Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Lee v. Lundquist
COA04
In Lee v. Lundquist, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the key property to characterize was the spouses’ LLC membership interests, not the duplex later transferred into the LLC. Because the parties formed 9018 Wellwood LLC during marriage and received their membership interests at that time, those interests were presumed community property under Texas Family Code section 3.003. The wife’s tracing evidence showed only that separate funds may have been used to purchase the duplex later deeded to the LLC, but it did not prove that her membership interest itself was separate when created. Applying the inception-of-title doctrine, the court held the membership interests were characterized when issued, and the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the interests were community property.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an LLC is formed during marriage, separate-property tracing aimed only at the company’s later-acquired assets usually will not establish that the membership interest itself is separate. In characterization disputes, target the correct property interest, prove its inception date, and if tracing does not reach the ownership interest itself, consider reimbursement or offset theories instead."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Darsi Rae Myers and Antonie Chris Vorster
COA06
In this Texas divorce appeal, the dispute centered on whether about fifty acres in Scroggins acquired during marriage was community property or the wife’s separate property. The trial court treated the property inconsistently, awarding it to Myers as separate property while also structuring a payout based on a finding that it was community. The Texarkana Court of Appeals applied the community-property presumption in Family Code section 3.003 together with the inception-of-title rule and held that the warranty deed, purchase-money note, and related title evidence naming Myers alone were clear and convincing evidence rebutting the community presumption, despite conflicting language in the deed of trust. The court also held Myers failed to prove reimbursement claims because her testimony about separate funds used for community expenses was vague, undocumented, and inadequately traced. Because the characterization error materially affected the overall just-and-right division, the court affirmed the divorce but reversed and remanded the property division for reconsideration.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume real property bought during marriage is automatically community. In characterization fights, deed and purchase-money documents can rebut the community presumption, but reimbursement claims still require organized tracing and documentary proof. A single characterization mistake can undo the entire property division on appeal."
Ida Thomas, Willie Aron Pitre, and Beulah Giles v. Fidelity National Title
COA14
In this appeal arising from the sale of inherited real property, the heirs alleged that Fidelity National Title wrongfully distributed sale proceeds to at least one person who was not entitled to receive them. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that, although Fidelity’s summary-judgment motion attacked only negligence and breach-of-contract theories tied to its role as title insurer, the heirs’ live pleading could fairly be read under Texas fair-notice standards to assert a separate breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim based on Fidelity’s role as escrow agent responsible for holding and disbursing funds. Because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) forbids summary judgment on a ground not expressly presented in the motion, the trial court could not dispose of that unaddressed escrow-agent fiduciary-duty theory. The court therefore reversed and remanded as to the fiduciary-duty claim and affirmed the remainder of the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Match the motion to the live pleading. If a neutral actor is alleged to have mishandled sale or settlement funds in an escrow or disbursing role, plead that fiduciary-duty theory clearly, and on defense, expressly move against it by name. A summary-judgment motion aimed only at negligence, contract, or title-insurer duties will not knock out an unaddressed escrow-duty claim."
In re International Leadership of Texas, Inc. and International Leadership of Texas – Global
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff’s Rule 162 nonsuit was mandatory and immediately effective when filed before the plaintiff rested and more than three days before a Rule 91a hearing. The defendants’ Rule 91a motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction were defensive pleadings, not claims for affirmative relief, so they did not prevent dismissal. The court also rejected the trial court’s outright denial of the nonsuit based on the suit being brought for a minor through a next friend, explaining that if an apparent conflict existed between the minor and the next friend, the proper step under Rule 173 was to appoint a guardian ad litem before acting on the nonsuit. Because the record showed no conflict finding, the trial court abused its discretion, and mandamus issued directing dismissal absent a conflict determination and ad litem appointment.
Litigation Takeaway
"A timely nonsuit is usually automatic: trial courts cannot keep a case alive just because a dispositive motion is pending or because a minor is involved. To defeat or delay a nonsuit, the opposing party must show a live claim for affirmative relief, or the court must identify an actual apparent conflict between the minor and the next friend and follow Rule 173 by appointing a guardian ad litem."
Rodriguez v. State
COA05
In Rodriguez v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a criminal judgment after rejecting challenges to the denial of a mistrial and to the qualifications of the State’s child-abuse expert, while also modifying the written judgment to correct clerical inaccuracies. The mistrial complaint arose after the prosecutor asked an improper redirect question implying another accused person had admitted sex with the complainant; because the trial court immediately sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard before any answer was given, the appellate court held the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the extraordinary remedy of mistrial. The court likewise found no reversible abuse of discretion in allowing the expert testimony. For family-law crossover purposes, the opinion’s most useful holding is that an appellate court may reform a written judgment to match the actual record when the discrepancy is clerical and the record clearly shows the truth of the trial court’s ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"The best family-law lesson from Rodriguez is procedural, not substantive: if a decree or order contains a clerical mismatch with the reporter’s record, verdict, stipulation, or oral rendition, ask the appellate court to reform the order so the record speaks the truth rather than assuming reversal is required. The case also reinforces that curative instructions usually defeat mistrial complaints absent truly incurable prejudice, and that expert-qualification challenges need a strong record to overcome abuse-of-discretion review."
