Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
723 opinions found
In the Interest of L.L., a Child
COA02
After a trial court terminated a Father's parental rights to his child, L.L., based on endangerment and best-interest findings, his appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous. The Second Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal existed. Finding no non-frivolous issues, the court affirmed the termination decree. However, the court clarified that under Texas Family Code § 107.016 and the Texas Supreme Court's precedent in In re P.M., appointed counsel’s obligations do not end at the intermediate court; the duty to represent the parent continues through potential proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless counsel is relieved for good cause.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination cases, an appointed attorney's duty of representation is "sticky"—it persists through the exhaustion of all appeals, including a petition for review to the Texas Supreme Court, even if the intermediate court determines the appeal is frivolous."
Trevino v. Trevino
COA01
After Mark Anthony Trevino appealed a family law judgment, the trial court exercised its plenary power to grant a motion for new trial. The parties requested that the appellate court abate (pause) the appeal pending the outcome of the new trial. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the jurisdictional requirements for an appeal, noting that appellate jurisdiction generally requires a final judgment. The court held that because the grant of a new trial effectively vacates the original judgment, there was no longer a final order for the court to review. Consequently, the court held it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal entirely rather than granting an abatement.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court’s order granting a new trial acts as a total 'reset' button that vacates the original judgment; this automatically divests the appellate court of jurisdiction, resulting in a dismissal of the appeal rather than a temporary pause."
Mahasneh v. Mahasneh
COA02
A former wife sought a protective order against her ex-husband after he engaged in a persistent pattern of stalking, including placing a GPS tracker on her vehicle and surveilling her workplace. The trial court issued a 30-year protective order under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and awarded her attorney's fees. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals examined whether the evidence supported such a long duration and whether the attorney's fees were sufficiently proven. The court affirmed the 30-year protective order, ruling that Chapter 7B allows for long-term orders based on stalking without the "future family violence" findings required by the Family Code. However, the court reversed the attorney's fees award, holding that counsel's testimony was too conclusory and failed to meet the strict "lodestar" requirements—specifically failing to detail the hours worked, the hourly rate, and the specific tasks performed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning a protective order does not exempt you from strict evidentiary rules for attorney's fees; always provide a detailed "lodestar" breakdown—including specific tasks, hours, and rates—or risk losing the fee award on appeal. Additionally, consider utilizing Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure for stalking cases, as it can provide longer-term protection than the Family Code with different evidentiary requirements."
In the Interest of K.H., K.H., K.H., and E.H., Children
COA14
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her four children, arguing that the evidence against her was legally and factually insufficient. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the mother's history under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), which focuses on a parent's endangering course of conduct. The court reviewed documentary evidence—including CPS reports and criminal affidavits—detailing a 16-hour abandonment of a toddler, physical abuse, and chronic medical neglect. The court held that this persistent pattern of instability and failure to complete a court-ordered service plan constituted clear and convincing evidence to support termination. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decree, finding that termination was in the children's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination proceedings, documentary evidence like CPS reports and criminal affidavits can be just as powerful as live testimony; if admitted without objection, these records can establish a "course of conduct" sufficient to permanently terminate parental rights even if the parent fails to appear at trial."
Ex Parte Giambi Boyd
COA01
Giambi Boyd was held in pretrial detention for over 500 days on $1.2 million bail for felony charges including murder. He filed for habeas corpus, arguing that under Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, he was entitled to release or a bail reduction because the State was not ready for trial within the mandatory 90-day window. The trial court denied the request, prioritizing the severity of the offenses and community safety. On appeal, the court analyzed Article 17.151 as a mandatory statutory directive that leaves no room for judicial discretion regarding safety or the nature of the crime once the 90-day readiness period expires. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, holding that because the State admitted it was not ready for trial due to pending lab results, the trial court was required by law to either release Boyd on a personal bond or reduce his bail to an amount he could actually afford.
Litigation Takeaway
"In "crossover" cases where a family law client is detained on high bail for felony allegations, Article 17.151 is a mandatory tool to secure their release if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days. This rule allows practitioners to bypass judicial concerns about "community safety" and the "nature of the offense" to ensure the client can participate in civil proceedings like custody evaluations and final trials."
