Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1544 opinions found
Julia Ann Poff v. William Harvey Poff
COA09
In Poff v. Poff, the Beaumont Court of Appeals considered a divorce decree that resolved both property division and SAPCR issues. After the appeal was filed, the parties’ only remaining minor child and the father died in a boating accident. The court held that those deaths made the conservatorship, possession, access, communication, and child-support issues moot because no live parent-child controversy remained and the court could no longer grant effective relief. But the appeal was not moot in full: the property division still affected the parties’ legal interests. Applying the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, and relying on implied findings because no findings of fact were requested, the court affirmed the trial court’s property division.
Litigation Takeaway
"In mixed divorce/SAPCR appeals, post-judgment events can wipe out custody and support issues without ending the entire appeal. Lawyers should reassess mootness immediately, separate live property issues from dead SAPCR issues, and make sure the trial record independently supports any surviving property challenge."
In the Interest of L.G.O.A.
COA09
In In re L.G.O.A., the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly used a judgment nunc pro tunc to add an omitted child-support start date to an agreed SAPCR order after plenary power expired. The original order set Father’s monthly support amount but left blank the date the first payment was due. Looking to the full record—including testimony from Mother and former counsel, the agreed nature of the order, the contemporaneous income withholding order signed during plenary power, and the parties’ later conduct—the court concluded the blank date was a clerical omission in memorializing the judgment actually rendered, not a judicial change creating a new substantive term. The court therefore upheld insertion of January 1, 2021, as the support commencement date.
Litigation Takeaway
"A nunc pro tunc can still fix an important omission after plenary power expires if the record shows the court already rendered judgment on the issue and the signed order simply failed to capture it. In family-law cases, lawyers should preserve contemporaneous proof—drafts, emails, withholding orders, and testimony—because the fight will turn on whether the defect is clerical or judicial."
Scott Kenneth Higley v. Elesa Jo Jorgensen
COA03
In Higley v. Jorgensen, the father sought to reduce child support and modify conservatorship, claiming a material and substantial change in circumstances. The trial court found he failed to prove the required comparative change between the prior order and current circumstances, especially where his own income records did not clearly show a legally sufficient decline. The court also found the modification suit frivolous under Texas Family Code section 156.005 based on the lack of evidentiary support and the unnecessary litigation burden it imposed, and awarded the mother $14,222.50 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed both the denial of modification and the fee award.
Litigation Takeaway
"A modification petition needs proof, not just allegations. If a parent cannot present a clear apples-to-apples comparison showing a material and substantial change since the last order, the court can deny relief—and if the filing is weak, unsupported, or needlessly drives up litigation costs, the movant may also be ordered to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees."
Carey Lynn Johnson v. Jon P. Herrera
COA01
In Johnson v. Herrera, the First Court of Appeals held that a trial court exceeded its authority by using a Chapter 157 enforcement proceeding to impose new post-judgment speech and contact restrictions that were not contained in the final SAPCR order. The original order barred harassment and negative social-media reviews, but the later enforcement order went further by requiring Johnson to obtain court approval before contacting Quest Diagnostics, its employees or attorneys, or making additional complaints to Quest or regulators. The court analyzed the distinction between enforcement under Texas Family Code Chapter 157 and modification under Chapter 156, concluding that enforcement may compel compliance with existing terms but cannot materially alter the parties’ rights or obligations. Because the added restrictions functioned as a modification without Chapter 156 pleadings or proof, the court reversed and struck those provisions, while dismissing the remainder of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the relief you want changes the operative terms of a final SAPCR order, you must plead and prove a Chapter 156 modification—not try to slip new restrictions into a Chapter 157 enforcement action. In post-judgment family cases, courts can enforce existing orders, but they cannot add new no-contact, speech, or prior-approval requirements unless the case is properly postured as a modification."
In the Interest of M.B.
COA02
In *In the Interest of M.B.*, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order modifying probation and committing M.B. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department under Family Code section 54.05. The State proved multiple probation violations, including retaliatory threats against a witness, an assault on that witness, a separate assaultive spitting incident, and school-attendance violations. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because the trial judge could credit the witnesses, rely on corroborating officer testimony and M.B.’s partial admissions, and reject M.B.’s self-defense and denial theories. The court also held the disposition evidence was sufficient because the record showed escalating violence, prior firearm-related misconduct, chronic noncompliance, and failure of earlier, less restrictive probation interventions. M.B.’s complaint about the lack of a psychological evaluation was not preserved for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a severe remedy affirmed on appeal, build a layered record showing clear violations, corroboration, escalation, and why lesser interventions already failed. If you want to resist that remedy, do more than deny the allegations—develop a concrete competing narrative and preserve every procedural complaint in the trial court."
