Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1102 opinions found
Blair v. Blair
COA02
In Blair v. Blair, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a post-divorce order appointing a receiver to sell marital real property because the 2013 divorce decree expressly authorized either party to seek a receiver if the property was not sold by March 15, 2014. The court treated the receivership as a straightforward enforcement of the decree’s property-division terms rather than an extraordinary equitable remedy requiring separate proof of waste, imminent harm, or inadequate legal remedies. The court also rejected the appellant’s limitations, laches, dormancy, and due-process complaints because they were either not preserved in the trial court, not supported by the appellate record, or contradicted by record evidence showing notice. The court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the receiver.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree includes a clear receiver-on-default provision for sale of real property, enforcing that provision years later is much easier and more likely to survive appeal. For both sides, Blair is also a preservation case: defenses like limitations, laches, dormancy, and due process must be clearly raised, supported by evidence, and ruled on in the trial court, or they will likely fail on appeal."
In Re Richard Earl Purkey Jr. and Ashlyn Purkey Jordan
COA09
In re Purkey holds that a district court cannot use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 to authorize pre-suit depositions aimed at developing claims that belong in a statutory probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction. The petitioners sought depositions to investigate alleged lack of capacity, undue influence, and trust-related issues surrounding a decedent’s 2024 will and amended trust. Looking past the Rule 202 label to the substance of the requested discovery, the Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded the anticipated claims were classic probate matters—a will contest, an effort to set aside probate, and trust disputes incident to an estate. Because Rule 202 does not expand subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court exceeded its authority by ordering the depositions. The court conditionally granted mandamus, holding that the improper pre-suit discovery could not be adequately cured on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing a Rule 202 petition, identify the real dispute and the court that actually has power to hear it. If the discovery is really designed to build a will contest, probate challenge, or trust dispute tied to an estate, you must proceed in probate court—not through a separate district-court discovery action. For family lawyers, the lesson is to screen early for probate overlap and avoid using Rule 202 as an end-run around jurisdictional limits."
In the Interest of A.M., J.M., and K.W., Children
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to prove endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on the mother’s years-long course of conduct: repeatedly entering or returning to abusive relationships, exposing the children to domestic violence, leaving them with a known violent caregiver, and minimizing or concealing the abuse even after serious assaults, police involvement, and one child’s murder. The court reasoned that endangerment may be shown by a continuing pattern of conduct that jeopardizes a child’s physical or emotional well-being, even when the violence is directed primarily at the parent rather than the child. That same pattern, combined with the mother’s instability in housing, employment, legal compliance, and protective decision-making, supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domestic violence evidence is powerful not just when a child is directly assaulted, but when a parent repeatedly exposes children to violent partners, ignores warning signs, and minimizes the danger. In custody, modification, and termination cases, lawyers should build a timeline showing the parent’s knowledge of the abuse, continued contact with the abuser, child exposure, and lack of protective change over time."
Perricone v. Perricone
COA11
In Perricone v. Perricone, the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed a contested Rule 145 statement of inability to afford court costs in litigation arising from divorce and custody-related disputes. After a defendant challenged the indigency filing, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found the declarant’s financial statement contained material misrepresentations and omissions, including unsupported claims of means-tested benefits, undisclosed assets, and inaccurate income and valuation information. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f), the court held that once a contest is filed, the burden shifts to the declarant to prove inability to pay by a preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings and concluded the record supported denial of indigency status. The court also held that the challenger’s unsworn declaration was sufficient because it substantially complied with Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 132.001 despite minor technical defects.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 145 form is only the starting point. If the other side contests indigency, the party claiming inability to pay must back it up with credible, documented proof, and courts will closely examine omissions, inconsistencies, household support, and prior financial representations. For family-law litigators, Perricone is a roadmap both for attacking weak indigency claims and for preparing defensible ones."
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed the notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still not enough to invoke jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within that grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension in the appellate court that reasonably explains the delay. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion or equivalent filing until after the grace period expired, the late explanation could not cure the defect, and the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law-related appeals, a late notice of appeal is not self-curing just because it lands within Rule 26.3’s grace period. If the notice is late, counsel must also file a Rule 26.3 extension motion in the appellate court within that same window, with a reasonable explanation. Do not wait for a clerk’s defect notice or assume a later response will save jurisdiction."
