusive jurisdiction. Also, make the MSA internally consistent and preserve objections carefully—especially if you do not want your own proposed language used against you on appeal."
Havens v. State
COA13
In Havens v. State, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for assault-family violence by impeding breath or circulation. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because the complainant had inconsistencies in her story, memory gaps, a prior methamphetamine history, and there was conflicting testimony about intoxication and how her injuries occurred. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court held those points raised credibility and weight issues for the jury, not legal-insufficiency grounds on appeal. Because the complainant testified Havens choked her until she lost consciousness and that testimony was corroborated by medical records, provider testimony, photographs, and prompt outcry evidence, a rational jury could find the elements of Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(B) beyond a reasonable doubt.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence cases, strangulation allegations supported by medical records, photos, and prompt outcry can carry the day even when the complaining witness has credibility vulnerabilities, inconsistent recall, or substance-use history. For family-law litigators, impeachment alone is often not enough; the real battle is whether there is corroboration of the core assault narrative and whether the opposing side can offer a coherent alternative explanation for the injuries."
In the Interest of S.C., Jr., J.A.V., and K.A.V., Children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(Q). Father was serving concurrent 12-year and 15-year prison sentences after convictions for multiple offenses, including domestic-violence assault and evading arrest, and the Department filed its petition on July 9, 2024. The court focused on whether Father would be unable to care for the children for at least two years from that filing date and held the evidence was sufficient because parole had already been denied, he would not be eligible again for at least two years, and his suggested relative placement never developed into a workable care plan. The court also rejected Father’s unpreserved constitutional challenge, holding that termination appeals do not excuse preservation requirements under a fundamental-error theory.
Litigation Takeaway
"When litigating incarceration-based termination or parenting disputes, courts want concrete proof, not possibilities. Speculative parole, prison programming, or vague claims that a relative could help will not defeat a showing that an incarcerated parent cannot care for a child during the statutory period; lawyers need hard release-date evidence and a real, documented caregiving plan."
In re Joshua George Peacock
COA14
In In re Peacock, the trial court held Joshua Peacock in contempt in a post-divorce enforcement case based on alleged failures to pay two child-support installments and to comply with insurance and life-insurance-proof obligations. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that contempt in a family-law enforcement case must strictly track the motion for enforcement and the proof because Texas Family Code sections 157.002 and 157.166, along with due process, require specific notice of each alleged violation and a contempt order that specifically states the manner of noncompliance. Because the contempt order went beyond the notice provided in the enforcement motion and imposed coercive conditions not properly tethered to the pleaded violations, the order was void to that extent. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the contempt order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want contempt, plead each violation with exact dates, amounts, and conduct, then make sure the contempt order mirrors those allegations exactly. In Texas family-law enforcement, overbroad pleadings or orders can destroy an otherwise valid contempt remedy, and respondents should compare the motion, evidence, and order line by line for due-process defects."
Patrick Lawler v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Lawler v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld convictions for sexual performance by a child and multiple aggravated sexual assault offenses arising from a child’s disclosures to school staff, forensic interviewers, and a caregiver. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because the child’s statements were inconsistent and evolved over time, and he also claimed double jeopardy based on multiple punishments involving the same child. Applying deferential legal-sufficiency review, the court held that the jury could credit the child’s testimony despite omissions, inconsistencies, and incremental disclosures, and could reasonably infer inducement from the defendant’s authority and the child’s statements that he “had to” comply. The court also held that double jeopardy was not violated because the convictions were based on distinct acts occurring on different occasions, not the same unit of prosecution. The court modified the judgments to remove unpronounced fines and otherwise affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving child abuse allegations, inconsistent or piecemeal child disclosures do not automatically defeat the case. Build the record incident-by-incident and outcry-by-outcry, preserve the child’s language, and separate distinct acts, dates, and recipients so the factfinder can credit the child and draw reasonable inferences from authority, dependency, and context."