Opinion Library

Gonzalez v. State

COA10

In Gonzalez v. State, the appellant challenged a child-abuse conviction by arguing the State violated article 39.14 in connection with a therapist who had seen the child before the later outcry. The court did not reach the merits because the discovery complaint was not preserved: in the trial court, the defense argued the State should have investigated the therapist and developed exculpatory information, but on appeal the argument shifted to a narrower claim that the State failed to disclose the therapist’s contact information or notify the defense it was withholding it. Applying Rule 33.1 and noncomportment precedent, the court held those were materially different theories and the appellate complaint was forfeited. The court also upheld denial of mistrial on juror nondisclosure because counsel had not exercised sufficient voir dire diligence to uncover the juror’s relationship with the complainant.

Litigation Takeaway

"Preservation is theory-specific. In family-law discovery fights, a general complaint that the other side failed to investigate, search, supplement, or disclose will not necessarily preserve a narrower appellate complaint about a specific witness, provider, record, or contact detail. State the exact discovery failure, tie it to the correct rule or remedy, and obtain a ruling on each distinct theory."

Wally Yammine v. Propel Financial Services, LLC, as Agent and Attorney in Fact for Propel Funding National 1, LLC; and HK REO, LLC

COA02

In this appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly dismissed a bill-of-review case based on a hybrid motion to dismiss that was not tied to any recognized Texas procedural vehicle. The appellees argued lack of jurisdiction, failure to tender, and failure to state a claim, but they did not file or comply with Rule 91a, summary judgment, special exceptions, a proper plea to the jurisdiction, dismissal for want of prosecution, or the Baker v. Goldsmith procedure governing pretrial disposition of bills of review. The court emphasized that Texas trial courts do not have free-floating authority to dismiss civil claims on the merits simply because a party says the plaintiff should lose. Because no rule, statute, or recognized common-law procedure authorized the dismissal used here, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed the dismissal order and remanded without deciding the underlying merits of the bill of review.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas family litigation, a strong merits argument is not itself a dismissal mechanism. If an opponent wants to knock out a bill of review, modification claim, enforcement-related pleading, or post-decree dispute, they must use the correct procedural vehicle—and comply with that vehicle’s rules. When a trial court grants an ad hoc “motion to dismiss” untethered to a valid rule, statute, or recognized procedure, that order is vulnerable on appeal."

Child Custody

Villarreal v. State

COA10

In Villarreal v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a child’s forensic outcry admitted under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072 is substantive evidence that may be considered for its truth, even when the child later fully recants. The child initially gave a detailed forensic interview describing sexual abuse, but more than two years later recanted and maintained at trial that the accusation was false. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and relying on Rodriguez v. State, the court concluded that once the article 38.072 predicate is satisfied, the prior outcry can alone support the verdict without corroboration. The recantation created a credibility issue for the jury, not a legal-sufficiency defect, so the conviction was affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"A later recantation does not automatically erase the force of a child’s earlier disclosure. If the prior statement comes in through a proper substantive evidentiary pathway, the factfinder may still rely on it heavily, making admissibility and foundation critical battlegrounds in custody, protective-order, and conservatorship litigation."

Evidence

Moises Depazrobles v. The State of Texas

COA02

In Moises Depazrobles v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld admission of a defendant’s Spanish-language interview translated into English by a police-provided interpreter. The court analyzed whether the translation created an additional hearsay layer and, applying Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(C) and (D) and Saavedra v. State, held it did not because the record showed the defendant understood, accepted, and used the interpreter as his conduit. The court relied on the defendant’s express confirmation that he understood the interpreter, the detective’s testimony about the interpreter’s certification and prior work, the absence of evidence of any motive to distort, and the defendant’s responsive words and conduct during the interview. On that foundation, the court held the translated statements were admissible as party admissions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family cases, statements made through an interpreter may come in as the opposing party’s own admission without a second hearsay problem if you build a Rule 801(e)(2) foundation showing the party authorized or adopted the interpreter and the translation was reliable. The practical lesson is to develop—or attack—the record on interpreter qualifications, dialect, confirmation of understanding, opportunities to clarify, neutrality, and conduct consistent with comprehension."

General trial issues

James Hale v. Lanesborough Corporation and Texas SFI Partnership 24, Ltd.

COA01

In James Hale v. Lanesborough Corporation and Texas SFI Partnership 24, Ltd., the plaintiff claimed repeated apartment fire alarms caused his hearing loss. The defendants filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion challenging causation. The First Court of Appeals held that because medical causation required expert testimony, Hale had to submit admissible expert summary-judgment evidence, such as an affidavit or deposition excerpts. His expert designation and Rule 194 disclosure were only notice tools, not evidence, and counsel’s description of expected testimony did not raise a fact issue. The court also held the trial court acted within its discretion by hearing the motion after the docket-control deadline, effectively modifying that deadline.