In re Sandra Ramirez
COA08
In In re Sandra Ramirez, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by transferring venue from El Paso County to Kaufman County without a Rule 87-compliant setting, notice, and hearing. The movant argued the matter was effectively set during a status conference and heard by submission, but the mandamus record and certified register of actions showed no actual setting or hearing. Relying on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87 and Henderson v. O’Neill, the court concluded unsupported attorney assertions could not establish compliance, rejected the argument that Ramirez failed to preserve error, and conditionally granted mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the transfer order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side wants to transfer venue, they must create a clean Rule 87 record with an actual setting, proper notice, and a hearing or documented submission setting. In family-law cases, an informal status conference or off-record discussion is not enough, and a transfer order entered without those procedural safeguards is a strong candidate for immediate mandamus relief."
In the Interest of J.J. III and D.R.L.J., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and he also challenged best interest. But he did not challenge the separate constructive-abandonment finding under subsection (N). The Fourth Court of Appeals applied the settled rule that one valid predicate ground under section 161.001(b)(1), coupled with a best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2), is enough to affirm termination. Because subsection (N) was an independent ground and was left unchallenged, the court treated it as established on appeal and affirmed the termination order without needing to decide the father’s attacks on subsections (D) and (E).
Litigation Takeaway
"In a termination appeal, you must challenge every independent predicate ground that can support the judgment. If even one statutory ground is left unchallenged, the court can affirm so long as the best-interest finding stands, making issue selection on appeal potentially case-dispositive."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Caroline Brookshire and Trenton Brookshire and in the Interest of R.L.B., D.B.B. and H.A.B., Children
COA12
In this Texas family-law appeal arising from a contested divorce and SAPCR, the appellee argued the judgment should be affirmed because the appellate record was supposedly incomplete: although audio and video exhibits were admitted and included in the record, the court reporter did not identify the exact timestamps or clips played at trial. The Tyler Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and held that the incomplete-record presumption in Rule 34.6(c) applies only when an appellant elects to proceed on a partial reporter’s record. Because the appellant requested the complete reporter’s record and the admitted digital exhibits were actually included, the absence of clip-by-clip transcription or timestamp notation did not make the record incomplete. The court therefore rejected the appellee’s request for a presumption in favor of the judgment and allowed merits review to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate review of digital evidence, request the full reporter’s record and make sure the admitted audio/video exhibits are included. Brookshire also teaches trial lawyers not to rely on the court reporter to identify clips—state timestamps and excerpts on the record whenever possible—but an appellee cannot turn that imprecision alone into an automatic affirmance under Rule 34.6(c)."
In re Bradley Welsh
COA02
In a child-support enforcement proceeding, the trial court orally found Bradley Welsh in contempt on April 8, 2026 and ordered him confined for sixty days, but did not sign the written contempt and commitment order until thirty-six days later. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that due process permits only a short and reasonable time between an oral contempt finding with confinement and the signed written order under Ex parte Calvillo Amaya. The court rejected arguments that later work-release discussions meant the contempt ruling was incomplete or that Welsh invited the delay, concluding the hearing had effectively ended and the postponement was caused by the court’s process. Because the delayed written order violated due process, the contempt and commitment order was void, and the court granted habeas relief and vacated the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas contempt practice, an oral confinement ruling is not enough. If a court orally finds contempt and orders jail time, the written contempt and commitment order must be prepared and signed almost immediately; otherwise the order may be void regardless of the underlying violation. Family-law lawyers should have proposed contempt orders ready at the hearing and, for respondents, should closely compare the oral ruling date to the signature date for a potential habeas challenge."
Brennan Short v. Jamie Short
COA04
In Short v. Short, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that although a deed from one spouse to the other during marriage creates a presumption of gift, that presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence when the deed does not contain an express separate-property recital. Wife owned the Boerne home before marriage, later deeded Husband a one-half interest during a refinance intended to pay off other debt and lower monthly payments, and testified she did not intend a gift. Relying on In re J.Y.O., the court held parol evidence of her intent was admissible, found sufficient evidence that the transfer was a financing accommodation rather than a donative transfer, and affirmed the trial court’s characterization of the entire property as Wife’s separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
"An interspousal deed is powerful, but not always dispositive. In Texas property-characterization disputes, a spouse can defeat the gift presumption with clear and convincing evidence showing the transfer was made for refinancing or debt-service purposes rather than out of donative intent—especially when the deed lacks an express separate-property recital. Plead lack of donative intent and any fraud, duress, or mistake theories, and preserve objections if the other side tries unpleaded issues."