Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
Hutcherson v. Hutcherson
COA03
In a divorce involving a high-net-worth couple with a valid premarital agreement (PMA), the trial court awarded the wife a $900,000 money judgment and $5,000 per month in spousal maintenance. This award occurred despite the PMA limiting the community estate to approximately $83,000, with most assets characterized as the husband's separate property. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict between the trial court's equitable "just and right" division powers and the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA). The court held that because the PMA was valid, the trial court was strictly bound by its property characterizations. By awarding a judgment nearly eleven times the value of the community estate, the trial court effectively divested the husband of his separate property, which is prohibited under Texas law. The court reversed the money judgment and maintenance award, holding that a luxurious lifestyle during marriage does not allow a court to circumvent the contractual limitations of a PMA.
Litigation Takeaway
"A premarital agreement is a binding ceiling on property division. Trial courts cannot use large money judgments or "lifestyle-based" spousal maintenance to bypass a valid agreement that limits community assets. If the community estate is small due to a premarital contract, the court's award must stay within the value of those limited assets; otherwise, it is an unconstitutional divestiture of separate property."
In the Interest of K.H., K.H., K.H., and E.H., Children
COA14
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her four children, arguing that the evidence against her was legally and factually insufficient. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the mother's history under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), which focuses on a parent's endangering course of conduct. The court reviewed documentary evidence—including CPS reports and criminal affidavits—detailing a 16-hour abandonment of a toddler, physical abuse, and chronic medical neglect. The court held that this persistent pattern of instability and failure to complete a court-ordered service plan constituted clear and convincing evidence to support termination. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decree, finding that termination was in the children's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination proceedings, documentary evidence like CPS reports and criminal affidavits can be just as powerful as live testimony; if admitted without objection, these records can establish a "course of conduct" sufficient to permanently terminate parental rights even if the parent fails to appear at trial."
KSW Rail Group, LLC v. SLI, Inc.
COA05
SLI, Inc. sued KSW Rail Group, LLC using its registered assumed name and obtained a default judgment via substituted service. KSW challenged the judgment, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the legal entity was not properly named in the citation and the return of service was technically deficient. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied the 'misnomer' doctrine, ruling that serving an entity under its registered d/b/a effectively invokes jurisdiction over the legal entity. Furthermore, the court held that Rule 118 allows for the post-judgment amendment of a return of service to reflect the truth of service and demonstrate strict compliance with a substituted service order. The court affirmed the default judgment, holding that technical clerical errors in a return do not void service if they can be cured by amendment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Technical errors in a process server's return of service aren't necessarily fatal to a default judgment; Rule 118 allows you to retroactively fix the record to reflect that proper service actually occurred. Additionally, if a party is using a registered assumed name (d/b/a), serving them under that name is legally sufficient to bind the actual legal entity."
The City of Arlington v. Airport Properties, Inc.
COA02
After Airport Properties, Inc. sued the City of Arlington, the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea, and the City filed an interlocutory appeal. While the appeal was pending, Airport Properties nonsuited all its claims against the City. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162, which provides an 'absolute right' to nonsuit claims before all evidence is introduced. Because the City had no pending counterclaims for affirmative relief, the court held that the nonsuit extinguished the live controversy, rendering the interlocutory appeal moot and stripping the appellate court of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A plaintiff can use a Rule 162 nonsuit as a 'kill switch' to moot a pending interlocutory appeal and reset the jurisdictional battle, provided the respondent has not anchored the litigation with an independent claim for affirmative relief."
Mahasneh v. Mahasneh
COA02
A former wife sought a protective order against her ex-husband after he engaged in a persistent pattern of stalking, including placing a GPS tracker on her vehicle and surveilling her workplace. The trial court issued a 30-year protective order under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and awarded her attorney's fees. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals examined whether the evidence supported such a long duration and whether the attorney's fees were sufficiently proven. The court affirmed the 30-year protective order, ruling that Chapter 7B allows for long-term orders based on stalking without the "future family violence" findings required by the Family Code. However, the court reversed the attorney's fees award, holding that counsel's testimony was too conclusory and failed to meet the strict "lodestar" requirements—specifically failing to detail the hours worked, the hourly rate, and the specific tasks performed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning a protective order does not exempt you from strict evidentiary rules for attorney's fees; always provide a detailed "lodestar" breakdown—including specific tasks, hours, and rates—or risk losing the fee award on appeal. Additionally, consider utilizing Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure for stalking cases, as it can provide longer-term protection than the Family Code with different evidentiary requirements."