In the Interest of R.D.E., a Child
COA05
In this case, a mother voluntarily placed her child in an Iowa guardianship, which was later domesticated in Texas. When the non-parent guardian filed a Texas SAPCR and the mother sought to terminate the guardianship, the trial court consolidated the two proceedings. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed this consolidation, holding that trial courts have broad discretion to combine related cases to prevent conflicting orders. The court further determined that the mother's challenges to the 'parental presumption' were either waived due to her failure to provide proper record citations in her brief or were unsupported because the existing voluntary guardianship had already altered the legal landscape regarding the child's best interests.
Litigation Takeaway
"Voluntarily entering into a guardianship—even in another state—can significantly weaken the legal 'parental presumption' in future Texas custody battles. Additionally, appellate courts strictly enforce procedural rules; failing to include specific record citations in a brief can lead to the automatic waiver of your most critical arguments."
Ex Parte Giambi Boyd
COA01
After being detained for 560 days on a $1.2 million bond for felony charges, Giambi Boyd sought a bond reduction because the State failed to announce it was ready for trial within the statutory 90-day window. The trial court denied his pretrial writ of habeas corpus despite the State admitting it was still awaiting forensic lab results. The First Court of Appeals reversed the decision, analyzing Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that a felony defendant must be released on personal bond or have their bail reduced to an affordable amount if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days. The court held that this provision is mandatory and takes precedence over general safety factors, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by maintaining an unattainable bond.
Litigation Takeaway
"In high-conflict family law cases involving parallel criminal charges, practitioners can use Article 17.151 to prevent 'strategic detention.' If the State is not ready for trial within 90 days of a client's felony arrest, counsel can force a bond reduction to an affordable amount, ensuring the client can participate in mediation, attend hearings, and defend their parental rights in the civil suit."
Gonzalez v. Montalvo
COA14
In a dispute over the partition of several hundred acres of estate property, the appellant challenged the trial court's order to sell the land and its denial of a jury trial. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals first clarified that a "phase-one" partition order—which determines if property should be sold or divided in kind—is a final, appealable judgment. On the jury issue, the court held that a party cannot rely on a jury demand and fee payment made by another party who has since nonsuited their claims, as a nonsuit restores the parties to their pre-filing positions. Regarding the partition itself, the court found the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by focusing on whether individual tracts could be split equally rather than whether the aggregate estate could be fairly divided. The court affirmed the denial of the jury trial but reversed the order of sale.
Litigation Takeaway
"Always file your own jury demand and pay the fee; relying on an opponent’s request is a 'trap' because a nonsuit will immediately strip you of that jury right. Furthermore, in partition litigation, the 'phase one' order is not interlocutory—you must appeal the decision to sell versus divide immediately or lose the right to challenge it."
Fanous v. Allstate Insurance
COA02
In Fanous v. Allstate Insurance, the appellant filed a notice of appeal 21 days after the mandatory 90-day deadline triggered by a motion for new trial. The appellant argued the delay was a strategic decision to avoid 'alienating' the trial judge during a pending hearing. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 26.3, concluding that appellate deadlines are strictly jurisdictional. The court held that subjective tactical concerns or the desire to maintain a judge's favor do not constitute a reasonable explanation for missing filing windows, and subsequently dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never miss a jurisdictional appellate deadline for the sake of 'trial court optics'; the appellate clock does not pause for pending motions or a lawyer's fear of alienating the trial judge."
In the Interest of A.R. and C.R., Children
COA10
In this parental termination case, a mother’s court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, asserting that the appeal was frivolous, and simultaneously moved to withdraw from the case. The Tenth Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record and agreed that there were no arguable grounds for reversal, affirming the termination decree. However, the court denied the attorney’s motion to withdraw. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in In re P.M., the court concluded that a parent’s statutory right to counsel persists through the exhaustion of all appellate remedies, including the filing of a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. Therefore, an attorney cannot withdraw simply because the appeal is deemed meritless at the intermediate stage.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas parental termination cases, the right to court-appointed counsel is a "long-tail" obligation; even if an attorney believes an appeal is meritless, they must generally remain on the case until the client has had the opportunity to seek review from the Texas Supreme Court."