Litigation Takeaway

"Expert disclosures are not evidence. If a no-evidence motion targets an issue that requires expert proof, you must put admissible expert testimony into the summary-judgment record or lose—even if the expert has already been designated. Also, do not assume a docket-control deadline will bar a late summary-judgment motion absent a concrete showing of prejudice."

Termination of Parental Rights

In the Interest of E.R.T., a Child

COA13

The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights after a two-year-old child presented with severe unexplained injuries, multiple old and new fractures, bruising, respiratory distress, and extreme malnourishment. The court held that the medical evidence, the child’s overall condition, the mother’s status as primary caregiver, her failure to obtain regular medical care, and her shifting explanations supported clear-and-convincing findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The same evidence supported the best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2), and the mother’s complaint about the de novo hearing was rejected because she failed to preserve error.

Litigation Takeaway

"You do not need an eyewitness to prove endangerment. In Texas family cases, objective medical records, injury patterns, caregiver exclusivity, delayed treatment, and inconsistent parental explanations can be enough to support severe conservatorship restrictions or even termination. Just as important, procedural complaints are worthless on appeal if counsel does not preserve them clearly in the trial court."

Evidence

Armando Arredondo Jr. v. State of Texas

COA13

In this criminal appeal with strong family-law crossover value, the court held that the defendant waived any hearsay complaint about text-message exhibits because counsel affirmatively said there was no objection when the screenshots were offered and admitted, then objected only later when an officer began reading the already-admitted messages aloud. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and preservation principles from Ethington, the court concluded the objection was untimely and therefore did not reach the merits of whether the other side of the text conversation was hearsay or merely contextual. The court also modified the written judgment to correct an inaccuracy about the plea to an enhancement paragraph because the appellate record affirmatively showed the judgment did not match the truth of the record.

Litigation Takeaway

"Object when the exhibit is offered, not when the damaging contents are later read or emphasized. In abuse-related family cases involving texts, screenshots, records, and layered out-of-court statements, saying “no objection” to the exhibit will usually waive later admissibility complaints; if only part of the exhibit is problematic, request redaction, limitation, and a clear ruling at the time of admission."

Julia Ann Poff v. William Harvey Poff

COA09

In Poff v. Poff, the Beaumont Court of Appeals considered a divorce decree that resolved both property division and SAPCR issues. After the appeal was filed, the parties’ only remaining minor child and the father died in a boating accident. The court held that those deaths made the conservatorship, possession, access, communication, and child-support issues moot because no live parent-child controversy remained and the court could no longer grant effective relief. But the appeal was not moot in full: the property division still affected the parties’ legal interests. Applying the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, and relying on implied findings because no findings of fact were requested, the court affirmed the trial court’s property division.

Litigation Takeaway

"In mixed divorce/SAPCR appeals, post-judgment events can wipe out custody and support issues without ending the entire appeal. Lawyers should reassess mootness immediately, separate live property issues from dead SAPCR issues, and make sure the trial record independently supports any surviving property challenge."

Divorce

Rhonda Cherie Martin v. David Lee Martin

COA03

In Martin v. Martin, the wife appealed a final divorce decree after the trial court denied her request to continue trial when her attorney had withdrawn about two months earlier and replacement counsel appeared only on the eve of trial. The Third Court of Appeals held the denial was not an abuse of discretion. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 253 and the abuse-of-discretion framework from Villegas, the court looked at the full procedural history: the divorce had been pending for years, the withdrawal was agreed, the wife knew the trial date, and the record did not show diligence in obtaining new counsel or specific prejudice from going forward. The court also rejected her complaint about the husband’s late amended counterpetition adding a fraud claim because Rule 245 did not apply, and she failed to preserve any Rule 63 surprise or prejudice objection. Other appellate complaints were overruled as unpreserved or inadequately briefed.

Litigation Takeaway

"A continuance after counsel withdrawal is not automatic. In Texas family-law cases, the party seeking delay must make a record showing diligence, preserved objections, and concrete prejudice—not just that new counsel needs more time. If a late amended pleading creates real surprise, object specifically, move to strike if appropriate, and tie any continuance request to the exact additional preparation the amendment requires."

Ex parte Randy Louis Dupree

COA09

In Ex parte Randy Louis Dupree, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over an attempted appeal from the summary dismissal of an SVP detainee’s habeas application, but it could treat the filing as a mandamus proceeding because Dupree expressly requested that alternative relief. On the merits, the court applied mandamus standards and rejected Dupree’s as-applied constitutional challenge to GPS-monitoring requirements under Health and Safety Code section 841.082 and TCCO Policy 3.36 because he failed to develop a factual record showing those provisions operated unconstitutionally in his specific circumstances. The court therefore denied mandamus relief.

Litigation Takeaway

"If appealability is doubtful, ask the court to alternatively treat the filing as a mandamus proceeding—but do not expect procedural recasting to save a weak record. For family-law practitioners, the real lesson is to identify the correct appellate vehicle early and build a mandamus-ready, fact-specific record, especially for as-applied challenges to temporary orders, discovery rulings, or emergency custody decisions."