Adam Horwitz v. City of Denton, et al.
COA02
In this case, Appellant Adam Horwitz attempted to appeal interlocutory orders granting a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss. Horwitz filed his notice of appeal nearly three months after the orders were signed, mistakenly believing that his filing of a motion for new trial extended the appellate deadline to 90 days, a belief reinforced by the trial court's docket labeling the orders as 'Final.' The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and 28.1, which stipulate that accelerated appeals from interlocutory orders must be filed within 20 days and are not extended by motions for new trial. The court held that because the orders did not dispose of all parties and claims, they were interlocutory, the 20-day deadline applied, and the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on a Motion for New Trial to extend your appellate deadlines for interlocutory orders. In accelerated appeals—common in family law for jurisdictional disputes or temporary injunctions—you must file your notice of appeal within 20 days of the signature, or you risk losing your right to appeal entirely."
In the Interest of T.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental termination case, the Department sought to terminate a mother's rights after her child, T.M., tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. The mother contended the exposure was accidental due to her work as a hotel housekeeper, but the Department also cited her failure to keep the child away from a drug-using father. The Court of Appeals analyzed the endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b), determining that the mother's choice to bring the child to a high-risk workplace and allow unsupervised contact with the father supported endangerment. However, the Court also scrutinized the Department's compliance with Section 161.001(f), which requires clear and convincing evidence of reasonable efforts to return the child. Ultimately, the Court issued a partial reversal and remand, holding that the Department failed to satisfy its high evidentiary burden for every mandatory statutory finding required to support the irrevocable termination of parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug exposure is not a "universal solvent" that excuses the Department from its burden of proof; practitioners must ensure that every statutory element, particularly the requirement for reasonable reunification efforts under Section 161.001(f), is supported by clear and convincing evidence to avoid reversal on appeal."
In the Interest of L.L., a Child
COA02
After a trial court terminated a Father's parental rights to his child, L.L., based on endangerment and best-interest findings, his appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous. The Second Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal existed. Finding no non-frivolous issues, the court affirmed the termination decree. However, the court clarified that under Texas Family Code § 107.016 and the Texas Supreme Court's precedent in In re P.M., appointed counsel’s obligations do not end at the intermediate court; the duty to represent the parent continues through potential proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless counsel is relieved for good cause.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination cases, an appointed attorney's duty of representation is "sticky"—it persists through the exhaustion of all appeals, including a petition for review to the Texas Supreme Court, even if the intermediate court determines the appeal is frivolous."
Hyde v. Aero Valley Property Owners Association, Inc.
COA02
The Hyde Parties appealed a summary judgment regarding airport management authority but only targeted the primary appellee (POA), intentionally excluding twenty-five intervening property owners who had been awarded identical declaratory relief in the same judgment. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the 'doctrine of entangled interests' and the finality of unchallenged judgments, concluding that when a party fails to challenge a portion of a judgment granting the same relief to an intervenor as it does to the primary appellee, that portion remains binding. The court held that because the judgment in favor of the intervenors became final and could not be disturbed, the appeal against the POA was rendered moot, necessitating an affirmance of the entire judgment without reaching the underlying merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"In cases involving intervenors—such as grandparents in custody battles or business entities in property divisions—failing to specifically name and challenge the relief granted to those third parties in your appeal can result in a total waiver of your right to challenge the judgment as a whole."
Absolute Oil + Gas, LLC v. Chord Energy Corp.
COA01
In Absolute Oil + Gas, LLC v. Chord Energy Corp., the trial court severed dismissed tort and unjust enrichment claims from an ongoing contract dispute to create a final, appealable judgment. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the severance under the three-prong Guaranty Federal test, focusing on whether the claims were 'factually interwoven.' The court found that because all claims stemmed from the same alleged collusive scheme to inflate costs and shared identical parties and evidence, severance risked inconsistent rulings—particularly regarding whether an express contract barred quasi-contractual recovery. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion, reversing the severance order because the claims were inextricably linked by shared operative facts.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prevent 'divide and conquer' tactics in complex property litigation by using the Interwoven Claims Doctrine to block the severance of tort claims (like fraud on the community) from the main property division, ensuring a single, cohesive 'just and right' adjudication."