Lecompte v. State
COA01
In Lecompte v. State, the First Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant could appeal an adjudication of guilt after deferred adjudication when he had signed a revocation-stage agreement expressly waiving appeal. Lecompte pleaded true to supervision violations, accepted the State’s recommendation of a two-year sentence within a two-to-twenty-year punishment range, and signed a written waiver of appeal that was also signed by counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge. The court explained that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) does not by itself bar appeals from later adjudications after deferred adjudication, but ordinary waiver principles do apply. Relying on Ex parte Broadway and Blanco, the court held the waiver was knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and supported by consideration because Lecompte received the State’s sentencing recommendation at the low end of the range. The court therefore enforced the waiver and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a party knowingly signs a bargained-for waiver of appeal in a revocation or adjudication proceeding, appellate review may be gone for good. For family-law lawyers handling cases with parallel criminal exposure—especially family-violence cases—coordinate with criminal counsel before any plea, stipulation, or waiver is signed because the resulting adjudication may become functionally final immediately and shape custody, possession, protective-order, and property-division strategy."
In the Interest of S.V., a Minor Child
COA05
In In re S.V., the Dallas Court of Appeals decided whether a mother’s child-support enforcement motion was timely under Texas Family Code § 157.005 when the two-year filing deadline fell on a Saturday, followed by Sunday and Memorial Day, and the motion was filed the next business day. The court held Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 applies to extend the deadline to the next non-holiday business day, so the May 31, 2022 filing was timely even though the support obligation terminated on May 28, 2020. Because the motion was timely, the trial court retained authority to confirm arrearages, reduce them and accrued interest to judgment, and award statutory attorney’s fees. The court also rejected the father’s service, amended-pleading, continuance, and other procedural complaints, finding no reversible error.
Litigation Takeaway
"When calculating the two-year deadline to confirm child-support arrearages under Family Code § 157.005, do not stop at the calendar anniversary date—apply Rule 4. If the last day falls on a weekend or legal holiday, filing on the next business day is timely. Practically, lawyers should carefully identify the true termination date of support, preserve proof of filing, and focus defense efforts on actual accounting or notice problems rather than weak weekend-deadline arguments."
Mouton v. State
COA14
In Mouton v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a 16-year-old’s recorded interview at Houston Police Department headquarters was noncustodial, so warnings under Miranda, article 38.22, and Family Code section 51.095 were not required. The juvenile argued the interview was effectively custodial because it occurred at police headquarters, she was separated from her mother, had to pass through security, and was questioned about serious criminal exposure. The court applied an objective reasonable-child standard and focused on the actual circumstances rather than the official setting alone: she voluntarily came with family, was not handcuffed or restrained, kept her belongings, the detectives were in plain clothes and unarmed, the door was unlocked, her mother remained nearby and could observe remotely, and detectives indicated she would be going home that day. Based on those facts, the court concluded a reasonable 16-year-old would not have believed she was under restraint to the degree associated with formal arrest, and it affirmed denial of the suppression motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving abuse allegations or child interviews, Mouton is a strong reminder that coercion arguments rise or fall on objective interview details—not labels like police station, CAC, or investigation. If you want a child’s statement credited, build a record showing voluntary attendance, lack of restraint, caregiver access, and a clear ability to leave. If you want to challenge the statement, focus on concrete signs of detention or isolation such as locked doors, blocked exits, caregiver exclusion, confiscated belongings, or statements implying the child could not end the encounter."
In the Interest of H.E.C. and E.G.C., Children
COA06
In this Texarkana appeal, a former stepfather filed an original SAPCR seeking conservatorship of his former stepchildren, arguing he had standing under Texas Family Code § 102.004(a)(1) because he shared a biological child with the children’s mother and that child was the older children’s half-sibling. The court rejected that theory after applying the plain text of Government Code § 573.022(a), which defines consanguinity as existing only when one person is the descendant of the other or they share a common ancestor. Because the stepchildren were neither the stepfather’s descendants nor related to him through a common ancestor, the half-sibling connection did not create consanguinity standing. The court refused to expand the statute based on policy or absurdity arguments, affirmed dismissal for lack of standing, and reversed and remanded the attorney’s-fee award because the fee proof did not satisfy Rohrmoos lodestar standards.
Litigation Takeaway
"Blended-family facts and equitable caregiving narratives do not create SAPCR standing. If a former stepparent is filing under § 102.004, confirm a true consanguinity basis—descendant status or a shared common ancestor—before suit; a biological child in common with the other parent does not supply standing as to that child’s half-siblings. Also, even when you win a jurisdictional fight, attorney’s fees still require detailed, nonconclusory lodestar proof."
Moritz v. Moritz
COA03
In Moritz v. Moritz, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree denying the wife’s request for spousal maintenance. The court explained that Texas Family Code section 8.051 requires more than proof of a long-term marriage or general financial hardship: the spouse seeking maintenance must prove an inability to meet minimum reasonable needs and also establish a specific statutory ground for eligibility. Because the wife did not clearly identify the subsection she relied on, did not develop evidence showing inability to meet her minimum reasonable needs, and did not address the diligence requirement applicable to ten-year-marriage claims under section 8.051(2)(B), she failed to show entitlement to maintenance as a matter of law. The court also affirmed the property division, denial of reimbursement, and rejection of evidentiary complaints due to lack of findings, lack of preservation, and inadequate briefing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Spousal maintenance in Texas is a strictly statutory remedy, not a general fairness argument. Lawyers must plead the exact Family Code basis, prove minimum reasonable needs with concrete evidence, and, in ten-year-marriage cases, present diligence evidence to overcome the presumption against maintenance. More broadly, Moritz shows that weak records, missing findings, waived objections, and thin appellate briefing can sink otherwise sympathetic claims."