Opinion Library

Westyn Gregory Whetstone v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Whetstone v. State, a defendant was convicted of criminal trespass, but the written judgment erroneously labeled the offense as a Class A misdemeanor involving a 'habitation' despite the State having abandoned that specific allegation at trial. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the record under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), which allows appellate courts to reform judgments to 'speak the truth' when they have the necessary information to do so. The court held that because the jury charge and sentencing only reflected a Class B offense, the written judgment contained a clerical error that must be reformed to reflect the actual adjudication.

Messele Kelel v. Dallas Central Appraisal District

COA05

In Messele Kelel v. Dallas Central Appraisal District, a property owner challenged a $74,250 tax valuation, presenting evidence of lower-priced comparable sales and internal settlement offers from the appraisal district as low as $30,000. The trial court granted a 'no-evidence' summary judgment in favor of the appraisal district, effectively dismissing the owner's claims. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that the owner's evidence—specifically the comparable data and the district's own lower offers—constituted 'more than a scintilla' of evidence. The court held that while this evidence did not prove the property's value as a matter of law, it was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved at trial.

EX PARTE BESSIE TEKILA MARTIN

COA02

After Bessie Tekila Martin's deferred adjudication in Tarrant County was adjudicated, she faced new charges in Parker County for the same conduct. She filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Parker County prosecution was barred by double jeopardy because those offenses had been 'taken into account' during her Tarrant County sentencing under Texas Penal Code Section 12.45. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the 'paper trail' and found significant record gaps, including missing motions and inconsistent cause numbers. Consequently, the court held that it could not determine which specific offenses were actually admitted and considered, remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute.

EX PARTE BESSIE TEKILA MARTIN

COA02

In Ex parte Martin, the Second Court of Appeals addressed a double jeopardy challenge where a defendant claimed that out-of-county offenses were barred from prosecution because they had been 'taken into account' during a prior sentencing in another county under Texas Penal Code Section 12.45. While the court acknowledged that a valid Section 12.45 agreement bars subsequent prosecution for the admitted conduct, it found the record in this case insufficient to verify which specific offenses were included in the prior plea. Consequently, the court held that a defendant must provide a complete factual record—including the specific list of unadjudicated offenses—to sustain such a claim and remanded the case for further evidentiary development.

Kist v. Kist

COA14

Kathryn Kist sought to lift a geographic residency restriction to relocate her four children from Texas to Indiana, presenting evidence of a $70,000 job offer, free housing from her parents, and access to private schooling. She argued that the father, Jonathan, was largely uninvolved and that staying in Texas was a financial hardship. Jonathan contested the move, presenting evidence of his involvement and the children's stability in their current environment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict using the Lenz factors and Texas public policy favoring 'frequent and continuing contact' with both parents. The court held that because the trial court faced conflicting testimony regarding the father’s involvement and the children's best interests, it did not abuse its discretion in maintaining the residency restriction or in characterizing Jonathan's post-petition home purchase as his separate property.

COA10

In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, S.W. appealed an order committing her to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. Her court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous and a motion to withdraw. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code § 51.101(a), which requires counsel appointed at the initial detention stage to represent the child 'until the case is terminated.' Drawing a parallel to the Texas Supreme Court’s 'continuing duty' doctrine in parental rights termination cases (In re P.M.), the court interpreted 'termination' to mean the exhaustion of all appeals through the Texas Supreme Court. Consequently, while the court affirmed the commitment order, it denied the attorney's motion to withdraw.

IN THE ESTATE OF LONNIE K. LEDBETTER JR., DECEASED

COA02

Following the death of Lonnie Ledbetter Jr., his children sued his surviving spouse, alleging she exerted undue influence to divert millions of dollars into a private trust. During evidentiary hearings, the spouse invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when questioned about her identity, and evidence emerged of suspicious, large-scale asset transfers. In response, the trial court took the 'sua sponte' (on its own motion) step of appointing a neutral receiver to manage the trust assets. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 64.001(a)(7) and equitable principles, determining that trial courts possess the inherent authority to protect the subject matter of litigation from dissipation. The court held that because a party’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a civil case allows for a negative inference, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a receiver to preserve the property while the lawsuit was pending.

Gannon v. The State of Texas

COA02

After Dayton Joseph Gannon was convicted of aggravated robbery for brandishing a knife and aggressively posturing toward a victim through a laundromat's glass door, he appealed, arguing that the threat of injury was not 'imminent' because the victim was armed and separated from him by a physical barrier. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory meaning of 'imminent'—defined as 'near, at hand, or on the verge of happening'—and determined that a threat is judged by the aggressor's volatility and conduct rather than the victim's defensive capabilities. The court held that the display of a deadly weapon combined with combative posturing is sufficient to establish an imminent threat, regardless of whether the victim has a weapon or is behind glass.

Keenan DeAndre Black v. The State of Texas

COA02

In this case, a trial court orally waived a $6,000 statutory fine for a defendant found to be indigent, yet the subsequent written judgment erroneously included the fine. On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the conflict between the judge's verbal ruling and the written record. The court analyzed the 'bench controls the pen' doctrine, which dictates that an oral pronouncement made in open court is the legally binding judgment, while the written order is merely a record of that act. Finding a clear conflict, the court held that the oral waiver must prevail and modified the written judgment to delete the $6,000 fine.

In Re Darren L. Reagan

COA05

Darren L. Reagan filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a trial court's order granting a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition without reaching the substantive legal merits because the relator failed to comply with the technical requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, the court analyzed the petition's failure to use the verbatim certification language now required by the renumbered Rule 52.3(k) and the failure to provide a sworn or certified record under Rule 52.7(a). The court held that strict adherence to the "exact words" of the appellate rules is a mandatory prerequisite for the court to exercise its jurisdiction for extraordinary relief.