Moises Depazrobles v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Moises Depazrobles v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld admission of a defendant’s Spanish-language interview translated into English by a police-provided interpreter. The court analyzed whether the translation created an additional hearsay layer and, applying Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(C) and (D) and Saavedra v. State, held it did not because the record showed the defendant understood, accepted, and used the interpreter as his conduit. The court relied on the defendant’s express confirmation that he understood the interpreter, the detective’s testimony about the interpreter’s certification and prior work, the absence of evidence of any motive to distort, and the defendant’s responsive words and conduct during the interview. On that foundation, the court held the translated statements were admissible as party admissions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, statements made through an interpreter may come in as the opposing party’s own admission without a second hearsay problem if you build a Rule 801(e)(2) foundation showing the party authorized or adopted the interpreter and the translation was reliable. The practical lesson is to develop—or attack—the record on interpreter qualifications, dialect, confirmation of understanding, opportunities to clarify, neutrality, and conduct consistent with comprehension."
In the Interest of X.I.C., a Child
COA07
In this restricted appeal from a default parentage judgment, the Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed because substituted service under Rule 106(b) was defective on the face of the record. The petitioner obtained orders allowing substituted service at a Grand Prairie address and by text, but the supporting affidavits did not provide sufficient probative facts showing the respondent could probably be found there or that the proposed substituted methods would be reasonably effective to give notice. The court also held service failed to strictly comply with the first order because the order required both delivery at the residence and service by text, while the record showed only texting occurred. Given Texas’s strict-compliance standard for service in default cases, the defective service required reversal and remand.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a default in family court, Rule 106(b) substituted service must be supported by detailed, fact-specific affidavits and carried out exactly as the order says—every step, every method, no shortcuts. Any mismatch between the motion, affidavit, order, return, or later address information can make error apparent on the face of the record and undo the judgment on restricted appeal."
Gonzalez v. State
COA10
In Gonzalez v. State, the appellant challenged a child-abuse conviction by arguing the State violated article 39.14 in connection with a therapist who had seen the child before the later outcry. The court did not reach the merits because the discovery complaint was not preserved: in the trial court, the defense argued the State should have investigated the therapist and developed exculpatory information, but on appeal the argument shifted to a narrower claim that the State failed to disclose the therapist’s contact information or notify the defense it was withholding it. Applying Rule 33.1 and noncomportment precedent, the court held those were materially different theories and the appellate complaint was forfeited. The court also upheld denial of mistrial on juror nondisclosure because counsel had not exercised sufficient voir dire diligence to uncover the juror’s relationship with the complainant.
Litigation Takeaway
"Preservation is theory-specific. In family-law discovery fights, a general complaint that the other side failed to investigate, search, supplement, or disclose will not necessarily preserve a narrower appellate complaint about a specific witness, provider, record, or contact detail. State the exact discovery failure, tie it to the correct rule or remedy, and obtain a ruling on each distinct theory."
Armando Arredondo Jr. v. State of Texas
COA13
In this criminal appeal with strong family-law crossover value, the court held that the defendant waived any hearsay complaint about text-message exhibits because counsel affirmatively said there was no objection when the screenshots were offered and admitted, then objected only later when an officer began reading the already-admitted messages aloud. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and preservation principles from Ethington, the court concluded the objection was untimely and therefore did not reach the merits of whether the other side of the text conversation was hearsay or merely contextual. The court also modified the written judgment to correct an inaccuracy about the plea to an enhancement paragraph because the appellate record affirmatively showed the judgment did not match the truth of the record.
Litigation Takeaway
"Object when the exhibit is offered, not when the damaging contents are later read or emphasized. In abuse-related family cases involving texts, screenshots, records, and layered out-of-court statements, saying “no objection” to the exhibit will usually waive later admissibility complaints; if only part of the exhibit is problematic, request redaction, limitation, and a clear ruling at the time of admission."
Wally Yammine v. Propel Financial Services, LLC, as Agent and Attorney in Fact for Propel Funding National 1, LLC; and HK REO, LLC
COA02
In this appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly dismissed a bill-of-review case based on a hybrid motion to dismiss that was not tied to any recognized Texas procedural vehicle. The appellees argued lack of jurisdiction, failure to tender, and failure to state a claim, but they did not file or comply with Rule 91a, summary judgment, special exceptions, a proper plea to the jurisdiction, dismissal for want of prosecution, or the Baker v. Goldsmith procedure governing pretrial disposition of bills of review. The court emphasized that Texas trial courts do not have free-floating authority to dismiss civil claims on the merits simply because a party says the plaintiff should lose. Because no rule, statute, or recognized common-law procedure authorized the dismissal used here, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed the dismissal order and remanded without deciding the underlying merits of the bill of review.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family litigation, a strong merits argument is not itself a dismissal mechanism. If an opponent wants to knock out a bill of review, modification claim, enforcement-related pleading, or post-decree dispute, they must use the correct procedural vehicle—and comply with that vehicle’s rules. When a trial court grants an ad hoc “motion to dismiss” untethered to a valid rule, statute, or recognized procedure, that order is vulnerable on appeal."